http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/04/us/amtrak-train-derails-outside-of-philadelphia.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=photo-spot-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
LRV-11 refers to model year 2011? Excerpt from Loram
http://www.loram.com/services/default.aspx?id=102
"RAILVAC™ is a unique excavation machine that conveys material through vacuum and airflow. The machine is rail mounted and designed to travel at track speeds while towing up to four fully loaded ballast cars. The combination of a powerful digging arm with twin engines and vacuum pumps makes it capable of excavating compacted ballast, clay, mud, water, sand, and soil. The digging arm can work at distances up to 15 feet from track centerline.
"Material is extracted through the suction hose and deposited in the main hopper. The finer dust then runs through a filtration system, removing the dust from the air stream. The filter elements are cleaned automatically by the air counterflow during the routine unloading of the system. A rear swing conveyor, or optional side dumping doors unload material."
BaltACD petitnj Here you see the consequence of a "20 step process" to allow equipment on the right-of-way. Any one step in the 20 step process is forgotten or misinterpreted and the accident occurs. The 20 step process is so complex that any thing done wrong causes an accident. Now they will add steps 21, 22 and 23 (maybe even 24) and the possibility of error remains the same. Some one in the area of safety should suggest to the rule makers that making the rules more complex does not make the rules safer -- quite the opposite. As rules become more complex they are easy to misunderstand. Since the existing rule was suppolsed to make the work safe, the error comes in assuming rules make it safe. People make it safe. Tell it to the Lawyers that are now making Operating Rules. Lawyers have never found anything too simple to make overly complex with a multitude of 'gotchas'.
petitnj Here you see the consequence of a "20 step process" to allow equipment on the right-of-way. Any one step in the 20 step process is forgotten or misinterpreted and the accident occurs. The 20 step process is so complex that any thing done wrong causes an accident. Now they will add steps 21, 22 and 23 (maybe even 24) and the possibility of error remains the same. Some one in the area of safety should suggest to the rule makers that making the rules more complex does not make the rules safer -- quite the opposite. As rules become more complex they are easy to misunderstand. Since the existing rule was suppolsed to make the work safe, the error comes in assuming rules make it safe. People make it safe.
Here you see the consequence of a "20 step process" to allow equipment on the right-of-way. Any one step in the 20 step process is forgotten or misinterpreted and the accident occurs. The 20 step process is so complex that any thing done wrong causes an accident. Now they will add steps 21, 22 and 23 (maybe even 24) and the possibility of error remains the same. Some one in the area of safety should suggest to the rule makers that making the rules more complex does not make the rules safer -- quite the opposite. As rules become more complex they are easy to misunderstand. Since the existing rule was suppolsed to make the work safe, the error comes in assuming rules make it safe. People make it safe.
Tell it to the Lawyers that are now making Operating Rules. Lawyers have never found anything too simple to make overly complex with a multitude of 'gotchas'.
The comments in this Thread by petitnj and BaltACD seem to be pretty salient points in the narative of this incident. A 'process' written by individuals who might, or might not, be involved in the worksite process..[ ie: '..No skin in the game?..]. Creating a process of a number of steps{21 ?], any one of which, if missed can lead to physical injuries-or the death of workers involved in the labor being preformed; would seem to be a sure way to invite failure.
An observaton might be, that this circumstance seems to call for a need of a regulatory application of The K.I.S.S. principle.
Might this be a problem caused by regulation, written by lawyers who are/were more interested in arguing 'risk' circumstances in a court room environment, than a protection of workers in a potentially, very dangerous working environment ? It was a shame in this case that two workers had to pay the price with their lives and so many others, passengers were injured in this incident.
I see no reason to jump to the conclusion that it was the fault of the rules. Can somebody find and post those twenty-step rules that govern this type of work? It would be interesting to see them.
There are so many unknowns here that I haven't been able to keep count. We'll have to wait for word from the investigators to tell us exactly what happened.
It's interesting that the news media says the two people killed had many years of Amtrak service. At this stage of the game it's not possible for us to say whether they committed a rule violation or were the victims of somebody else's error. I have often thought that many years of service sometimes leads to a self confident sense of security, which can lead to a complacent attitude. Of course we don't know for sure, and I don't mean to cast aspersions on these deceased workers. It just seems that this might be relevant to the discussion of overly complex rules. Could veterans develop an idea that they will cherry-pick rules, complying with the ones that seem most relevant and bypassing those that they deem less so, relying on past experience to decide?
This is a general question. It should not be construed as blaming the deceased in this accident.
Tom
EuclidCan somebody find and post those twenty-step rules that govern this type of work? It would be interesting to see them.
That "20 step" statement was made by Senator Schumer. I doubt the senator is qualified on either the Amtrak or NORAC book of rules. So seeking clarity on such a statement is pretty impossible.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Don't know about “20-step rules.” Chuck Schumer called it a “20-step protocol.” Might be in the “Roadway Worker Protection Manual,” which NTSB mentions in http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAB1506.pdf
MBTA Roadway Worker Protection Manual
http://www.acecma.org/acecma/file/FY2015/RWP_Effective_January_1_2015.pdf
zugmann Euclid Can somebody find and post those twenty-step rules that govern this type of work? It would be interesting to see them. That "20 step" statement was made by Senator Schumer. I doubt the senator is qualified on either the Amtrak or NORAC book of rules. So seeking clarity on such a statement is pretty impossible.
Euclid Can somebody find and post those twenty-step rules that govern this type of work? It would be interesting to see them.
I was wondering about that because the 20-step comment did seem a bit hypothetical in the context it was used. But others seemed to suggest that complicated rules cause accidents, so I am wondering how complicated the rules are that govern this type of maintenace track authority, and if they are more complicated than necessary.
Sounds like another politician blowin' hot air and smoke trying to make people think he's smart.
Norm
Shumer was merely relaying what was told to him by the Amtrak chair.
CNN has it down to 12 steps.
http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/04/us/amtrak-crash-philadelphia/
I think Schumer was basically defending Amtrak from a mistaken notion that people might have that a simple careless moment by workers around passing trains could get passengers killed. So he emphasized that there is a big formal procedure for making sure the trains are protected just as they are protected by trackside signals, for instance.
The media likes Chuck because he’s so photogenic.
Every media story about the inciden I saw, both national and local, brought up the Frankfort overspeed incident as well as the Kansas track displacement incident and tried to spin them as connected and Amtrak being 'out of control'. While all incidents did happen to Amtrak, the causes of each incident were entirely different, with the Kansas incident being entirely beyond Amtrak's ability to control (or BNSF's ability for that matter).
With both the current incident and the Frankfort incident happening on the NEC, it does bring into question the 'Safety Culture' that is in place on the NEC; Is that culture sufficient? I don't have any answers.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
wanswheel CNN has it down to 12 steps. http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/04/us/amtrak-crash-philadelphia/
And a bunch of people on the comments section of one of the articles (NYT maybe?) don't know what a backhoe is.
But yet, of course, they are fully qualified to make comments about the safety of the railroad.
Of course they are qualified zugmann, as the saying goes, "what you don't know, teach." They just taught us something. They taught us that they don't know anything worth our time reading.
Ricky W.
HO scale Proto-freelancer.
My Railroad rules:
1: It's my railroad, my rules.
2: It's for having fun and enjoyment.
3: Any objections, consult above rules.
Lots of folks are critical of Charles shumer, but to be honest he has always been a friend of Amtrak . a huge advocate for the corridor and for the empire service. Like all politicians, he lines headlines. But Amtrak needs a few more like him in congress. Far from perfect but for the most part in Amtrak's cornor when its needed.
Euclid I think Schumer was basically defending Amtrak from a mistaken notion that people might have that a simple careless moment by workers around passing trains could get passengers killed. So he emphasized that there is a big formal procedure for making sure the trains are protected just as they are protected by trackside signals, for instance.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
Many questions
1. Why was train on track 3 traveling its speed when work going on adjaecent track 4 ? Is that less than the FRA 20 foot minimum ?
2. Should 89 have been on track 2 ? ( wrong direction )
3. When the ACS derailed how were train cars and motor able to travel a mile and not leave confines of track 3 ?
4. How much damage to track 3 in that mile of rail, connectors or spikes, cross ties, ballast ?
5. Is this the track cleaner working on track 4 ?
6. Was this work to level the rail due to imperfections of crossing open deck bridges ?
I made the "20 step" comment to point to the complexity of some of the rules. Even if CN's 12 step rule is in place that requires significant study of the details. Rules become so detailed that the workers focus on the rule details instead of the safety of the job. One example is the read-back requirements of authorizations. Some has to be spelled out, some by phonetics, some can be added to the page, some can be changed. Here the details of the rule become the dominant concern. Maybe if the rule were simpler and the worker thought about the authorization, the outcome might be simpler.
Murphy Siding Euclid I think Schumer was basically defending Amtrak from a mistaken notion that people might have that a simple careless moment by workers around passing trains could get passengers killed. So he emphasized that there is a big formal procedure for making sure the trains are protected just as they are protected by trackside signals, for instance. Mistaken notion?
Mistaken notion?
Well yes, I mean mistaken notion that the public might get in thinking that this backhoe crash is another indefensible event like when a driver violates a grade crossing. That kind of train grade crossing hazard is bound to happen on a repeating basis, and for the most part, such collisions do not endanger the passengers.
I think that Schumer was trying to reassure the train traveling public that this backhoe accident (which did derail the train) was not something that can threaten the passengers with unpredictable regularity such as crossing crashes do.
To make that point, he said that Amtrak has a 20-step procedure to safely control the relationship between this maintenance work and the passing trains. He was making the point that plenty of thought has gone into controlling this safety.
So he was defending Amtrak against any mistaken notions to the contrary.
Excerpt from Wall Street Journal
The two Amtrak workers killed Sunday died as one of them, a supervisor, was racing to save his colleague who was on a maintenance vehicle in the path of an oncoming train, a person familiar with the matter said Tuesday.
“The supervisor went running over to the location to get the guy out of there,” said the person, who was briefed on the crash and also knew both men. “That’s when the train came and killed the both of them. He was trying to get Joe the hell out of there, and he was killed in the process.”
The Delaware County Medical Examiner’s office in Pennsylvania identified the Amtrak workers who were killed as Joseph Carter Jr. and Peter Adamovich.
Miscommunication during a shift change appears to have played a role in the crash, the people said. The collision occurred less than an hour after a new foreman took charge of temporary maintenance work in the track area, and a new dispatcher assumed responsibility for train movements in the area. “There was some type of communication breakdown in there,” one of the people said.
Both Mr. Adamovich, the supervisor, and Mr. Carter, the operator of the maintenance vehicle known as a backhoe, had decades of experience, two people familiar with the matter said.
Mr. Adamovich marked his 35th anniversary at Amtrak in 2013, according to a company publication. “Both of them were competent, safe,” one of the people said. The backhoe was replacing railroad ties at the time of the accident, straddling one set of tracks while its mechanical arm pulled ties out from under an adjacent set of tracks, he said.
Excerpt from Associated Press
Federal investigators say the Amtrak passenger train that crashed into a backhoe on a track near Philadelphia was going 106 mph in a 110 mph zone before the fatal collision.
The National Transportation Safety Board says the engineer placed the train into emergency mode five seconds before impact.
NTSB investigator Ryan Frigo says videos show construction equipment on the track and a contractor’s equipment on the adjacent track Sunday morning. He says he cannot say who was authorized to be on the track.
The track workers killed are being identified by the Delaware County Medical Examiner’s Office as 61-year-old backhoe operator Joseph Carter Jr. of Wilmington, Delaware, and 59-year-old Peter Adamovich of Lincoln University, Pennsylvania. Autopsies conducted Monday show they died of blunt force trauma.
So, now the news anchors on ABC, both local affiliate and national news, are asking, "Why didn't Positive Train Control prevent this crash?".
The news media really does zero research on any of the stories they run.
PTC will assist with overspeed incidents, and preventing collisions between trains, not other items that shouldn't be there, like automobiles, or construction equipment like a backhoe.
They also stated that the backhoe was on an adjacent track, with the Loram equipment, and failed to clear. Take that info for what it is worth based on the other part of said report on PTC....
The question about PTC does not seem unreasonable. The public does not know the answer, and the crash raises the question.
Thinking about that question causes me to have this question: When this occupancy authority is granted, is it only by instructional communication or orders?
Wouldn’t there be a way to actually lock a track out of service through signal indications? That latest news makes it sound like there was some sort of loss of communication over the track authority. It seems like there ought to be something more definite than a set of rules and communications that could be mistakenly omitted, if that is what happened.
FWIW The pictures I saw in USA TODAY show the mile marker as 15.3. If I am reading the numbers on the pole correctly.
Also here is the map from Sunday's Trains News Wire piece: http://trn.trains.com/sitefiles/resources/image.aspx?item={761C3905-23F4-43DA-9E0C-5B2E1893D418}
I'll try to get a street location on GoogleMaps.
latest after NTSB report
http://www.nbcnews.com/video/investigators-human-error-may-have-caused-deadly-amtrak-crash-658806851533
I think looking at the pictures the train stopped south of the Highland Av SEPTA(Chester, Pa) station.
Looking at the south of following street location, the train stopped about where you can see an Acela train set on GoogleMaps:
Highland Av & 6th St - MBFS, Chester, PA
I believe it is Booth St. The overpass shown in one of the videos of the incident matches the profile.
Euclid The question about PTC does not seem unreasonable. The public does not know the answer, and the crash raises the question. Thinking about that question causes me to have this question: When this occupancy authority is granted, is it only by instructional communication or orders? Wouldn’t there be a way to actually lock a track out of service through signal indications? That latest news makes it sound like there was some sort of loss of communication over the track authority. It seems like there ought to be something more definite than a set of rules and communications that could be mistakenly omitted, if that is what happened.
Can't speak for Amtrak rules and procedures on the NEC.
On my carrier, MofW establishes a Work Zone with limits and tracks of their choosing. Esablishment of the Work Zone reqires trains to receive permission from the Employee in Charge for PERMISSION to pass through the zone - that permission may include speed restricions to apply within the zone. If trains have not received permission of the EIC, they must stop at the entry limit of the work zone until permission is received. Establishment of the Work Zone does not give MofW authority to occupy or foul the track, in an of itself. The EIC must communicate with the Train Dispatcher to occupy or foul tracks within the Work Zone, when permission is granted appropriate blocking procedures are enacted in the Computer Aided Dispatching System to identify the track(s) blocked and the employee holding that block authority. Signals may be lined into the area of the Work Zone, as trains MUST get permission of the EIC to pass through the Work Zone. In multiple track territory, normally MofW will be doing 'heavy' work on one track and passing trains on adjacent track(s). Establishment of a Work Zone also allows Work Trains to work directly in association with other MofW on track equipment, which would not be possible without the establishment of the Work Zone, as one main point of our Operating Rules is to keep MofW equipment and trains apart.
PTC as being implemented on my carrier, will provide protection against MofW Work Zones and other MofW authorities that have been issued through the use of the CADS as well as protecting against temporary Slow Orders that MofW issue.
I have no idea if the Amtrak ASESS system has such functions.
This is what I had in mind in my previous post. It is quite an informative article:
“As a backup, Amtrak rules often require a “supplemental shunting device” to be put in place on the tracks where work is being performed. The device interrupts the track circuit in such a way that the train engineer receives a red signal light to stop the train. It isn’t clear whether the shunting device was being used, according to the people familiar with the matter.”
http://www.wsj.com/articles/amtrak-supervisor-was-trying-to-save-colleague-when-both-died-1459803669
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