Where does an Irishman stash a red herring?
Excerpt from Train of Thought by Steve Sweeney, Apr. 6
But the bold-faced, lame-brained idea that PTC should be installed in every possible piece of track equipment, locomotive, and device is wayward and irresponsible…
The hundreds of thousands of pieces of rail equipment to be so reconfigured could easily cost billions of dollars more than it already has to install PTC and do little more than what an appropriately placed flagman, shunting cable, or dispatcher-acknowledged work zone do. And they work well when used.
wanswheelExcerpt from Train of Thought by Steve Sweeney, Apr. 6 But the bold-faced, lame-brained idea that PTC should be installed in every possible piece of track equipment, locomotive, and device is wayward and irresponsible… The hundreds of thousands of pieces of rail equipment to be so reconfigured could easily cost billions of dollars more than it already has to install PTC and do little more than what an appropriately placed flagman, shunting cable, or dispatcher-acknowledged work zone do. And they work well when used.
But the bold-faced, lame-brained idea that PTC should be installed in every possible piece of track equipment, locomotive, and device is wayward and irresponsible… The hundreds of thousands of pieces of rail equipment to be so reconfigured could easily cost billions of dollars more than it already has to install PTC and do little more than what an appropriately placed flagman, shunting cable, or dispatcher-acknowledged work zone do. And they work well when used.
And Steve has that nailed down perfectly.
Norm
Norm48327 wanswheel Excerpt from Train of Thought by Steve Sweeney, Apr. 6 But the bold-faced, lame-brained idea that PTC should be installed in every possible piece of track equipment, locomotive, and device is wayward and irresponsible… The hundreds of thousands of pieces of rail equipment to be so reconfigured could easily cost billions of dollars more than it already has to install PTC and do little more than what an appropriately placed flagman, shunting cable, or dispatcher-acknowledged work zone do. And they work well when used. And Steve has that nailed down perfectly.
wanswheel Excerpt from Train of Thought by Steve Sweeney, Apr. 6 But the bold-faced, lame-brained idea that PTC should be installed in every possible piece of track equipment, locomotive, and device is wayward and irresponsible… The hundreds of thousands of pieces of rail equipment to be so reconfigured could easily cost billions of dollars more than it already has to install PTC and do little more than what an appropriately placed flagman, shunting cable, or dispatcher-acknowledged work zone do. And they work well when used.
An appropriately place flagmen, shunting cable, or dispatcher-acknowledged work zone seems to lack something, as we see in the case of this crash.
That "little more" that Mr. Sweeney refers to seems to be exactly what is lacking in the current safeguards. That "little more" takes the human error out of the equation.
First - recognize that the shunt cable and the shunting created by a rail vehicle are two different animals.
It's already been noted that hi-rail and MOW vehicles may not provide an adequate shunt due to their weight. This is why their wheels are insulated - it prevents the expectation that they will shunt from being something upon which people rely. The vehicles won't shunt - you need to protect yourself by another means.
There's no question that a cable-and-clamp shunt can be a valuable additional tool to protect workers on the tracks. However, it does need to be used in conjunction with other means of protection. Ever have to jiggle the clamps on the jumper cables when trying to start a car?
As Balt noted, however, it takes a dispatcher's permission to use that shunt, in no small part to avoid dropping a signal in the face of an oncoming train.
Which brings us back to the basic problem - there was a failure of communication on several fronts. And that's what killed two perfectly good workers. The lack of use of any shunts may be a contributing factor, but it appears a simple phone call would have prevented the incident altogether.
Focusing on the shunts to the exclusion of the communications issue is barking up the wrong tree.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
EuclidAn appropriately place flagmen, shunting cable, or dispatcher-acknowledged work zone seems to lack something, as we see in the case of this crash. That "little more" that Mr. Sweeney refers to seems to be exactly what is lacking in the current safeguards. That "little more" takes the human error out of the equation.
Well, I guess you're the expert and we all should defer to you.
Oh, and while you're at it, please tell us what experience you have regarding the subject.
I expect the NTSB find the cause of the communications failure in the complex system of permissions, retracted permissions, acknowledgments, etc. As that one person said, they probably already know where the system failed. But then in the bigger picture, they will blame the cause on that very system, calling it obsolete, and then advocate for new fail-safe protection system.
Rather than quibble about what is and is not PTC, I would just say that the new protection system will be integrated with PTC. It might use perfected MOW vehicle shunts, but I expect it to move beyond that approach to something based on defined zone of protection. That defined zone of protection will not need a shunt to positively enforce it. The system will simply enforce the zone according to its definition. Shunting would be “Old school.” These will be the key points:
A work zone will be established.
The work zone will prevent trains from entering it.
The work zone cannot be taken away without the permission of the work crew.
The work crew will always have a clear indication of having permission.
So trains and work crews will be positively be interlocked with each other.
With PTC, trains will be prevented from running past their territory. I don’t know how you could enforce the equivalent of that on the work crews. In effect, it would amount to clearing the work crew fouling automatically if they lose their permission. There is no practical way to do that, so it will instead rely on keeping the work crew informed of their protection status. This protection would come from wireless transmissions to receiving instruments worn by the workers, staged on site, and inside the operating cab of MOW power equipment.
So if this safety zone suddenly loses its protection for some reason; or if the workers happened to mistakenly wander out of their zone, they will be immediately informed of that.
With everyone in the work crew being constantly aware of whether or not they have protection; and with the cancellation of the protection being only possible by the work crew, and with it being impossible for trains to enter that work zone; that seems like it would be quite reliable.
That is the fundamentals of an interlocking system. It goes back to the 1800s.
The PTC debate needs some clarification. The trains article a few years back had a long article on ACSES. If someone has access to the article please get it.
As I recall the article stated something to the effect that MOW and other personnel could place a temporary transponder on a track that would limit ACSES speeds ?
EuclidSo pointing to a fail-safe system beyond the current system of verbal permissions is now a red herring? That does not even make sense. What would the red herring be intended to distract from? Maybe Norm could chime in and help us understand this.
Its a red herring because its not a root cause and putting down a shunt only works if there is a signal system. If there is no signal system then all the shunts in the world will not provide one ounce of protection.
The basis on the whole thing is establishing the work zone and communicating that to the people working on the track. If that process is solid then every gang everywhere has established protection and ALL the other systems and suggestions can support that protection. If there is a hole in establishing the work zone then all the other systems overlayed on the base process will not be reliable.
Similarly the communication is key. If the work zone process is rock solid, but the communication is not robust, then you will have situations where the workers may not be in their working limits (they may not have working limits, they may outside their limits by location or time, they may have restrictions on the use of the limits).
Both of those are foundational. Those two elements are critical and work on any territory in any situation. Shunts only work in signalled territory, PTC only works in PTC territory, etc.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
Euclid A work zone will be established. The work zone will prevent trains from entering it. The work zone cannot be taken away without the permission of the work crew.
This is the existing process that was in place at the time of the incident.
Euclid 4. The work crew will always have a clear indication of having permission.
4. The work crew will always have a clear indication of having permission.
This is the only thing that would be new.
dehusman Euclid A work zone will be established. The work zone will prevent trains from entering it. The work zone cannot be taken away without the permission of the work crew. This is the existing process that was in place at the time of the incident. Euclid 4. The work crew will always have a clear indication of having permission. This is the only thing that would be new.
What about #2 and #3? What prevents a dispatcher from taking work zone permission away without permission from the work crew?
EuclidWhat prevents a dispatcher from taking work zone permission away without permission from the work crew?
His desire to keep his job. Plus the fact that the blood would be on his hands.
This is a serious business, and those involved tend to treat it seriously. I'm pretty sure Balt will back that up.
tree68 Euclid What prevents a dispatcher from taking work zone permission away without permission from the work crew? His desire to keep his job. Plus the fact that the blood would be on his hands. This is a serious business, and those involved tend to treat it seriously. I'm pretty sure Balt will back that up.
Euclid What prevents a dispatcher from taking work zone permission away without permission from the work crew?
Well then , contrary to what Dave said, my points #2 and #3 are new as well as point #4. In the system I am describing, the dispatcher will not be able to remove fouling permission once given. It would be just like lining a train up for a closed drawbridge. Once the clear signal is given, it cannot be taken away. It does not rely on the judgement of a human to not take the signal away because he does not want to lose his job. It is an interlocking system.
The system I am descibing will be new as an overall system, but it is not my idea. It has been outlined in several news articales about this crash. As I said, the principles go back to what was developed in the 1800s.
Weeding out employees that display your kind of 'cowboy' thinking that one can do anything they want, anytime they want. Employees that desire to maintain a continuing employment relationship sincerely attempt to comply with the rules that are in place.
In this incident, if the NTSB could pin the incident on the Dispatcher, they would have done so in a heartbeat as the Dispatcher controls the railroad and is first 'target' whenever a incident that revolves around track authority happens.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACD Euclid What prevents a dispatcher from taking work zone permission away without permission from the work crew? Weeding out employees that display your kind of 'cowboy' thinking that one can do anything they want, anytime they want. Employees that desire to maintain a continuing employment relationship sincerely attempt to comply with the rules that are in place. In this incident, if the NTSB could pin the incident on the Dispatcher, they would have done so in a heartbeat as the Dispatcher controls the railroad and is first 'target' whenever a incident that revolves around track authority happens.
I never said anything about blaming the dispatcher in this case. And my point has nothing to do with assuming that employees may do what they want because of a cowboy attitude. My point is only whether it is physically possible to take away foul protection. If it is physically possible, it might happen by accident or misunderstdanding no matter how concientious an employee might be.
What prevents a dispatcher from taking work zone permission away without permission from the work crew?
Common sense, and a desire to keep themselves employeed as a dispatcher.
This thread is starting have a familiar ring to it. One poster talking in circles about unlikely what ifs.
An "expensive model collector"
Here is a system where the track foreman has a key, and the dispatcher cannot remove foul protection unless the track foreman gives the key to the dispatcher. That’s want I’m saying; a true interlocking system, kind of like a staff system.
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20160407_Feds_had_advised_Amtrak_to_install_safety_backup_systems.html
“A third backup goes a step beyond the current communication between on-site workers and dispatchers. This system, implemented by Metro-North after a worker was fatally struck by a train in 2013, gives a foreman at a work site a unique code. A dispatcher cannot route a train to that track without speaking to the person on site, asking for the code and entering it into a control panel.”
EuclidA dispatcher cannot route a train to that track without speaking to the person on site, asking for the code and entering it into a control panel.”
Alas, unless there's a physical barrier involved (ie, a switch or derail) or some form of third party enforcement (ie, PTC), a train can still enter the work zone.
The first three steps are in place in all dark territory, for all movements. See our earlier discussion about "taking the railroad home." They are also in place for work zones in signalled territory.
The random key is simply an enforcement tool. Like almost all rules in railroading, the need for its use is written in blood.
n012944This thread is starting have a familiar ring to it. One poster talking in circles about unlikely what ifs.
It's sounding like the Lac Megantic thread; OVER AND OVER AND OVER.
Euclid Here is a system where the track foreman has a key, and the dispatcher cannot remove foul protection unless the track foreman gives the key to the dispatcher. That’s want I’m saying; a true interlocking system, kind of like a staff system. http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20160407_Feds_had_advised_Amtrak_to_install_safety_backup_systems.html “A third backup goes a step beyond the current communication between on-site workers and dispatchers. This system, implemented by Metro-North after a worker was fatally struck by a train in 2013, gives a foreman at a work site a unique code. A dispatcher cannot route a train to that track without speaking to the person on site, asking for the code and entering it into a control panel.”
Keep reinventing the wheel and some day you might actually get it to roll. In the meantime you're just blowing smoke.
Norm48327 Euclid Here is a system where the track foreman has a key, and the dispatcher cannot remove foul protection unless the track foreman gives the key to the dispatcher. That’s want I’m saying; a true interlocking system, kind of like a staff system. http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20160407_Feds_had_advised_Amtrak_to_install_safety_backup_systems.html “A third backup goes a step beyond the current communication between on-site workers and dispatchers. This system, implemented by Metro-North after a worker was fatally struck by a train in 2013, gives a foreman at a work site a unique code. A dispatcher cannot route a train to that track without speaking to the person on site, asking for the code and entering it into a control panel.” Keep reinventing the wheel and some day you might actually get it to roll. In the meantime you're just blowing smoke.
No, you are just whining in your reply. A real railroad (Metro-North) implemented the system, not Euclid and not you or anyone else on here. I understand the circular parade gets tiresome, but you may overlook some good points in your irritation with him.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Norm,
That is from a 2014 FRA advisory. It is their idea, not mine.
I’m amused at all these quibbling little arguments against any possible improvement in the way things are being done. It seems to be a popular theme here on the forum.
I am aware of the saying that the railroad rules are written in blood, and I don’t see it as being complimentary. In my opinion having the rules written in blood is emblematic of a culture that always insists that no safety improvement is ever necessary until bloodshed proves otherwise. The ideal system would anticipate danger and do something about it before blood is shed.
I expect there will be new rules written in the blood of these most recent two victims of the backhoe crash.
We're up to only nine (maybe this will start the tenth?) pages, so the horse may not be dead yet?
Johnny
Deggesty We're up to only nine (maybe this will start the tenth?) pages, so the horse may not be dead yet?
Better a dead horse on here than more (potentially avoidable) deaths of workers and passengers.
And the when the code is entered and protection is released; PROTECTION IS RELEASED! A backhoe operator puts his machine on track without authority and gets obliterated by the train that was being operated after PROTECTION WAS RELEASED. Just as appears to have happened in this instance where the Night Foreman RELEASED PROTECTION on the track the train was operating on.
No matter how many repetitive steps you put into the action of releasing protection - WHEN PROTECTION IS RELEASED THERE IS NO PROTECTION.
Even without knowing what caused this backhoe crash, I conclude that the primary thing that was missing from the safety system was the ability of the track crew to know that they had no protection. Obviously they had no protection and did not know that. If they had known that, the collision probably would not have happened.
schlimmNo, you are just whining in your reply.
Sorry to disappoint you but I am not one of those liberal whiners.
schlimmI understand the circular parade gets tiresome, but you may overlook some good points in your irritation with him.
I believe Euclid is a big boy and you needent keep continuously coming to his defense. It's time to let him fight his own battles.
EuclidThe ideal system would anticipate danger and do something about it before blood is shed.
Unfortunately, true clairvoyance is rare.
The old wisdom (still true today) is that "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." Any procedure is fine until someone finds a way around it which results in something bad happening. That's why railroad rules are written in blood, and it's why we aren't still operating under the same rules the railroads used in 1865.
Expectations change, too. Used to be it was OK to go between or under a train without ensuring protection. Not too many people got hurt, and if they did, it was part of the job.
Nowadays we expect zero injuries, so we do our best to ensure that those selfsame injuries won't happen by calling for three step, red zone, or whatever a railroad chooses to call the procedure.
No one designs a system that will cause injury or death. On the other hand, it's virtually impossible to anticipate every possible situation. So we do our best and learn from the mistakes.
no,youre a conservative whiner
EuclidEven without knowing what caused this backhoe crash, I conclude that the primary thing that was missing from the safety system was the ability of the track crew to know that they had no protection. Obviously they had no protection and did not know that. If they had known that, the collision probably would not have happened.
It seems that everyone but the backhoe operator knew there was no protection in place. Did he arrive late for the day and miss the job briefing? Did he have to make a nature call during the job briefing? Did he not pay any attention during the job briefing. Why did the backhoe operator do what he did? That is the unanswered question.
Norm48327 schlimm No, you are just whining in your reply. Sorry to disappoint you but I am not one of those liberal whiners. schlimm I understand the circular parade gets tiresome, but you may overlook some good points in your irritation with him. I believe Euclid is a big boy and you needent keep continuously coming to his defense. It's time to let him fight his own battles.
schlimm No, you are just whining in your reply.
schlimm I understand the circular parade gets tiresome, but you may overlook some good points in your irritation with him.
He is, I don't and he does. But I believe strongly in freedom of speech. And sometimes, if you listen, you just might learn something, even from Euclid.
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