Well here you have it from the NTSB with my emphasis added in bold. I don’t see anything dismissing the role of shunts as not being a central issue just because foul time precedes the use of a shunt; a premise that has been asserted here by others. In fact, I see just the opposite in the following quote:
“Although the MBCR has modified its dispatching methods since this accident, the potential exists on other railroads for a dispatcher to incorrectly apply or remove the protection.
Unless a shunting device is used by the work crew, the train dispatcher provides the only signal protection in controlled territory. As this accident demonstrates, the dispatching system is not immune to human error, and electrically shunting the rails is therefore an important safety redundancy.
The Safety Board concludes that maintenance-of-way work crews on all railroads who depend on the train dispatcher for signal protection need redundant protection to restrict train movements into work areas.
Therefore, the Safety Board recommends that the FRA require redundant signal protection, such as shunting, for maintenance-of-way work crews who depend on the train dispatcher to provide signal protection.”
Dave Husman,
Just to reiterate to you and others, I am not speculating one iota about the cause of this crash. All I am interested in is learning what causes would fit the circumstances of granting and removing foul protection. In other words, what could have caused the crash? It is simply an academic question, and it could be asked even if this crash had never happened.
With the complexity of these circumstances, I see absolutely no way to speculate with any confidence on what the cause actually was. However, you have offered pure speculation in the form of an exact hypothesis that includes your assertion that no foul time for the day crew ever existed, and therefore, you conclude that the blame falls squarely on the track crew. I have asked you a couple times how you know that, and you have never answered.
When I offer two suggestions of alternative explanations that seem to fit the circumstances, you dismiss them because you contend that they are too complex to be likely. However, you explanation of their complexity is only your generalization in which you exaggerate the potential complexity. Read the letter from the NTSB to Joseph H. Boardman posted above by wanswheel. The cause of that crash was exactly one of the scenarios that I offered as an alternative to your assertion of the cause of this crash. It does not sound so complex as to warrant the conclusion of improbability that you offer.
Here it is from the NTSB’s letter:
“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the January 9, 2007, collision of train 322 with a track maintenance vehicle near Woburn, Massachusetts, was the failure of the train dispatcher to maintain blocking that provided signal protection for the track segment occupied by the maintenance-of-way work crew, and the failure of the work crew to apply a shunting device that would have provided redundant signal protection for their track segment. Contributing to the accident was Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad's failure to ensure that maintenance-of-way work crews applied shunting devices as required.
On the day of the accident, the track segment had been removed from service and the track maintenance crew had been given exclusive track occupancy; so their expectation was that no train would be permitted on the track while they were working on it.
The engineer of the accident train had a clear signal indication and did not have any knowledge that a track maintenance crew would be occupying the same track.”
You said this:
“No matter how you slice it it comes back to the question of whether or not there was foul time out on the tracks at the time of the incident and how it was communicated.”
It most certainly does not come back to that question alone. If there was no foul time, it goes to the question of why that was. I see at least three possibilities:
No foul time was ever asked for or granted.
Foul time was requested, granted, but never executed.
Foul time was requested, granted, and then taken away.
Both #2 and #3 could have occurred without the knowledge of the track crew, thus leaving them unprotected while they believed protection was in place. So if the rules required the track crew to use a shunt to back up foul time, you could say that a shunt was not required because no foul time existed. However, the point is that the track workers would have believed they had foul time because it was confirmed to have been granted.
I do not know how the rules deal with the fine point. If the rules require the use of a shunt during foul time, I would expect that to include that the use of a shunt is required whenever a track crew believes they have foul time. That way they would be protected by the shunt in case of granted foul time mistakenly being withdrawn or never executed as in the case described in the NTSB letter above.
Once again, I am not offering this as speculation of what actually happened, but rather, as a possibility.
“I tend towards the simplest answer when engaged in wild speculation (and that is all any of this is). The more slices of Swiss cheese whose holes have to line up the less likely the situation is.”
If “wild speculation” is all you are doing, I don’t understand your desperation to defend it from alternative theories offered by others.
n012944 schlimm An interesting comment from someone who said this less than 12 hours after the accident; schlimm We do not know the determination yet, but it would appear to be a human error: the dispatcher's or the work crew's. You were real quick to guess that it was human error, when there were very few facts released. Why was it ok for you to guess and speculate then, but not now? There was still a very real possibility that it could have been computer error at that point. Wasn't that just "silly guessing" by you at that point? Of course that fits with your agenda, and the almost sick joy you seem to get when a railroader commits an error.
schlimm
An interesting comment from someone who said this less than 12 hours after the accident;
schlimm We do not know the determination yet, but it would appear to be a human error: the dispatcher's or the work crew's.
We do not know the determination yet, but it would appear to be a human error: the dispatcher's or the work crew's.
You were real quick to guess that it was human error, when there were very few facts released. Why was it ok for you to guess and speculate then, but not now? There was still a very real possibility that it could have been computer error at that point. Wasn't that just "silly guessing" by you at that point? Of course that fits with your agenda, and the almost sick joy you seem to get when a railroader commits an error.
No, that was just an obvious and logical conclusion based on the available facts. To go beyond that is what is silly because we really have no more facts now than then. We all must wait for the NTSB. I derive no "pleasure" in pointing out the obvious. You, however, seem to have a huge resentment against any outersiders who have the the temerity to ever suggest that human railroaders just might have committed an error or that there is a need for improvements that the rails can and should make. I happen to know a number of current and retired railroaders who are secure enough to voice the same concerns.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
n012944 AnthonyV Also, if the trackworkers did not receive foul time, wouldn't a shunt being installed by them indicate to the powers to be that there is mistake? Anthony V. You can't shunt the track without foul time.
AnthonyV Also, if the trackworkers did not receive foul time, wouldn't a shunt being installed by them indicate to the powers to be that there is mistake? Anthony V.
Also, if the trackworkers did not receive foul time, wouldn't a shunt being installed by them indicate to the powers to be that there is mistake?
Anthony V.
You can't shunt the track without foul time.
Assume the track crew thought they had foul time on a particular track but didn't. Would not a shunt alert the dispatcher and everyone else that something is wrong?
I'm starting to believe that the MOW crew did have foul time - but not on the track involved.
If that was the case, the question becomes why did the backhoe operator set on where he did? Did he do so of his own volition, did someone else tell him to do so? What was the recent history of foul time on the track involved? How might that factor into the decision to set on there?
As for the rest of this mess - it never seems to be an issue until someone's hypothesis gets challenged. Then the folks with the knowledge somehow magically go from being experts to know-it-all snobs.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Last week (page 5) I posted an excerpt from WSJ article quoting Gary Noto’s email about ordering more shunting devices on Monday, the day after the tragedy. Mr. Noto is Deputy Division Engineer, Track and Structures, Amtrak, 400 W. 31st St., New York, NY 10001. He started out as a trackman on Penn Central in 1975. The WSJ article got the attention of Senator Nelson of the Commerce, Science & Transportation committee, who put it on their website.
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/4/nelson-statement-on-report-that-basic-safety-measures-may-have-prevented-a-crash
An "expensive model collector"
NTSB has said at least once before that lack of shunting was part of a probable cause.
Excerpt from Safety Recommendation, to Joseph H. Boardman of all people, Jan. 10, 2008
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the January 9, 2007, collision of train 322 with a track maintenance vehicle near Woburn, Massachusetts, was the failure of the train dispatcher to maintain blocking that provided signal protection for the track segment occupied by the maintenance-of-way work crew, and the failure of the work crew to apply a shunting device that would have provided redundant signal protection for their track segment. Contributing to the accident was Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad's failure to ensure that maintenance-of-way work crews applied shunting devices as required.
The engineer of the accident train had a clear signal indication and did not have any knowledge that a track maintenance crew would be occupying the same track. After exiting a curve at approximately 62 mph, little time (about 1.5 seconds) was available before the train reached the work area. The engineer realized that the work crew was on his track and initiated emergency braking. Train speed decreased to approximately 44 mph at the time of the collision.
A shunting device electrically prevents the signals from displaying clear indications to approaching trains. The Safety Board concludes that the track maintenance crew had not applied a shunting device; therefore, additional signal protection did not exist for the track segment they occupied, and the dispatcher's screen did not indicate the track segment was occupied.
MBCR rules required the track foreman to have a shunting device at each end of the work area every time a track was taken out of service for maintenance. However, interviews with track maintenance employees, including those not involved in the accident, confirmed that it was common practice to use shunting devices only for big jobs and that replacing ties, as the track crew in the accident had been doing, was considered to be a small job. The track crew had reserved the track segment from 9:45 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. and was clearly engaged in a significant amount of work on the day of the accident. The Safety Board concludes that MBCR maintenance-of-way work crews routinely reduced safety by not using shunting devices when performing jobs that required the track to be out of service.
The MBCR had many opportunities to be aware that the requirement to use shunting devices was commonly disregarded. For example, track supervisors visiting work sites could have seen that a shunting device was not used as required. Transportation supervisors on passing trains could have observed that shunting devices were not in place. Dispatching supervisors could have noted the absence of a magenta indication on the dispatching screens. Finally, the MBCR's program of tests and observations should have provided a safety net to ensure that compliance with the rules was frequently examined. The Safety Board concludes that the MBCR's management failed to ensure that maintenance-of-way work crews were using shunting devices as required.
The primary method used by railroads to protect roadway workers with exclusive track occupancy is by train dispatcher blocking and unblocking of track segments. The layers of redundant steps required for the dispatcher to block and unblock track segments vary from railroad to railroad depending on their procedures and the design of their dispatching system.
Although the MBCR has modified its dispatching methods since this accident, the potential exists on other railroads for a dispatcher to incorrectly apply or remove the protection. Therefore, the Safety Board recommends that the FRA advise railroads of the need to examine their train dispatching systems and procedures to ensure that appropriate safety redundancies are in place for establishing protection and preventing undesired removal of protection for roadway workers receiving track occupancy authority.
The Safety Board is aware that shunting by track maintenance work crews on main track is not a common practice in the railroad industry. This may be due, in large part, to the absence of a Federal requirement for shunting to provide maintenance-of-way work crew protection. Unless a shunting device is used by the work crew, the train dispatcher provides the only signal protection in controlled territory. As this accident demonstrates, the dispatching system is not immune to human error, and electrically shunting the rails is therefore an important safety redundancy. The Safety Board concludes that maintenance-of-way work crews on all railroads who depend on the train dispatcher for signal protection need redundant protection to restrict train movements into work areas. Therefore, the Safety Board recommends that the FRA require redundant signal protection, such as shunting, for maintenance-of-way work crews who depend on the train dispatcher to provide signal protection.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/09/AR2007010900896.html
BaltACD schlimm tree68 In other words, your guess is only slightly more informed than anyone else's. At least you admit as much, unlike some rail folks on here who make pronouncments as though they were established facts. Guessing/speculation without the facts is fun, but also rather senseless. And your guess is less informed - not being Rule Book Qualified on any present carrier.
schlimm tree68 In other words, your guess is only slightly more informed than anyone else's. At least you admit as much, unlike some rail folks on here who make pronouncments as though they were established facts. Guessing/speculation without the facts is fun, but also rather senseless.
tree68
In other words, your guess is only slightly more informed than anyone else's. At least you admit as much, unlike some rail folks on here who make pronouncments as though they were established facts.
Guessing/speculation without the facts is fun, but also rather senseless.
And your guess is less informed - not being Rule Book Qualified on any present carrier.
A guess is a guess is a guess, with the larger, but still tiny positive factor being logic, not rulebook qualified. In your case, you have an agenda and vested interest. I am only pointing out that all this speculation is just that, silly guessing, until the preliminary findings are released.
EuclidIf a shunt was required and none was used, was that a matter of human error?
Possibly, possibly not. Read the rules.
The whole question hinges on whether or not a shunt was required. If a shunt wasn't required then not having a shunt on the track wasn't an error.
The ONLY time a shunt is required is if there is foul time and one of the other methods of protection (and the rules list several) are not being used.
If they didn't have foul time then no shunt was required.
If they did and one of the other methods of protection were being used then no shunt was required.
I tend towards the simplest answer when engaged in wild speculation (and that is all any of this is). The more slices of Swiss cheese whose holes have to line up the less likely the situation is.
No matter how you slice it it comes back to the question of whether or not there was foul time out on the tracks at the time of the incident and how it was communicated.
EuclidThen I would ask how you know that foul permission had not been asked for by the track crew, granted by the dispatcher, but never executed by the dispatcher, without the knowledge of the track crew? Or how do you know that foul permission had not been granted and then mistakenly taken away by the dispatcher, without the knowledge of the track crew?
I'm sure somebody can come up with a scenario that allows both of those things to happen. The question is how many other things do you have to break to make it happen.
For a train to be operating at 100+ mph in the middle of foul time there had to have been multiple, simultaneous failures by some combination of the dispatcher, signal system, dispatching system, train crew and work crew. I am sure somebody can come up with a scenario. If that was the case it ought to be very easy to figure out because that scenario would leave multiple radio communications, dozens of records in the dispatching system and records in the signal system, plus everybody within earshot of the EIC would know about it because he would have gone off like a Roman candle when the train went by him. But if you read all the news reports for documentation of something like that, its crickets.
On the other hand speculating on a scenario where the 1st trick operator got a turnover from the 3rd trick operator (not the 1st trick supervisor) and mistakenly believed that there was foul protection when there wasn't, would require a whole lot less slices of Swiss cheese, wouldn't require any major systems to fail, would leave a very diffcult trail and could certainly happen in the context of the various news reports.
So if you are speculating, any scenario is possible. How many slices of Swiss cheese are you trying to line up the holes in?
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
AnthonyVAlso, if the trackworkers did not receive foul time, wouldn't a shunt being installed by them indicate to the powers to be that there is mistake?
If they install a shunt on an active track without foul time, they're looking at some time off for fouling the track without foul time. And what happens if they drop a signal in the face of a train travelling at 100 MPH plus?
Shunts follow provision of foul time for a reason.
Unlike industrial lockout/tagout, one person (the EIC) is responsible for obtaining foul time, not everyone on the crew. That's why there are job briefings.
And all the shunts in the world won't help if someone is on the wrong track...
tree68Aside from the fact that only the investigators have all of the available facts... What you're seeing here generally represents estimations based on past practice and experience, oftimes by folks with substantial time on railroads.
tree68 Norm48327 It's a letter to Boardman from the union. Interesting comments about shunts.
Norm48327 It's a letter to Boardman from the union. Interesting comments about shunts.
It seems to me that a shunt would protect the track workers in the event of a mistake by the trackworkers or anybody else.
Norm48327It's a letter to Boardman from the union. Interesting comments about shunts.
This was linked before. It's my opinion that the shunt focus is an attempt to deflect attention from individuals who may have made mistakes. As has been noted numerous times, shunts are secondary to foul time as issued by the dispatcher. If no foul time has been issued, no shunts would be placed.
Here you go Bucky. It's a letter to Boardman from the union. Interesting comments about shunts.
http://www.trainorders.com/discussion/warning.php?forum_id=4&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bmwe.org%2Fcms%2Ffile%2F04132016_154402_Boardman_Letter.pdf
Norm
EuclidSo please tell me how you know that the track crew had not been granted foul time, and was operating under the assumption that they had it?
Aside from the fact that only the investigators have all of the available facts...
It's very possible that the first trick crew did have foul time - for the track the other equipment was located on, but not for the track the backhoe occupied. Or maybe they didn't have foul time and we're just lucky that the train didn't pile into the more substantial equipment on the adjacent track.
This leaves open several possibilities, including the backhoe operator being briefed that there was foul time in place, and then believing that the foul time covered the track he was setting the backhoe on. Perhaps it had been in place on that track on past days.
What you're seeing here generally represents estimations based on past practice and experience, oftimes by folks with substantial time on railroads.
Euclid dehusman There was not foul time, so there wasn't any requirement for shunts,... Dave, How do you know that there was not foul time during the first shift? I am not contending that there was foul time. I am just wondering how you know that there was not.
dehusman There was not foul time, so there wasn't any requirement for shunts,...
Dave,
How do you know that there was not foul time during the first shift? I am not contending that there was foul time. I am just wondering how you know that there was not.
I should have asked the original question this way: If a shunt was required and none was used, was that a matter of human error? Obviously not using a shunt was not human error if using a shunt was not required. I am not sure it was required by the rules, and it certainly would not have been required if there were no foul permission in place. But if it was required, would the failure to use it be human error?
I ask because some dismiss the failure to use a shunt because it was not the first controlling factor, that is, the granting of foul permission.
But again, I ask how you know that no foul permission had been granted to the first trick track crew. You will probably answer that the fact that the train hit the backhoe means that there was no foul protection. Then I would ask how you know that foul permission had not been asked for by the track crew, granted by the dispatcher, but never executed by the dispatcher, without the knowledge of the track crew? Or how do you know that foul permission had not been granted and then mistakenly taken away by the dispatcher, without the knowledge of the track crew?
In both of those cases, a shunt may have been required by a track crew assuming they had foul time, even if they did not have it. Certainly, this circumstance would have been a textbook example of why a shunt is needed as a backup.
So please tell me how you know that the track crew had not been granted foul time, and was operating under the assumption that they had it?
Dehusman, I admire you for your patience.
_____________
"A stranger's just a friend you ain't met yet." --- Dave Gardner
I'll ask this again. Was the deceased "supervisor" the EIC? Or was he the supervisor of the backhoe operator and working under an EIC? Does anyone know how many personnel were working that morning? Was the Loram unit working and manned? Did it have a work zone separate from the backhoe? (doubtful)
dehusman Euclid: If a shunt was not used in the case of this crash, was that a matter of human error? I will try this again and try to type very slowly so you can understand it. [ snarky putdown]The 3rd trick employee in charge had foul time. The 3rd trick employee in charge released the foul time. If the 3rd trick employee in charge had put down shunts for his foul time, he would have REMOVED them when he gave up his foul time.
Euclid: If a shunt was not used in the case of this crash, was that a matter of human error?
I will try this again and try to type very slowly so you can understand it. [ snarky putdown]The 3rd trick employee in charge had foul time. The 3rd trick employee in charge released the foul time. If the 3rd trick employee in charge had put down shunts for his foul time, he would have REMOVED them when he gave up his foul time.
And your source is?
dehusmanThere was not foul time, so there wasn't any requirement for shunts,...
Euclid If a shunt was not used in the case of this crash, was that a matter of human error?
If a shunt was not used in the case of this crash, was that a matter of human error?
I will try this again and try to type very slowly so you can understand it.
The 3rd trick employee in charge had foul time.
The 3rd trick employee in charge released the foul time.
If the 3rd trick employee in charge had put down shunts for his foul time, he would have REMOVED them when he gave up his foul time.
That's why shunts are not the cause of this accident. The only way they would have helped is if the 3rd trick EIC violated the rules and left them on when he released his foul time. If the 3rd trick EIC complied with the rules then whether he used shunts or didn't use shunts, the situation would have been EXACTLY the same when 1st trick started. The shunts not being applied is not human error and is not an "error" at all. There was not foul time, so there wasn't any requirement for shunts, the only way shunts would have been there under with all the other circumstances is if somebody violated the rules.
The error is that that people were occupying/fouling the main track without authority. There is a strong possibility human error was involved in that.
BaltACD schlimm tree68 Exactly. We only know with some certitude that it was human error committed by either of the shift EICs from the track crew or a dispatcher. If it was a Dispatcher error, the FRA would have been shouting that from the roof tops the day after the event. The FRA loves to 'out' mistakes that happen at the top of the responsibility chain.
schlimm tree68 Exactly. We only know with some certitude that it was human error committed by either of the shift EICs from the track crew or a dispatcher.
Exactly. We only know with some certitude that it was human error committed by either of the shift EICs from the track crew or a dispatcher.
If it was a Dispatcher error, the FRA would have been shouting that from the roof tops the day after the event. The FRA loves to 'out' mistakes that happen at the top of the responsibility chain.
Specious, at best. The point is that the NTSB has not made even a preliminary finding as to cause; they do not know, and neither do you.
zugmann BaltACD Somebody has to.
BaltACD
Somebody has to.
I understand that, what I am saying is that the FRA highlights those early in the process when they happen. They have not been highlighted to date.
For all the people rushing to say "shunts" or lack thereof are the problem, read the last paragraph of the rule:
Prior to releasing foul time, the employee-in-charge must ensure that all supplemental protection has been removed.
That's why shunts are not the cause of this accident. The only way they would have helped is if the 3rd trick EIC violated the rules and left them on when he released his foul time. If the 3rd trick EIC complied with the rules then whether he used shunts or didn't use shunts, the situation would have been EXACTLY the same when 1st trick started.
Are shunts a good idea to put down when there is foul time out there? You betcha. But they don't establish foul time. They are put down AFTER you get foul time and are taken up BEFORE you release foul time. The only time they are out there is during the foul time. The key is foul time, not the shunts.
BaltACDThe FRA loves to 'out' mistakes that happen at the top of the responsibility chain.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.