Norm48327Can he, through the dispatcher, convey that protection to the foreman of the releiving shift or would he have to close his protevtion and the new foreman secure his?
Unlike the Form D we are issued to operate a train, which is issued to the "conductor & engineer" (C&E) of the train - not specific individuals - track permission like this would generally be issued to an individual. I don't recall any mechanism in NORAC to do the transfer you suggest.
We routinely give up our track so another train can use it almost immediately. As often as not, this is done by phone, with the two conductors standing side by side. One cancels, the other takes the phone and gets their paper for their train.
Euc - If the backhoe was working on the track in question without foul time or another blocking procedure in place, then someone screwed up by not securing that permission from the dispatcher. The question there is why, as we have been discussing.
If the backhoe was otherwise clear of the track in question but fouled it by encroaching on it (boom, bucket), or even if he drove the backhoe onto the track in question, the question then becomes whether the operator erred by fouling the active track, or whether the track should have been protected and wasn't, potentially leading the operator to believe he could foul.
There are still a lot of unknowns here, most of which we won't have an answer to until the final report is filed or someone decides to let the information out.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Euclid tree68 I'm still back at the point that the backhoe fouled the active track. That doesn't mean the backhoe was on the tracks - only that it was fouling. Unless I've missed something - was there even a need to get foul time on the active track? Did the trackhoe operator simply move outside the already authorized work zone? I saw an article last night that said that the backhoe was on the same track as the train, and the writer said it was therefore a "head on" collision. If the backhoe was on one track and fouling a second track, wouldn't it need foul protection for both tracks? At this point, I assume that either the backhoe operator mistakenly fouled a track for which he had no foul protection; or the somewhere else in the chain of communications, foul protection was removed from the backhoe without the operator and others on the ground being aware of that removed protection.
tree68 I'm still back at the point that the backhoe fouled the active track. That doesn't mean the backhoe was on the tracks - only that it was fouling. Unless I've missed something - was there even a need to get foul time on the active track? Did the trackhoe operator simply move outside the already authorized work zone?
I'm still back at the point that the backhoe fouled the active track.
That doesn't mean the backhoe was on the tracks - only that it was fouling.
Unless I've missed something - was there even a need to get foul time on the active track? Did the trackhoe operator simply move outside the already authorized work zone?
I saw an article last night that said that the backhoe was on the same track as the train, and the writer said it was therefore a "head on" collision. If the backhoe was on one track and fouling a second track, wouldn't it need foul protection for both tracks? At this point, I assume that either the backhoe operator mistakenly fouled a track for which he had no foul protection; or the somewhere else in the chain of communications, foul protection was removed from the backhoe without the operator and others on the ground being aware of that removed protection.
I am willing to bet, the supervisor that was killed knew the backhoe was not authorized on the track it occupied and was taking actions to have the backhoe operator get the backhoe off the track. Work gangs consist of up to and maybe exceed 100 people, the EIC cannot have personal communications with each person in the gang, at best he can have contact with supervisors that have responsibility for various work areas of the gang, it then becomes those supervisors responsibility to advise their people of what the working constraints are.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
An interesting article about shunts.
http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/in-transit/Amtrak-train-crash-mirrors.html
As information comes out more questions appear. It may be the overnight shift had a block on track #3. The supervisor released the track 3 and maybe even track 4 then left work scene before the next shift supervisor came on duty. Did the overnight supervisor leave because of HOS limitations ? Maybe the overnight super should have waited for day super to transfer track time ?
This work zone appears to have started Friday night and supposed to continue until very early Monday morning ? If the Loram on track 4 did not shunt the track maybe the dispatcher did not even know that there was a work zone there. The 106 MPH speed of train #89 on the adjaecent track #3 makes one wonder since track speed is not supposed to be allowed when adjaecent tracks are less than 20 feet ?
When I see gangs working on the three track BNSF racetrack, even if they are only on one track, there are red flags on all three tracks on each boundry of the work zone and I see and hear on the radio trains calling the EIC for clearance to enter and pass the crew. Usually, the EIC gives clearance to proceed at track speed, but they sometimes they request a lower speed or that the train wait for clearance. I have never seen or heard a train ignore the work zone. I suspect that since the amtrak was doing 106 mph, the engineer probably never saw any markers nor did he have notice to make any radio contact with the EIC and that the dispatcher had not established a protected zone. Or is it routine to have a work zone and not include the adjacent tracks? I sure would not want trains passing me at 110 mph without being aware of them.
Still suspect that the new (1st trick) shift failed to renew the work zone after it was released by the third trick shift.
I don't think I've seen any coverage that precisely explains the position of the backhoe, but it appears that it was on the adjacent track or between that track and the Palmetto's track. It appears that the boom struck across the front of the locomotive and spun it around to strike windows on the first Amfleet car.
There is a current discussion on the Amtrak Unlimited site in which a forum member mentions a current article in Wall Street Journal. Evidently, that article says the track had protection during the time that the night work crew was there, but that protection was released at shift change. However, the article says the employee used a cell phone for this communication with the dispatcher, rather than an Amtrak radio. If the radio had been used, the incoming work crew would have heard the communication and known the track was no longer protected. It appears that the incoming crew thought the protection was still in effect.
If this information is correct, it looks like the dispatcher and night crew employee in charge should not have communicated by cell phone; and the day crew should not have interpreted lack of information to the contrary as an indication that the track continued to be protected.
Plenty of blame to go around.
Tom
Tom,
This says the train and backhoe were on the same track. I also see this article and others is starting to mention cell phone use as you mention. I think this wreck is going to focus on an issue of safety culture.
http://www.cortezjournal.com/article/20160407/AP/304079793/AfterAmtrakworkerskilledincrashfederalregulatorsordersafetyreview
"The video showed there was construction equipment on the track and work train equipment on the track immediately adjacent to the Amtrak train's track," NTSB investigator Ryan Frigo said. "The backhoe was on the track where the Amtrak train was traveling."
Euclid Tom, This says the train and backhoe were on the same track. I also see this article and others is starting to mention cell phone use as you mention. I think this wreck is going to focus on an issue of safety culture. http://www.cortezjournal.com/article/20160407/AP/304079793/AfterAmtrakworkerskilledincrashfederalregulatorsordersafetyreview "The video showed there was construction equipment on the track and work train equipment on the track immediately adjacent to the Amtrak train's track," NTSB investigator Ryan Frigo said. "The backhoe was on the track where the Amtrak train was traveling."
It is appearing that the critical element is becoming, What kind of turnover did the Night Foreman have with the Day Foreman and specifically, what was the Day foreman told about any protections that were or were not in place.
What I am putting together, from the bits and pieces that are being reported in the media, is that there was virtually no communication between Night Foreman and Day Foremen. The Night Foreman left the property and then called in on his private phone to release the protection he was carrying. The Day Foreman, may or may not have contacted the Dispatcher for protection - if he did, he found out one of two things, protection was in place in the name of the Night Foreman or there was No Protection in place as the Night Foreman had released it.
Incident took place at approximately 8 AM; historically MofW shifts start at 7 AM (most all of the railroad crafts that operate shifts use 7AM - 3PM - 11PM as the shift starts)
I don't see the cell phone use in and of itself as a problem. When used in a prescribed manner (job briefing, not performing any "active railroading", etc), there is no problem with cell phones. Given the past focus on them, though, it's not surprising such attention may be given.
I fear this will bring undue attention on cell phones. It appears the problem was not the cell phone use in and of itself - it was the timing of the call(s) made (or not made) and an apparent lack of face-to-face communication.
From my reading of the incident, a call over the Company radio would have been heard by other employees, such as the day crew. Use of the private cell phone precluded this, and effectively deprived the day crew of useful information. There are good reasons for following prescribed communication protocols. It appears that the night supervisor should not have made the call in this way, and the Dispatcher should not have accepted it.
ACY From my reading of the incident, a call over the Company radio would have been heard by other employees, such as the day crew. Use of the private cell phone precluded this, and effectively deprived the day crew of useful information. There are good reasons for following prescribed communication protocols. It appears that the night supervisor should not have made the call in this way, and the Dispatcher should not have accepted it. Tom
Company radios have their own issues. Both the field radios and the tranmitter/receivers that allow the Dispatchers to be a part of the conversations. To have effective communications, both parties need to be able to hear each other clearly - there are times (more frequent than the companies would like to admit to) when the company radio system does not support EFFECTIVE communications.
I don't know the effectiveness of Amtrak radio system in accident area. I do know a carrier the operates in same area has been having radio communications issues in the area. Coincidence? Or is this a radio resistant area (and they do exist for whatever the reason(s))
No matter the means of release of protection - the appearant lack of communications between the Night Foreman and the Day Foreman concerning the protection is paramount.
In this area there are two radio channels commonly used - the road channel and the dispatcher's channel. Unless everyone goes over to the dispatchers channel, they wouldn't hear the communication between the EIC and the DS.
In and of itself, there is nothing wrong with the EIC talking to the DS by phone, be it cell or landline.
As Balt notes, the biggest problem appears to have been on the worksite and the failure of the two shifts to talk to each other.
If the DS had information that the ongoing work would involve the track in question, then he/she probably should have questioned what was going on.
It may also depend on what, if anything, the off-going EIC told the DS in terms what what could be expected for the day shift.
I don’t understand the issue about anybody not hearing the phone transmission. If the day foreman of the track crew did not hear the phone call that fouling permission had been retracted, does that mean that he is free to assume that it still exists from the previous shift?
It seems to me that if this permission can be retracted during a shift change, it would be required that the next shift verify whether or not the permission is still in effect.
For a new shift to proceed under the assumption that fouling permission exists because they have not heard otherwise seems like a flawed concept.
EuclidFor a new shift to proceed under the assumption that fouling permission exists because they have not heard otherwise seems like a flawed concept.
Which is pretty much where we're going with this.
Just remember the common breakdown of "assume."
tree68 Euclid For a new shift to proceed under the assumption that fouling permission exists because they have not heard otherwise seems like a flawed concept. Which is pretty much where we're going with this. Just remember the common breakdown of "assume."
Euclid For a new shift to proceed under the assumption that fouling permission exists because they have not heard otherwise seems like a flawed concept.
Well the question I have goes to that point. Is it normal, acceptable procedure for the new shift to proceed under the assumption that fouling permission exits because they have not heard otherwise? Or must the new shift proactively, and independently confirm that they have fouling permission before starting work? What is the rule about that?
If the rule mandates that the each shift must confirm fouling permission, then I don't see what the communcation from the crew reliquishing their fouling permission has to do with anything in this accident.
Euclid tree68 Euclid Which is pretty much where we're going with this. Just remember the common breakdown of "assume." Well the question I have goes to that point. Is it normal, acceptable procedure for the new shift to proceed under the assumption that fouling permission exits because they have not heard otherwise? Or must the new shift proactively, and independently confirm that they have fouling permission before starting work? What is the rule about that? If the rule mandates that the each shift must confirm fouling permission, then I don't see what the communcation from the crew reliquishing their fouling permission has to do with anything in this accident.
tree68 Euclid Which is pretty much where we're going with this. Just remember the common breakdown of "assume."
Don't know about Amtrak MofW discipline procedures. On my carrier for Dispatcher's not transfering 'protection' and the details surrounding it's granting is a fireable offence - and I have seen it applied.
tree68As Balt notes, the biggest problem appears to have been on the worksite and the failure of the two shifts to talk to each other. If the DS had information that the ongoing work would involve the track in question, then he/she probably should have questioned what was going on. It may also depend on what, if anything, the off-going EIC told the DS in terms what what could be expected for the day shift.
And until transcripts of the conversations are released we are not going to know what went wrong.
Norm
Euclid I don’t understand the issue about anybody not hearing the phone transmission. If the day foreman of the track crew did not hear the phone call that fouling permission had been retracted, does that mean that he is free to assume that it still exists from the previous shift? It seems to me that if this permission can be retracted during a shift change, it would be required that the next shift verify whether or not the permission is still in effect. For a new shift to proceed under the assumption that fouling permission exists because they have not heard otherwise seems like a flawed concept.
Nope!
That would make the day shift foreman a fool.
If foul time must continue until the employee who requested it releases it, is it customary to release it at shift change, in order to not have it last longer than necessary?
tree68 Amtrak uses NORAC, currently the 10th Edition. You can find them on-line.
Amtrak uses NORAC, currently the 10th Edition. You can find them on-line.
http://www.hubdiv.org/docs/signaling/NORAC.pdf
140. Foul Time
Foul Time may be issued only by the Dispatcher, or Operator when authorized by the Dispatcher.
a. Action Required Prior to Issuance
Before issuing or authorizing Foul Time, the Dispatcher must determine that no trains or other on-track equipment have been authorized to occupy the track segment to be fouled. In signaled territory, the Dispatcher must ensure that Stop Signals have been displayed and blocking devices applied to controls of switches and signals leading to the affected track. When trains are to be held at a TBS where blocking devices cannot be applied, the Dispatcher must issue Form D line 13 instructing the Operator to hold trains clear of the affected track.
b. Permission to Foul
Permission to foul the track must include the following information:
1. Title and name of employee receiving foul time
2. Track designation
3. Track limits (between/at)
4. Time limits
The receiving employee must repeat this permission and the Dispatcher or Operator must then confirm it before the Foul Time becomes effective.
c. Releasing Foul Time
Once protection has been provided, it must be maintained until the employee who was granted the foul time has released the foul time. The release must include the employee's title and name, and the track designation and limits being released. This information must be repeated by the Dispatcher or Operator, and confirmed by the employee releasing the foul time before blocking devices are removed.
Do we know if the Foreman that was killed was the EIC?
I am suspecting he wasn't, but had information from the EIC that foul time WAS NOT in effect and when he saw the backhoe operator on the track he took actions to get him off the track. Proper communications among ALL parties in a large gang can be a difficult proposition.
FRA ordering Amtrak Safety Stand down -
http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2016/04/08/after-deadly-crash-amtrak-must-retrain-workers-on-safety/
Norm48327 Euclid I don’t understand the issue about anybody not hearing the phone transmission. If the day foreman of the track crew did not hear the phone call that fouling permission had been retracted, does that mean that he is free to assume that it still exists from the previous shift? It seems to me that if this permission can be retracted during a shift change, it would be required that the next shift verify whether or not the permission is still in effect. For a new shift to proceed under the assumption that fouling permission exists because they have not heard otherwise seems like a flawed concept. Nope! That would make the day shift foreman a fool.
Norm,
I agree that such a rule would be flawed and dangerous. I am just saying that if the day shift foreman is required to verify permission before starting, I do not see how anything about the previous permission would be relevant. So then I don’t understand why a point is being made about the new shift not hearing the previous shift’s permission being canceled over the phone transmission.
EuclidSo then I don’t understand why a point is being made about the new shift not hearing the previous shift’s permission being canceled over the phone transmission.
Just another possibility amongst the many we've discussed here. No more or less a big deal than anything else.
As Balt points out, there likely were folks who were aware that the foul time had been cancelled. It appears that the word didn't make it all the way to the bottom.
tree68 Euclid So then I don’t understand why a point is being made about the new shift not hearing the previous shift’s permission being canceled over the phone transmission. Just another possibility amongst the many we've discussed here. No more or less a big deal than anything else. As Balt points out, there likely were folks who were aware that the foul time had been cancelled. It appears that the word didn't make it all the way to the bottom.
Euclid So then I don’t understand why a point is being made about the new shift not hearing the previous shift’s permission being canceled over the phone transmission.
In the above quote by me, I am talking about the point being made in the news reports, not points being made by people discussing it here. It seems to be the most current development in the news coverage.
When you say it appears that word did not reach the bottom, it sounds like you are saying that therefore, the bottom (track people) did not realize permission had been cancelled; i.e. they never got that word, so they proceeded unprotected, but they believed they were protected.
Others here seem to say that it is the responsiblity of the new track crew to seek and recieve fouling permission before fouling any track. If that is their responsibility, what difference does it make if word of cancellation of the previous shift's permission did not get to the next shift? The next shift is not allowed to assume that protection exists simply because they never heard of it being cancelled.
It's the responsibility of the EIC to have protection in place, and to communicate that information to those who need to know, who need to communicate that to subordinates, etc, etc. It's probably a pyramid with a big crew, such as Balt has mentioned.
It's also in the rules (and normal practice) to hold a job briefing at the start of the shift, and any time anything changes. That's true for train crews, MOW, everyone.
If it's a large crew, the practice may have been to pass the briefing down the ladder, as opposed to trying to brief several dozen to 100+ people at the same time. That will undoubtedly be addressed by NTSB and in the safety stand-down.
What remains to be seen is where any breakdowns in communication may have occurred. For that we'll probably have to wait for NTSB to tell us.
We also don't know if the backhoe operator was on the track in question because he mistakenly believed that said track was protected, because he was "freelancing," or for some other reason. Again, we'll have to wait.
I would opine that the media using the possible cell phone involvement is akin to how they recently tried to tie the Kansas incident in with previous Amtrak incidents.
EuclidIn the above quote by me, I am talking about the point being made in the news reports, not points being made by people discussing it here. It seems to be the most current development in the news coverage.
You have to remember that the media is in the business of getting ratings or selling papers. They don't let a little thing like facts get in the way of a good fabricated story. Accuracy be damned. Get the story out NOW!
I am not much concerned about what actually happened in this particular accident. I am only just wondering what could have happened. For that I would need a clear explanation of the exact process of fouling protection being recognized by everyone involved in a case of fouling protection.
I can see where a gang might be very large, and maybe one leader will brief them all either directly individually, or the one leader would brief leaders of smaller sub groups. But between the train control and that one leader of the track people, it seems like the system would be very simple and failsafe in nature. In effect it would allow the establishment of foul protection zone, and would offer yes/no foul protection verification for any person actually involved in a fouling action, or about to undertake one.
But everything I am hearing from all sources is that it is a very complex process of communications going both ways, up, down, meetings, up to 100 people involved in each act of adding, removing, and modifying of fouling permissions. If that is the case, it seems there will very likely be misunderstandings. Maybe they happen frequently, but seldom lead to a crash because they are caught in time.
If all of that is the case with current practice, I think that what I am visualizing as a simple interlocking plant-like protection would be the product of PTC, which apparently was not in use in the case of this crash.
With PTC, the zone of protection would be established in the PTC system and that system would apply it to the site on the ground. At the same time, that system would lock out any trains from entering the zone of protection. It would be the PTC automatic effect of shunting the rails with jumpers and clamps. But unlike the fallibility of manual shunting being overlooked by the responsible person, PTC would automatically shunt or switch all protecting signals to the indications as though there was an actual rail shunt. PTC would do this as an automatic reaction to the establishment of a zone of foul protection.
So that positively protects the track people from the trains. There also must be something to protect the track people from accidentally straying from their zone of protection. Maybe inside of the backhoe, you have a little green signal in front of the operator telling him that he has the foul protection, and that no conflict with trains is possible. The backhoe operator has the green light, so he knows that all possible conflicting trains have a red light. Maybe each worker could have some full time verification as well. Maybe you would have a hub signal that would be set up as a visible beacon to several people working in a group. If any man or machine wanders out of it zone of protection, the light turns from green to red.
Now that is a protection system where nobody gets killed.
All PTC is going to do is the same thing that calling the dispatcher does now. Someone (the EIC) still has to initiate the action.
All the other stuff is just more to fail.
If everyone plays by the existing rules, nobody gets hurt. Someone didn't play by the existing rules. Someone got hurt.
Until we see the NTSB report, we won't know who didn't play by the rules.
When a work zone is established, can that zone only include the track that is being worked on and trains still operate on adjacent tracks at track speed without notifying the workers (EIC) on the track being worked on? That seems to be what happened here. I don't believe thats how it is supposed to be. I think the zone has to include the adjacent track and that the trains have to get clearance from the EIC to be allowed to enter the zone (all tracks) and at a defined speed. Without that, the potential for accidents like this is real.
[quote user="Electroliner 1935"]
When a work zone is established, can that zone only include the track that is being worked on and trains still operate on adjacent tracks at track speed without notifying the workers (EIC) on the track being worked on? That seems to be what happened here. I don't believe thats how it is supposed to be. I think the zone has to include the adjacent track and that the trains have to get clearance from the EIC to be allowed to enter the zone (all tracks) and at a defined speed. Without that, the potential for accidents like this is real. [/quote]
Can't speak to Amtrak practice.
On my carrier the Work Zone applies to All track between specified mileposts. The EIC is contacted by ALL trains operating on any track for permission to pass. The EIC grants permission and specifies any speed restriction that may be desired - for track conditions or any other reason. Permission can be granted to pass at maximum authorized speed for your train. The train will specify which track it is operating on when requesting permission.
Amtrak procedures may vary.
tree68 All PTC is going to do is the same thing that calling the dispatcher does now. Someone (the EIC) still has to initiate the action. All the other stuff is just more to fail. If everyone plays by the existing rules, nobody gets hurt. Someone didn't play by the existing rules. Someone got hurt. Until we see the NTSB report, we won't know who didn't play by the rules.
I don’t agree with that. The results may be the same, but that is IF everybody does their job in the manual system.
With PTC, you define the work zone, and the system automatically protects the trains and the track workers. It cannot be violated. PTC would act like a positive interlocking plant. Unlike the current manual system, with PTC, you could not give clear signals to trains which would permit them to enter a protected area. And you could not have workers violating their designated foul protected space without being warned in real time. With the present manual system, workers can stray out of their space without even being aware of it.
Track crews can also have their fouling permission retracted without their knowledge or consent; unless they happen to have the track shunted. I find it amazing that Amtrak is now handing out shunts and encouraging workers to use them. This sounds like an unusually informal approach to positive safety. All the safety of the current system depends on people doing the right things, and there is too much risk that they won’t.
PTC does this all naturally. You just define the work zone, and PTC does the rest. The only additional functionality that is needed is that the PTC relationship to trains has to be extended to include maintenance equipment and even individual workers. Once you do that, you have a system that is dramatically more safe and reliable than the present old school method.
The way I see it, the main issue coming out of this crash is not to discover who did not play by the rules, although that will be found. But main issue is coming up with a better mousetrap where people don’t die just because someone forgot something in the old fashioned system. Brakemen would have never lost fingers if they had just kept them out of the couplers.
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.