EuclidNo it would not have to be out of its territory to get hit by the train. The train could have been mistakenly allowed into the track crew's territory. In that case, both the train and the backhoe would be in their authorized territory, but the authorization for the train would be a error [made] by the person granting the authorization.
If Nick Vantuono in Railway Age is correct, the situation is far worse. He said the backhoe was on its hi-rail wheels, ON the track the Palmetto was running on, and that the supervisor tried to alert the backhoe operator when it became clear the train was approaching on that track, but didn't have time. Seems much of the backhoe actually was pushed down to where the train finally stopped, and that something -- probably the backhoe arm -- produced an amazing shorted arc between the catenary and the train until the substation breakers tripped.
I am trying to determine just what this "20-step procedure" Schumer talked about included. The phrase, of course, is all over Google... as quotes from Schumer. Whatever it is, its execution that day resulted in a piece of equipment set up for travel on the same track as a 106-mph passenger train... under ACSES PTC control. I find it extremely difficult to come up with an engineering description of a "safety" system that could produce such a result, let alone one rich in Government-organization 20-step procedures.
Assuming lack of communication was the major factor, communication between the two foremen and the two dispatchers would be the problem. They should be the only ones releasing and obtaining track/foul time. None of the day shift people should have started work until they had a job briefing and were assured they had track time.
Norm
This turn to lack of communication brings up too many questions. We have at least 2 dispatchers, 2 foremen, how many track workers. The various ways of communications between these persons gets exponential and will not speculate as to which one it is. Also were there a shorage of dispatchers ? Complicating this is that maybe one or more of the persons got caught by HOS. Also how many went off duty at the same time with a possible time gap ?
Euclid, the black hole of the Trains galaxy. Truth and Facts enter, never to escape.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Euclid Norm, The hole is in your mind.
Norm,
The hole is in your mind.
What ever you say. Of course I should know you are always right.
EuclidNo it would not have to be out of its territory to get hit by the train. The train could have been mistakenly allowed into the track crew's territory. In that case, both the train and the backhoe would be in their authorized territory, but the authorization for the train would be a error make by the person granting the authorization.
Your hole is getting deeper. Perhaps you should stop digging.
[quote user="RME"]
Euclid People have to clarify what they mean when they say the backhoe wandered out of its territory. It makes it sound like the backhoe operator made a mistake. In the bigger picture here, we have no idea whether the backhoe was out of its territory simply because it was hit by the train, as many seem to assume would be the case.
RME Norm48327 "Those who do not remember the mistakes of the past are condemned to repeat them." Verb. Sap.
Norm48327
"Those who do not remember the mistakes of the past are condemned to repeat them."
Verb. Sap.
Those who do not comply with established rules break them.
Euclid For all we know, the train may have been inadvertently cleared to run into the protected territory.
For all we know, the train may have been inadvertently cleared to run into the protected territory.
A quote from earlier in this thread..
BOB WITHORN from the Trains News Wire; (I probably missed this in the earlier posts, if so sorry to repeat) “The gang had been fouling the other tracks at times and had received permission from the dispatcher to do so,” the source says. “Sunday morning, there was a shift change. The night foreman gave up all fouls (alerting train crews to the work), and the day shift foreman had not asked for any fouls.”
from the Trains News Wire; (I probably missed this in the earlier posts, if so sorry to repeat)
“The gang had been fouling the other tracks at times and had received permission from the dispatcher to do so,” the source says. “Sunday morning, there was a shift change. The night foreman gave up all fouls (alerting train crews to the work), and the day shift foreman had not asked for any fouls.”
No fouls = no"protected" track.
An "expensive model collector"
EuclidPeople have to clarify what they mean when they say the backhoe wandered out of its territory. It makes it sound like the backhoe operator made a mistake.
Seems pretty obvious to me. Backhoe is a piece of construction equipment. It belongs on the track being worked on, or the adjacent 'shoulder' of the ROW, not on track that isn't being worked on ... whether or not that track is considered a 'buffer zone' from active rail by whatever work rules are supposed to prevent any chance of interference. Such a buffer zone isn't a turning row, or a 'half-the-distance-is-permissible-encroachment' area or whatever; it is NOT a place for construction equipment to be, even momentarily ... and one reason for that is the deadliness if a train should accidentally be routed down that track.
EDIT: This point does change if, as indicated, the dispatcher was permitting equipment across multiple tracks 'as a rule' under foul protection. I will wait to see exactly how the NTSB characterizes this before commenting further, as it seems troublesome that protection via the dispatcher could go from 'absolute' to 'none' within the span of a shift change...
For example, the backhoe operator may have had his territory taken away without him knowing it. So while he was suddenly outside of his territory, he did not make the mistake.
I am reminded of an old rhyme, which ends "He was right ... dead right! ... as he sped along, but he's just as dead as if he'd been dead wrong". This isn't about whether the backhoe driver 'made a mistake' or his supervisor held the phone wrong. (The point you're actually trying to make, which is that the policies and procedures are wrong, is too important to waste by diddling with semantics here.)
In the bigger picture here, we have no idea whether the backhoe was out of its territory simply because it was hit by the train, as many seem to assume would be the case.
For the backhoe to be hit by any train, any time, it would have to have been out of its territory.
Isn't this really a kind of Captain Obvious moment? The rules we know establish a buffer zone of 'one track' between construction and high-speed operation. What would you call it other than 'inadvertently cleared' if there is a 110-mph train on an immediately-adjacent track?
The thing I still can't figure out, and am waiting for the NTSB to provide, is how the Palmetto came to be running 110 mph immediately adjacent to a known work site with equipment present. Seems to me that's a combination of a number of slipshod practices, any one of which 'good railroading common sense' would have prevented if someone had been thinking with it.
Steve Sweeny said: “It seems clear, but not proven, that for whatever reason, the backhoe crossed near or onto a live track without protection or authorization.” Why does it seem clear to him?
“It seems clear, but not proven, that for whatever reason, the backhoe crossed near or onto a live track without protection or authorization.”
Why does it seem clear to him?
Because the backhoe was hit by the damn train, that's why! What kind of 'protection or authorization' WOULD produce a train strike?
Steve Sweeny said: “In this case, people have read or heard about a technology that is supposed to prevent accidents, so they believe it is supposed to prevent all accidents. But that was never PTC’s intent, and it is beyond the practical limits of any technology to prevent every kind of accident. Particularly when one extremely fallible element — the human being — is part of the equation.” I would say that nobody believes that PTC or any system will prevent ALL accidents, as Mr. Sweeney laments. He is taking that to an absurd level just to bolster his argument against PTC because of its cost. He says PTC cannot achieve a worthwhile result because the equation includes the fallibility of the human being. Well indeed, that is just exactly the point of PTC or any interlocking safety system. That is to take the fallible human being out of the decision making process.
“In this case, people have read or heard about a technology that is supposed to prevent accidents, so they believe it is supposed to prevent all accidents. But that was never PTC’s intent, and it is beyond the practical limits of any technology to prevent every kind of accident. Particularly when one extremely fallible element — the human being — is part of the equation.”
I would say that nobody believes that PTC or any system will prevent ALL accidents, as Mr. Sweeney laments. He is taking that to an absurd level just to bolster his argument against PTC because of its cost. He says PTC cannot achieve a worthwhile result because the equation includes the fallibility of the human being. Well indeed, that is just exactly the point of PTC or any interlocking safety system. That is to take the fallible human being out of the decision making process.
Somebody cue Mr. Schanoes, who can comment on this far better than I could.
One of the 'four mandates' rolled into PTC is supposed to be the 24/7 default presence of 'civil' enforcement, independent of PRECISELY the kind of stupidity and cascading error that produced this accident. Whether or not PTC takes the 'human fallibility' entirely out of the equation is irrelevant ... in this specific instance. And if it matters, I completely agree that civil protection "ought" to be 'automatic' in the sense that block signals ... or positive protection in the German PZW system ... are supposed to be. That very clearly doesn't leave any room for arguments that releasing a 'hold' via the wrong kind of communication leaves a hole large enough to ... drive a backhoe through ... but even a noncontinuous track-protection setup shouldn't have such a hole.
As with the German railcar accident, I think back to the string of events -- some more 'culpable' than others -- that led to the Manhattan West Side collision in the Sixties. The point was repeatedly made in the investigation that eliminating any one of a number of factors, or poor SOPs, would have either prevented the accident or made it less deadly. I'm interested in seeing just how many of these are identified in the present case ... but, and I really hate to say this of the dead, the backhoe guy or his supervisor thinking they were justified in going, no matter how expediently or for however short a time, in a place they should never have been is not a good example of one.
Norm48327Gonna do anothe Lac Megantic rant?
I have read Steve Sweeny’s piece and largely disagree with his points.
People have to clarify what they mean when the say the backhoe wandered out of its territory. It makes it sound like the backhoe operator made a mistake. For example, the backhoe operator may have had his territory taken away without him knowing it. So while he was suddenly outside of his territory, he did not make the mistake. In the bigger picture here, we have no idea whether the backhoe was out of its territory simply because it was hit by the train, as many seem to assume would be the case. For all we know, the train may have been inadvertently cleared to run into the protected territory.
Steve Sweeny said:
Why does it seem clear to him? I can see no reason why it would be clear that the backhoe crossed near or onto a live track without protection or authorization.
EuclidThere you go. Every single bit of that is what I have described as the PTC solution in my last few posts. Some of those in the know here need to inform the FRA that none of that is necessary because everything is just so perfect the way it has always been done.
Gonna do anothe Lac Megantic rant?
See Steve Sweeny's take on it here.
http://cs.trains.com/trn/b/staff/archive/2016/04/06/positive-train-control-39-s-quot-csi-effect-quot.aspx
wanswheelAncient history department
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned..."
wanswheel Ancient history department Excerpt from FRA Safety Advisory, Nov. 25, 2014 https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/11/25/2014-27955/roadway-worker-authority-limits-importance-of-clear-communication-compliance-with-applicable-rules FRA is concerned about the infrequent, but repetitive incidents involving roadway workers being struck or nearly struck by trains that appear to be due to miscommunication or error regarding the roadway workers' authority limits or location in relation to the authority limits… [incidents described] FRA believes that the probability of the incidents described above occurring could be significantly reduced by installation of Positive Train Control (PTC). Until such time that PTC is implemented, and for locations where PTC is not required, FRA recommends that railroads adopt one or more electronic technologies that may serve to fill the technology gap. Examples of such technology already in use include the following systems: Enhanced Employee Protection System—With this system, when an RWIC secures a track authority, he or she is provided a code via a beeper-like device that is not provided to the dispatcher issuing the authority. The system is designed so that the dispatcher cannot remove the blocking devices that are preventing the clearing of the absolute signal until the RWIC provides him or her with the issued code. Thus, the dispatcher cannot remove the associated on-track safety provided by the authority without the knowledge and agreement of the RWIC. This system is currently in use on a northeastern commuter railroad. Hi-Rail Limits Compliance System—This system relies upon a global positioning system location transponder that is mounted in a hi-rail or roadway maintenance machine and linked to the dispatching office. When the vehicle or machine is operated within a mile of the authority limits, the operator will be alerted via a yellow warning light on the transponder. When the vehicle or machine is operated within one-half mile of the authority limits, the operator will be alerted via a yellow flashing light on the transponder. If the operator operates the vehicle or machine outside of his or her authority limits or sets on a main track for which he or she does not have authority, the operator will be alerted via a red warning light and the dispatcher is immediately notified as well, so that appropriate action can be taken. This system is currently in use on a number of subdivisions of a Class 1 railroad. Train Approach Warning System (TAWS)—For this system, an electronic alerter device is utilized at interlockings to detect an approaching train on any track and provide both visual and audible indicators to roadway workers via a personal beeper device on their person and at their bungalow, once the system is activated. This on-track safety system has been utilized under FRA waiver by a major Class 1 railroad at selected interlockings since 2001.
Ancient history department
Excerpt from FRA Safety Advisory, Nov. 25, 2014
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/11/25/2014-27955/roadway-worker-authority-limits-importance-of-clear-communication-compliance-with-applicable-rules
FRA is concerned about the infrequent, but repetitive incidents involving roadway workers being struck or nearly struck by trains that appear to be due to miscommunication or error regarding the roadway workers' authority limits or location in relation to the authority limits…
[incidents described]
FRA believes that the probability of the incidents described above occurring could be significantly reduced by installation of Positive Train Control (PTC). Until such time that PTC is implemented, and for locations where PTC is not required, FRA recommends that railroads adopt one or more electronic technologies that may serve to fill the technology gap. Examples of such technology already in use include the following systems:
There you go. Every single bit of that is what I have described as the PTC solution in my last few posts. Some of those in the know here need to inform the FRA that none of that is necessary because everything is just so perfect the way it has always been done.
dehusman Euclid With PTC, the zone of protection would be established in the PTC system and that system would apply it to the site on the ground. The problem is you are describing a completely different system than PTC. That's not how PTC works. The work zone is established in the existing DISPATCHING systems. PTC doesn't establish any zones anywhere. At the same time, that system would lock out any trains from entering the zone of protection. PTC doesn't "lock out" anything. PTC tells the train where its authority ends and PTC prohibits the train from exceeding its authority.
Euclid With PTC, the zone of protection would be established in the PTC system and that system would apply it to the site on the ground.
The problem is you are describing a completely different system than PTC. That's not how PTC works. The work zone is established in the existing DISPATCHING systems. PTC doesn't establish any zones anywhere.
At the same time, that system would lock out any trains from entering the zone of protection.
PTC doesn't "lock out" anything. PTC tells the train where its authority ends and PTC prohibits the train from exceeding its authority.
I did not say that PTC established the work zone. I said that the work zone would be established in PTC.
Isn’t locking out any trains from entering the zone of protection the same as prohibiting a train from exceeding its authority?
I think your objections are largely based on semantics such as whether the “doing” is by PTC or the dispatching system.
When I refer to PTC protecting the work zone, I am referring to PTC preventing trains from entering the work zone. It is the same as “preventing trains from proceeding past their limits of their authority,” as you say.
I agree that it unsafe for people working on the track to be distracted. Is watching out for trains distracting, or is it the responsible safety precaution? Is being cautious a distraction?
EuclidWith PTC, the zone of protection would be established in the PTC system and that system would apply it to the site on the ground.
But unlike the fallibility of manual shunting being overlooked by the responsible person, PTC would automatically shunt or switch all protecting signals to the indications as though there was an actual rail shunt.
PTC has no capability to do any of that. It isn't intended to do that and there is no provision to do that in PTC. All that is done through the existing dispatching system.
PTC would do this as an automatic reaction to the establishment of a zone of foul protection. So that positively protects the track people from the trains.
Once again, not how PTC works. PTC works through individual trains. If they do not comply with the speed restrictions or do not take action to comply with the limits of their authority, the system will stop the train. No limits are created in PTC, PTC doesn't "protect" anything. All it does is make sure the train doesn't proceed past the limits of its authority or exceed the speed.
There also must be something to protect the track people from accidentally straying from their zone of protection. Maybe inside of the backhoe, you have a little green signal in front of the operator telling him that he has the foul protection, and that no conflict with trains is possible.
Completely new system, has nothing to do with PTC, PTC has no capability in the current system to do this. How will the backhoe know which authority is covering it? If I have authority 100 on track 1 and authority 101 on track 2, how will the backhoe know which authority is covering it? What will stop the backhoe operator from just backing up to foul the adjacent track?
The backhoe operator has the green light, so he knows that all possible conflicting trains have a red light.
How are you going to protect the employees in non-signaled territory? how are you going to protect the employees in non-PTC territory (which is about 60% of the US).
Maybe each worker could have some full time verification as well. Maybe you would have a hub signal that would be set up as a visible beacon to several people working in a group. If any man or machine wanders out of it zone of protection, the light turns from green to red.
How do you keep a signal visible to people to people who are spread out over a 2 mile stretch on both sides of equipment around curves in tunnels? If I am a MofW supervisor concerned about safety, the LAST thing I want is my people to keep watching over their shoulder at a signal light. VERY unsafe. I want they focused on the job in front of them so they don't injure themselves because they weren't watching what they were doing.
There are many adequate ways to improvete safety without spending billions of dollars on new technology and taking years to develop the technology and deploy it (which would be required with your solution). For example, assuming that the change in authority was a root cause, you could change the rules to allow foul time authority to be cascaded from one EIC to a relieving EIC. Cost to implement, a couple hundred thousand for rule book changes and training. Time to implement, less than a month. Effective? Yes, if that is a root cause of the incident.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
The accident was probably the consequence of human errors in communication. The point of systems is to reduce the occurence of such errors. If it had been worse, along with the track crew, many passengers could have been killed and injured. Fortunately that did not happen. But pretty obviously, the system here needs modification to reduce to probability of such an communication screw up in the future. BaltACD said as much in relation to the dispatcher's error in Bavaria.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
tree68 Euclid With the present manual system, workers can stray out of their space without even being aware of it.
Euclid With the present manual system, workers can stray out of their space without even being aware of it.
EuclidWith the present manual system, workers can stray out of their space without even being aware of it.
Is every worker going to have some sort of tracker/alarm system on his/her body?
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68 All PTC is going to do is the same thing that calling the dispatcher does now. Someone (the EIC) still has to initiate the action. All the other stuff is just more to fail. If everyone plays by the existing rules, nobody gets hurt. Someone didn't play by the existing rules. Someone got hurt. Until we see the NTSB report, we won't know who didn't play by the rules.
All PTC is going to do is the same thing that calling the dispatcher does now. Someone (the EIC) still has to initiate the action.
All the other stuff is just more to fail.
If everyone plays by the existing rules, nobody gets hurt. Someone didn't play by the existing rules. Someone got hurt.
Until we see the NTSB report, we won't know who didn't play by the rules.
I don’t agree with that. The results may be the same, but that is IF everybody does their job in the manual system.
With PTC, you define the work zone, and the system automatically protects the trains and the track workers. It cannot be violated. PTC would act like a positive interlocking plant. Unlike the current manual system, with PTC, you could not give clear signals to trains which would permit them to enter a protected area. And you could not have workers violating their designated foul protected space without being warned in real time. With the present manual system, workers can stray out of their space without even being aware of it.
Track crews can also have their fouling permission retracted without their knowledge or consent; unless they happen to have the track shunted. I find it amazing that Amtrak is now handing out shunts and encouraging workers to use them. This sounds like an unusually informal approach to positive safety. All the safety of the current system depends on people doing the right things, and there is too much risk that they won’t.
PTC does this all naturally. You just define the work zone, and PTC does the rest. The only additional functionality that is needed is that the PTC relationship to trains has to be extended to include maintenance equipment and even individual workers. Once you do that, you have a system that is dramatically more safe and reliable than the present old school method.
The way I see it, the main issue coming out of this crash is not to discover who did not play by the rules, although that will be found. But main issue is coming up with a better mousetrap where people don’t die just because someone forgot something in the old fashioned system. Brakemen would have never lost fingers if they had just kept them out of the couplers.
[quote user="Electroliner 1935"]
When a work zone is established, can that zone only include the track that is being worked on and trains still operate on adjacent tracks at track speed without notifying the workers (EIC) on the track being worked on? That seems to be what happened here. I don't believe thats how it is supposed to be. I think the zone has to include the adjacent track and that the trains have to get clearance from the EIC to be allowed to enter the zone (all tracks) and at a defined speed. Without that, the potential for accidents like this is real. [/quote]
Can't speak to Amtrak practice.
On my carrier the Work Zone applies to All track between specified mileposts. The EIC is contacted by ALL trains operating on any track for permission to pass. The EIC grants permission and specifies any speed restriction that may be desired - for track conditions or any other reason. Permission can be granted to pass at maximum authorized speed for your train. The train will specify which track it is operating on when requesting permission.
Amtrak procedures may vary.
When a work zone is established, can that zone only include the track that is being worked on and trains still operate on adjacent tracks at track speed without notifying the workers (EIC) on the track being worked on? That seems to be what happened here. I don't believe thats how it is supposed to be. I think the zone has to include the adjacent track and that the trains have to get clearance from the EIC to be allowed to enter the zone (all tracks) and at a defined speed. Without that, the potential for accidents like this is real.
I am not much concerned about what actually happened in this particular accident. I am only just wondering what could have happened. For that I would need a clear explanation of the exact process of fouling protection being recognized by everyone involved in a case of fouling protection.
I can see where a gang might be very large, and maybe one leader will brief them all either directly individually, or the one leader would brief leaders of smaller sub groups. But between the train control and that one leader of the track people, it seems like the system would be very simple and failsafe in nature. In effect it would allow the establishment of foul protection zone, and would offer yes/no foul protection verification for any person actually involved in a fouling action, or about to undertake one.
But everything I am hearing from all sources is that it is a very complex process of communications going both ways, up, down, meetings, up to 100 people involved in each act of adding, removing, and modifying of fouling permissions. If that is the case, it seems there will very likely be misunderstandings. Maybe they happen frequently, but seldom lead to a crash because they are caught in time.
If all of that is the case with current practice, I think that what I am visualizing as a simple interlocking plant-like protection would be the product of PTC, which apparently was not in use in the case of this crash.
With PTC, the zone of protection would be established in the PTC system and that system would apply it to the site on the ground. At the same time, that system would lock out any trains from entering the zone of protection. It would be the PTC automatic effect of shunting the rails with jumpers and clamps. But unlike the fallibility of manual shunting being overlooked by the responsible person, PTC would automatically shunt or switch all protecting signals to the indications as though there was an actual rail shunt. PTC would do this as an automatic reaction to the establishment of a zone of foul protection.
So that positively protects the track people from the trains. There also must be something to protect the track people from accidentally straying from their zone of protection. Maybe inside of the backhoe, you have a little green signal in front of the operator telling him that he has the foul protection, and that no conflict with trains is possible. The backhoe operator has the green light, so he knows that all possible conflicting trains have a red light. Maybe each worker could have some full time verification as well. Maybe you would have a hub signal that would be set up as a visible beacon to several people working in a group. If any man or machine wanders out of it zone of protection, the light turns from green to red.
Now that is a protection system where nobody gets killed.
EuclidIn the above quote by me, I am talking about the point being made in the news reports, not points being made by people discussing it here. It seems to be the most current development in the news coverage.
You have to remember that the media is in the business of getting ratings or selling papers. They don't let a little thing like facts get in the way of a good fabricated story. Accuracy be damned. Get the story out NOW!
It's the responsibility of the EIC to have protection in place, and to communicate that information to those who need to know, who need to communicate that to subordinates, etc, etc. It's probably a pyramid with a big crew, such as Balt has mentioned.
It's also in the rules (and normal practice) to hold a job briefing at the start of the shift, and any time anything changes. That's true for train crews, MOW, everyone.
If it's a large crew, the practice may have been to pass the briefing down the ladder, as opposed to trying to brief several dozen to 100+ people at the same time. That will undoubtedly be addressed by NTSB and in the safety stand-down.
What remains to be seen is where any breakdowns in communication may have occurred. For that we'll probably have to wait for NTSB to tell us.
We also don't know if the backhoe operator was on the track in question because he mistakenly believed that said track was protected, because he was "freelancing," or for some other reason. Again, we'll have to wait.
I would opine that the media using the possible cell phone involvement is akin to how they recently tried to tie the Kansas incident in with previous Amtrak incidents.
tree68 Euclid So then I don’t understand why a point is being made about the new shift not hearing the previous shift’s permission being canceled over the phone transmission. Just another possibility amongst the many we've discussed here. No more or less a big deal than anything else. As Balt points out, there likely were folks who were aware that the foul time had been cancelled. It appears that the word didn't make it all the way to the bottom.
Euclid So then I don’t understand why a point is being made about the new shift not hearing the previous shift’s permission being canceled over the phone transmission.
Just another possibility amongst the many we've discussed here. No more or less a big deal than anything else.
As Balt points out, there likely were folks who were aware that the foul time had been cancelled. It appears that the word didn't make it all the way to the bottom.
In the above quote by me, I am talking about the point being made in the news reports, not points being made by people discussing it here. It seems to be the most current development in the news coverage.
When you say it appears that word did not reach the bottom, it sounds like you are saying that therefore, the bottom (track people) did not realize permission had been cancelled; i.e. they never got that word, so they proceeded unprotected, but they believed they were protected.
Others here seem to say that it is the responsiblity of the new track crew to seek and recieve fouling permission before fouling any track. If that is their responsibility, what difference does it make if word of cancellation of the previous shift's permission did not get to the next shift? The next shift is not allowed to assume that protection exists simply because they never heard of it being cancelled.
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