wanswheel Balt, no doubt, but would the dispatcher not give permission? Excerpt from Wall Street Journal, Apr. 7 The Federal Railroad Administration directed Amtrak on Wednesday to conduct immediate safety reviews, citing violations that came to light after Sunday’s fatal crash in Pennsylvania. The U.S. Department of Transportation’s FRA said it told the national passenger railroad on Wednesday to perform a “safety stand-down”—a review of basic work-safety protocols—with its track workers and train dispatchers, even as two federal investigations into Sunday’s collision continue… The Wall Street Journal reported earlier this week that a basic safety device that might have prevented the crash—a removable circuit used to “shunt” tracks and trigger a red stop signal—wasn't in place, despite Amtrak rules that require such a device in most situations.
Balt, no doubt, but would the dispatcher not give permission?
Excerpt from Wall Street Journal, Apr. 7
The Federal Railroad Administration directed Amtrak on Wednesday to conduct immediate safety reviews, citing violations that came to light after Sunday’s fatal crash in Pennsylvania.
The U.S. Department of Transportation’s FRA said it told the national passenger railroad on Wednesday to perform a “safety stand-down”—a review of basic work-safety protocols—with its track workers and train dispatchers, even as two federal investigations into Sunday’s collision continue…
The Wall Street Journal reported earlier this week that a basic safety device that might have prevented the crash—a removable circuit used to “shunt” tracks and trigger a red stop signal—wasn't in place, despite Amtrak rules that require such a device in most situations.
MofW does not get everything they ask for when the ask for it. Some things they ask for are impossible to grant, in accordance with the rules. Some things they ask for are impossible to grant with the location and priority of trains.
The Train Dispatcher is the supreme 'traffic cop' do something that the Train Dispatcher has not authorized at the risk of your personal safety as well as the safety of retaining your job.
MofW requests will be granted whenever possible to do so.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
A shunt can be used ONLY if you have the Train Dispatchers authority to apply it. Main Tracks are the Train Dispatchers - to do ANYTHING on the Main Tracks (and others as specified in the Book of Rules and/or TTSI) you must have the Train Dispatchers permission/authority.
dehusmanThe requirement to create "on track" protection for a vehicle that isn't "on track" is very difficult. PTC prevents a train from exceeding its authority or from entering another authority.
And how far a reach is to expect that individual workers would have to have some sort of personal locator system that ensures that they don't "exceed their authority" by wandering too far and in the wrong direction? Such locator systems exist for firefighters, although they are expensive and therefore not widely deployed.
There are plenty of procedures in place to protect work sites now. But everyone has to use those procedures, and properly. In this case, it appears something was lacking. Eventually we'll find out exactly what it was.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
It seems a shunting device would've been the only way for PTC to stop the train in time. Excerpt from Wall Street Journal, Apr. 5
Had a shunt been used, Amtrak’s computerized collision-avoidance system known as positive train control, or PTC, could have prevented the accident, said Steven Ditmeyer, a former federal railroad official and Virginia-based consultant who has advised the U.S. government and transportation industry groups but not Amtrak.
“It would have triggered the signal system, which would have triggered PTC,” Mr. Ditmeyer said of the shunting device. “I can think of no reason that there would not be a shunt in place” when maintenance is under way.
EuclidThey do refer to such backhoe protection as apparently requiring wireless sending receiving equipment onboard.
The requirement to create "on track" protection for a vehicle that isn't "on track" is very difficult.
PTC prevents a train from exceeding its authority or from entering another authority.
If we extend that to the backhoe, keeping it from exceeding its authority means it can't go where it doesn't have authority. On a train that means set the brakes and stop movement. The other option is keeping it fron entering another authority, which in this case would be keeping the backhoe from entering the trains's authority. On a train that means set the brakes and stop movement. What is the equivalent for a backhoe?
With a train the function is purely a "linear" question. The authority is a "line" and PTC requires the engine to know what line its on, what boundaries are on the line, where it is on that line and whether its operation is predicted to not exceed those boundaries. PTC assumes a train as a one dimensional object. It only has position/length. A train on one track has no interaction with a train on an adjacent track.
On the other hand a work group has positon/length and width, its two dimensional. A work group on one track may have interactions with trains or work groups on another track. A backhoe is not rail bound so it has no fixed position relative to the track. Assume the position locator is on the cab of the backhoe. If the track runs E-W and the backhoe is oriented E-W then the backhoe is most likely entirely coincident to the track. But if the backhoe is oriented N-S then most likely one or both ends of the backhoe will foul an adjacent track, even though the position locator is centered over the track its authorized on.
You would have to equip the backhoe with the same computer system that an engine is equipped with (computer, radio equipment, transponder, power supply) except that most of the functions would be irrelevant (backhoes don't operate on main track authority, backhoes don't have speed restrictions, backhoes don't care about signal indication, backhoes don't care about switch positions, backhoes don't care about track occupancy, etc)
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
"The TSR's are supposed to protect work zones." - quoting myself
Dehusman... Thank you; you're right. TSR's do not provide protection by themselves. I forgot the word "help". TSR's issued through ACSES help to protect work zones; usually in conjuntion with track & time authority. Per the link that I provided from Siemens, "ACSES II provides vehicle and track maintenance information in real time".
CC
There are news articles that refer to PTC at the Amtrak site having been operational, and that it failed to protect the backhoe as it was intended to do. But I can’t tell if these articles are misunderstanding the role of PTC in this case or not.
They do refer to such backhoe protection as apparently requiring wireless sending receiving equipment onboard. When Amtrak was asked if this was the case, they either said they would not comment or that they did not know.
In other coverage, it was stated that Amtrak is in a difficult position of needed to decide whether to spend money on such onboard equipment for the protection of backhoes, or to spend it on infrastructure upgrade.
With all the recent talk of PTC protection being essential in the U.S., it puts the spotlight on wrecks such as this one occurring on a system that now has PTC protection. That might explain the hemming and hawing about why the backhoe may or may not have been equipped. Maybe that is why Schumer was assuring us that we needn’t worry about safety because there is a 20-step-protocol in place.
EuclidPrevent train incursions into roadway workers within an established work zone.
Here is the key. PTC will prevent incursions into established work zones. The instant that the night EIC released his foul time the work zone ceased to exist from the standpoint of the dispatching system and PTC. The instant the foul time was released the work zone was no longer "established".
The real questions I am sure the NTSB is asking are:
Was the foul time properly released?
Why was the foul time released?
Was it communicated to the relieving EIC?
Why did the relieving EIC allow work to begin without confirming that foul time was applied to the required tracks?
What was the job briefing to the work group?
Why did the backhoe operator foul the other track if it wasn't protected?
What types of protection was the gan using besides foul time?
Plus a zillion more questions. We really don't have the answer to any of those questions.
Chris30"Dispatchers can enter daily temporary speed restrictions and know that the ACSES II equipped trains will enforce them". The TSR's are supposed to protect work zones.
Temporary speed restrictions do NOT provide worker protection. Temporary speed restrictions temporaily reduce the track speed within certain limits. They have NOTHING to do with worker protection. For example on the western roads a Form A bulletin are the temporary speed restrictions and a Form B bulletin are the work protection bulletins. A form B may or may not have a speed restriction associated with it. A form A may or may not coincide with a work zone. They are two different things and have different purposes.
There are 4 categories of protection for gangs:
1. Track authority - that is some sort of authority issued by the dispatcher that protects the limits. It interacts with the dispatching systems and whatever version of PTC if used on the territory. The authority will be created by the dispatcher at the request of the EIC and is removed at the request of the EIC (in a few case it may have a time limit and expire at the end of that limit). It this type of protection is not in place then PTC will NOT know about or provide protection. It either exists of it doesn't.
2. Signal systems - if there is an automatic block signal system on the track then something that shunts the rails or creates a track occupancy will set the signals to stop at the entrances to the block. That could be a piece of equipment that shunts the track, a track shunt, a switch placed in manual operation, a switch opened , a rail joint disconnected or a rail removed or cut. If the signal system is shunted automatic systems like PTC will restrict the movement into the block and it will be visible to the dispatcher on a system like CTC. If there is nothing that creates a track occupancy than the signal system will not provide restrictive signals.
3. Documentation - if the method of protection involves some form of written documentation to the train crew that work is being done on the track then the train crew will have that documentation in their paperwork. Generally only those types of work that are planned 12-16 hours in advance generate paperwork to the crew because that is the lead time required to safely distribute it. "Ad hoc" work will generally not rely on paper documentation. Paper document protection is the least flexible and potentially has the biggest footprint.
4. Physical warning systems - range from flags and signs to watchmen to flagmen. Flags, flagmen and signs warn trains they are approaching a work area, watchmen warn people in the work area trains are approaching. Depending on the type of warning, the warning could indicate a reduction in speed or a stop. Depending on the type of warning and the work being done, the train could be verbally instructed by the EIC to stop, reduce speed or proceed at maximum speed.
Not all work requires all types of protection. Some protection is mutually exclusive. Some types of protection are only available in certain areas where certain types of main track authority or signal systems are used.
The responsibility to establish protection and the choice of which available protection is used for what work belongs with the people doing the work. They have the authority and the requirement to request the protection and they have the authority to remove the protection. The dispatcher has responsibility to establish protection based on track authority and documentation. The work group has responsibility to establish protection by signals or physical warnings.
This is quite detailed and informative:
http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/safety/two-killed-in-wreck-of-amtrak-palmetto.html?channel=60
Here is a little more reflection on what PTC is supposed to do as it relates to the question of what it was expected to in the case of this backhoe on the track. Judging from some of the latest news, that question does not appear to have a straight answer when posed to Amtrak.
* Positive train control (PTC) is a system of functional requirements for monitoring and controlling train movements to provide increased safety. The American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way Association (AREMA) describes PTC as having four primary characteristics:
The four cardinal PTC principles mandated under RSIA (Rail Safety Improvement Act) of 2008 are:
"Investigators are looking at the possibility that as a day crew began track work, the foul time was improperly canceled."
Perhaps improperly cancelled is another way of saying that the dispatcher (DS) didn't reissue the track and time for the day crew as may have been necessary with a new Foreman in Charge.
On the Northeast Corridor Amtrak uses their form positive train control (PTC) called: Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES II). This is a cab signaled system that's in place on most, but not all of the NEC. One of the newer features is temporary speed restrictions (TSR's). (1) "Dispatchers can enter daily temporary speed restrictions and know that the ACSES II equipped trains will enforce them". The TSR's are supposed to protect work zones.
A lot of frustrated questions I know. The only thing that I can say for sure is that rule #1 safety was violated and it cost two longtime employess their lives. (The supervisor who tried to warn the backhoe operator and died doing so is a hero in my book.)
(1) http://w3.usa.siemens.com/mobility/us/en/Events/railway-interchange/Documents/SIE_BRO_ACSES%20II.pdf
Here's another good link with more information on ACSES (reference pages 14 &15 of the PDF:
https://www.amtrak.com/ccurl/774/37/Amtrak-Ink-Jan-Feb-2015.pdf
I am not sure what to make of this:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/06/amtrak-crash-train-safety-system-concerns
From the article:
“A newly upgraded safety system and regulations governing track maintenance should have been enough to prevent a fatal collision between an Amtrak passenger train and a construction vehicle on Sunday.
The railroad industry’s state-of-the-art safety technology – a package of communications and engineering upgrades known as positive train control (PTC) – was in place and operational at the site of the deadly crash, an Amtrak spokesman confirmed. But some actions normally expected from the system did not occur: the alerting of the train’s engineer and the automatic slowing or stopping of the locomotive.”
dehusman I've had to go track down EIC's at the motel when they failed to give up some authority on the main track before they tied up for the night.
I've had to go track down EIC's at the motel when they failed to give up some authority on the main track before they tied up for the night.
As have I. And it doesn't matter if you can't find him/her, you do not release his/her blocking without talking to them.
An "expensive model collector"
blue streak 1 Is the procedure of a shift change require the going off duty requester to release or is the new supervisor able to request the foul time to be continued / extended ?
Something I don't want to do is "take the railroad home with me." As Balt notes, the foreman owns the action (block, OOS, etc). It's in his name. As such, if Joe goes home and I take over as foreman, I can't cancel the block/OOS when we get done - he has to.
I've encountered this, but not under MOW. Since many of our runs are after the DS goes off duty, the conductor will hold the paper until the next day. If I don't call the DS as soon as they go on duty, sometimes freight folks want track, but since I still "own" it, the DS can't give it to them. So I'll get a phone call.
Here is a close up of the ACS-64. This poster is somewhat amazed at the lack of damage after hitting 15,000 # equipment at a speed just under 106 MPH
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=4434018
Another question. This appeared to be at a shift change always a problem in any construction / maintenance work. If foul time for track #3 was released why ? Is the procedure of a shift change require the going off duty requester to release or is the new supervisor able to request the foul time to be continued / extended ?
Excerpt from Wall Street Journal, Apr. 5
https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#tbm=nws&q=%22Amtrak+Crash+Probe+Indicates+Basic+Safety+Measure+Wasn%27t+Deployed%22
On Monday, Amtrak official Gary Noto asked colleagues to procure supplemental shunting devices, or SSDs, for crews to use when they perform track work in short windows known as “foul time.”
“Please get supply of SSD’s for all crews, we must use them whenever getting foul time, the only exception I can think of is the track inspector who is walking miles of track and when signal system cannot support this action,” Mr. Noto said in an email reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. “Please make it a point to be vigilant when visiting [work] gangs and do what you can to teach and mentor them, when deficiencies are observed.”
The email also urged colleagues to supply more crews with portable radios, and to install radios in all equipment that “occupies or can foul.” The email notes that Amtrak officials are “looking into going back to have equipment radios with external speakers.”
Euclid How does the one requesting the release of foul time accomplish that release?
How does the one requesting the release of foul time accomplish that release?
There are formal procedures for requesting foul time (or block protection in my carrier) and there is also formal procedures for releasing. In both cases the communication is repated by the parties involved - the TD after the request for blocking, will apply the block(s) necessary and tell the requesting party the territory that has been blocked off. The requesting party will repeat the territory that the TD has stated has been blocked off.
When it comes time to release, the party in the field will request the TD remove the blocking that has been applied on SPECIFIED territory, the TD will remove the blocking and repeat the territory that has had blocking removed. The field party will acknowledge that the TD has removed the blocking that the field party wanted removed. The blocking is applied between Control Points on track(s) as specified by the requesting party.
On large projects (track gangs, tie gangs etc.) there is ONE employee in charge. That employee is the only one authorized to communicate with the TD and that employee's instructions to field personnel (such as get in the clear - NOW) must be followed. The employee in charge is the one that requests foul time or other blocking and that is the only employee that is allowed to release the foul time or blocking. All communication between the field and the TD is recorded and available for review in these types of incidents.
The backhoe operator would not be the Employee in Charge. On my carrier the EIC's only responsibilities are to communicate with the TD and arrange track occupancy in accordance with the blocking the EIC has been provided by the TD. The EIC must insure that ALL equipment and personnel are clear of the protected limits when releasing the blocking.
This incident is 100% man failure - the NTSB report will ultimately tell us who was at fault.
Euclid Is it possible for the dispatcher to return the track to normal service without the MOW supervisor canceling the foul time?
Is it possible for the dispatcher to return the track to normal service without the MOW supervisor canceling the foul time?
If the TD wants to be terminated. Foul time is similar to Blue Flag procedures - the one requesting it must be the one to release it.
MrLynnSounds like there needs to be more redundancy: dispatcher and MOW crew BOTH should set foul time on the track(s).
The MOW supervisor calls for foul time/OOS. The dispatcher gives it out, applies blocks, etc. When done, the MOW supervisor cancels, the dispatcher returns the track to normal service.
The dispatcher has no idea of the actual conditions unless it's right outside the window. He/she has to take the word of the personnel on site.
This is sounding like both a lack of communication, especially lack of an adequate turnover between shifts/crews, and very possibly some assumptions made (incoming crew assuming they still had foul time, among other things).
We'll have to see what conclusions NTSB draws.
2015 Amtrak photo, Joseph Carter, Jr., the late backhoe operator, on the left
Joe Carter, rest in peace.
wanswheel Excerpt from Philly.com, Apr. 6 The morning of the crash, an overnight crew had been working on the rails with foul time in place, sources said. Investigators are looking at the possibility that as a day crew began track work, the foul time was improperly canceled. There are four separate tracks controlled by Amtrak in the area of the crash. The equipment, a backhoe and a ballast sweeper, was on tracks two and three. Track two was inoperable, officials said, but, because foul time was released on track three, trains were free to travel on it. The backhoe and Train 89 were both on track three.
Excerpt from Philly.com, Apr. 6
The morning of the crash, an overnight crew had been working on the rails with foul time in place, sources said. Investigators are looking at the possibility that as a day crew began track work, the foul time was improperly canceled.
There are four separate tracks controlled by Amtrak in the area of the crash. The equipment, a backhoe and a ballast sweeper, was on tracks two and three. Track two was inoperable, officials said, but, because foul time was released on track three, trains were free to travel on it. The backhoe and Train 89 were both on track three.
Schlimm, looks like it's the 'someone failed to do there job'.
from the Trains News Wire; (I probably missed this in the earlier posts, if so sorry to repeat)
“The gang had been fouling the other tracks at times and had received permission from the dispatcher to do so,” the source says. “Sunday morning, there was a shift change. The night foreman gave up all fouls (alerting train crews to the work), and the day shift foreman had not asked for any fouls.”
Seems like the more logical cause and the NTSB is the only one to set the actual cause, but it's not a flawed system.
On my carrier, all communications with the Train Dispatcher are recorded, both radio and telephone. I expect a similar system is in effect on Amtrak. The Computer Aided Dispatching System keeps a log of all signal and blocking manipulations - I expect Amtraks system is similar.
Everything that the Control Center did or said is on recorded data. What took place in the field however, isn't.
In thinking about this accident, the natural focus is on the backhoe getting struck by the train. It may be easy to overlook some of the other amazing details.
The train came upon the scene at 106 mph. The engineer dynamited by the brakes 5 seconds before impact. I suppose impact speed was nearly at 106 mph. The impact derailed the locomotive, apparently by lifting the front end and dropping it back down with the left rail approximately centered under the locomotive. Apparently, this condition offered some guidance because the derailed locomotive ran a mile this way before stopping. That must be a record.
Passengers said it was as if the train had entered a sand storm that covered the train in flying debris and blocked the vision through the windows. I can see where the “sandstorm” came from with the lead truck of the locomotive running on the concrete ties and ballast for a mile; starting at over 100 mph.
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