How do you think at 180 MPH? Now Navy Aircraft Deck hands do it all the time
schlimm mudchicken schlimm It shows that the railroads still have a problem with collisions with other trains and vehicles. humans. Hey, drawing red lines through another's post is rude. What is your solution to the "human" problem? Automation?
mudchicken schlimm It shows that the railroads still have a problem with collisions with other trains and vehicles. humans.
schlimm It shows that the railroads still have a problem with collisions with other trains and vehicles. humans.
It shows that the railroads still have a problem with collisions with other trains and vehicles. humans.
Hey, drawing red lines through another's post is rude. What is your solution to the "human" problem? Automation?
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
BaltACDThe theory being that the financial effects of injuries and human factor incidents cost more than minor dips in efficiency. Don't know that I fully agree with the theory, but I am not in a position to view the comparitive bottom lines.
Cogent analysis beyond the "offical story" of a spreadsheet. Thanks!
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
schlimm BaltACD Doubtless true, but I wonder if it is also related to a likely decline in the number of workers there?
BaltACD
Doubtless true, but I wonder if it is also related to a likely decline in the number of workers there?
Two things above the reduced number of employees. Second time around Baltimore was not the headquarters of the Employer, therefore most employees didn't have a contact in the Company leadership to protect them; The change in culture was REAL, company officials were measured more on their injury record and human factor incident records than on their efficiency records.
Helping to change the culture was a near total workforce turnover in a relatively short period of time. The 'old heads' didn't influence the young blood long enough for the old heads bad habits to become ingrained in the new work force.
The theory being that the financial effects of injuries and human factor incidents cost more than minor dips in efficiency. Don't know that I fully agree with the theory, but I am not in a position to view the comparitive bottom lines.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACDI worked in B&O's Baltimore Terminal in the early 70's. If the terminal went 30 days without a reportable injury it was a minor miracle. In the 21st Century the terminal has gone a year with only one reportable injury; and not just in one single year. The change in the Safety Culture between the two periods in time is the reason. If one thinks and believes Safety First rather than safety fast the culture changes.
Being this is South Philly you have to watch out for them back hoes its not a good idea to make a back hoe angry.
So long as we are human we are fallible. However, starting and ENFORCING a Safety Culture goes a long way in minimizing human error.
I worked in B&O's Baltimore Terminal in the early 70's. If the terminal went 30 days without a reportable injury it was a minor miracle. In the 21st Century the terminal has gone a year with only one reportable injury; and not just in one single year. The change in the Safety Culture between the two periods in time is the reason. If one thinks and believes Safety First rather than safety fast the culture changes.
This incident with the Rule G failures alone highlights a lack of any safety culture on Amtrak.
"HUMANS" You nailed it MC.
It shows that the railroads still have a problem with collisions with other trains and vehicles.
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015013053718;view=1up;seq=66
"The theory that all negligence which causes serious disaster will always be found to have been more or less habitual is still worthy of respect."
from "Has GR&I No.5 passed Mill Creek?" written by Harold B. Norman from the January 1974 edition of Trains magazine.
Originally from the middle column of page 44 of the 1889* (Vol. 21) Railroad Gazette, appears to be under the "EDITORIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS" heading there.
*The Trains article says it relates to an 1888 accident - not surprising that the commentary didn't appear in print until early the next year.
- Paul North.
Randy Stahl I think the FRA/NTSB will insist on a safety blitz.
I think the FRA/NTSB will insist on a safety blitz.
schlimm Euclid So, what is the source for this information about the positive drug tests for the backhoe operator, Joseph Carter Jr., and supervisor, Peter John Adamovich? And why would this information not be included in the NTSB report linked at the top of this post? That information on the two operators was included in the report. Drugs included cocaine and oxycodone, morphine and codeine. I suggest you look beyond page 1.
Euclid So, what is the source for this information about the positive drug tests for the backhoe operator, Joseph Carter Jr., and supervisor, Peter John Adamovich? And why would this information not be included in the NTSB report linked at the top of this post?
That information on the two operators was included in the report. Drugs included cocaine and oxycodone, morphine and codeine. I suggest you look beyond page 1.
Yes I now see the reference in the report posted at the top of this page by wanswheel called the MEDICAL FACTUAL REPORT. It refers to positive drug tests of the engineer, backhoe operator, and supervisor.
Previously, I had only read the 13-page HUMAN PERFORMANCE GROUP CHAIRMAN’S FACTUAL REPORT. It mentions and details the positive drug test of only the engineer, and not of the backhoe operator and supervisor.
Perhaps this divided report is why some newspapers reported positive drug tests for the engineer, backhoe operator, and supervisor; while others reported a positive drug test for only the engineer.
BaltACD My readings indicate there was a totally faulty job briefing between the Night MofW Foreman and the Day Foreman, that concluded when the Night Foreman released his Foul Protection via a cell phone when he was presumably off the property. Had foul protection been authorized by the Dispatcher trains would have been held off the tracks upon which the protection applied. Just as Train Crews can't out think Dispatchers in the moves that will be made, the Dispatcher can't out think MofW in what MofW wants to do at any point in time. MofW either has foul time or they don't. If there is no foul time - Run Trains. Daylight Foreman knew he did not have Foul Time, but he had no knowledge that the Night Foreman had released Foul Time. Comments were made that the MofW gang was waiting for the arrival of the back hoe operator. I appears that the back hoe operator arrived, fired up his equipment and occupied the track, without having any form of job briefing with any of his MofW supervisors. There area serious flaws in the Safety Culture at Amtrak as demonstrated by this incident.
My readings indicate there was a totally faulty job briefing between the Night MofW Foreman and the Day Foreman, that concluded when the Night Foreman released his Foul Protection via a cell phone when he was presumably off the property.
Had foul protection been authorized by the Dispatcher trains would have been held off the tracks upon which the protection applied. Just as Train Crews can't out think Dispatchers in the moves that will be made, the Dispatcher can't out think MofW in what MofW wants to do at any point in time. MofW either has foul time or they don't. If there is no foul time - Run Trains. Daylight Foreman knew he did not have Foul Time, but he had no knowledge that the Night Foreman had released Foul Time.
Comments were made that the MofW gang was waiting for the arrival of the back hoe operator. I appears that the back hoe operator arrived, fired up his equipment and occupied the track, without having any form of job briefing with any of his MofW supervisors.
There area serious flaws in the Safety Culture at Amtrak as demonstrated by this incident.
Likely so. Heavy duty drugs (cocaine, oxy, codeine and morphine) with the two construction operators didn't help. Looks like Amtrak needs a lot more random screens.
Appears to be Bad Communications between formen and dispatchers. Engineer was doing what he was directed to do and did not receive notice of the work zone. While he had drugs in system, they don't seem to have impaired his performance. Press jumps on word DRUG and goes crazy. Dispatcher didn't notify Engineer of possibility of foul at work site.
As I read this, the work zone clearance was released by the night foreman and no notice to train 89's crew was given that it needed to be aware of the work zone.
I live near the BNSF Chicago racetrack and the communications between the work crews, train crews, and dispatchers seem to be much more rigorous and by the numbers. I would not want to assume being able to work on track with trains approaching and passing me at more than 20 mph unless I had confidence that train crews were made aware of my presence and were instructed to obtain clearance to pass me.
Unfortunately the dead men cannot say why they thought they were ok to work on a live track.
Perhaps there needs to be a method for an employee in charge (EIC) to transfer his clearance to the next EIC without removing or interupting the clearance.
Looks like Amtrak may have some of the safety culture issues that WAMTA has.
Medical factual report
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=448761&docketID=59509&mkey=92941
EuclidSo, what is the source for this information about the positive drug tests for the backhoe operator, Joseph Carter Jr., and supervisor, Peter John Adamovich? And why would this information not be included in the NTSB report linked at the top of this post?
In reference to this report:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59999/59509/599674.pdf
In the report, it details that the engineer tested positive for drugs.
Several, if not the majority of news reports lead with this revelation in a way that seems to at least strongly imply that the accident was the fault of the engineer due to drug use. From what I know, regarding this crash sequence, there is no evidence showing that the engineer failed to perform his job in any way that could be the result of drug impairment.
Here is an example of such a story:
http://www.phillyvoice.com/ntsb-engineer-chester-amtrak-crash-tested-positive-marijuana-opioids/
However, there are other news stories that report that both track workers also tested positive for drugs. Here is an example:
http://www.providencejournal.com/news/20170127/investigators-report-3-amtrak-workers-in-fatal-crash-had-used-drugs
Quote from the link:
“All three of the people involved in a fatal Amtrak crash near Philadelphia last April tested positive for drug use, including the train's engineer and two members of a railway work crew who both were killed, according to federal investigators.”
So, what is the source for this information about the positive drug tests for the backhoe operator, Joseph Carter Jr., and supervisor, Peter John Adamovich?
And why would this information not be included in the NTSB report linked at the top of this post?
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/PR20170126b.aspx
https://news.google.com/news/story?ncl=dVrV0takLI3Go-MKv-DznHrCP7QpM&q=AMTRAK+CHESTER+NTSB&lr=English&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjTta3W7eLRAhWDRiYKHRMpBPMQqgIIJzAA
DEH: The "25 foot rule" is an FRA sponsored rule, not just the domain of the western roads. This is why you see plenty of passing sidings and 2mt's widened or built new to something in excess of 20-25 feet. (rulemaking started in 1998 and was finally first published 2008)...Can't speak to other railroads, but BNSF was already designing this way in 1993.
...ie- less than 20 feet and M/W activities stop, people in the clear and train passes by at restricted speed.
You can still build at 14 or 15 foot (state rule sets that width) track centers, but you lose a lot of operating flexibility. (plus there are main tracks and side tracks back east grandfathered-in at 12'6" still in places). Bridges tend to be the main culprit followed by R/W issues where this still happens. The 11 foot dock and team track center spacing in now outlawed everywhere AFAIK)
Not sure of the intent of the article, but given the propensity of the media to get things wrong it is impossible to determine whether or not they are pushing an agenda. The media knows little or nothing about railroads and aviation yet they publish their garbage as if they had done their homework and knew of what they spoke.
When they say the backhoe operator had the right to be on the tracks they were accurate to a point. He had the right to be on the ROW and on a specific track. Their implication is he had rights on any track. That wouldn't necessarily be correct.
Were you to follow aviation accident reports and have knowledge of airplanes and their operation, you would know they were seriously misinforming their audience. It's very likely their lack of knowledge applies to railroads too.
Norm
I get the impression that the news media is developing a stake in exonerating the backhoe operator. Obviously the information released by the NTSB is not sufficient to clear him of blame, but more than one story reads like the one I posted above, which clearly says that the backhoe operator had the right to be fouling the track at the time the train arrived. Other stories stop just sort of that conclusion such as this one where the reporter in the video says:
“The backhoe operator had a right to be on the tracks the day he was hit and killed by a train.”
The title of the video is this:
NTSB: Backhoe operator had a right to be on the tracks.
While the statement and the title may be technically correct, they could not be more misleading. They lead to this erroneous conclusion:
“The backhoe operator had a right to be on the tracks at the time he was hit and killed by a train.”
Obviously, many people reading the video title and hearing its narrative will conclude that they convey the meaning of my second (example) statement. But they do not convey that meaning because the NTSB has not said whether the backhoe had a right to be on the track it was on when the train struck it. All they have said is that the backhoe had the periodic right during a specific timeframe be on the track on which the train approached. What we need to draw any further conclusion is the knowledge of whether the periodic right existed at the time the train approached. The actual text of the article says this:
“A backhoe operator had a right to be on train tracks periodically on the weekend an Amtrak train slammed into it, killing the operator and a supervisor, federal crash investigators said Monday.”
In that statement, the inclusion of the word “periodically” is at least closer to being fair and objective than the vocal narrative of the video. But, still, when you open with even that statement in the text, it sounds like it clears the backhoe operator. What else can it mean? The actual facts of the statement offer no possible conclusion without knowing what is meant by “periodical.”
The actual facts of the statement tell us nothing. So, why did the NTSB release just this one little tidbit that tells us nothing, but lends itself to such easy spin and misinterpretation by the media? I think they should either tell us what happened sooner rather than later; or hold off on telling us anything until they can tell us everything.
To get a feel for the spin, Google this:
“backhoe operator had the right to be on the track”
Euclid It is up to the track workers to acquire foul time and it is up to the dispatcher to deliver it. Once foul time is given, it is up to the track workers to abide by its limits, and up to the dispatcher to maintain it until the track workers relinquish it. I see no reason to assume that a lack of foul time was the result of a failure to acquire it versus a failure to deliver it. A mistake could have been made in either side of the transaction. Interestingly, this news piece seems to conclude that the track on which the backhoe and train were on was out of service at the time of the crash. Apparently, it is misunderstanding of what the NTSB has said about that matter. http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2016/04/18/backhoe-amtrak-wreck-had-periodic-right-tracks/83194478/ From the article: “A backhoe and two longtime Amtrak employees, one from Delaware, were authorized to be on the railroad tracks on April 3 when a passenger train hit and killed them, federal investigators said Monday.”
It is up to the track workers to acquire foul time and it is up to the dispatcher to deliver it. Once foul time is given, it is up to the track workers to abide by its limits, and up to the dispatcher to maintain it until the track workers relinquish it.
I see no reason to assume that a lack of foul time was the result of a failure to acquire it versus a failure to deliver it. A mistake could have been made in either side of the transaction. Interestingly, this news piece seems to conclude that the track on which the backhoe and train were on was out of service at the time of the crash. Apparently, it is misunderstanding of what the NTSB has said about that matter.
http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2016/04/18/backhoe-amtrak-wreck-had-periodic-right-tracks/83194478/
From the article:
“A backhoe and two longtime Amtrak employees, one from Delaware, were authorized to be on the railroad tracks on April 3 when a passenger train hit and killed them, federal investigators said Monday.”
People from Delaware are unable to read and comprehend the report, Nothing was said in the report (brief and cloudy wording) that inferred that MofW had protection on the track the train was operating on.
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