schlimm Lots of speculation. Why not be patient and wait for the preliminary findings of the NTSB based on facts?
Lots of speculation. Why not be patient and wait for the preliminary findings of the NTSB based on facts?
(Insert your favorite diety here), Grant me patience, but I want it NOW!
Norm
As to speculation about the cause of this crash, I see no way to do that. My only interest and basis for comments here is to explore the safety system that was in place and the various ways that it might have failed. I would have the same questions if there had been no crash.
The crash merely brings up the subject of safety methods that are aimed at preventing crashes. I don’t recall saying anything that speculates about what the actual failure was. Although, it might get close to that with speculating about various outcomes of hypothetical failures within such safety systems.
With the bewildering and complex system of permissions, acknowledgment, expiration, renewal, between a variety of train movements over a variety of tracks, I see no way to find even a suggestion of what went wrong. I am more concerned about the safety system and how it can fail.
However, I do find lots of speculation here and in the news that assumes that the track crew did not have proper authority to be fouling the site of the crash. And it seems to be based on the fact that the train hit the backhoe. Not only is that speculation, but it is a faulty premise as well.
So I stay out of speculation about the cause of this crash.
I did notice in one news article, the writer cites an observer who said this:
“The NTSB has all the information it needs to quickly determine exactly what happened: The train’s event recorder, forward- and inward-facing cameras in the locomotive cab, radio transmissions, dispatcher records, etc. So why will it take 12 to 18 months to issue an official finding and a final report? By now, anyone involved knows exactly what took place.”
Euclid“The NTSB has all the information it needs to quickly determine exactly what happened: The train’s event recorder, forward- and inward-facing cameras in the locomotive cab, radio transmissions, dispatcher records, etc. So why will it take 12 to 18 months to issue an official finding and a final report? By now, anyone involved knows exactly what took place.”
Then perhaps it would be wise to let the NTSB sort through that information and come to a conclusion and then make their recommendations rather than trying to second guess them. I'm certain they know how the system works and what to suggest to prevent a recurrence.
Norm48327 Euclid “The NTSB has all the information it needs to quickly determine exactly what happened: The train’s event recorder, forward- and inward-facing cameras in the locomotive cab, radio transmissions, dispatcher records, etc. So why will it take 12 to 18 months to issue an official finding and a final report? By now, anyone involved knows exactly what took place.” Then perhaps it would be wise to let the NTSB sort through that information and come to a conclusion and then make their recommendations rather than trying to second guess them. I'm certain they know how the system works and what to suggest to prevent a recurrence.
Euclid “The NTSB has all the information it needs to quickly determine exactly what happened: The train’s event recorder, forward- and inward-facing cameras in the locomotive cab, radio transmissions, dispatcher records, etc. So why will it take 12 to 18 months to issue an official finding and a final report? By now, anyone involved knows exactly what took place.”
Norm,
The quote above that you attribute to me was not said by me. It was referenced in a news article as having been said by someone else who the article does not identify. I have no idea whether the statement is true.
As to your comment about that quote, the person quoted gives no indication of second guessing the NTSB, as you say. His only point is to ask why, with all the information readily at hand, it should take the NTSB 12-18 months to announce a conclusion.
But again, this is not my opinion or something that I said.
RME[snipped - PDN] . . . Somebody cue Mr. Schanoes, who can comment on this far better than I could. . . .
Link to Railway Age column by William C. Vantuono, quoted in Schanoes' blog and elsewhere in this thread:
http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/safety/two-killed-in-wreck-of-amtrak-palmetto.html?channel=60
- Paul North.
Paul,
I cannot get that link to Railway Age to work anymore, but what I quoted in the second post is from that article. I am not sure who actually made the statement, but William Vantuono quoted him or her. Apparently Mr. Schanoes agrees.
EuclidI did notice in one news article, the writer cites an observer who said this: “The NTSB has all the information it needs to quickly determine exactly what happened: The train’s event recorder, forward- and inward-facing cameras in the locomotive cab, radio transmissions, dispatcher records, etc. So why will it take 12 to 18 months to issue an official finding and a final report? By now, anyone involved knows exactly what took place.”
It's not enough to know what took place physically.
As the discussion here plainly shows, there are myriad contributing factors. Two of those factors are not available to explain themselves.
What will take time will be stitching together all of the events surrounding the incident in order to determine why it took place. Once we know that, we can take measures to ensure that the same chain of events (or one like it) won't be repeated.
It's entirely possible that the "smoking gun" has already been identified, even if it hasn't been announced publically.
One must remember, too, that it's possible that litigation will occur as a result of the incident. Everyone will want the facts right before that happens.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68 Euclid I did notice in one news article, the writer cites an observer who said this: “The NTSB has all the information it needs to quickly determine exactly what happened: The train’s event recorder, forward- and inward-facing cameras in the locomotive cab, radio transmissions, dispatcher records, etc. So why will it take 12 to 18 months to issue an official finding and a final report? By now, anyone involved knows exactly what took place.” It's not enough to know what took place physically. As the discussion here plainly shows, there are myriad contributing factors. Two of those factors are not available to explain themselves. What will take time will be stitching together all of the events surrounding the incident in order to determine why it took place. Once we know that, we can take measures to ensure that the same chain of events (or one like it) won't be repeated. It's entirely possible that the "smoking gun" has already been identified, even if it hasn't been announced publically. One must remember, too, that it's possible that litigation will occur as a result of the incident. Everyone will want the facts right before that happens.
Euclid I did notice in one news article, the writer cites an observer who said this: “The NTSB has all the information it needs to quickly determine exactly what happened: The train’s event recorder, forward- and inward-facing cameras in the locomotive cab, radio transmissions, dispatcher records, etc. So why will it take 12 to 18 months to issue an official finding and a final report? By now, anyone involved knows exactly what took place.”
I have no idea how long it should take. However, we already know what took place physically, so I must conclude that the person who made the comment is not referring to a desire for the NTSB to quicly tell us what took place phsically.
What everyone wants to know is why it happened. I assume that is what the person who made the comment means. And that person contends that the NTSB now has all the information to determine why the accident happened.
As I understand it, both that person making the above comment and Mr. Schanoes feels that the NTSB drags out the investigation and thus takes too long to tell us what happened. Perhaps Railway Age Editor, William C. Vantuono feels the same way since he quoted the person complaining about the NTSB taking too much time.
EuclidAs I understand it, both that person making the above comment and Mr. Schanoes feels that the NTSB drags out the investigation and thus takes too long to tell us what happened. Perhaps Railway Age Editor, William C. Vantuono feels the same way since he quoted the person complaining about the NTSB taking too much time.
Those people can put their pants back on and let the NTSB do what they do. The world (and the NTSB) doesn't revolve around their wants. Let's have a thorough investigation. If they want quick answers and uninformed guesses, they can just read some of the crap that is posted to this site.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
“With nearly 40 years on the rail, Carter can run countless pieces of machinery with finesse that earns him constant praise from his co-workers. Some say he could thread a needle with a backhoe if he tried.”
https://www.gofundme.com/6gxbe8s4
Euclid As I understand it, both that person making the above comment and Mr. Schanoes feels that the NTSB drags out the investigation and thus takes too long to tell us what happened. Perhaps Railway Age Editor, William C. Vantuono feels the same way since he quoted the person complaining about the NTSB taking too much time.
Typical Company Official response - Fire first, get told why later. Company Officials have the excuse of complying with various labor agreements when going through the investigation process which have specific time constraints. The NTSB has no such time constraints and intends to get to the ROOT CAUSE, not just the easily observable cause - and they, in many cases, are different.
The fact that the incident happened indicates rules were violated - the big question is why.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
http://www.wsj.com/articles/amtrak-crash-probe-indicates-basic-safety-measure-wasnt-deployed-1459885465
From the link. My emphasis added in bold:
An investigation into this week’s Amtrak crash in Chester, Pa., indicates track workers didn’t deploy a basic, decades-old safety measure that experts say could have prevented a collision that killed two workers and injured more than 30 passengers, people familiar with the matter said.
Crews performing work on a stretch of Amtrak’s heavily traveled Northeast Corridor on Sunday apparently didn’t put in place what is known as a supplemental shunting device, in apparent violation of Amtrak’s own worker-protection rules, these people said. The device, which is clamped to the track, completes an electrical circuit to alert the signaling system that the track is occupied.
Had a shunt been used, Amtrak’s computerized collision-avoidance system known as positive train control, or PTC, could have prevented the accident, said Steven Ditmeyer, a former federal railroad official and Virginia-based consultant who has advised the U.S. government and transportation industry groups but not Amtrak.
“It would have triggered the signal system, which would have triggered PTC,” Mr. Ditmeyer said of the shunting device. “I can think of no reason that there would not be a shunt in place” when maintenance is under way.
EuclidI cannot get that link to Railway Age to work anymore, but what I quoted in the second post is from that article. I am not sure who actually made the statement, but William Vantuono quoted him or her. Apparently Mr. Schanoes agrees.
Euclid http://www.wsj.com/articles/amtrak-crash-probe-indicates-basic-safety-measure-wasnt-deployed-1459885465 From the link. My emphasis added in bold: An investigation into this week’s Amtrak crash in Chester, Pa., indicates track workers didn’t deploy a basic, decades-old safety measure that experts say could have prevented a collision that killed two workers and injured more than 30 passengers, people familiar with the matter said. Crews performing work on a stretch of Amtrak’s heavily traveled Northeast Corridor on Sunday apparently didn’t put in place what is known as a supplemental shunting device, in apparent violation of Amtrak’s own worker-protection rules, these people said. The device, which is clamped to the track, completes an electrical circuit to alert the signaling system that the track is occupied. Had a shunt been used, Amtrak’s computerized collision-avoidance system known as positive train control, or PTC, could have prevented the accident, said Steven Ditmeyer, a former federal railroad official and Virginia-based consultant who has advised the U.S. government and transportation industry groups but not Amtrak. “It would have triggered the signal system, which would have triggered PTC,” Mr. Ditmeyer said of the shunting device. “I can think of no reason that there would not be a shunt in place” when maintenance is under way.
If you don't have Foul Time on a track - you don't have any authorization to shunt the track. The two work hand in hand. Being on track or affecting the signal system (which a shunt does) require the permission of the Train Dispatcher.
BaltACDIf you don't have Foul Time on a track - you don't have any authorization to shunt the track. The two work hand in hand. Being on track or affecting the signal system (which a shunt does) require the permission of the Train Dispatcher.
How do you know that they did not have foul time or were otherwise lacking authorization to shunt the track?
EuclidHow do you know that they did not have foul time or were otherwise lacking authorization to shunt the track?
Balt did not say one way or the other about foul time. He only told you what is required to set a shunt. What part don't you understand?
Excerpt from Statement of BMWED, Apr. 4
https://www.bmwe.org/cms/file/04052016_082049_BMWED%20Statement%20on%20Fatal%20Amtrak%20Accident,%20Chester%20PA%20FINAL.pdf
“The Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED) mourns the tragic loss of life in Chester, PA. Our thoughts and prayers are with the families of the fallen at this extremely difficult time. We also express our concern for those passengers on Train 89 who suffered injuries in this tragic accident,” said BMWED National President Freddie N. Simpson.
“There have been three track worker fatalities in Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor since March 1, 2016. This is totally unacceptable and points to systemic deficiencies in the safety culture at Amtrak,” Simpson said.
BMWED General Chairman Jed Dodd echoed the concerns about safety culture at Amtrak, stating, “Amtrak has abandoned a close call reporting system that permitted these problems to be identified and resolved without waiting for fatalities, fired long-service railroad managers without due process, instituted a draconian discipline program designed to intimidate and silence the rank and file regarding safety, put safety training into the hands of trainers with no railroad experience, and hired senior managers who have no experience in operating or maintaining a railroad. This is a recipe for disaster and the blame should lay squarely at the feet of senior management officials responsible for these misguided and regressive policies.”
If they thought they had a valid "work zone" with the right to foul the track, they should have had the right to employ a shunt. Without that right they should not foul. Or is there another reading of the rule?
Norm48327 Euclid How do you know that they did not have foul time or were otherwise lacking authorization to shunt the track? Balt did not say one way or the other about foul time. He only told you what is required to set a shunt. What part don't you understand?
Euclid How do you know that they did not have foul time or were otherwise lacking authorization to shunt the track?
The person in the article I posted said that if the crew had used a shunt, the accident would not have happened. No other condition to that statement was offered by the person who made it. So it sounds like not using the shunt was the choice made by the track crew.
Balt responded to that by saying, “If you don't have Foul Time on a track - you don't have any authorization to shunt the track. The two work hand in hand.”
That sounds like an explanation addressing the question of why they crew did not use a shunt. Although he did not say that the track crew did not have foul time, the context of responding to me by saying that they could not use a shunt without foul time sounded like he was assuming that they did not have foul time.
That sounded to me like he is offering a reason why they did not use a shunt. So I asked him why he assumed that reason. My question to Balt was a sincere question. It was not meant as an insult.
So I think you are seeing trouble where none exists.
And it's possible they didn't use a shunt because they thought they "owned" the track and therefore didn't need it. Oftimes people take shortcuts because in their experience, certain steps are unnecessary.
There are plenty of ongoing questions about the incident - and ongoing questions regarding the safety culture. Getting to the bottom of all of those questions will take some time.
Here is an article about backup safety such as using a shunt. The two in red are what I suggested a couple pages back:
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20160407_Feds_had_advised_Amtrak_to_install_safety_backup_systems.html
From the link:
"Rail workers rely on strictly structured communication between a site foreman and dispatcher to keep trains off tracks where people are present.
The 2014 FRA advisory recommended three types of backup for cases in which there is a communications breakdown. One is a device worn by workers that would alert them to a coming train while simultaneously warning train operators of people ahead.
Another would offer similar protections for maintenance vehicles."
******************************
Another article mentions that Amtrak had decided against using shunts because they don’t work all the time. This is because track maintenance vehicles are lighter than locomotives, and thus may not complete the electrical connection to shunt the rails. So Amtrak thought it would be unsafe to rely on a safety system such as shunting which might fail sometimes. I can see the logic of that position. But I have to wonder why a lighter weight vehicle could not be equipped with a means of reliably creating a successful shunt.
EuclidAnother article mentions that Amtrak had decided against using shunts because they don’t work all the time. This is because track maintenance vehicles are lighter than locomotives, and thus may not complete the electrical connection to shunt the rails. So Amtrak thought it would be unsafe to rely on a safety system such as shunting which might fail sometimes. I can see the logic of that position. But I have to wonder why a lighter weight vehicle could not be equipped with a means of reliably creating a successful shunt.
The shunt in question has absolutely nothing to do with the on-track equipment and the conductivity thereof. In fact, many hi-rail vehicles actually have insulated wheels.
As has already been noted, the shunt consists of a length of cable with a clamp on each end that is place across the tracks. The same concept is used by signal maintainers to check crossing and other circuits.
A shunt could be used to protect workers even if they had no on-track equipment at all.
Excerpt from Wall Street Journal, Apr. 10
The apparent safety lapses behind the Chester, Pa., accident lay bare what some Amtrak officials and union representatives describe as a culture hampered by disagreement over how to keep track workers safe…
One former Amtrak nonmanagement supervisor who directed work crews until he retired in 2014 said managers sometimes pressure workers to complete tasks quickly, and to lift restrictions on train speed before a safety concern is addressed, all to keep the trains moving.
He also said managers tend to “over-inundate employees with safety concerns to the point where there were so many rules to follow, no matter what the employees did they were committing safety violations.” The result, he said, was confusion about what safety protocols are essential.
An Amtrak spokeswoman denied that managers push workers to cut corners at the expense of safety. The railroad recently issued a list of “cardinal rules”—including existing prohibitions against tampering with safety equipment, using electronic devices when working and cheating on required job exams—and warned that it would punish or fire those who don’t comply.
http://www.bmwe3014.org/Latest_news/amtrak/2016/SEA_Stadtler%20Cardinal%20Rules%202%2023%2016_FINAL.pdf
tree68 Euclid Another article mentions that Amtrak had decided against using shunts because they don’t work all the time. This is because track maintenance vehicles are lighter than locomotives, and thus may not complete the electrical connection to shunt the rails. So Amtrak thought it would be unsafe to rely on a safety system such as shunting which might fail sometimes. I can see the logic of that position. But I have to wonder why a lighter weight vehicle could not be equipped with a means of reliably creating a successful shunt. The shunt in question has absolutely nothing to do with the on-track equipment and the conductivity thereof. In fact, many hi-rail vehicles actually have insulated wheels. As has already been noted, the shunt consists of a length of cable with a clamp on each end that is place across the tracks. The same concept is used by signal maintainers to check crossing and other circuits. A shunt could be used to protect workers even if they had no on-track equipment at all.
Euclid Another article mentions that Amtrak had decided against using shunts because they don’t work all the time. This is because track maintenance vehicles are lighter than locomotives, and thus may not complete the electrical connection to shunt the rails. So Amtrak thought it would be unsafe to rely on a safety system such as shunting which might fail sometimes. I can see the logic of that position. But I have to wonder why a lighter weight vehicle could not be equipped with a means of reliably creating a successful shunt.
I understand what you are saying as a shunt being a wire and some connector clamps, and I had thought that was what the news was referring to. Several articles describe them that way. But the article that I mentioned in connection with the shunts and the backhoe crash does not mention wire shunts.
Instead, it describes the problem with rail mounted maintenance equipment not being heavy enough to reliably produce a shunt. It says that this type of shunt is what Amtrak considers to be too unreliable, that therefore it should not be used because people may depend on it, and it might fail. It does make me wonder if Amtrak also considers the wire shunt to be too unreliable to use.
Because of Amtrak’s banning of shunting, they have insulated axles on MOW equipment to make shunting impossible. That may be the reason for the insulated wheels that you mentioned.
Here is the article:
http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/in-transit/Amtrak-train-crash-mirrors.html
"It is beyond question that the means were available to Amtrak to install a fail-safe system which would operate to prevent a derailment even assuming all the other factors in this case," Connor's attorney wrote in a letter accompanying the announcement of his client's resignation.
Followers of the accident investigation, and of rail-safety issues, understood the reference immediately.
The "fail-safe" system referred to would allow railroad maintenance vehicles to, in effect, create buffer zones front and back as they move down the track. This is done electrically and is called "shunting. "
And the controversy concerning whether to shunt relatively lightweight vehicles - such as the 15-ton ballast regulator involved in the Jan. 29 crash - is central to debates taking place in Congress concerning pending rail- safety legislation, and around bargaining tables where railroad-company managers and union negotiators meet.
First, some technical background:
A weak electrical current passes continuously through all steel rails. When a locomotive operates over the rails of track is occupied…
But at one-tenth the weight of a locomotive, a ballast regulator "will complete that circuit only sometimes," said Amtrak spokesman John Jacobsen in an interview after several Amtrak workers told the National Transportation Safety Board that shunting might have prevented the recent crash.
It "might complete (the circuit) three-quarters of the time if the rails have a lot of activity over them and are real smooth and polished," Jacobsen said. "But it lacks the weight to put enough pressure on the rails to shunt all the time. "
As a result, he said, Amtrak "decided a long time ago not to allow equipment which doesn't shunt consistently to shunt at all," and manufacturers were instructed to insulate the undercarriages of maintenance vehicles so they simply cannot shunt.
Euclid tree68 Euclid Another article mentions that Amtrak had decided against using shunts because they don’t work all the time. This is because track maintenance vehicles are lighter than locomotives, and thus may not complete the electrical connection to shunt the rails. So Amtrak thought it would be unsafe to rely on a safety system such as shunting which might fail sometimes. I can see the logic of that position. But I have to wonder why a lighter weight vehicle could not be equipped with a means of reliably creating a successful shunt. The shunt in question has absolutely nothing to do with the on-track equipment and the conductivity thereof. In fact, many hi-rail vehicles actually have insulated wheels. As has already been noted, the shunt consists of a length of cable with a clamp on each end that is place across the tracks. The same concept is used by signal maintainers to check crossing and other circuits. A shunt could be used to protect workers even if they had no on-track equipment at all. I understand what you are saying as a shunt being a wire and some connector clamps, and I had thought that was what the news was referring to. Several articles describe them that way. But the article that I mentioned in connection with the shunts and the backhoe crash does not mention wire shunts. Instead, it describes the problem with rail mounted maintenance equipment not being heavy enough to reliably produce a shunt. It says that this type of shunt is what Amtrak considers to be too unreliable, that therefore it should not be used because people may depend on it, and it might fail. It does make me wonder if Amtrak also considers the wire shunt to be too unreliable to use. Because of Amtrak’s banning of shunting, they have insulated axles on MOW equipment to make shunting impossible. That may be the reason for the insulated wheels that you mentioned. Here is the article: http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/in-transit/Amtrak-train-crash-mirrors.html From the link: "It is beyond question that the means were available to Amtrak to install a fail-safe system which would operate to prevent a derailment even assuming all the other factors in this case," Connor's attorney wrote in a letter accompanying the announcement of his client's resignation. Followers of the accident investigation, and of rail-safety issues, understood the reference immediately. The "fail-safe" system referred to would allow railroad maintenance vehicles to, in effect, create buffer zones front and back as they move down the track. This is done electrically and is called "shunting. " And the controversy concerning whether to shunt relatively lightweight vehicles - such as the 15-ton ballast regulator involved in the Jan. 29 crash - is central to debates taking place in Congress concerning pending rail- safety legislation, and around bargaining tables where railroad-company managers and union negotiators meet. First, some technical background: A weak electrical current passes continuously through all steel rails. When a locomotive operates over the rails of track is occupied… But at one-tenth the weight of a locomotive, a ballast regulator "will complete that circuit only sometimes," said Amtrak spokesman John Jacobsen in an interview after several Amtrak workers told the National Transportation Safety Board that shunting might have prevented the recent crash. It "might complete (the circuit) three-quarters of the time if the rails have a lot of activity over them and are real smooth and polished," Jacobsen said. "But it lacks the weight to put enough pressure on the rails to shunt all the time. " As a result, he said, Amtrak "decided a long time ago not to allow equipment which doesn't shunt consistently to shunt at all," and manufacturers were instructed to insulate the undercarriages of maintenance vehicles so they simply cannot shunt.
There are rules for MofW to have equipment on track. There are rules to have trains on track. The rules, when complied with, do not permit trains and MofW equipment to be on the same track in the same location, except in VERY NARROWLY defined circumstances where work trains are operating under the authority of MofW personnel as MofW equipment within the ESTABLISHED limits of a MofW work zone. MofW equipment IS NOT expected to shunt the track and activate track circuits or highway crossing protection.
The Chester incident IS NOT one of those narrowly defined circumstances.
The shunt factor is a red herring - the primary issue is the permissions or lack thereof.
tree68 The shunt factor is a red herring - the primary issue is the permissions or lack thereof.
But you'll never convince our resident KIA of that.
EuclidBecause of Amtrak’s banning of shunting, they have insulated axles on MOW equipment to make shunting impossible.
Since there are multiple types of shunts, the statement that AMTK has "banned shunts" may be misleading. They have banned wheel shunts on smaller vehicles because they are unreliable (for the same reason a single light engine or a single car may not activate track circuits). If a method is unreliable then you don't want to rely on it.
You would be well served to not take news reports literally. Assume the reports will get the details wrong and be pleasantly suprised when they actually get something right. Also remember that government agencies hav agendas to justify their own positions and decisions. So pretty much every accident "could have been prevented if they had implemented PTC" regardless if the accident could have also be prevented if the other safety processes had been followed or PTC is dependent on a low tech solution.
For example, the statement that a shunt would have prevented a train from entering the block is not necessarily true. If the there is NO foul time in the block a train could be permitted into the block at restricted speed. All shunts do is create an occupancy, they don't establish protection, they don't tell the dispatcher anybody's there. It is quite common for a gang to clear up and leave a "track light" (occupancy ) in a block behind them caused by a piece of machinery breaking a wire associated with the signal system. A major project will always have a couple signal maintainers on hand to patch up the broken wires caused by the machinery or work. What PTC does is prohibit high speed collisions but it won't eliminate low speed collisions.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
Why is the shunt all of a sudden a red herring? In the last post, you told me that what I said about the equipment shunt was completely unrelated. I posted an article about how it is a direct focus of this current accident investigation, and so now you say it is just a red herring.
You and Balt say it is all about permissions and rules. Shunts are part of the rules. They are a backup protection. In this case of Amtrak, they have been made to be against the rules. The article talks about reintroducing shunts that would be triggered by MOW vehicles, and using those vehicles to define the limits of a shunted work zone.
While it may have been the earlier Chester crash that started the discussion, the article brings it up in reference to this current collision. It is referred to as a “fail-safe” protection system. Obviously, the overall point so far developing in this investigation is that current MOW protection system is too vulnerable to human error.
So pointing to a fail-safe system beyond the current system of verbal permissions is now a red herring? That does not even make sense. What would the red herring be intended to distract from? Maybe Norm could chime in and help us understand this.
Not using shunts is just plain stupid. It is not rocket science. Ways were found to make RDCs shunt reliably. It should be possible to do the same for all rail vehicles. That is my opinion.
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