We're up to only nine (maybe this will start the tenth?) pages, so the horse may not be dead yet?
Johnny
Norm,
That is from a 2014 FRA advisory. It is their idea, not mine.
I’m amused at all these quibbling little arguments against any possible improvement in the way things are being done. It seems to be a popular theme here on the forum.
I am aware of the saying that the railroad rules are written in blood, and I don’t see it as being complimentary. In my opinion having the rules written in blood is emblematic of a culture that always insists that no safety improvement is ever necessary until bloodshed proves otherwise. The ideal system would anticipate danger and do something about it before blood is shed.
I expect there will be new rules written in the blood of these most recent two victims of the backhoe crash.
Norm48327 Euclid Here is a system where the track foreman has a key, and the dispatcher cannot remove foul protection unless the track foreman gives the key to the dispatcher. That’s want I’m saying; a true interlocking system, kind of like a staff system. http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20160407_Feds_had_advised_Amtrak_to_install_safety_backup_systems.html “A third backup goes a step beyond the current communication between on-site workers and dispatchers. This system, implemented by Metro-North after a worker was fatally struck by a train in 2013, gives a foreman at a work site a unique code. A dispatcher cannot route a train to that track without speaking to the person on site, asking for the code and entering it into a control panel.” Keep reinventing the wheel and some day you might actually get it to roll. In the meantime you're just blowing smoke.
Euclid Here is a system where the track foreman has a key, and the dispatcher cannot remove foul protection unless the track foreman gives the key to the dispatcher. That’s want I’m saying; a true interlocking system, kind of like a staff system. http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20160407_Feds_had_advised_Amtrak_to_install_safety_backup_systems.html “A third backup goes a step beyond the current communication between on-site workers and dispatchers. This system, implemented by Metro-North after a worker was fatally struck by a train in 2013, gives a foreman at a work site a unique code. A dispatcher cannot route a train to that track without speaking to the person on site, asking for the code and entering it into a control panel.”
Here is a system where the track foreman has a key, and the dispatcher cannot remove foul protection unless the track foreman gives the key to the dispatcher. That’s want I’m saying; a true interlocking system, kind of like a staff system.
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20160407_Feds_had_advised_Amtrak_to_install_safety_backup_systems.html
“A third backup goes a step beyond the current communication between on-site workers and dispatchers. This system, implemented by Metro-North after a worker was fatally struck by a train in 2013, gives a foreman at a work site a unique code. A dispatcher cannot route a train to that track without speaking to the person on site, asking for the code and entering it into a control panel.”
Keep reinventing the wheel and some day you might actually get it to roll. In the meantime you're just blowing smoke.
No, you are just whining in your reply. A real railroad (Metro-North) implemented the system, not Euclid and not you or anyone else on here. I understand the circular parade gets tiresome, but you may overlook some good points in your irritation with him.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Norm
n012944This thread is starting have a familiar ring to it. One poster talking in circles about unlikely what ifs.
It's sounding like the Lac Megantic thread; OVER AND OVER AND OVER.
EuclidA dispatcher cannot route a train to that track without speaking to the person on site, asking for the code and entering it into a control panel.”
Alas, unless there's a physical barrier involved (ie, a switch or derail) or some form of third party enforcement (ie, PTC), a train can still enter the work zone.
The first three steps are in place in all dark territory, for all movements. See our earlier discussion about "taking the railroad home." They are also in place for work zones in signalled territory.
The random key is simply an enforcement tool. Like almost all rules in railroading, the need for its use is written in blood.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Euclid What prevents a dispatcher from taking work zone permission away without permission from the work crew?
What prevents a dispatcher from taking work zone permission away without permission from the work crew?
Common sense, and a desire to keep themselves employeed as a dispatcher.
This thread is starting have a familiar ring to it. One poster talking in circles about unlikely what ifs.
An "expensive model collector"
BaltACD Euclid What prevents a dispatcher from taking work zone permission away without permission from the work crew? Weeding out employees that display your kind of 'cowboy' thinking that one can do anything they want, anytime they want. Employees that desire to maintain a continuing employment relationship sincerely attempt to comply with the rules that are in place. In this incident, if the NTSB could pin the incident on the Dispatcher, they would have done so in a heartbeat as the Dispatcher controls the railroad and is first 'target' whenever a incident that revolves around track authority happens.
Weeding out employees that display your kind of 'cowboy' thinking that one can do anything they want, anytime they want. Employees that desire to maintain a continuing employment relationship sincerely attempt to comply with the rules that are in place.
In this incident, if the NTSB could pin the incident on the Dispatcher, they would have done so in a heartbeat as the Dispatcher controls the railroad and is first 'target' whenever a incident that revolves around track authority happens.
I never said anything about blaming the dispatcher in this case. And my point has nothing to do with assuming that employees may do what they want because of a cowboy attitude. My point is only whether it is physically possible to take away foul protection. If it is physically possible, it might happen by accident or misunderstdanding no matter how concientious an employee might be.
EuclidWhat prevents a dispatcher from taking work zone permission away without permission from the work crew?
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
tree68 Euclid What prevents a dispatcher from taking work zone permission away without permission from the work crew? His desire to keep his job. Plus the fact that the blood would be on his hands. This is a serious business, and those involved tend to treat it seriously. I'm pretty sure Balt will back that up.
His desire to keep his job. Plus the fact that the blood would be on his hands.
This is a serious business, and those involved tend to treat it seriously. I'm pretty sure Balt will back that up.
Well then , contrary to what Dave said, my points #2 and #3 are new as well as point #4. In the system I am describing, the dispatcher will not be able to remove fouling permission once given. It would be just like lining a train up for a closed drawbridge. Once the clear signal is given, it cannot be taken away. It does not rely on the judgement of a human to not take the signal away because he does not want to lose his job. It is an interlocking system.
The system I am descibing will be new as an overall system, but it is not my idea. It has been outlined in several news articales about this crash. As I said, the principles go back to what was developed in the 1800s.
dehusman Euclid A work zone will be established. The work zone will prevent trains from entering it. The work zone cannot be taken away without the permission of the work crew. This is the existing process that was in place at the time of the incident. Euclid 4. The work crew will always have a clear indication of having permission. This is the only thing that would be new.
Euclid A work zone will be established. The work zone will prevent trains from entering it. The work zone cannot be taken away without the permission of the work crew.
This is the existing process that was in place at the time of the incident.
Euclid 4. The work crew will always have a clear indication of having permission.
4. The work crew will always have a clear indication of having permission.
This is the only thing that would be new.
What about #2 and #3? What prevents a dispatcher from taking work zone permission away without permission from the work crew?
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
EuclidSo pointing to a fail-safe system beyond the current system of verbal permissions is now a red herring? That does not even make sense. What would the red herring be intended to distract from? Maybe Norm could chime in and help us understand this.
Its a red herring because its not a root cause and putting down a shunt only works if there is a signal system. If there is no signal system then all the shunts in the world will not provide one ounce of protection.
The basis on the whole thing is establishing the work zone and communicating that to the people working on the track. If that process is solid then every gang everywhere has established protection and ALL the other systems and suggestions can support that protection. If there is a hole in establishing the work zone then all the other systems overlayed on the base process will not be reliable.
Similarly the communication is key. If the work zone process is rock solid, but the communication is not robust, then you will have situations where the workers may not be in their working limits (they may not have working limits, they may outside their limits by location or time, they may have restrictions on the use of the limits).
Both of those are foundational. Those two elements are critical and work on any territory in any situation. Shunts only work in signalled territory, PTC only works in PTC territory, etc.
The PTC debate needs some clarification. The trains article a few years back had a long article on ACSES. If someone has access to the article please get it.
As I recall the article stated something to the effect that MOW and other personnel could place a temporary transponder on a track that would limit ACSES speeds ?
I expect the NTSB find the cause of the communications failure in the complex system of permissions, retracted permissions, acknowledgments, etc. As that one person said, they probably already know where the system failed. But then in the bigger picture, they will blame the cause on that very system, calling it obsolete, and then advocate for new fail-safe protection system.
Rather than quibble about what is and is not PTC, I would just say that the new protection system will be integrated with PTC. It might use perfected MOW vehicle shunts, but I expect it to move beyond that approach to something based on defined zone of protection. That defined zone of protection will not need a shunt to positively enforce it. The system will simply enforce the zone according to its definition. Shunting would be “Old school.” These will be the key points:
A work zone will be established.
The work zone will prevent trains from entering it.
The work zone cannot be taken away without the permission of the work crew.
The work crew will always have a clear indication of having permission.
So trains and work crews will be positively be interlocked with each other.
With PTC, trains will be prevented from running past their territory. I don’t know how you could enforce the equivalent of that on the work crews. In effect, it would amount to clearing the work crew fouling automatically if they lose their permission. There is no practical way to do that, so it will instead rely on keeping the work crew informed of their protection status. This protection would come from wireless transmissions to receiving instruments worn by the workers, staged on site, and inside the operating cab of MOW power equipment.
So if this safety zone suddenly loses its protection for some reason; or if the workers happened to mistakenly wander out of their zone, they will be immediately informed of that.
With everyone in the work crew being constantly aware of whether or not they have protection; and with the cancellation of the protection being only possible by the work crew, and with it being impossible for trains to enter that work zone; that seems like it would be quite reliable.
That is the fundamentals of an interlocking system. It goes back to the 1800s.
EuclidAn appropriately place flagmen, shunting cable, or dispatcher-acknowledged work zone seems to lack something, as we see in the case of this crash. That "little more" that Mr. Sweeney refers to seems to be exactly what is lacking in the current safeguards. That "little more" takes the human error out of the equation.
Well, I guess you're the expert and we all should defer to you.
Oh, and while you're at it, please tell us what experience you have regarding the subject.
First - recognize that the shunt cable and the shunting created by a rail vehicle are two different animals.
It's already been noted that hi-rail and MOW vehicles may not provide an adequate shunt due to their weight. This is why their wheels are insulated - it prevents the expectation that they will shunt from being something upon which people rely. The vehicles won't shunt - you need to protect yourself by another means.
There's no question that a cable-and-clamp shunt can be a valuable additional tool to protect workers on the tracks. However, it does need to be used in conjunction with other means of protection. Ever have to jiggle the clamps on the jumper cables when trying to start a car?
As Balt noted, however, it takes a dispatcher's permission to use that shunt, in no small part to avoid dropping a signal in the face of an oncoming train.
Which brings us back to the basic problem - there was a failure of communication on several fronts. And that's what killed two perfectly good workers. The lack of use of any shunts may be a contributing factor, but it appears a simple phone call would have prevented the incident altogether.
Focusing on the shunts to the exclusion of the communications issue is barking up the wrong tree.
Norm48327 wanswheel Excerpt from Train of Thought by Steve Sweeney, Apr. 6 But the bold-faced, lame-brained idea that PTC should be installed in every possible piece of track equipment, locomotive, and device is wayward and irresponsible… The hundreds of thousands of pieces of rail equipment to be so reconfigured could easily cost billions of dollars more than it already has to install PTC and do little more than what an appropriately placed flagman, shunting cable, or dispatcher-acknowledged work zone do. And they work well when used. And Steve has that nailed down perfectly.
wanswheel Excerpt from Train of Thought by Steve Sweeney, Apr. 6 But the bold-faced, lame-brained idea that PTC should be installed in every possible piece of track equipment, locomotive, and device is wayward and irresponsible… The hundreds of thousands of pieces of rail equipment to be so reconfigured could easily cost billions of dollars more than it already has to install PTC and do little more than what an appropriately placed flagman, shunting cable, or dispatcher-acknowledged work zone do. And they work well when used.
But the bold-faced, lame-brained idea that PTC should be installed in every possible piece of track equipment, locomotive, and device is wayward and irresponsible… The hundreds of thousands of pieces of rail equipment to be so reconfigured could easily cost billions of dollars more than it already has to install PTC and do little more than what an appropriately placed flagman, shunting cable, or dispatcher-acknowledged work zone do. And they work well when used.
And Steve has that nailed down perfectly.
An appropriately place flagmen, shunting cable, or dispatcher-acknowledged work zone seems to lack something, as we see in the case of this crash.
That "little more" that Mr. Sweeney refers to seems to be exactly what is lacking in the current safeguards. That "little more" takes the human error out of the equation.
wanswheelExcerpt from Train of Thought by Steve Sweeney, Apr. 6 But the bold-faced, lame-brained idea that PTC should be installed in every possible piece of track equipment, locomotive, and device is wayward and irresponsible… The hundreds of thousands of pieces of rail equipment to be so reconfigured could easily cost billions of dollars more than it already has to install PTC and do little more than what an appropriately placed flagman, shunting cable, or dispatcher-acknowledged work zone do. And they work well when used.
Where does an Irishman stash a red herring?
Excerpt from Train of Thought by Steve Sweeney, Apr. 6
But the bold-faced, lame-brained idea that PTC should be installed in every possible piece of track equipment, locomotive, and device is wayward and irresponsible…
The hundreds of thousands of pieces of rail equipment to be so reconfigured could easily cost billions of dollars more than it already has to install PTC and do little more than what an appropriately placed flagman, shunting cable, or dispatcher-acknowledged work zone do. And they work well when used.
Not using shunts is just plain stupid. It is not rocket science. Ways were found to make RDCs shunt reliably. It should be possible to do the same for all rail vehicles. That is my opinion.
tree68 The shunt factor is a red herring - the primary issue is the permissions or lack thereof.
The shunt factor is a red herring - the primary issue is the permissions or lack thereof.
Why is the shunt all of a sudden a red herring? In the last post, you told me that what I said about the equipment shunt was completely unrelated. I posted an article about how it is a direct focus of this current accident investigation, and so now you say it is just a red herring.
You and Balt say it is all about permissions and rules. Shunts are part of the rules. They are a backup protection. In this case of Amtrak, they have been made to be against the rules. The article talks about reintroducing shunts that would be triggered by MOW vehicles, and using those vehicles to define the limits of a shunted work zone.
While it may have been the earlier Chester crash that started the discussion, the article brings it up in reference to this current collision. It is referred to as a “fail-safe” protection system. Obviously, the overall point so far developing in this investigation is that current MOW protection system is too vulnerable to human error.
So pointing to a fail-safe system beyond the current system of verbal permissions is now a red herring? That does not even make sense. What would the red herring be intended to distract from? Maybe Norm could chime in and help us understand this.
EuclidBecause of Amtrak’s banning of shunting, they have insulated axles on MOW equipment to make shunting impossible.
Since there are multiple types of shunts, the statement that AMTK has "banned shunts" may be misleading. They have banned wheel shunts on smaller vehicles because they are unreliable (for the same reason a single light engine or a single car may not activate track circuits). If a method is unreliable then you don't want to rely on it.
You would be well served to not take news reports literally. Assume the reports will get the details wrong and be pleasantly suprised when they actually get something right. Also remember that government agencies hav agendas to justify their own positions and decisions. So pretty much every accident "could have been prevented if they had implemented PTC" regardless if the accident could have also be prevented if the other safety processes had been followed or PTC is dependent on a low tech solution.
For example, the statement that a shunt would have prevented a train from entering the block is not necessarily true. If the there is NO foul time in the block a train could be permitted into the block at restricted speed. All shunts do is create an occupancy, they don't establish protection, they don't tell the dispatcher anybody's there. It is quite common for a gang to clear up and leave a "track light" (occupancy ) in a block behind them caused by a piece of machinery breaking a wire associated with the signal system. A major project will always have a couple signal maintainers on hand to patch up the broken wires caused by the machinery or work. What PTC does is prohibit high speed collisions but it won't eliminate low speed collisions.
But you'll never convince our resident KIA of that.
Euclid tree68 Euclid Another article mentions that Amtrak had decided against using shunts because they don’t work all the time. This is because track maintenance vehicles are lighter than locomotives, and thus may not complete the electrical connection to shunt the rails. So Amtrak thought it would be unsafe to rely on a safety system such as shunting which might fail sometimes. I can see the logic of that position. But I have to wonder why a lighter weight vehicle could not be equipped with a means of reliably creating a successful shunt. The shunt in question has absolutely nothing to do with the on-track equipment and the conductivity thereof. In fact, many hi-rail vehicles actually have insulated wheels. As has already been noted, the shunt consists of a length of cable with a clamp on each end that is place across the tracks. The same concept is used by signal maintainers to check crossing and other circuits. A shunt could be used to protect workers even if they had no on-track equipment at all. I understand what you are saying as a shunt being a wire and some connector clamps, and I had thought that was what the news was referring to. Several articles describe them that way. But the article that I mentioned in connection with the shunts and the backhoe crash does not mention wire shunts. Instead, it describes the problem with rail mounted maintenance equipment not being heavy enough to reliably produce a shunt. It says that this type of shunt is what Amtrak considers to be too unreliable, that therefore it should not be used because people may depend on it, and it might fail. It does make me wonder if Amtrak also considers the wire shunt to be too unreliable to use. Because of Amtrak’s banning of shunting, they have insulated axles on MOW equipment to make shunting impossible. That may be the reason for the insulated wheels that you mentioned. Here is the article: http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/in-transit/Amtrak-train-crash-mirrors.html From the link: "It is beyond question that the means were available to Amtrak to install a fail-safe system which would operate to prevent a derailment even assuming all the other factors in this case," Connor's attorney wrote in a letter accompanying the announcement of his client's resignation. Followers of the accident investigation, and of rail-safety issues, understood the reference immediately. The "fail-safe" system referred to would allow railroad maintenance vehicles to, in effect, create buffer zones front and back as they move down the track. This is done electrically and is called "shunting. " And the controversy concerning whether to shunt relatively lightweight vehicles - such as the 15-ton ballast regulator involved in the Jan. 29 crash - is central to debates taking place in Congress concerning pending rail- safety legislation, and around bargaining tables where railroad-company managers and union negotiators meet. First, some technical background: A weak electrical current passes continuously through all steel rails. When a locomotive operates over the rails of track is occupied… But at one-tenth the weight of a locomotive, a ballast regulator "will complete that circuit only sometimes," said Amtrak spokesman John Jacobsen in an interview after several Amtrak workers told the National Transportation Safety Board that shunting might have prevented the recent crash. It "might complete (the circuit) three-quarters of the time if the rails have a lot of activity over them and are real smooth and polished," Jacobsen said. "But it lacks the weight to put enough pressure on the rails to shunt all the time. " As a result, he said, Amtrak "decided a long time ago not to allow equipment which doesn't shunt consistently to shunt at all," and manufacturers were instructed to insulate the undercarriages of maintenance vehicles so they simply cannot shunt.
tree68 Euclid Another article mentions that Amtrak had decided against using shunts because they don’t work all the time. This is because track maintenance vehicles are lighter than locomotives, and thus may not complete the electrical connection to shunt the rails. So Amtrak thought it would be unsafe to rely on a safety system such as shunting which might fail sometimes. I can see the logic of that position. But I have to wonder why a lighter weight vehicle could not be equipped with a means of reliably creating a successful shunt. The shunt in question has absolutely nothing to do with the on-track equipment and the conductivity thereof. In fact, many hi-rail vehicles actually have insulated wheels. As has already been noted, the shunt consists of a length of cable with a clamp on each end that is place across the tracks. The same concept is used by signal maintainers to check crossing and other circuits. A shunt could be used to protect workers even if they had no on-track equipment at all.
Euclid Another article mentions that Amtrak had decided against using shunts because they don’t work all the time. This is because track maintenance vehicles are lighter than locomotives, and thus may not complete the electrical connection to shunt the rails. So Amtrak thought it would be unsafe to rely on a safety system such as shunting which might fail sometimes. I can see the logic of that position. But I have to wonder why a lighter weight vehicle could not be equipped with a means of reliably creating a successful shunt.
The shunt in question has absolutely nothing to do with the on-track equipment and the conductivity thereof. In fact, many hi-rail vehicles actually have insulated wheels.
As has already been noted, the shunt consists of a length of cable with a clamp on each end that is place across the tracks. The same concept is used by signal maintainers to check crossing and other circuits.
A shunt could be used to protect workers even if they had no on-track equipment at all.
I understand what you are saying as a shunt being a wire and some connector clamps, and I had thought that was what the news was referring to. Several articles describe them that way. But the article that I mentioned in connection with the shunts and the backhoe crash does not mention wire shunts.
Instead, it describes the problem with rail mounted maintenance equipment not being heavy enough to reliably produce a shunt. It says that this type of shunt is what Amtrak considers to be too unreliable, that therefore it should not be used because people may depend on it, and it might fail. It does make me wonder if Amtrak also considers the wire shunt to be too unreliable to use.
Because of Amtrak’s banning of shunting, they have insulated axles on MOW equipment to make shunting impossible. That may be the reason for the insulated wheels that you mentioned.
Here is the article:
http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/in-transit/Amtrak-train-crash-mirrors.html
From the link:
"It is beyond question that the means were available to Amtrak to install a fail-safe system which would operate to prevent a derailment even assuming all the other factors in this case," Connor's attorney wrote in a letter accompanying the announcement of his client's resignation.
Followers of the accident investigation, and of rail-safety issues, understood the reference immediately.
The "fail-safe" system referred to would allow railroad maintenance vehicles to, in effect, create buffer zones front and back as they move down the track. This is done electrically and is called "shunting. "
And the controversy concerning whether to shunt relatively lightweight vehicles - such as the 15-ton ballast regulator involved in the Jan. 29 crash - is central to debates taking place in Congress concerning pending rail- safety legislation, and around bargaining tables where railroad-company managers and union negotiators meet.
First, some technical background:
A weak electrical current passes continuously through all steel rails. When a locomotive operates over the rails of track is occupied…
But at one-tenth the weight of a locomotive, a ballast regulator "will complete that circuit only sometimes," said Amtrak spokesman John Jacobsen in an interview after several Amtrak workers told the National Transportation Safety Board that shunting might have prevented the recent crash.
It "might complete (the circuit) three-quarters of the time if the rails have a lot of activity over them and are real smooth and polished," Jacobsen said. "But it lacks the weight to put enough pressure on the rails to shunt all the time. "
As a result, he said, Amtrak "decided a long time ago not to allow equipment which doesn't shunt consistently to shunt at all," and manufacturers were instructed to insulate the undercarriages of maintenance vehicles so they simply cannot shunt.
There are rules for MofW to have equipment on track. There are rules to have trains on track. The rules, when complied with, do not permit trains and MofW equipment to be on the same track in the same location, except in VERY NARROWLY defined circumstances where work trains are operating under the authority of MofW personnel as MofW equipment within the ESTABLISHED limits of a MofW work zone. MofW equipment IS NOT expected to shunt the track and activate track circuits or highway crossing protection.
The Chester incident IS NOT one of those narrowly defined circumstances.
Excerpt from Wall Street Journal, Apr. 10
The apparent safety lapses behind the Chester, Pa., accident lay bare what some Amtrak officials and union representatives describe as a culture hampered by disagreement over how to keep track workers safe…
One former Amtrak nonmanagement supervisor who directed work crews until he retired in 2014 said managers sometimes pressure workers to complete tasks quickly, and to lift restrictions on train speed before a safety concern is addressed, all to keep the trains moving.
He also said managers tend to “over-inundate employees with safety concerns to the point where there were so many rules to follow, no matter what the employees did they were committing safety violations.” The result, he said, was confusion about what safety protocols are essential.
An Amtrak spokeswoman denied that managers push workers to cut corners at the expense of safety. The railroad recently issued a list of “cardinal rules”—including existing prohibitions against tampering with safety equipment, using electronic devices when working and cheating on required job exams—and warned that it would punish or fire those who don’t comply.
http://www.bmwe3014.org/Latest_news/amtrak/2016/SEA_Stadtler%20Cardinal%20Rules%202%2023%2016_FINAL.pdf
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