BigJimIn the wake of all of this, the sensative folks at TRAINS comes out with this!
That showed up in my mailbox (with my magazine) several days before the wreck. If they are clairvoyant enough to have predicted this incident, I want to talk to them about a lottery ticket.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
BigJimIn the wake of all of this, the sensitive folks at TRAINS come out with this!
They have had the '13 biggest blunders in railroading' in heavy rotation on the mobile site since before the Cayce accident, and they have another ad in black and white (I think it is Classic Trains related) touting some other wreck-porn sort of book. You'd think they would have the decency, or at least the respect, to take these out of rotation for a reasonable time when this, or the earlier wreck in Washington, occurred. I wasn't going to comment on this disconnect, but I'm glad Big Jim broached the issue.
It is a concern as to what was the CSX crew past 72 hours of their activities were ? When did they go on duty and off just before the incident ? What time was their next scheduleded on duty if one ? What were their previous times as well ? Were any HOS factors involved ? Where were they picked up after " securing " the CSX train ?
oltmannd rrboomer Since this is CTC territory, reporting hand throw switch position and or required FRA form(s) are quite likely not second nature to the crew members. What may well come out is CSX has gone through a gigantic shakeup from the late EEH, including brand new non railroad background managers, etc. Events like this are most often the result of several missteps coming together at the wrong time. The results are tragic. Lets hope lessons are quickly learned and no more of this occurs during the rest of the nationwide PTC construction and rollout. It will be interesting to see what, if any, the CSX mgt turmoil in the past year played in this situation. Does anyone know CSX's rules regarding hand-throws in dark territory in the "post Graniteville" world? What does the paper trail look like?
rrboomer Since this is CTC territory, reporting hand throw switch position and or required FRA form(s) are quite likely not second nature to the crew members. What may well come out is CSX has gone through a gigantic shakeup from the late EEH, including brand new non railroad background managers, etc. Events like this are most often the result of several missteps coming together at the wrong time. The results are tragic. Lets hope lessons are quickly learned and no more of this occurs during the rest of the nationwide PTC construction and rollout.
Since this is CTC territory, reporting hand throw switch position and or required FRA form(s) are quite likely not second nature to the crew members. What may well come out is CSX has gone through a gigantic shakeup from the late EEH, including brand new non railroad background managers, etc. Events like this are most often the result of several missteps coming together at the wrong time. The results are tragic. Lets hope lessons are quickly learned and no more of this occurs during the rest of the nationwide PTC construction and rollout.
It will be interesting to see what, if any, the CSX mgt turmoil in the past year played in this situation.
Does anyone know CSX's rules regarding hand-throws in dark territory in the "post Graniteville" world? What does the paper trail look like?
Post Graniteville, the FRA requires a Switch Position Awareness Form in dark territory when using a hand operated switch.
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2005/11/25/05-23303/fra-emergency-order-no-24-notice-no-2-emergency-order-no-24-hand-operated-main-track-switches
The form can be a specific document or, has we use, a Conductor's Log book. It requires the times the switch is reversed and restored normal. Once restored normal, the intials of the person restoring the switch (if not the conductor) must be entered and the conductor and engineer must initial the document. When reporting clear of a warrant (in our case) in the dispatcher must be advised of switches used, if any, and that both condr and engr agree that they are restored normal.
In a signal suspension, they would need the SPAF. I could see someone in normally signalled territory forgetting something like this. Although, even in CTC we advise the dispatcher when we have restored a switch.
Jeff
EuclidBut in a head-on collsion when the locomotive strikes an opposing locomotive, a lof of the energy is dissipated in the jacknifing and telescoping of the trailing rolling stock. This is perfectly illustrated in the videos showing staged head-on collisions using steam locomotives pulling trains. The locomotives stop dead in their tracks, ofter having their tenders tossed up in the air as they jacknife vertically from the impact.
w.r.t. energy dissipation after collision, I think about the impact attenuation equipment the put on the back of highway maintenance trucks. They absorb impact from cars that would strike them from behind. Would something like that work for Amtrack? Imagine a 45' low profile car designed to crumple and dissipate impact energy. I would be coupled to the front of the engine, protecting against head-on collisions. It wouldn't prevent all damage in the event of a collision, but it might be the difference between crew fatality and crew on permanent disability.
Other posts and other sites bring up the consideration of signal suspension experience. Signal crews and installers probably are well versed on how the rules are for signal suspensions are supposed to be applied. Now what if the CSX crew and maybe Amtrak crew have had little or no experience operating under such conditions ?. If your whole career was operating under CTC rules with only maybe just a few weather outages how easy is it to forget the rules you do not use ?
While the signal suspension and the potential lack of experience with dark territory operations (ie, SPAFs) are certainly factors, those are both simply safeguards.
The bottom line here remains that the switch was not restored to normal as called out in the timetable (at least in ours, where all mainline switches and their "normal" position is listed) when the crew was done with their move. And it was locked in the reverse position - it's not like an employee (or a trespasser) came by and randomly threw the switch.
The double whammy here could well be if the dispatcher quizzed the crew on the switch and was informed that it was returned to normal, and perhaps that the SPAF was signed. Especially if the crew hadn't normalled the switch.
As Balt notes, all dispatcher traffic is recorded.
It was interesting to notice how Sumwalt reacted to questions related to the act of leaving the switch lined wrong. Sumwalt's narrative suddenly seemed to point to a person on the CSX freight crew failing to reline the switch for the main line, and then he mentions having interviewed that crew. Reporters instantly wanted to know what that person responsible for not relining the switch had to say for themself.
But the answer to that pregnant question will have to wait a bit longer because all interviews must be conducted before saying what information they reveal.
blue streak 1 Other posts and other sites bring up the consideration of signal suspension experience. Signal crews and installers probably are well versed on how the rules are for signal suspensions are supposed to be applied. Now what if the CSX crew and maybe Amtrak crew have had little or no experience operating under such conditions ?. If your whole career was operating under CTC rules with only maybe just a few weather outages how easy is it to forget the rules you do not use ?
And toss in CSX mgt upheaval and the elimination of RFE positions and a shift of attitude from safety to production and what do you get?
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
Why is Amtrak using the Buckingham Branch line instead of CSX's main line between Richmond and Clifton Forge? I assume that the CSX line is better maintained than BB.
UberImagine a 45' low profile car designed to crumple and dissipate impact energy.
Crash energy management yes but low profile cars won't work. The tend to climb much easier than high cars. The accident at Red Oak comes to mindhttp://bustrainandtrolley.wrongfuldeathconsultants.com/wp-content/uploads/ntsbreport.jpg
The new high-speed locomotive Siemens ACS64 is equipped with Crash Energy Management (CEM) elements for head-on collisions up to 25 mph. 50 mph is a four times higher crash energy. Theoretically it should be possible to design CEM elements for 50 mph. If it is practicable I doubt.
There always will be crash scenarios that cannot be handled even with the best of crashworthiness designs.
I think existing locomotives can't get retrofitted as the load carrying structure doesn't fit.Regards, Volker
EuclidSumwalt's narrative suddenly seemed to point to a person on the CSX freight crew failing to reline the switch for the main line, and then he mentions having interviewed that crew.
To avoid misunderstandings, NTSB interviewed the CSX crew. Sumwalt said he didn't new the results yet.Regards, Volker
tree68 The bottom line here remains that the switch was not restored to normal as called out in the timetable (at least in ours, where all mainline switches and their "normal" position is listed) when the crew was done with their move. And it was locked in the reverse position - it's not like an employee (or a trespasser) came by and randomly threw the switch.
While I don't expect it to be the case, it shouldn't be ruled out entirely. There have been cases where tresspassers tampered with switches. And there is also the chance that a disgruntled former CSX employee could be involved. It may have not been directed to wreck Amtrak, but it just happened to be the next train to come along.
Again, I think the above is unlikely, but it is a possibility.
ccltrains Why is Amtrak using the Buckingham Branch line instead of CSX's main line between Richmond and Clifton Forge? I assume that the CSX line is better maintained than BB.
Also, the current route Washington-Clifton Forge is about 210 miles; going by way of Richmond would be close to 350 miles.
Really, a new thread should have been created for this discussion; I see no connecton between your question and the topic of this thread.
Johnny
There is an interesting blog post on the Railway Age web site, authored by David Schanoes, a long-time, up-from-the-ranks operating man, titled "As I (don't) understand it". The article talks about the recent accident, involving Amtrak 91 in Cayce, SC.
The link: http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/blogs/david-schanoes/as-i-dont-understand-it.html?channel=00.
Judging from his previous postings and confirmed by a friend that knows him, David is a no-nonsense, no-excuses type of operating man. The last paragraph is his bottom-line take on the situation. It may be that simple (maybe).
Incidentally, one of his previous articles on the Railway Age site, dated 01/18/18, titled "Stark Raving Mad, Ceritifiable-and no Whimpering" is an fascinating piece, that reads like railroad fiction. It covers his personal experiences as a hump trainmaster, responding to an explosion at the Texaco tank farm, next to Conrail's Oak Island Yard in 1983.
The link: http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/blogs/david-schanoes/stark-raving-mad-certifiable%E2%80%94and-no-whimpering.html?channel=00
Pete
Deggesty- Unlike your view I do see a connection to this thread. Questioning why not to use another routing when it was known that the signals were out of service is reasonable. My question is just as relevant as asking why the turnout was not aligned properly. I was not aware of the 100+ miles additional run on the CSX main which is a good reason to use the sub. Historically short lines have not maintained the tracks to the standard employed by class 1's. Perhaps BB is doing proper mainternance since passenger trains are running on it. This I cannot verify.
jeffhergertWhile I don't expect it to be the case, it shouldn't be ruled out entirely. There have been cases where tresspassers tampered with switches. And there is also the chance that a disgruntled former CSX employee could be involved. It may have not been directed to wreck Amtrak, but it just happened to be the next train to come along. Again, I think the above is unlikely, but it is a possibility. Jeff
The NTSB stated that the switch was locked in the diverging position. Is it possible then to tamper the switch? Can a former CSX worker still have a fitting key?Regards, Volker
VOLKER LANDWEHRThe NTSB stated that the switch was locked in the diverging position. Is it possible then to tamper the switch? Can a former CSX worker still have a fitting key? Regards, Volker
The appropriate key can be obtained by someone with the desire to have one. If CSX is using the S&G high security lock common on many railroads, all you need to know which one. I found several S&G locks with keys listed on E-Bay.
Just as there are thousands of switch locks, there are thousands of switch keys. That a former employee (or someone not associated with a RR) might have a key is not beyond possibility.
I have the key for the locks on our railroad. If that happens to be the lock on that section of CSX, then I, too, have a key for that lock. No, I wasn't in SC, or anywhere near it.
US passenger cars are designed to withstand buffing forces of 800,000 lbs without permanent deformation. The DOT did some tests on Budd Pioneer cars in 2010-11 to test the Finite Element Analysis (FEA) models for three criteria: 1) 800k lbs, no permanent deformation; 2) 1 M lbs, limited permanent deformation and 3) 1.2 M lbs without crippling. The Budd cars (ex-SEPTA, nee PRR 244 & 248) were modified with crash energy management "systems", which appear consist mostly of plating over the end door openings to make the carbody more uniform. The test was for a 'static' loading, which was MUCH less energetic than the forces involved in slowing AMTK #91 from 50 to 0 mph in approximately 100 feet.
Also, the forces in the test were linear. The roof buckled first, around the 1M lb mark, and the underframes deformed near 1.15M lbs.
The first coach shows the effects of an almost linear transfer of dynamic force, which was NOT simulated in the tests. The buckled car shows what happens in an imbalanced force impact (car was still on more of the curve. I think someone said that was the lounge car. Being that the collision happened around 0230, it was fortunate that the lounge was empty, or there would've been a higher death toll.
Conclusion was that the FEA model was very reliable in predicting the behaviour of the carbodies, although not 100% accurate in predicting where buckling would occur. Paper was presented at the ASME/ASCE/IEEE 2012 Joint Rail Conference, # JRC2012-74087 https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/11992.
jeffhergert oltmannd rrboomer Since this is CTC territory, reporting hand throw switch position and or required FRA form(s) are quite likely not second nature to the crew members. What may well come out is CSX has gone through a gigantic shakeup from the late EEH, including brand new non railroad background managers, etc. Events like this are most often the result of several missteps coming together at the wrong time. The results are tragic. Lets hope lessons are quickly learned and no more of this occurs during the rest of the nationwide PTC construction and rollout. It will be interesting to see what, if any, the CSX mgt turmoil in the past year played in this situation. Does anyone know CSX's rules regarding hand-throws in dark territory in the "post Graniteville" world? What does the paper trail look like? Post Graniteville, the FRA requires a Switch Position Awareness Form in dark territory when using a hand operated switch. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2005/11/25/05-23303/fra-emergency-order-no-24-notice-no-2-emergency-order-no-24-hand-operated-main-track-switches The form can be a specific document or, has we use, a Conductor's Log book. It requires the times the switch is reversed and restored normal. Once restored normal, the intials of the person restoring the switch (if not the conductor) must be entered and the conductor and engineer must initial the document. When reporting clear of a warrant (in our case) in the dispatcher must be advised of switches used, if any, and that both condr and engr agree that they are restored normal. In a signal suspension, they would need the SPAF. I could see someone in normally signalled territory forgetting something like this. Although, even in CTC we advise the dispatcher when we have restored a switch. Jeff
Thanks. The plot thickens...
RDG467 The Budd cars (ex-SEPTA, nee PRR 244 & 248) were modified with crash energy management "systems", which appear consist mostly of plating over the end door openings to make the carbody more uniform.
The Figure 1 shows the CEM frame at the left end. The type of CEM construction is better visible in Figure 3 on page 2 of the following link: https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/9504/dot_9504_DS1.pdf?
RDG467Conclusion was that the FEA model was very reliable in predicting the behaviour of the carbodies, although not 100% accurate in predicting where buckling would occur.
FEA models can only be accurate if you insert all the material weaknesses at the right location. That is almost impossible.
Perhaps i don't understand you correctly but you can't compare the tests with accident cars. In the tests the load was applied at 4 point, 2 near the roof and 2 on the frame where the CEM frame was applied.Regards, Volker
PeteM3 There is an interesting blog post on the Railway Age web site, authored by David Schanoes, a long-time, up-from-the-ranks operating man, titled "As I (don't) understand it". The article talks about the recent accident, involving Amtrak 91 in Cayce, SC. The link: http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/blogs/david-schanoes/as-i-dont-understand-it.html?channel=00. Judging from his previous postings and confirmed by a friend that knows him, David is a no-nonsense, no-excuses type of operating man. The last paragraph is his bottom-line take on the situation. It may be that simple (maybe). Incidentally, one of his previous articles on the Railway Age site, dated 01/18/18, titled "Stark Raving Mad, Ceritifiable-and no Whimpering" is an fascinating piece, that reads like railroad fiction. It covers his personal experiences as a hump trainmaster, responding to an explosion at the Texaco tank farm, next to Conrail's Oak Island Yard in 1983. The link: http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/blogs/david-schanoes/stark-raving-mad-certifiable%E2%80%94and-no-whimpering.html?channel=00 Pete
Best two lines: "And, again, I understand that these are unusual circumstances.
I understand that in unusual operating circumstances, we need to deploy other than usual operating personnel."
“Timing is everything” …… that said, I have searched and searched to try to find a post that I thought mentioned radio traffic just before the accident. In that chatter there was a delay of 91 and it seemed that this fit the protocol of release/reassign the EC-1. I can not find that post and details of the timing. If recalled correctly it was not very long that 91 had to delay their progress. With that said the following is up for recall as POSSIBLE causes. It is NOT an explanation of what happened recently. BUT it did happen as the NTSB said so.
Reference NTSB report Accident Investigation Report HQ-2015-1005 CSX Transportation (CSX) Martin, SC January 27, 2015 on page #6 of this report: FRA dispatched a team to investigate the accident and determine a probable cause of the derailment. ……..edit mrw emphasis here ………The DVR video recovered from the previous train that traversed the area in a northward direction showed the switch lined in the normal position with the switch target displaying a green target for a normal movement.The DVR footage from Train Q198-27, also viewed by FRA personnel, showed the switch target changing from green to red and back to green. The video also showed what appeared to be the shadow of an individual moving across the track in the area of the switch located at MP AMH 489.20. FRA’s field investigation showed the switch located at MP AMH 489.20 was lined and locked in the reverse position. The switch target had been tampered with to display a green flag for a normally lined switch. ……..Edit for emphasis ends……….The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was called to the scene and removed the switch stand for further analysis at their facility in Virginia. CSX and the FBI believe that the accident was caused by vandalism but have not made an official cause as of the time of this report. Overall Conclusion It is the determination of FRA that the accident was caused by the tampering with and vandalism of the switch at MP AMH 489.20 on CSX’s Augusta Subdivision. The Sandoz Spur switch had been lined and locked in the reverse position and the switch target turned to show a normal mainline move to the approaching train. Probable Cause Vandalism of track or track appliances (e.g., objects placed on track, switch thrown, etc.).
In the above case there was time to accomplish the vandalism, again I hope to find the dispatch/91 recall of chatter and see if the above scenario would have been improbable if not impossible. Endmrw0207181720
From the discussion indicating that they were switching the car loading tracks, the CSX crew must have had both accident switch and the auto facility switch on their EC-1. From the pictures, those switches are close together. I wonder if they were on the SPAF as 1 or 2 entries. Interestingly, all the pictures that I’ve seen show the auto facility switch in the normal position. Lastly, without the signal suspension, the crew would have to line both switches back. At least the SPAF provides a reminder, but signals provide better protection.
AMH 489.2 is near Allandale, on the former Charleston and Western Carolina.
Two points on switches based on preceeding discussion:
1. Switch stand targets. If this switch was even equipped, and it likely wasn't, it is standard practice for crew members to visually inspect the turnout prior to throwing it, to make sure it is clear of debris and not obviously damaged. They may then throw the turnout, and then are again supposed to check that the rails are properly aligned for their movement.
In essence, the stand targets aren't ever supposed to mean dittily in terms of actual movement. They're meant more for seeing what might be lined against you in a yard, for instance. Certainly power turnouts never have them anymore.
As to knowing which way is normal, in this case it is pretty darn clear what is main and what is siding, so I don't think any argument that the crew may have forgetten what track is what holds any water.
2. Turnout numbers and speed. The general "rule of thumb" for the maximum speed through a diverging turnout is twice the number of the turnout in miles per hour. Therefore slow-speed, 20mph turnouts are generally no less than a #10, 30mph uses at least a #15 and 45mph will use something like a #22.
Railroads all have their actual numbers, but this gives you an idea. My suspicion is that the turnout in question was installed for slow-speed operation, maybe up to medium speed, which would put Amtrak at about twice the intended safe speed of no more than 30mph or so.
As usual, engineers toss in a margin of safety so it isn't shocking that they might have made it through at twice the speed. A fair part of the limit is simply for ride quality and maintenance, since trains won't be riding exceptionally hard on the outside rail.
I might add that for you model railroaders out there, the switch number rule of thumb still applies - 60mph scale speed into that #12? Well, I guess they are just toys!
As the train approached that switch, what would have been the optimum response by the engineer in terms of brake application? Sumwalt pointed out that it is the duty of the crew to watch for misaligned switches. I don't know what the visibility was, but assuming the switch position was observable for say 250 feet prior to the switch, what would be the optimum location to begin braking, and what type of brake application would have been best?
Euclid Sumwalt pointed out that it is the duty of the crew to watch for misaligned switches.
Sumwalt pointed out that it is the duty of the crew to watch for misaligned switches.
I propose an experiment:
At various randomly selected locations around the country, a crew throws the switch "wrong" ahead of a known oncoming train. At, say, 60 mph. Or maybe 80 mph. They will, of course, correct that before the train arrives at the switch.
The experiment is to see how many operators dump the air before the switch.
Aside from some engineers having to change their underpants, I'm not seeing a downside on this experiment. Unless, of course, hardly any engineers hit the brakes.
Perhaps the crew's duty should also include flapping their arms to lift the train over any track obstruction.
Ed
Euclid...assuming the switch position was observable for say 250 feet prior to the switch,...
At 59 MPH, that's just under three seconds... The first second will be taken up by reacting to what they see. This is no different than if you are driving and the light starts to change ahead of you. It's well documented that it will take at least 3/4 of a second just to recognize the situation, then add the time necessary to move your foot from the gas to the brake - a good portion of that three seconds is gone.
The infamous Gulf Curve wreck on the New York Central didn't involve a switch, but it did involve rapid decelleration. As the train approached what was, at the time, about the sharpest curve on the NYC mainline, the engineer closed the throttle on his steam engine.
The result was cars strewn hither and yon and a number of deaths. The engineer apparently knew immediately he'd done wrong, but didn't live long enough to explain.
Three seconds isn't really long enough for the brakes on a train to be applied and have any effect on the speed of the train. I would opine the engineer might make some manner of application, as well as moving the throttle to idle, but will be more focused on bracing for impact.
Assuming the track is clear (unlike Cayce), and the switch is of a higher number, it's possible the train will make it through with nothing worse than a violent rocking.
7j43k,
My point was not to find out how people would respond. It was to ask what the optimum response would be.
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