EuclidFinding the cause of this accident does indeed require discovering who was to blame. My point is that either the train or the backhoe had to be in an unauthorized location in order for the collision to have occurred.
And part of my point is that, unless the train were dramatically overspeeding, "it" could not possibly have been in an 'unauthorized location' in and of itself ... or arguably with any responsibility or blame appertaining to any of its crew.
Now, I happen to agree completely that the likely "blame" for this incident rests squarely with whoever (and it might be more than one person, or set of procedures) routed the Palmetto on a track adjacent to a work zone at 110 mph. I (and this is 'personally') think that very little if any blame applies to the train crew either for not 'recognizing' they were on such a track, or for doing something -- what that something might have been, I don't really know, at that speed -- to slow down the train when they first saw or encountered the work zone and recognized it was adjacent to the track they were on. The train had nowhere to go, just as an earlier counterpart had nowhere to 'dodge' at Gunpow/Chase.
Now, I was reminded of that earlier video where the railcar(?) contacts the material handler that turns into the ROW unexpectedly. Something I expect to 'develop' here is that the backhoe people EXPECTED that 'adjacent' track to be clear of traffic, as indicated in an earlier post here, and thought they could encroach on it when moving to work in some way... perhaps even expecting the approaching high-speed train would surely be 'one track further over'...
(no need here to capitalize any letters in 'assume'; we'd all get it but it's too much gallows humor just yet...)
RME Euclid At this point, I must conclude that either the backhoe was in the wrong place, or the train was in the wrong place. It could have been either one.
Euclid At this point, I must conclude that either the backhoe was in the wrong place, or the train was in the wrong place. It could have been either one.
Finding the cause of this accident does indeed require discovering who was to blame.
My point is that either the train or the backhoe had to be in an unauthorized location in order for the collision to have occurred. The near universal assumption in the news is that the backhoe was in an unauthorized location. I have already seen one comment calling the track workers "idiots." No sign yet of the Darwin Award.
dehusman It wan't that the backhoe operator was just a bit off center and the train scraped the backhoe, he was substantially fouling the other track in order for the damage to be enough to crush the front of the engine and derail it.
Has that actually been substantiated? I'd think that at 110 mph relative velocity even a slight 'interference' might transfer enough momentum or shock to pull the backhoe into closer contact and thence destructive 'disassembly'.
The point that Euclid is making is I think a better one: who thought up the idea that merely shunting a track would justify unrestricted 110mph operation on a closely adjacent track, with workers present? Most states have now adopted 'move over' laws to keep traffic at least a lane separate from presumably-working 'responders' even when the usual sorts of speed reductions for emergency flashing lights are being observed.
Note I'm not saying this accident would have been 'prevented' if the backhoe had fouled and been contacted at some lower, protected speed. What I am wondering about is whether the force that drove the incident would have been reduced, and perhaps greatly reduced, quite probably to a degree that would not have produced the derailment observed or the secondary impact to the train where it occurred.
Perhaps Dave H can expand on this, but I've done considerable photography of MOW in progress and never seen a train allowed through at track speed no matter how far away the crew was from the track. Slow orders and noise have always been enforced. NEC may have different rules.
Norm
dehusman Euclid I think the point is that the shunt would be used to protect all tracks that the equipment is either on or fouling. Ideally, this system would enable the operator of the equipment to have direct feedback indicating that the track he is fouling (either by being on it or reaching to foul it) is locked out of service. The idea would be to provide an automatically enforced system of interlocking that would protect against this nonsene of distant parties being confused by a shift change A shunt is two C clamps with a piece of wire with a resistor that you clamp to both rails to cause the signal system to display an occupancy. I've used them many times. If sets the signals to STOP on the track they are applied. They are used on the track that the work is being performed in order to create a posititive occupancy on that track. It does not in any way communicate with anything else. You do not put a shunt on a "live" track because its a track on which train traffic is permitted. All the shunts in the world ONLY work if the people working on the tracks stay on the tracks that are shunted. If the people working on the tracks foul any other track, then they are outside their work area and outside their protection. This isn't rocket science. It wan't that the backhoe operator was just a bit off center and the train scraped the backhoe, he was substantially fouling the other track in order for the damage to be enough to crush the front of the engine and derail it. The question we don't know the answer to is why.
Euclid I think the point is that the shunt would be used to protect all tracks that the equipment is either on or fouling. Ideally, this system would enable the operator of the equipment to have direct feedback indicating that the track he is fouling (either by being on it or reaching to foul it) is locked out of service. The idea would be to provide an automatically enforced system of interlocking that would protect against this nonsene of distant parties being confused by a shift change
A shunt is two C clamps with a piece of wire with a resistor that you clamp to both rails to cause the signal system to display an occupancy. I've used them many times. If sets the signals to STOP on the track they are applied. They are used on the track that the work is being performed in order to create a posititive occupancy on that track. It does not in any way communicate with anything else.
You do not put a shunt on a "live" track because its a track on which train traffic is permitted.
All the shunts in the world ONLY work if the people working on the tracks stay on the tracks that are shunted. If the people working on the tracks foul any other track, then they are outside their work area and outside their protection. This isn't rocket science. It wan't that the backhoe operator was just a bit off center and the train scraped the backhoe, he was substantially fouling the other track in order for the damage to be enough to crush the front of the engine and derail it. The question we don't know the answer to is why.
All I said was to outline a basic concept of positively taking a track out of service. Some of this may be current practice and some may not. That is why I used the term "ideally" in refering to the basic concept. But you act like you find major disagreement with my point, and yet none of what you say conflicts with what I said.
One thing about what you say puzzles me. You keep saying that the backhoe was fouling the track, therefore you imply that the mistake was that the backhoe was where it was not authorized to be. How do you reach that conclusion? The fact that the backhoe was struck by the train does not prove that the backhoe was in the wong place. How can be so sure that the train was not on the wrong track?
http://www.sandcco.com/testing%20shunts.htm#bag
are these the Shunts?
Still waiting for an answer why train #89 was authorized for 110 MPH on track 3 adjaecent to work track 4 ? Why was 89 not put on track 2 which would have been away from work zone. Sunday morning certainly is not a busy time on the RR at that location..
Can we get a picture of circut shunts I cant seem to find any on google images
EuclidI think the point is that the shunt would be used to protect all tracks that the equipment is either on or fouling. Ideally, this system would enable the operator of the equipment to have direct feedback indicating that the track he is fouling (either by being on it or reaching to foul it) is locked out of service. The idea would be to provide an automatically enforced system of interlocking that would protect against this nonsene of distant parties being confused by a shift change
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
EuclidAt this point, I must conclude that either the backhoe was in the wrong place, or the train was in the wrong place. It could have been either one.
This is not a 'conclusion' -- it does not matter to the accident who was in the 'wrong' place. The correct way to address this situation is not to assign blame to the guilty (or call them 'idiots' whether "merited by their actions" or not), nor is it to find better and more complete ways to specify who has the priority or right-of-way in standard operating procedure. What's needed is a way to pick up on the 'interference condition', notify both parties promptly (or, in the case of a backhoe fouling an adjacent track envelope, pre-emptively), and then have your drilled-in 'standard operating procedure' act to eliminate the condition before the accident can occur.
Note that there's a difference between this and an edict like 'starting as of now there will be no longer be hard landings at this airport' ...
What I find most interesting is the near universal assumption by the media that the backhoe was in the wrong place due to its operator and supervisor making what is being universally referred to as a “colossal mistake.”
At this point, I must conclude that either the backhoe was in the wrong place, or the train was in the wrong place. It could have been either one. The position of both the train and the backhoe was determined by a system that could have made the colossal mistake in granting authority to either the backhoe or the train.
It appears to me that the media cannot assimilate the possibility that the train could have been mistakenly routed. They apparently are projecting their view based on grade crossing crashes where the vehicle is always where it is not supposed to be. In a grade crossing crash, there is no possibility that the train was in the wrong place. So the media appears to be projecting that grade crossing assumption to this backhoe crash, with the backhoe just thought to be one more item that trains hit as they do at grade crossings.
dehusman Euclid The article says it is not clear whether the shunting device was being used. My only point was that such a device was part of the practice to take a track out of service with full protection, as I speculated about earlier. Why it was not used, or why it was used, but did not work is not clear. The shunting device would be used on the train on which the work was being performed. If the train was not on the track on which the work was being performed then the shunting device was irrelevant. If the backhoe was on or fouling the track the train was on, a track other than the track on which the work was being performed, then the shunting device is irrelevant.
Euclid The article says it is not clear whether the shunting device was being used. My only point was that such a device was part of the practice to take a track out of service with full protection, as I speculated about earlier. Why it was not used, or why it was used, but did not work is not clear.
The shunting device would be used on the train on which the work was being performed. If the train was not on the track on which the work was being performed then the shunting device was irrelevant.
If the backhoe was on or fouling the track the train was on, a track other than the track on which the work was being performed, then the shunting device is irrelevant.
I think the point is that the shunt would be used to protect all tracks that the equipment is either on or fouling. Ideally, this system would enable the operator of the equipment to have direct feedback indicating that the track he is fouling (either by being on it or reaching to foul it) is locked out of service.
The idea would be to provide an automatically enforced system of interlocking that would protect against this nonsene of distant parties being confused by a shift change.
MrLynnI'm wondering about the speed. The train was at 106 mph, close to top track speed. Is is common to run that fast through a work zone? The NEC trains I've been on usually slow down considerably and toot their horns a lot when passing MOW crews.
Depending on the work being done and the clearance to workers on the ground, the speed past a gang may be restricted. If all the workers are clear of the track by 25 feet and anybody on the adjacent track is in the cab of a piece of work equipment, then they may have been able to do max speed. That's another piece of the puzzle that says the backhoe was not where it was supposed to be. Everything else looks like it was supposed to be set up for the workers to be clear of active tracks (and probably the track being worked on). The way the dispatcher routed the train, the way the train was moving, all consistent with the workers being on the ground clear of the active track and the track being worked on.
EuclidThe article says it is not clear whether the shunting device was being used. My only point was that such a device was part of the practice to take a track out of service with full protection, as I speculated about earlier. Why it was not used, or why it was used, but did not work is not clear.
The shunting device would be used on the track on which the work was being performed. If the train was not on the track on which the work was being performed then the shunting device was irrelevant.
"The train was operating at a speed below its maximum for the track and location where it was."
I'm wondering about the speed. The train was at 106 mph, close to top track speed. Is is common to run that fast through a work zone? The NEC trains I've been on usually slow down considerably and toot their horns a lot when passing MOW crews.
/Mr Lynn
dehusman Euclid Thinking about that question causes me to have this question: When this occupancy authority is granted, is it only by instructional communication or orders? Wouldn’t there be a way to actually lock a track out of service through signal indications? That latest news makes it sound like there was some sort of loss of communication over the track authority. It seems like there ought to be something more definite than a set of rules and communications that could be mistakenly omitted, if that is what happened. PTC would not (and did not) prevent this collision because PTC is not designed to prevent this type of incident. The work gang had authority on its track. The train had authority on its track. The train was operating at a speed below its maximum for the track and location where it was. PTC is satisfied. Everybody has met their requirements.
Euclid Thinking about that question causes me to have this question: When this occupancy authority is granted, is it only by instructional communication or orders? Wouldn’t there be a way to actually lock a track out of service through signal indications? That latest news makes it sound like there was some sort of loss of communication over the track authority. It seems like there ought to be something more definite than a set of rules and communications that could be mistakenly omitted, if that is what happened.
PTC would not (and did not) prevent this collision because PTC is not designed to prevent this type of incident.
The work gang had authority on its track.
The train had authority on its track.
The train was operating at a speed below its maximum for the track and location where it was.
PTC is satisfied. Everybody has met their requirements.
The article that I quoted from in reference to the point about PTC contained quotes by experts that claimed that PTC would have protected against this type of collision. Unfortunately, the article is now locked except for those who are registered.
dehusman BaltACD The fact that the NTSB reported the speed of the train to be 106 MPH in a 110 zone says on it's face that there was no shunted track circuit on the track the train was operationg. Nothing I have read to date has identified if the backhoe was ON or FOULING the track the train was operating on. I would think that the train hit the backhoe would be evidence that the backhoe was on or fouling the track the train was operating on. Normally trains don't reach out and smack something not on their track.
BaltACD The fact that the NTSB reported the speed of the train to be 106 MPH in a 110 zone says on it's face that there was no shunted track circuit on the track the train was operationg. Nothing I have read to date has identified if the backhoe was ON or FOULING the track the train was operating on.
I would think that the train hit the backhoe would be evidence that the backhoe was on or fouling the track the train was operating on. Normally trains don't reach out and smack something not on their track.
I think Balt’s point was that we don’t know whether the backhoe was on or fouling the live track. Obviously we do know that it was one or the other.
BaltACD Euclid This is what I had in mind in my previous post. It is quite an informative article: “As a backup, Amtrak rules often require a “supplemental shunting device” to be put in place on the tracks where work is being performed. The device interrupts the track circuit in such a way that the train engineer receives a red signal light to stop the train. It isn’t clear whether the shunting device was being used, according to the people familiar with the matter.” http://www.wsj.com/articles/amtrak-supervisor-was-trying-to-save-colleague-when-both-died-1459803669 The fact that the NTSB reported the speed of the train to be 106 MPH in a 110 zone says on it's face that there was no shunted track circuit on the track the train was operationg. Nothing I have read to date has identified if the backhoe was ON or FOULING the track the train was operating on.
Euclid This is what I had in mind in my previous post. It is quite an informative article: “As a backup, Amtrak rules often require a “supplemental shunting device” to be put in place on the tracks where work is being performed. The device interrupts the track circuit in such a way that the train engineer receives a red signal light to stop the train. It isn’t clear whether the shunting device was being used, according to the people familiar with the matter.” http://www.wsj.com/articles/amtrak-supervisor-was-trying-to-save-colleague-when-both-died-1459803669
This is what I had in mind in my previous post. It is quite an informative article:
“As a backup, Amtrak rules often require a “supplemental shunting device” to be put in place on the tracks where work is being performed. The device interrupts the track circuit in such a way that the train engineer receives a red signal light to stop the train. It isn’t clear whether the shunting device was being used, according to the people familiar with the matter.”
http://www.wsj.com/articles/amtrak-supervisor-was-trying-to-save-colleague-when-both-died-1459803669
The fact that the NTSB reported the speed of the train to be 106 MPH in a 110 zone says on it's face that there was no shunted track circuit on the track the train was operationg. Nothing I have read to date has identified if the backhoe was ON or FOULING the track the train was operating on.
The article says it is not clear whether the shunting device was being used. My only point was that such a device was part of the practice to take a track out of service with full protection, as I speculated about earlier. Why it was not used, or why it was used, but did not work is not clear.
Going back to Schumer’s reassurance about the “20-step-protocol,” some have said that if rules are too complex, that alone raises a danger. They have a point. Without seeing the rules, it is hard to assess that possibility of complicated rules being at fault.
However, some of the coverage of this crash refers to confusion in the communication of the protection process being caused by the shift change. The frivolity of that excuse leads me to conclude rules and authority alone is a defective form of protection.
BaltACDThe fact that the NTSB reported the speed of the train to be 106 MPH in a 110 zone says on it's face that there was no shunted track circuit on the track the train was operationg. Nothing I have read to date has identified if the backhoe was ON or FOULING the track the train was operating on.
EuclidThinking about that question causes me to have this question: When this occupancy authority is granted, is it only by instructional communication or orders? Wouldn’t there be a way to actually lock a track out of service through signal indications? That latest news makes it sound like there was some sort of loss of communication over the track authority. It seems like there ought to be something more definite than a set of rules and communications that could be mistakenly omitted, if that is what happened.
The problem is that the backhoe WASN'T where it was supposed to be. It was on or fouling the live track on which the train was operating. PTC can't detect that, PTC doesn't protect against that. The protection against somebody randomly driving a vehicle across a live track rests with the operator of the vehicle.
This is not to say there weren't possible lapses in the processes. The backhoe driver may not have been told the other track was a live track. Any number of things could have gone wrong. But the other possibility is that the track was properly protected for the work being done, the backhoe operator could have been told not to foul the other track , the train, the dispatcher and everybody else on the gang could have been doing exactly as required and it was just the backhoe operator made a decision to foul the other track at exactly the wrong time.
The NTSB will have to figure that one out.
BaltACDNothing I have read to date has identified if the backhoe was ON or FOULING the track the train was operating on.
My impression based on the damage is that they were fouling - but we don't know yet, and I am just guessing.
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Euclid The question about PTC does not seem unreasonable. The public does not know the answer, and the crash raises the question. Thinking about that question causes me to have this question: When this occupancy authority is granted, is it only by instructional communication or orders? Wouldn’t there be a way to actually lock a track out of service through signal indications? That latest news makes it sound like there was some sort of loss of communication over the track authority. It seems like there ought to be something more definite than a set of rules and communications that could be mistakenly omitted, if that is what happened.
The question about PTC does not seem unreasonable. The public does not know the answer, and the crash raises the question.
Thinking about that question causes me to have this question: When this occupancy authority is granted, is it only by instructional communication or orders?
Wouldn’t there be a way to actually lock a track out of service through signal indications? That latest news makes it sound like there was some sort of loss of communication over the track authority. It seems like there ought to be something more definite than a set of rules and communications that could be mistakenly omitted, if that is what happened.
Can't speak for Amtrak rules and procedures on the NEC.
On my carrier, MofW establishes a Work Zone with limits and tracks of their choosing. Esablishment of the Work Zone reqires trains to receive permission from the Employee in Charge for PERMISSION to pass through the zone - that permission may include speed restricions to apply within the zone. If trains have not received permission of the EIC, they must stop at the entry limit of the work zone until permission is received. Establishment of the Work Zone does not give MofW authority to occupy or foul the track, in an of itself. The EIC must communicate with the Train Dispatcher to occupy or foul tracks within the Work Zone, when permission is granted appropriate blocking procedures are enacted in the Computer Aided Dispatching System to identify the track(s) blocked and the employee holding that block authority. Signals may be lined into the area of the Work Zone, as trains MUST get permission of the EIC to pass through the Work Zone. In multiple track territory, normally MofW will be doing 'heavy' work on one track and passing trains on adjacent track(s). Establishment of a Work Zone also allows Work Trains to work directly in association with other MofW on track equipment, which would not be possible without the establishment of the Work Zone, as one main point of our Operating Rules is to keep MofW equipment and trains apart.
PTC as being implemented on my carrier, will provide protection against MofW Work Zones and other MofW authorities that have been issued through the use of the CADS as well as protecting against temporary Slow Orders that MofW issue.
I have no idea if the Amtrak ASESS system has such functions.
I believe it is Booth St. The overpass shown in one of the videos of the incident matches the profile.
I think looking at the pictures the train stopped south of the Highland Av SEPTA(Chester, Pa) station.
Looking at the south of following street location, the train stopped about where you can see an Acela train set on GoogleMaps:
Highland Av & 6th St - MBFS, Chester, PA
latest after NTSB report
http://www.nbcnews.com/video/investigators-human-error-may-have-caused-deadly-amtrak-crash-658806851533
FWIW The pictures I saw in USA TODAY show the mile marker as 15.3. If I am reading the numbers on the pole correctly.
Also here is the map from Sunday's Trains News Wire piece: http://trn.trains.com/sitefiles/resources/image.aspx?item={761C3905-23F4-43DA-9E0C-5B2E1893D418}
I'll try to get a street location on GoogleMaps.
So, now the news anchors on ABC, both local affiliate and national news, are asking, "Why didn't Positive Train Control prevent this crash?".
The news media really does zero research on any of the stories they run.
PTC will assist with overspeed incidents, and preventing collisions between trains, not other items that shouldn't be there, like automobiles, or construction equipment like a backhoe.
They also stated that the backhoe was on an adjacent track, with the Loram equipment, and failed to clear. Take that info for what it is worth based on the other part of said report on PTC....
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