EuclidAnother article mentions that Amtrak had decided against using shunts because they don’t work all the time. This is because track maintenance vehicles are lighter than locomotives, and thus may not complete the electrical connection to shunt the rails. So Amtrak thought it would be unsafe to rely on a safety system such as shunting which might fail sometimes. I can see the logic of that position. But I have to wonder why a lighter weight vehicle could not be equipped with a means of reliably creating a successful shunt.
The shunt in question has absolutely nothing to do with the on-track equipment and the conductivity thereof. In fact, many hi-rail vehicles actually have insulated wheels.
As has already been noted, the shunt consists of a length of cable with a clamp on each end that is place across the tracks. The same concept is used by signal maintainers to check crossing and other circuits.
A shunt could be used to protect workers even if they had no on-track equipment at all.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Here is an article about backup safety such as using a shunt. The two in red are what I suggested a couple pages back:
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20160407_Feds_had_advised_Amtrak_to_install_safety_backup_systems.html
From the link:
"Rail workers rely on strictly structured communication between a site foreman and dispatcher to keep trains off tracks where people are present.
The 2014 FRA advisory recommended three types of backup for cases in which there is a communications breakdown. One is a device worn by workers that would alert them to a coming train while simultaneously warning train operators of people ahead.
Another would offer similar protections for maintenance vehicles."
******************************
Another article mentions that Amtrak had decided against using shunts because they don’t work all the time. This is because track maintenance vehicles are lighter than locomotives, and thus may not complete the electrical connection to shunt the rails. So Amtrak thought it would be unsafe to rely on a safety system such as shunting which might fail sometimes. I can see the logic of that position. But I have to wonder why a lighter weight vehicle could not be equipped with a means of reliably creating a successful shunt.
And it's possible they didn't use a shunt because they thought they "owned" the track and therefore didn't need it. Oftimes people take shortcuts because in their experience, certain steps are unnecessary.
There are plenty of ongoing questions about the incident - and ongoing questions regarding the safety culture. Getting to the bottom of all of those questions will take some time.
Norm48327 Euclid How do you know that they did not have foul time or were otherwise lacking authorization to shunt the track? Balt did not say one way or the other about foul time. He only told you what is required to set a shunt. What part don't you understand?
Euclid How do you know that they did not have foul time or were otherwise lacking authorization to shunt the track?
Balt did not say one way or the other about foul time. He only told you what is required to set a shunt. What part don't you understand?
Norm,
The person in the article I posted said that if the crew had used a shunt, the accident would not have happened. No other condition to that statement was offered by the person who made it. So it sounds like not using the shunt was the choice made by the track crew.
Balt responded to that by saying, “If you don't have Foul Time on a track - you don't have any authorization to shunt the track. The two work hand in hand.”
That sounds like an explanation addressing the question of why they crew did not use a shunt. Although he did not say that the track crew did not have foul time, the context of responding to me by saying that they could not use a shunt without foul time sounded like he was assuming that they did not have foul time.
That sounded to me like he is offering a reason why they did not use a shunt. So I asked him why he assumed that reason. My question to Balt was a sincere question. It was not meant as an insult.
So I think you are seeing trouble where none exists.
If they thought they had a valid "work zone" with the right to foul the track, they should have had the right to employ a shunt. Without that right they should not foul. Or is there another reading of the rule?
Excerpt from Statement of BMWED, Apr. 4
https://www.bmwe.org/cms/file/04052016_082049_BMWED%20Statement%20on%20Fatal%20Amtrak%20Accident,%20Chester%20PA%20FINAL.pdf
“The Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED) mourns the tragic loss of life in Chester, PA. Our thoughts and prayers are with the families of the fallen at this extremely difficult time. We also express our concern for those passengers on Train 89 who suffered injuries in this tragic accident,” said BMWED National President Freddie N. Simpson.
“There have been three track worker fatalities in Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor since March 1, 2016. This is totally unacceptable and points to systemic deficiencies in the safety culture at Amtrak,” Simpson said.
BMWED General Chairman Jed Dodd echoed the concerns about safety culture at Amtrak, stating, “Amtrak has abandoned a close call reporting system that permitted these problems to be identified and resolved without waiting for fatalities, fired long-service railroad managers without due process, instituted a draconian discipline program designed to intimidate and silence the rank and file regarding safety, put safety training into the hands of trainers with no railroad experience, and hired senior managers who have no experience in operating or maintaining a railroad. This is a recipe for disaster and the blame should lay squarely at the feet of senior management officials responsible for these misguided and regressive policies.”
EuclidHow do you know that they did not have foul time or were otherwise lacking authorization to shunt the track?
Norm
BaltACDIf you don't have Foul Time on a track - you don't have any authorization to shunt the track. The two work hand in hand. Being on track or affecting the signal system (which a shunt does) require the permission of the Train Dispatcher.
How do you know that they did not have foul time or were otherwise lacking authorization to shunt the track?
Euclid http://www.wsj.com/articles/amtrak-crash-probe-indicates-basic-safety-measure-wasnt-deployed-1459885465 From the link. My emphasis added in bold: An investigation into this week’s Amtrak crash in Chester, Pa., indicates track workers didn’t deploy a basic, decades-old safety measure that experts say could have prevented a collision that killed two workers and injured more than 30 passengers, people familiar with the matter said. Crews performing work on a stretch of Amtrak’s heavily traveled Northeast Corridor on Sunday apparently didn’t put in place what is known as a supplemental shunting device, in apparent violation of Amtrak’s own worker-protection rules, these people said. The device, which is clamped to the track, completes an electrical circuit to alert the signaling system that the track is occupied. Had a shunt been used, Amtrak’s computerized collision-avoidance system known as positive train control, or PTC, could have prevented the accident, said Steven Ditmeyer, a former federal railroad official and Virginia-based consultant who has advised the U.S. government and transportation industry groups but not Amtrak. “It would have triggered the signal system, which would have triggered PTC,” Mr. Ditmeyer said of the shunting device. “I can think of no reason that there would not be a shunt in place” when maintenance is under way.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/amtrak-crash-probe-indicates-basic-safety-measure-wasnt-deployed-1459885465
From the link. My emphasis added in bold:
An investigation into this week’s Amtrak crash in Chester, Pa., indicates track workers didn’t deploy a basic, decades-old safety measure that experts say could have prevented a collision that killed two workers and injured more than 30 passengers, people familiar with the matter said.
Crews performing work on a stretch of Amtrak’s heavily traveled Northeast Corridor on Sunday apparently didn’t put in place what is known as a supplemental shunting device, in apparent violation of Amtrak’s own worker-protection rules, these people said. The device, which is clamped to the track, completes an electrical circuit to alert the signaling system that the track is occupied.
Had a shunt been used, Amtrak’s computerized collision-avoidance system known as positive train control, or PTC, could have prevented the accident, said Steven Ditmeyer, a former federal railroad official and Virginia-based consultant who has advised the U.S. government and transportation industry groups but not Amtrak.
“It would have triggered the signal system, which would have triggered PTC,” Mr. Ditmeyer said of the shunting device. “I can think of no reason that there would not be a shunt in place” when maintenance is under way.
If you don't have Foul Time on a track - you don't have any authorization to shunt the track. The two work hand in hand. Being on track or affecting the signal system (which a shunt does) require the permission of the Train Dispatcher.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
EuclidI cannot get that link to Railway Age to work anymore, but what I quoted in the second post is from that article. I am not sure who actually made the statement, but William Vantuono quoted him or her. Apparently Mr. Schanoes agrees.
- Paul North.
Euclid As I understand it, both that person making the above comment and Mr. Schanoes feels that the NTSB drags out the investigation and thus takes too long to tell us what happened. Perhaps Railway Age Editor, William C. Vantuono feels the same way since he quoted the person complaining about the NTSB taking too much time.
As I understand it, both that person making the above comment and Mr. Schanoes feels that the NTSB drags out the investigation and thus takes too long to tell us what happened. Perhaps Railway Age Editor, William C. Vantuono feels the same way since he quoted the person complaining about the NTSB taking too much time.
Typical Company Official response - Fire first, get told why later. Company Officials have the excuse of complying with various labor agreements when going through the investigation process which have specific time constraints. The NTSB has no such time constraints and intends to get to the ROOT CAUSE, not just the easily observable cause - and they, in many cases, are different.
The fact that the incident happened indicates rules were violated - the big question is why.
“With nearly 40 years on the rail, Carter can run countless pieces of machinery with finesse that earns him constant praise from his co-workers. Some say he could thread a needle with a backhoe if he tried.”
https://www.gofundme.com/6gxbe8s4
EuclidAs I understand it, both that person making the above comment and Mr. Schanoes feels that the NTSB drags out the investigation and thus takes too long to tell us what happened. Perhaps Railway Age Editor, William C. Vantuono feels the same way since he quoted the person complaining about the NTSB taking too much time.
Those people can put their pants back on and let the NTSB do what they do. The world (and the NTSB) doesn't revolve around their wants. Let's have a thorough investigation. If they want quick answers and uninformed guesses, they can just read some of the crap that is posted to this site.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
tree68 Euclid I did notice in one news article, the writer cites an observer who said this: “The NTSB has all the information it needs to quickly determine exactly what happened: The train’s event recorder, forward- and inward-facing cameras in the locomotive cab, radio transmissions, dispatcher records, etc. So why will it take 12 to 18 months to issue an official finding and a final report? By now, anyone involved knows exactly what took place.” It's not enough to know what took place physically. As the discussion here plainly shows, there are myriad contributing factors. Two of those factors are not available to explain themselves. What will take time will be stitching together all of the events surrounding the incident in order to determine why it took place. Once we know that, we can take measures to ensure that the same chain of events (or one like it) won't be repeated. It's entirely possible that the "smoking gun" has already been identified, even if it hasn't been announced publically. One must remember, too, that it's possible that litigation will occur as a result of the incident. Everyone will want the facts right before that happens.
Euclid I did notice in one news article, the writer cites an observer who said this: “The NTSB has all the information it needs to quickly determine exactly what happened: The train’s event recorder, forward- and inward-facing cameras in the locomotive cab, radio transmissions, dispatcher records, etc. So why will it take 12 to 18 months to issue an official finding and a final report? By now, anyone involved knows exactly what took place.”
It's not enough to know what took place physically.
As the discussion here plainly shows, there are myriad contributing factors. Two of those factors are not available to explain themselves.
What will take time will be stitching together all of the events surrounding the incident in order to determine why it took place. Once we know that, we can take measures to ensure that the same chain of events (or one like it) won't be repeated.
It's entirely possible that the "smoking gun" has already been identified, even if it hasn't been announced publically.
One must remember, too, that it's possible that litigation will occur as a result of the incident. Everyone will want the facts right before that happens.
I have no idea how long it should take. However, we already know what took place physically, so I must conclude that the person who made the comment is not referring to a desire for the NTSB to quicly tell us what took place phsically.
What everyone wants to know is why it happened. I assume that is what the person who made the comment means. And that person contends that the NTSB now has all the information to determine why the accident happened.
EuclidI did notice in one news article, the writer cites an observer who said this: “The NTSB has all the information it needs to quickly determine exactly what happened: The train’s event recorder, forward- and inward-facing cameras in the locomotive cab, radio transmissions, dispatcher records, etc. So why will it take 12 to 18 months to issue an official finding and a final report? By now, anyone involved knows exactly what took place.”
Paul,
I cannot get that link to Railway Age to work anymore, but what I quoted in the second post is from that article. I am not sure who actually made the statement, but William Vantuono quoted him or her. Apparently Mr. Schanoes agrees.
RME[snipped - PDN] . . . Somebody cue Mr. Schanoes, who can comment on this far better than I could. . . .
Link to Railway Age column by William C. Vantuono, quoted in Schanoes' blog and elsewhere in this thread:
http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/safety/two-killed-in-wreck-of-amtrak-palmetto.html?channel=60
Norm48327 Euclid “The NTSB has all the information it needs to quickly determine exactly what happened: The train’s event recorder, forward- and inward-facing cameras in the locomotive cab, radio transmissions, dispatcher records, etc. So why will it take 12 to 18 months to issue an official finding and a final report? By now, anyone involved knows exactly what took place.” Then perhaps it would be wise to let the NTSB sort through that information and come to a conclusion and then make their recommendations rather than trying to second guess them. I'm certain they know how the system works and what to suggest to prevent a recurrence.
Euclid “The NTSB has all the information it needs to quickly determine exactly what happened: The train’s event recorder, forward- and inward-facing cameras in the locomotive cab, radio transmissions, dispatcher records, etc. So why will it take 12 to 18 months to issue an official finding and a final report? By now, anyone involved knows exactly what took place.”
Then perhaps it would be wise to let the NTSB sort through that information and come to a conclusion and then make their recommendations rather than trying to second guess them. I'm certain they know how the system works and what to suggest to prevent a recurrence.
The quote above that you attribute to me was not said by me. It was referenced in a news article as having been said by someone else who the article does not identify. I have no idea whether the statement is true.
As to your comment about that quote, the person quoted gives no indication of second guessing the NTSB, as you say. His only point is to ask why, with all the information readily at hand, it should take the NTSB 12-18 months to announce a conclusion.
But again, this is not my opinion or something that I said.
Euclid“The NTSB has all the information it needs to quickly determine exactly what happened: The train’s event recorder, forward- and inward-facing cameras in the locomotive cab, radio transmissions, dispatcher records, etc. So why will it take 12 to 18 months to issue an official finding and a final report? By now, anyone involved knows exactly what took place.”
As to speculation about the cause of this crash, I see no way to do that. My only interest and basis for comments here is to explore the safety system that was in place and the various ways that it might have failed. I would have the same questions if there had been no crash.
The crash merely brings up the subject of safety methods that are aimed at preventing crashes. I don’t recall saying anything that speculates about what the actual failure was. Although, it might get close to that with speculating about various outcomes of hypothetical failures within such safety systems.
With the bewildering and complex system of permissions, acknowledgment, expiration, renewal, between a variety of train movements over a variety of tracks, I see no way to find even a suggestion of what went wrong. I am more concerned about the safety system and how it can fail.
However, I do find lots of speculation here and in the news that assumes that the track crew did not have proper authority to be fouling the site of the crash. And it seems to be based on the fact that the train hit the backhoe. Not only is that speculation, but it is a faulty premise as well.
So I stay out of speculation about the cause of this crash.
I did notice in one news article, the writer cites an observer who said this:
“The NTSB has all the information it needs to quickly determine exactly what happened: The train’s event recorder, forward- and inward-facing cameras in the locomotive cab, radio transmissions, dispatcher records, etc. So why will it take 12 to 18 months to issue an official finding and a final report? By now, anyone involved knows exactly what took place.”
schlimm Lots of speculation. Why not be patient and wait for the preliminary findings of the NTSB based on facts?
Lots of speculation. Why not be patient and wait for the preliminary findings of the NTSB based on facts?
(Insert your favorite diety here), Grant me patience, but I want it NOW!
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Does anybody believe that there was a protected work zone in effect when the accident happened? I think that the train was on an adjacent track to the Loran equipment doing 106 mph indicates that the engineer didn't think so. If he had kknown, he would have radioed to the EIC for clearance. As someone previously posted, "What we have is a failure to communicate" And why would an experienced employee go on a hot rail (active track) whith out thinking he had protection. You are trained to expect a train on any track at any time in all your safety briefings. So the question comes back to the day shift EIC not establishing his work zone protection.
Was the "supervisor" the EIC? We may never fully know why he thought the work zone from the night shift was still in effect if thats what he thought. Or why the dispatcher wasn't aware of an active work zone
EuclidHe says PTC cannot achieve a worthwhile result because the equation includes the fallibility of the human being. Well indeed, that is just exactly the point of PTC or any interlocking safety system. That is to take the fallible human being out of the decision making process.
The fallible human PTC is taking out of the equation is the train engineer. Pretty much ALL of the solutions suggested so far (and for that matter the existing systems) require some sort of authority be set up on a piece of track that the workers are supposed to stay within. One employee is charged with setting up the authority and one employee is charged with removing the authority. Having said that if that employee fails to establish the authority or removes the authority then there is no authority and there is no protection.
Without knowing what was said to the backhoe operator before he occupied the track, we really don't know why he was there. If we don't know that then we really don't know the cause and we really can't figure out a fix. We can guess at a whole bunch of things to do, but we really don't know if any of them will fix the real problem. The "solution" of "do everything" is really cool if you don't have to pay for it, integrate it or implement it. But even then there is no assurance that "doing everything" will fix it because the cause might be something new.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
EuclidThere you go. Every single bit of that is what I have described as the PTC solution in my last few posts. Some of those in the know here need to inform the FRA that none of that is necessary because everything is just so perfect the way it has always been done.
If you read the excerpt quoted it says:
FRA believes that the probability of the incidents described above occurring could be significantly reduced by installation of Positive Train Control (PTC). Until such time that PTC is implemented, and for locations where PTC is not required,
The systems they outlined were NOT part of PTC. They were recommended as a stop gap and possibilities where PTC was NOT going to be installed. Yes there are other systems. Yes you can overly them over PTC which is overlaid over the existing systems. But they would be additional systems that would have to be integrated with both PTC and the existing signal systems. So when I say that will take additonal time and money that's what I am talking about.
EuclidWhen I refer to PTC protecting the work zone, I am referring to PTC preventing trains from entering the work zone. It is the same as “preventing trains from proceeding past their limits of their authority,” as you say.
PTC doesn't keep trains out of the work zone, PTC keeps trains in their authority. You may think those are the same thing, but they aren't. It really doesn't matter whether what is beyond the train's authority, PTC doesn't care. It just wants the train to not leave its authority.
Three comments:
*See, for instance:
http://www.graceindustries.com/index.php/railroad-safety-products
http://graceindustries.com/gracetest/case1.html
http://www.safezonealert.com.au/products/wireless_workcrew_safety/
http://www.tcrponline.org/PDFDocuments/T-55.pdf
wanswheelPlease, learn to speak proper Schumerese
Thank you. I stand properly corrected.
Some more background in PTC for those who need or can stand it...
Please, learn to speak proper Schumerese. The protocols are a 20 step protocol.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvzKG1_wTBA&t=25s
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.