Euclid tree68 Euclid "I have already seen one comment calling the track workers "idiots." No sign yet of the Darwin Award." You are absolutely correct - one comment calling the track workers idiots. And no one (except you) has mentioned Darwin. One person, out of all the comments - including those by actual railroaders - questions the abilities of the MOW crew. From where I sit, most seem to think a breakdown of communications and/or procedure is probably chiefly the cause. Must be no one feels this is a "Darwin moment..." And that's why it hasn't been mentioned. Until now. Well I would not get too worried about it. I suspect that the one comment portends more to follow. And usually the Darwin Award runs right along with the moron and idiot lables. In any case, my larger point is that there seems to be a widespread consensus in the news media that the backhoe people were at fault. That is where the one "idiot" comment comes from. As I mentioned earlier, there seems to be an assumption that the track people were at fault because they were in the path of the train. In my opinion, that assumption comes from grade crossing crashes because the media is familar with them and they involve striking vehicles on the track similar to the situation with the backhoe.
tree68 Euclid "I have already seen one comment calling the track workers "idiots." No sign yet of the Darwin Award." You are absolutely correct - one comment calling the track workers idiots. And no one (except you) has mentioned Darwin. One person, out of all the comments - including those by actual railroaders - questions the abilities of the MOW crew. From where I sit, most seem to think a breakdown of communications and/or procedure is probably chiefly the cause. Must be no one feels this is a "Darwin moment..." And that's why it hasn't been mentioned. Until now.
Euclid "I have already seen one comment calling the track workers "idiots." No sign yet of the Darwin Award."
You are absolutely correct - one comment calling the track workers idiots.
And no one (except you) has mentioned Darwin.
One person, out of all the comments - including those by actual railroaders - questions the abilities of the MOW crew. From where I sit, most seem to think a breakdown of communications and/or procedure is probably chiefly the cause.
Must be no one feels this is a "Darwin moment..."
And that's why it hasn't been mentioned. Until now.
Well I would not get too worried about it. I suspect that the one comment portends more to follow. And usually the Darwin Award runs right along with the moron and idiot lables. In any case, my larger point is that there seems to be a widespread consensus in the news media that the backhoe people were at fault. That is where the one "idiot" comment comes from. As I mentioned earlier, there seems to be an assumption that the track people were at fault because they were in the path of the train. In my opinion, that assumption comes from grade crossing crashes because the media is familar with them and they involve striking vehicles on the track similar to the situation with the backhoe.
RMEThe point that Euclid is making is I think a better one: who thought up the idea that merely shunting a track would justify unrestricted 110mph operation on a closely adjacent track, with workers present?
Shunting the track has nothing to do with the problem. If the train had run down the track that was being worked on and ran over the backhoe on the track on which the work was being done, then the shunt might be an issue. But the fact that the backhoe was NOT on the track it was supposed to be on, that is the problem. The solution depends on WHY the backhoe was on another track.
The FRA sets the requirements on speeds by a work area. A key issue that I am sure that will be discussed is the whole question of whether there were "workers" present. By FRA regs a person in the control compartment of a piece of equipment is not the same as a person standing next to the track. If all the people involved with the work were supposed to be either in the control cab of equipment or on the field side of the track they were working on, then the FRA regs would permit passing at track speed. For example on some railroads they have work gangs stop work and clear the track by the amount required by the FRA to permit passenger and high priority trains to pass without delay.
I am sure that the NTSB will be looking at whether a person at the controls of a back hoe would be considered a person in a control compartment or a person on the track.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
dehusmanBut the fact that the backhoe was NOT on the track it was supposed to be on, that is the problem.
How do you know that? Can you provide a reference for that claim?
EuclidHow do you know that?
Until we find out exactly what happened with regard to track assignments, work limits, etc and so on, we can't know that.
In the meantime, unless it turns out Amtrak was on the wrong track, the fact that the equipment and the locomotive collided would be indicative that the equipment was in the wrong place. If it was not trackbound, it was fouling the adjacent track.
If it was trackbound, it was either on the wrong track, or a boom or other equipment was extended in such a way as to foul the other track.
The cab video will be enlightening.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
EuclidThe fact that the backhoe was struck by the train does not prove that the backhoe was in the wong place. How can be so sure that the train was not on the wrong track?
Because from all the pictures and descriptions I have seen there were multiple pieces of equipment working on the track, so if the train was on the wrong track they would have run over multiple pieces of equipment.
Because in every description I have read they only talked about working on one track.
Because the signal territory the equipment on the track would have probably shunted the signals which means the train would have been moving on restricted speed.
Becausee none of the reports took exception to the speed of the train, to the point of saying it was authorized at 110 mph. if it was operating on track on which work was being done it wouldn't be authorized at 110 mph.
Because the train on the wrong track, in the gang's limits, is immediately obvious and every person on the gang, every person in the dispatch office and every official on the ground would know that. Nobody (except people on this list) seem to be working on that assumption (although I am quite sure the NTSB has looked at that possibility).
Because to put the train on the wrong track would require many, many interlocked and involved systems with multiple checks and balances fail without anybody tumbling to it, while all the backhoe on the wrong track requires is the backhoe operator to turn the wheel to one side and step on the gas.
There doesn't really seem to be any compelling evidence to suggest that the train was on the wrong track.
Let me ask you the opposite question. Why do you think the backhoe was in the right place?
dehusman Euclid The fact that the backhoe was struck by the train does not prove that the backhoe was in the wong place. How can be so sure that the train was not on the wrong track? Because from all the pictures and descriptions I have seen there were multiple pieces of equipment working on the track, so if the train was on the wrong track they would have run over multiple pieces of equipment. Because in every description I have read they only talked about working on one track. Because the signal territory the equipment on the track would have probably shunted the signals which means the train would have been moving on restricted speed. Becausee none of the reports took exception to the speed of the train, to the point of saying it was authorized at 110 mph. if it was operating on track on which work was being done it wouldn't be authorized at 110 mph. Because the train on the wrong track, in the gang's limits, is immediately obvious and every person on the gang, every person in the dispatch office and every official on the ground would know that. Nobody (except people on this list) seem to be working on that assumption (although I am quite sure the NTSB has looked at that possibility). Because to put the train on the wrong track would require many, many interlocked and involved systems with multiple checks and balances fail without anybody tumbling to it, while all the backhoe on the wrong track requires is the backhoe operator to turn the wheel to one side and step on the gas. There doesn't really seem to be any compelling evidence to suggest that the train was on the wrong track. Let me ask you the opposite question. Why do you think the backhoe was in the right place?
Euclid The fact that the backhoe was struck by the train does not prove that the backhoe was in the wong place. How can be so sure that the train was not on the wrong track?
I have no opinion as to whether the backhoe was in the right place or not. But maybe the right track/wrong track is the wrong question. What if the backhoe and associated fouling were on a track or tracks that where proper authority had been granted to them? And what if the train was also granted authority to be on a track for which the authority had been granted to the backhoe and associated fouling?
In other words, it would be like a lap order mistake made by a dispatcher in train order days. If it were a lap of track authority, neither the train or the backhoe were on the wrong track. Both would have had the right to be there, but they should not have been given that right.
BaltACDOn my carrier, MofW establishes a Work Zone with limits and tracks of their choosing. Esablishment of the Work Zone reqires trains to receive permission from the Employee in Charge for PERMISSION to pass through the zone - that permission may include speed restricions to apply within the zone.
This sounds like it's up to the supervisor or some level of MofW management to decide how much area and what tracks they will need to request control over. Is this the case? I would think, though, that there must be guidelines or policies to follow, and it seems odd to me that they would allow 110mph operation on an adjacent track. Of course we don't know if Amtrak's policy differs from CSX's.
Instead of getting involved in a bunch of "What if..."'s, I think I'll wait and see what the investigation concludes.
_____________
"A stranger's just a friend you ain't met yet." --- Dave Gardner
Paul of Covington BaltACD This sounds like it's up to the supervisor or some level of MofW management to decide how much area and what tracks they will need to request control over. Is this the case? I would think, though, that there must be guidelines or policies to follow, and it seems odd to me that they would allow 110mph operation on an adjacent track. Of course we don't know if Amtrak's policy differs from CSX's. Instead of getting involved in a bunch of "What if..."'s, I think I'll wait and see what the investigation concludes.
BaltACD
Amtrak's rules differ from CSX Rules.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Excerpts from Electronic Code of Federal Regulations
http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=38faf95c721d77b90dd5f55b6a2cf4e2&mc=true&node=pt49.4.214&rgn=div5#se49.4.214_1323
§214.323 Foul time.
Working limits established on controlled track through the use of foul time procedures shall comply with the following requirements:
(a) Foul time may be given orally or in writing by the train dispatcher or control operator only after that employee has withheld the authority of all trains to move into or within the working limits during the foul time period.
(b) Each roadway worker to whom foul time is transmitted orally shall repeat the track number, track limits and time limits of the foul time to the issuing employee for verification before the foul time becomes effective.
(c) The train dispatcher or control operator shall not permit the movement of trains or other on-track equipment onto the working limits protected by foul time until the roadway worker who obtained the foul time has reported clear of the track.
§214.329 Train approach warning provided by watchmen/lookouts.
Roadway workers in a roadway work group who foul any track outside of working limits shall be given warning of approaching trains by one or more watchmen/lookouts in accordance with the following provisions:
(a) Train approach warning shall be given in sufficient time to enable each roadway worker to move to and occupy a previously arranged place of safety not less than 15 seconds before a train moving at the maximum speed authorized on that track can pass the location of the roadway worker.
(b) Watchmen/lookouts assigned to provide train approach warning shall devote full attention to detecting the approach of trains and communicating a warning thereof, and shall not be assigned any other duties while functioning as watchmen/lookouts.
(c) The means used by a watchman/lookout to communicate a train approach warning shall be distinctive and shall clearly signify to all recipients of the warning that a train or other on-track equipment is approaching.
(d) Every roadway worker who depends upon train approach warning for on-track safety shall maintain a position that will enable him or her to receive a train approach warning communicated by a watchman/lookout at any time while on-track safety is provided by train approach warning.
(e) Watchmen/lookouts shall communicate train approach warnings by a means that does not require a warned employee to be looking in any particular direction at the time of the warning, and that can be detected by the warned employee regardless of noise or distraction of work.
(f) Every roadway worker who is assigned the duties of a watchman/lookout shall first be trained, qualified and designated in writing by the employer to do so in accordance with the provisions of §214.349.
(g) Every watchman/lookout shall be provided by the employer with the equipment necessary for compliance with the on-track safety duties which the watchman/lookout will perform.
§214.339 Audible warning from trains.
Each railroad shall require that the locomotive whistle be sounded, and the locomotive bell be rung, by trains approaching roadway workers on or about the track. Such audible warning shall not substitute for on-track safety procedures prescribed in this part.
Thanks wanswheel; very interesting.
So that's why I commonly see guys holding 'W' signs before MOW work areas, meaning 'Whistle' I assume.
I don't see that they have a way of communicating with the workers, though, as would seem to be required of 'lookouts'. Are the lookouts different people? If so, you'd think the W sign could be on a post, and wouldn't need someone to hold it.
/Mr Lynn
Some one fill us in::: Is there a need for a backhoe to operate on both side of each rail in support of a Loram ? Could it have been that the Loram crew placed a shunt on their track 4. If the MOW crew had track authority on track 3 and did not have another shunt to place on the track ? A real Hobson's choice protect track 4 with equipment or track 3 ?
BaltACDAmtrak's rules differ from CSX Rules.
Amtrak uses NORAC, currently the 10th Edition. You can find them on-line.
Excerpt from FRA Track and Rail and Infrastructure Integrity Compliance Manual, Jan. 2014
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjGluny4vjLAhWHchQKHYlRBhsQFggeMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fra.dot.gov%2FElib%2FDocument%2F2886&usg=AFQjCNF9QM3b0nWYyvkZW1O2qLOlASmdWQ&bvm=bv.118443451,d.dmo
Guidance. Section 214.329 establishes the procedures for on-track safety of groups that utilize train approach warning. A reference to the definition of train approach warning would be useful to the understanding of this section. Section 214.329 specifies the circumstances and the manner in which roadway work groups may use this method of on-track safety. Prescribed here is the minimum amount of time for roadway workers to retreat to a previously arranged place of safety, the duties of the watchman/lookout and the fundamental characteristics of train approach warning communication.
It must be particularly noted that the 15-second train approach time does not include the time taken for a roadway worker to move clear of the track and into a place of safety. If that movement takes 10 seconds, then a train must be visible in time for a warning to be given 25 seconds before the train arrives.
Roadway workers, as indicated in the Rule, must have an acceptable “place of safety” to use to clear to upon the approach of trains when using train approach warning as a form of on-track safety. In normal circumstances, it is expected that workers will clear all tracks upon the approach of a train. Clearing onto another track where train approach warning is established may potentially trap workers if multiple train movements occur at the location in question. Regardless of the number of tracks at a work site, it is important to consider impediments to train approach warning at locations such as rock cuts or other locations with limited clearance.
It is also important to review §214.313(b) which states: “A roadway worker shall not foul a track except when necessary for the performance of duty.” Therefore, workers must have a specific reason in order to move into another track upon the approach of a train (e.g., work activity). This practice is only then acceptable if train approach warning is provided for all tracks without interruption and the workers have absolutely no chance of being trapped if multiple train movements simultaneously occur. In all cases where train approach warning is used, it is critical that comprehensive instructions are provided to roadway workers about where to clear track(s) upon the approach of trains.
Paragraph (e) states that the warning method shall not require a warned employee to be looking in a particular direction to detect the warning. The warned employee is one who is fouling or near the track, and who is being protected by the watchman/lookout. The warned employee is not necessarily another watchman/lookout.
A railroad may elect to use a chain of watchmen/lookouts to relay the warning of an approaching train. Since a watchman/lookout is required to maintain a vigilant watch, it is possible that a clear visual signal may be used for communication among watchmen/lookouts.
Radio communication or a cell phone may also be used as a supplement to the equipment issued to the watchman/lookout, but extreme care must be taken to guard against non-communication in the event of a radio failure. In particular, the portable radios commonly used for such purposes might suffer battery failure with no warning, thus breaking a vital communication link. A radio and/or cell phone shall not be considered proper equipment to provide sole auditory warning by a Watchman/Lookout, in compliance with §214.329.
This section further imposes a duty upon the employer to provide the watchman/lookout employee with the requisite equipment necessary to carry out his on-track safety duties. It is intended that a railroad's on-track safety program would specify the means to be used by watchmen/ lookouts to communicate a warning, and that they be equipped according to that provision.
The rule does not include a provision for train approach warning by any means other than the use of watchmen/lookouts. FRA is not aware of any other means of effectively performing this function with the requisite reliability, and will not place requirements for an untried system in this rule. However, the Advisory Committee report states that ``FRA will incorporate a near-term time-specific requirement to utilize on-track personal warning systems for roadway workers working alone under any conditions not requiring positive protection.'' FRA realizes that the technological advancements incorporated in ATCS, PTC or PTS might in the future provide another method of establishing on-track safety in compliance with this subpart. Although such technology is not specifically provided for in the current rule. Opportunities to employ advancements in this area will be handled pursuant to the waiver process. FRA will therefore be most interested in knowing when such systems are developed, tested, and proven reliable.
I have watched and listened to the BNSF working in the three track Chicago-Aurora racetrack and the train crews on all tracks contact the forman for clearance to pass the work site and have also heard dispatchers give orders to train personel to obtain clearance from the forman and since much of the area has quiet zones, to whistle "freely and often". Most of the time, the forman or his appointed watchman will respond via the radio to the engineer that they are cleared to pass at "track speed" or occasionally that they had to wait for them to get clear. I have never seen or heard of a work zone not including all three tracks even though the work is on only one track. I have been on platforms next to trains passing at seventy MPH (which scared me) and I can't believe the Amtrak procedures allow track speed through a work zone on an adjacent track. So it appears to me that either the engineer was not notified of the work zone or the Dispatcher was unaware of work zone thinking it had expired.
There was mentioned that there was a shift change and both foremen and dispatchers were changed and the work clearance got messed up. I like most of you await the TSB's pronouncements.
Not a serious accident - an Amtrak train hit a BNSF welding truck on the Chicago-Aurora racetrack in January.
http://www.publicsafetyreporter.com/2016/01/17/amtrak-train-crashes-with-bnsf-maintenance-truck-park-too-close-to-tracks-in-lisle-illinois/
Bob
If you are going to quote rules on "roadway workers" then you better quote the definition of a "roadway worker", because the guy on the backhoe may not fit the definition of a roadway worker.
Okeedoke. By federal law, “Roadway worker means any employee of a railroad, or of a contractor to a railroad, whose duties include inspection, construction, maintenance or repair of railroad track, bridges, roadway, signal and communication systems, electric traction systems, roadway facilities or roadway maintenance machinery on or near track or with the potential of fouling a track, and flagmen and watchmen/lookouts as defined in this section.”
http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=38faf95c721d77b90dd5f55b6a2cf4e2&mc=true&node=pt49.4.214&rgn=div5#se49.4.214_17
Cardinal rule of Dispatching - PROTECT then authorize.
Under 49CFR214c the backhoe operator & supervisor are Roadway Workers. Because the machine and man are in an area of less than 20 ft track centers, they can't work and can't be on the adjoining track in the cab or on the ground. The disconnect will have to be solved in the investigation. Something not right from the start.
Consider this quote:
"I believe without question it's a communication problem," says U.S. Rep. Bob Brady, who toured the crash scene Sunday. The backhoe was on one of four tracks when it was hit by train 89, and unnamed sources familiar with the investigation tell Philly.com that "problems with Amtrak's dispatch could have been a key factor in the crash. Information about the work crew's presence on the rails may not have been shared during a shift change."
http://gothamist.com/2016/04/05/amtrak_derailment_chester.php
That sounds to me like a case where the work crew was authorized, and that information was not applied to the train operation.
************************************
Here is the title and a quote from an article. After making this statement, it says nothing about what that “strong evidence” is. The article refers to the workers wrongly being on an “active” track, but it never considers that the reason could have been that the track was wrongly “active.”
Two workers killed in Amtrak crash may be at fault “There is strong evidence that the two Amtrak construction workers killed in a train crash Sunday made a "colossal" mistake by being on the wrong line, a source close to the investigation said.”
http://www.cbs46.com/story/31629958/amtrak-train-strikes-backhoe-derails-with-340-plus-on-board
Either someone (dispatcher or work crew) failed to do their job or the entire safety system is flawed. And this type of incident is not limited to Amtrak trackage.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
BaltACD Cardinal rule of Dispatching - PROTECT then authorize.
mudchicken Under 49CFR214c the backhoe operator & supervisor are Roadway Workers. Because the machine and man are in an area of less than 20 ft track centers, they can't work and can't be on the adjoining track in the cab or on the ground. The disconnect will have to be solved in the investigation. Something not right from the start.
Another statement that has been made by a number of Posters on this Forum from time to time has been: "....The GCOR rules are written in the blood of railroad workers..." [paraphrased]. It would seem that the circumstances of this unfortunate incident will add more weight to that statement of reactivity.(?)
Multiple track situation, in an area of high traffic, and higher speeds would seem to require special attention and a set of rules that are simple enough to be understood at all levels of responsibility, and situational control. The circumstances of this incident point out how fast a situation can develop in a real, working. world, and lead to injuries and loss of life' even with the best of intentions/ or rules being exercised.[my2c]
In thinking about this accident, the natural focus is on the backhoe getting struck by the train. It may be easy to overlook some of the other amazing details.
The train came upon the scene at 106 mph. The engineer dynamited by the brakes 5 seconds before impact. I suppose impact speed was nearly at 106 mph. The impact derailed the locomotive, apparently by lifting the front end and dropping it back down with the left rail approximately centered under the locomotive. Apparently, this condition offered some guidance because the derailed locomotive ran a mile this way before stopping. That must be a record.
Passengers said it was as if the train had entered a sand storm that covered the train in flying debris and blocked the vision through the windows. I can see where the “sandstorm” came from with the lead truck of the locomotive running on the concrete ties and ballast for a mile; starting at over 100 mph.
Excerpt from Philly.com, Apr. 6
The morning of the crash, an overnight crew had been working on the rails with foul time in place, sources said. Investigators are looking at the possibility that as a day crew began track work, the foul time was improperly canceled.
There are four separate tracks controlled by Amtrak in the area of the crash. The equipment, a backhoe and a ballast sweeper, was on tracks two and three. Track two was inoperable, officials said, but, because foul time was released on track three, trains were free to travel on it. The backhoe and Train 89 were both on track three.
wanswheel Excerpt from Philly.com, Apr. 6 The morning of the crash, an overnight crew had been working on the rails with foul time in place, sources said. Investigators are looking at the possibility that as a day crew began track work, the foul time was improperly canceled. There are four separate tracks controlled by Amtrak in the area of the crash. The equipment, a backhoe and a ballast sweeper, was on tracks two and three. Track two was inoperable, officials said, but, because foul time was released on track three, trains were free to travel on it. The backhoe and Train 89 were both on track three.
On my carrier, all communications with the Train Dispatcher are recorded, both radio and telephone. I expect a similar system is in effect on Amtrak. The Computer Aided Dispatching System keeps a log of all signal and blocking manipulations - I expect Amtraks system is similar.
Everything that the Control Center did or said is on recorded data. What took place in the field however, isn't.
Schlimm, looks like it's the 'someone failed to do there job'.
from the Trains News Wire; (I probably missed this in the earlier posts, if so sorry to repeat)
“The gang had been fouling the other tracks at times and had received permission from the dispatcher to do so,” the source says. “Sunday morning, there was a shift change. The night foreman gave up all fouls (alerting train crews to the work), and the day shift foreman had not asked for any fouls.”
Seems like the more logical cause and the NTSB is the only one to set the actual cause, but it's not a flawed system.
2015 Amtrak photo, Joseph Carter, Jr., the late backhoe operator, on the left
Joe Carter, rest in peace.
MrLynnSounds like there needs to be more redundancy: dispatcher and MOW crew BOTH should set foul time on the track(s).
The MOW supervisor calls for foul time/OOS. The dispatcher gives it out, applies blocks, etc. When done, the MOW supervisor cancels, the dispatcher returns the track to normal service.
The dispatcher has no idea of the actual conditions unless it's right outside the window. He/she has to take the word of the personnel on site.
This is sounding like both a lack of communication, especially lack of an adequate turnover between shifts/crews, and very possibly some assumptions made (incoming crew assuming they still had foul time, among other things).
We'll have to see what conclusions NTSB draws.
Is it possible for the dispatcher to return the track to normal service without the MOW supervisor canceling the foul time?
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