For northeast roads a signal displaying "Stop and Proceed" may be passed at restricted speed by a freight train if the signal displays both a number plate and a "G" or "R" plate. Passenger trains are still required to stop before proceeding.
NORAC rule 291 (Stop and Proceed):
Stop, then proceed at Restricted Speed until the entire train has:
1. Passed a more favorable fixed signal. or
2. Passed a location by one train length or 500 feet (whichever is greater), where a more favorable cab signal was received, or
3. Entered non-signalled DCS territory.
Where a letter G (grade marker) or a letter R (restricting marker) is displayed in addition to a number plate as part of these aspects, freight trains may observe the signal as though Restricting, Rule 290, were displayed.
LithoniaOperatorSome video I saw tonight on NBC News made it look, briefly, like one car was indeed broken in half. So I guess I was wrong about that. Yikes.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Deggesty LithoniaOperator https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/05/us/positive-train-control-explainer/index.html Is it accurate that, according to an NTSB official, PTC would have prevented this accident? Does PTC detect switches aligned the wrong way? (Particularly during a signal supension.) Say the siding was empty: would PTC slow a train knowing that no one would ever intend to enter a siding that fast? Would any switch aligned from a main to a siding always trigger PTC actions? Does PTC "know" that (in this case) a train is in that siding? Etc. Etc. Yes, had the PTC installation been complete and in service, there would have been a signal showing STOP. However, two things combined to make the collision possible: the installation was in process, necessitating the temporary inoperation of the signal system, and (far worse) the failure of an employee to realign the switch--MAN FAILURE.
LithoniaOperator https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/05/us/positive-train-control-explainer/index.html Is it accurate that, according to an NTSB official, PTC would have prevented this accident? Does PTC detect switches aligned the wrong way? (Particularly during a signal supension.) Say the siding was empty: would PTC slow a train knowing that no one would ever intend to enter a siding that fast? Would any switch aligned from a main to a siding always trigger PTC actions? Does PTC "know" that (in this case) a train is in that siding? Etc. Etc.
https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/05/us/positive-train-control-explainer/index.html
Is it accurate that, according to an NTSB official, PTC would have prevented this accident? Does PTC detect switches aligned the wrong way? (Particularly during a signal supension.) Say the siding was empty: would PTC slow a train knowing that no one would ever intend to enter a siding that fast? Would any switch aligned from a main to a siding always trigger PTC actions? Does PTC "know" that (in this case) a train is in that siding? Etc. Etc.
Yes, had the PTC installation been complete and in service, there would have been a signal showing STOP. However, two things combined to make the collision possible: the installation was in process, necessitating the temporary inoperation of the signal system, and (far worse) the failure of an employee to realign the switch--MAN FAILURE.
If the signal system had be active, the previous block signal would have been at stop. PTC would just prevent a man from sailing through it.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
rcdrye For northeast roads a signal displaying "Stop and Proceed" may be passed at restricted speed by a freight train if the signal displays both a number plate and a "G" or "R" plate. Passenger trains are still required to stop before proceeding. NORAC rule 291 (Stop and Proceed): Stop, then proceed at Restricted Speed until the entire train has: 1. Passed a more favorable fixed signal. or 2. Passed a location by one train length or 500 feet (whichever is greater), where a more favorable cab signal was received, or 3. Entered non-signalled DCS territory. Where a letter G (grade marker) or a letter R (restricting marker) is displayed in addition to a number plate as part of these aspects, freight trains may observe the signal as though Restricting, Rule 290, were displayed.
Not just for those in the northeast. Depending on the rule book (railroad and era), a "G", "R" or "P" plate allowed a train to pass without stopping. For some, again railroad and era, it may be applicable to certain trains, for example tonnage trains. For some the addition of those plates changed the signal from a Stop and Proceed to a Restricting and any train could pass it.
For us, we still have as one of the aspects listed for a Restricting, a red (or red over red) signal with both a number plate and a G plate. Restricted Proceed is slightly different from a Restricting in that where applicable, you can't exceed the proscribed speed through a turnout.
When it comes to signals, you really have to know your territory.
Jeff
EKR In my opinion, all facing point switches in TWC territory should be approached prepared to stop. That's my plan from now on.
In my opinion, all facing point switches in TWC territory should be approached prepared to stop. That's my plan from now on.
Malicious rules compliance and delaying trains. That's what some would charge you with.
Overmod oltmannd Or, perhaps that train was put there before the signal suspension, so no record of switch thrown and locked was needed? Don, you're stretching it too far. Remember that Balt said the suspension he knew about was the previous day. I doubt that train had been sitting there unattended with the switch lined wrong and locked for that length of time. Do you really think so, either?
oltmannd Or, perhaps that train was put there before the signal suspension, so no record of switch thrown and locked was needed?
Don, you're stretching it too far. Remember that Balt said the suspension he knew about was the previous day. I doubt that train had been sitting there unattended with the switch lined wrong and locked for that length of time. Do you really think so, either?
Well, they certainly didn't run another train by with the switch like that, so the active time since the suspension couldn't have been that long.
It's entirely possible the trains was put away with the signal system active, so no "lined and locked" double check, etc. needed. Should it have shown as occupied on dispatcher track line view? I suspect so. Did the dispatcher notice. Sure, if he was lining a train over the route. Maybe not if it was a while until next train and signal system was made inactive.
this does bring a question up: When was the signal system suspended?
And, yet another: How many freight trains run through there each day, and when do they run?
Johnny
From another site NTSB press release/
Some additional info:
- The distance from the switch to the collision point was 659'
- The freight train was pushed back 15' by the collision, from its original position.
- The CSX train crew, Dispatcher and Train Master have been interviewed today. Surviving Amtrak crew will be interviewed tomorrow.
- The Amtrak locomotive has been moved from the site to the adjacent auto loading facility yard.
- NTSB expects to be present on the ground through the coming weekend.
- The freight had two crew members, an Engineer and a Conductor.
- Amtrak had 139 pax and 8 crew members consisting of 1 Engineer, 1 Conductor, 1 Assistant Conductor and the rest OBS crew.
- The speed limit in the area for operations using track warrant under signal suspension is 59mph. Amtrak was compliant with that.
- The correct procedure before releasing the track warrant by the freight train would be to align the switch to the main line, lock it in that position, then install a derail on the siding, and then release the warrant.
- The track warrant was released by the freight train crew but the switch was found locked in the position towards the siding.
- Amtrak did have the necessary track warrant to operate as they were.
Two points raised on the Model Railroader forum that I have not seen discussed here yet:
1. This occurred at nighttime, so the expected view of the open switch points might not have been as clear -- first 'warning' might have been the diversion. Standing power might not have been clearly visible at first, either. See the road bridge a car-length from the point of impact, and the likely absence of lights on the standing train.
2. Apparently in some views you can see the lead truck from the P42 directly in front of the CSX motor, confirming the impact was full head-on.
I might add that in all the pictures I have seen that show the vestibule ends of the derailed "V", both ends appear to have the same car number. This strongly indicates to me that the car is, in fact, broken transversely.
NTSB Press release: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKe2dJIBmKA&feature=em-uploademail
.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/ntsb-amtrak-engineer-sounded-horn-applied-emergency-brake-in-sc-crash/2018/02/05/902b8df4-0aaf-11e8-95a5-c396801049ef_story.html?utm_term=.e676efcc57ee
Per this report, the Engineer was able to dump the train, dropping them down to 50 mph at impact. He also sounded the horn for 3 seconds continuiously.
At this point, clearly the Amtrak Crew has been absolved of all responsibility for the wreck. They did their job and were literally lined and locked towards disaster. May they rest in peace.
BigJim NTSB Press release: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKe2dJIBmKA&feature=em-uploademail
I don't understand the purpose of the horn signal. I would not have expected any brake application other than emergency as soon as the train entered the siding, if not before.
Sumwalt explained that it is the engineer's duty to look at the switch points upon approach to see which way they are lined. Is there a target on that switch that gives a reflective indication of how it is lined?
Deggestythis does bring a question up: When was the signal system suspended? And, yet another: How many freight trains run through there each day, and when do they run?
Can only go by my experiences with Signal Suspensions on the Baltimore Division; that when I retired had PTC installed and in testing Operation on several subdivisions.
Signal Suspensions affecting one or two Control Point would normally be placed in effect at 8 AM on Saturday mornings (Saturday & Sunday being periods of reduced traffic). The Suspensions would remain in effect until the Signal Department had installed and TESTED the equipment that was being installed; the Suspensions would normally last until Sunday afternoon or evening, on occasion, when trouble was encountered they could extend into Monday or Tuesday, however Sunday was the most frequent end of the Suspension.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Well, according to the NTSB it's worse than we thought. 659' from 'the switch' to the point of impact. At 7 sec from the termination of the EDR data the train was at full throttle (!) moving 56mph -- note that this appears to be after the locomotive negotiated the switch. At 5 sec the blended brake was applied (which I believe automatically knocks the throttle to idle on the P42) but this only took about 3mph off the train. The emergency brake was actuated only 3 seconds before the collision (using the 'mushroom-shaped button' according to Sumwalt; you can see it explained in the P42 video) and the train turned out to be going exactly how fast I thought, 50mph, at the moment the EDR cut off.
Apparently the CSX crew released track occupancy to the dispatcher 'in advance of' their actually relining the switch (!) and there is now some argument that they placed a derail some distance ahead of the standing train (which might account for a tilt and glancing collision leaving the lead truck where it is now). I will be highly interested in seeing the SPAF here ... if there is one.
A Trains staffer brought up during the Q&A that the Amcafe is in fact broken in half; NTSB indicated they will not have meaningful results on this for at least several days.
Sunwalt repeatedly stated that 91's movement was under 'track warrant' between 'two control points' -- is this correct for operation under signal suspension?
Euclid BigJim NTSB Press release: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKe2dJIBmKA&feature=em-uploademail Those are very thought provoking details. Sumwalt uses the end of the video as a time benchmark for the sequential events of horn signal, service application, and emergency application. I assume the end of the video marks the moment of impact. I don't understand the purpose of the horn signal. I would not have expected any brake application other than emergency as soon as the train entered the siding, if not before. Sumwalt explained that it is the engineer's duty to look at the switch points upon approach to see which way they are lined. Is there a target on that switch that gives a reflective indication of how it is lined?
Those are very thought provoking details. Sumwalt uses the end of the video as a time benchmark for the sequential events of horn signal, service application, and emergency application. I assume the end of the video marks the moment of impact.
Electric Lock Main Track switches do not have banners or targets.
Where Normal track speeds exceed 20 MPH and tracks may hold Trains (as defined in the Rule Book) Electric Lock Swtiches are required. Normal speed for Passenger trains when the signal system is operating is 79 MPH; with the signal system suspended 59 MPH. Within the defined areas of a Signal Suspension - Signals convey no authority except as may be specified in the Signal Suspension Bulletin. In many cases at the entry and exit of Signal Suspension Limits, the Suspension Bulletin 'MAY' specify that a signal 'MAY' identify the alignment of a switch that is protected by the signal. All other signals within the limits must be disregarded as the actions of signal personnel could have them displaying all kinds of indications including potentially some that aren't authorized by the rule book.
rrboomer Since this is CTC territory, reporting hand throw switch position and or required FRA form(s) are quite likely not second nature to the crew members. What may well come out is CSX has gone through a gigantic shakeup from the late EEH, including brand new non railroad background managers, etc. Events like this are most often the result of several missteps coming together at the wrong time. The results are tragic. Lets hope lessons are quickly learned and no more of this occurs during the rest of the nationwide PTC construction and rollout.
Since this is CTC territory, reporting hand throw switch position and or required FRA form(s) are quite likely not second nature to the crew members. What may well come out is CSX has gone through a gigantic shakeup from the late EEH, including brand new non railroad background managers, etc. Events like this are most often the result of several missteps coming together at the wrong time. The results are tragic. Lets hope lessons are quickly learned and no more of this occurs during the rest of the nationwide PTC construction and rollout.
It will be interesting to see what, if any, the CSX mgt turmoil in the past year played in this situation.
Does anyone know CSX's rules regarding hand-throws in dark territory in the "post Graniteville" world? What does the paper trail look like?
oltmanndDoes anyone know CSX's rules regarding hand-throws in dark territory in the "post Graniteville" world? What does the paper trail look like?
The fact that this isn't normally dark territory throws an unknown into the mix that Balt will have to address.
Based on my observations of CSX operations on the dark line near me: It starts when the crew is issued an EC1 (track warrant), which will include a "Line 11" (other comments) giving them permission to operate any switches they will need for their work.
When they are ready cancel their EC1, the dispatcher will ask if all switches are lined and locked normal, and if the SPAF (switch position awareness form) has been completed and signed by both crewmembers.
I don't hear the EC1's for the Chicago Line when I'm down that way, so I don't know if they work the same way on the signalled lines.
tree68 oltmannd Does anyone know CSX's rules regarding hand-throws in dark territory in the "post Graniteville" world? What does the paper trail look like? The fact that this isn't normally dark territory throws an unknown into the mix that Balt will have to address. Based on my observations of CSX operations on the dark line near me: It starts when the crew is issued an EC1 (track warrant), which will include a "Line 11" (other comments) giving them permission to operate any switches they will need for their work. When they are ready cancel their EC1, the dispatcher will ask if all switches are lined and locked normal, and if the SPAF (switch position awareness form) has been completed and signed by both crewmembers. I don't hear the EC1's for the Chicago Line when I'm down that way, so I don't know if they work the same way on the signalled lines.
oltmannd Does anyone know CSX's rules regarding hand-throws in dark territory in the "post Graniteville" world? What does the paper trail look like?
EC1 Line 11 is not used in normal signalled territory. In signalled territory prior to work, crew is to announce to the Dispatcher over the Road Radio Channel that they will be operating specific switch(es) - at the conclusion of the the work the crew is to announce over to the Dispatcher over the Road Channel that the switch(es) have been restored for Main Track operation.
oltmannd rrboomer Since this is CTC territory, reporting hand throw switch position and or required FRA form(s) are quite likely not second nature to the crew members. What may well come out is CSX has gone through a gigantic shakeup from the late EEH, including brand new non railroad background managers, etc. Events like this are most often the result of several missteps coming together at the wrong time. The results are tragic. Lets hope lessons are quickly learned and no more of this occurs during the rest of the nationwide PTC construction and rollout. It will be interesting to see what, if any, the CSX mgt turmoil in the past year played in this situation. Does anyone know CSX's rules regarding hand-throws in dark territory in the "post Graniteville" world? What does the paper trail look like?
23 17 46 11
rrboomerSince this is CTC territory, reporting hand throw switch position and or required FRA form(s) are quite likely not second nature to the crew members.
In light of the reported release of authority by the CSX crew without physically relining the switch, I find this perhaps the most unsettling emergent concern I have.
How much more ignorant of correct track-warrant or indeed any manual dispatching procedures will the current cohort of employees become under mandated PTC? And what safety corners will be cut, knowingly or unknowingly, when PTC goes down or, worse, becomes unstable without warning or reasonably assured operability?
I am wondering (idle curiosity): does anyone of us know the number of the turnout (how fast can it be taken safely)?
Overmod--- The more we become reliant on technology the less responsible, uninterested and lazy people become. So PTC will require a major step up, testing and enforcement of what to do and the rules when it inevitably has problems. The question being is the new cohort too far gone down the road of dumber and dumber, walking away from a switch aligned off the main into a parked train, thinking that is someone else's problem?
I've seen answers on tests from adult students that are ridiculous to a six year old, but the explanation is 'that is what the calculator shows'.
Miningman The question being is the new cohort too far gone down the road of dumber and dumber, walking away from a switch aligned off the main into a parked train, thinking that is someone else's problem?
I hope the timeline NTSB is establishing will answer some of our questions.
Someone wrote on this thread that Amtrak 91 was 20 minutes late. Perhaps the CSX crew thought #91 was already through. But that is speculation and doesn't answer why the CSX crew reported the switch realigned early.Regards, Volker
Overmod, Miningman, both of you are absolutely correct, especially Miningman's contention of "The more we become reliant on technology..." et al.
I see it all the time, people spoiled rotten by technology and labor-saving devices so that they're totally lost when having to do without them, too many examples to go into here.
I was up in New Jersey when Hurricane Sandy struck wiping out electric power in much of the area. One of the most pathetic things I saw then were photo spreads in the New York papers showing young people absolutely frantic looking for places to charge their cell phones of various makes and models. They couldn't function without 'em!
What kind of world are we making here? Gives me the willies.
Well, at least at The Basic School for Marine officers up the road in Quantico VA they still teach land navigation the old fashioned way, with map and compass, just as they did when I was there 40+ years ago. As they put it, "Well, what are you gonna do Lieutenant when that fancy GPS unit takes a bullet or a piece of shrapnel and won't work anymore?"
I am unfamiliar with CSX ops in that region. Is this the normal Florida route for freight? How many trains daily on this line?
ed
VOLKER LANDWEHRI hope the timeline NTSB is establishing will answer some of our questions.
Indeed. While there clearly was no southbound traffic on the line between the time the train was parked in the siding and when 91 came through, we don't know how long that was - at least I haven't heard that yet.
I would opine that if the crew of the freight knew they were getting out of the way of 91 they would have realized the switch needed to be restored. If we're talking hours between them parking the train and the arrival of 91...
It's highly unlikely that there was any northbound traffic during that period, as that would have messed up the switch mechanically. And even then, that would assume that a northbound did not see that the switch was reversed.
MP173I am unfamiliar with CSX ops in that region. Is this the normal Florida route for freight? How many trains daily on this line? ed
The incident happened on the former Seaboard line from Hamlet to Savannah. It does have through freight traffic, however, I am not sure just how much. The former Atlantic Coast Line route from Richmond to Savannah is the preferred route.
In the wake of all of this, the sensative folks at TRAINS comes out with this!https://kalmbachhobbystore.com/product/special-issue/vt-tr04180601-c?utm_source=SilverpopMailing&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=SA000_HBS_180206_P32296_TR04_TRN-CTR-HBS_Final&utm_content=&spMailingID=32901143&spUserID=MTE2ODA0NDM0NDA0S0&spJobID=1220257150&spReportId=MTIyMDI1NzE1MAS2
tree68It's highly unlikely that there was any northbound traffic during that period, as that would have messed up the switch mechanically. And even then, that would assume that a northbound did not see that the switch was reversed.
From ASMTRANSITDOCS
Amtrak Train 92 departing Miami 1/3/2018 came through the previous morning over five hours late at 9:39 AM. Whether there were other trains besides the AutoCarrier train remains to be learned.
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