Euclid Ed, I can see how the person requesting foul time could be designated as the only one who can request removing it. But isn’t it the dispatcher who actually sets up the zone of foul protection upon request, and then removes it upon request? If so, are you saying that it is physically or electronically impossible for the dispatcher to remove foul time without the request of the person in charge of the track crew? I understand that the rules require permission from the person owning the foul time in order for the dispatcher to release it. But what would prevent the dispatcher from mistakenly releasing it without a request from the track crew?
Ed,
I can see how the person requesting foul time could be designated as the only one who can request removing it. But isn’t it the dispatcher who actually sets up the zone of foul protection upon request, and then removes it upon request?
If so, are you saying that it is physically or electronically impossible for the dispatcher to remove foul time without the request of the person in charge of the track crew?
I understand that the rules require permission from the person owning the foul time in order for the dispatcher to release it. But what would prevent the dispatcher from mistakenly releasing it without a request from the track crew?
Because the dispatcher can not physicaly see the work crew or people fouling are in fact clear, they are by rule forbidden from removing any type of protection granted until the person that requested it releases it.
Nothing "prevents" me from running over a blue flag and coupling into the cars it protects, but if I ever did, it most likely would be the last move for a railroad I ever make.
If a shift change occures with the person who requested the protection leaving, he or she must release the protection, and if the person relieving that person wishes to have protection, they must ask for it themselves...happens all the time, the person leaving, the person coming on duty and the dispatcher will all converse via radio, and release the old protection, then re-establish new protection for the next MOW foreman in such a manner that there is no confusion as to what is going on...thats why we have to repeat things verbatium back to dispatchers, so there is a clear understanding of what is happening.
If the employee who originaly requested protection goes home without releasing his protection, he is said to have"taken the track home with him" because no matter how many shift changes of MOW, or dispatchers happens, that request stands till the person requesting the protection releases it.
If dispatchers change shift while a protection request is outstanding, it is the duty and responsibility of the outgoing dispatcher to inform the incoming dispatcher of the protection, and the protection request will be in noted in writting on the shift turnover as Balt and others have pointed out, and will be included in the dispatching system's computer, it will prompt and remind the new dispatcher of the work window and who requested, and released protection.
Thats not to say a dispatcher can not screw up, but it would be very unlikely that the releiving MOW foreman would not request his own protection from whoever is dispatching at the time he starts his shift.
This works just like red zone or three step protection...only I can request three step protection for myself, my helper can not piggy back off my request, and only I can release my three step protection...MOW can not piggyback off of the previous crews protection, and only the employee in charge who requested the protection can release it.
If these guys were working "under traffic" and didn'thave lookouts, well, we have had a pretty lengthy discussion about that before.
If a shunt was applied, like blue flag protection, the rules state "only the person applying the protection, or a person of the same caft, can remove the protection".
Note that if it is a "person of the same craft" removing the shunt or blue flag, that person by rule accepts complete responsibility for such action.
Now, I was not there, so I will refrain from "guessing" how this happened, but I can tell you that as a train crew member, the very first piece of paper we look at, long before our work orders and switch lists, is our track bulletins...I have to know who is working where, and when, before I can plan anything.
Rare is the word I would use to describe finding a MOW crew working in my area without such being noted on my track bulletin.
23 17 46 11
Euclid“It is possible for fouling permission to be inadvertently withdrawn without the knowledge of the work crew.”
YES, YES, YES!
Now; please stop over-analyzing it.
Norm
Ref: Euclid/Electroliner1935 3pm post 4-16
I hesitate to even suggest anything regarding this thread, since some are so prone to “strike at” any/all comments that seem the least bit “not of their thinking”. Deep breath. Here goes….. Mistakes happen. Knowledge of rules and operating according to rules that need to be obeyed…..hopefully, usually, everyone is okee dokee. But if a human is ANYWHERE involved (by the way, has anyone seen automation equipment fail, EVER) watch out, somewhere, sometime, a human will err, it will happen. Much has been said about the shunt. The BNSF three track main was said to have safety features during MOW operations. Further it was said that the shunt would be a hindrance to smooth operation since the thru trains call ahead to see speed to safely pass. Wait, as a self-guard, could not the shunt be installed by EIC and upon the train making the call (I know, I know, you rule “obeyers”,…. no shunt w/o dispatch authority……..chill just for a second …..this is a new idea ……. possibly incorporated in the official rules someday ….. unless ya’ll can point out the illogic to my suggestion …….….The dispatcher already gave a restriction, thus the train made the call). Dispatch would “see” the shunt EIC installed and w/o alarm know that the MOW is self-protecting. The EIC would lift the shunt as he gives on-coming train specific instructions per the dispatch order to obey the EIC when passing the work zone.
The only hindrance to this suggestion is the timeout/cycling of signals so as not to drop signals in front of an approaching train. Solution, further/earlier contact made to avoid previously mentioned “problem”. What say ye experts? I will not consider patent infringement if it does go forward by someone else. NO JOKE. If it could have saved those lives lost, nuff sed!
There is so much discussion of this subject = don’t know where I read the item……it even gave the specific name of the person at Amtrak who ordered new shunts from a supplier, THE DAY AFTER the accident. Coincidence? Interesting if true.
Norm48327 Euclid “It is possible for fouling permission to be inadvertently withdrawn without the knowledge of the work crew.” YES, YES, YES! Now; please stop over-analyzing it.
Euclid “It is possible for fouling permission to be inadvertently withdrawn without the knowledge of the work crew.”
Norm,
It is really just the point I was making in rebutting the claim by Dave Husman that the day shift track crew had not been granted foul time. I see no way to come to that conclusion as Dave has, because I do not know that the foul time had not been granted and then mistakenly withdrawn by the dispatcher. After all, it CAN happen so I see no way to rule it out without knowing for a fact that it did not happen.
It happened here:
“The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the January 9, 2007, collision of train 322 with a track maintenance vehicle near Woburn, Massachusetts, was the failure of the train dispatcher to maintain blocking that provided signal protection for the track segment occupied by the maintenance-of-way work crew, and the failure of the work crew to apply a shunting device that would have provided redundant signal protection for their track segment. Contributing to the accident was Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad's failure to ensure that maintenance-of-way work crews applied shunting devices as required.
On the day of the accident, the track segment had been removed from service and the track maintenance crew had been given exclusive track occupancy; so their expectation was that no train would be permitted on the track while they were working on it.
The engineer of the accident train had a clear signal indication and did not have any knowledge that a track maintenance crew would be occupying the same track.”
Euclid Norm48327 Euclid “It is possible for fouling permission to be inadvertently withdrawn without the knowledge of the work crew.” YES, YES, YES! Now; please stop over-analyzing it. Norm, It is really just the point I was making in rebutting the claim by Dave Husman that the day shift track crew had not been granted foul time. I see no way to come to that conclusion as Dave has, because I do not know that the foul time had not been granted and then mistakenly withdrawn by the dispatcher. After all, it CAN happen so I see no way to rule it out without knowing for a fact that it did not happen. It happened here: “The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the January 9, 2007, collision of train 322 with a track maintenance vehicle near Woburn, Massachusetts, was the failure of the train dispatcher to maintain blocking that provided signal protection for the track segment occupied by the maintenance-of-way work crew, and the failure of the work crew to apply a shunting device that would have provided redundant signal protection for their track segment. Contributing to the accident was Massachusetts Bay Commuter Railroad's failure to ensure that maintenance-of-way work crews applied shunting devices as required. On the day of the accident, the track segment had been removed from service and the track maintenance crew had been given exclusive track occupancy; so their expectation was that no train would be permitted on the track while they were working on it. The engineer of the accident train had a clear signal indication and did not have any knowledge that a track maintenance crew would be occupying the same track.”
IF - the day shift had requested protection and it had been granted and the train operted into the protected area it would have been HEADLINE NEWS on the day after the incident. That is the easiest of all things to check with the CADS systems each carrier uses for their Dispatching function. It is also possible that beings from another world manipulated the force fields on Earth to cause the incident.
Possible and Likely don't pass the same smell tests.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACD IF - the day shift had requested protection and it had been granted and the train operted into the protected area it would have been HEADLINE NEWS on the day after the incident. That is the easiest of all things to check with the CADS systems each carrier uses for their Dispatching function. It is also possible that beings from another world manipulated the force fields on Earth to cause the incident. Possible and Likely don't pass the same smell tests.
I am only saying that it is possible. It has happened, so I don't think it is as rare of a possibility as you suggest with your beings from another world hypothesis. Why rule out a reasonable possible cause?
I am certainly not saying that I believe the dispatcher caused this Amtrak crash or that the cause I mention is what actually did happen. I have no reason to guess at what actually happened. So I can't see ruling out that it did not happen just as a guess.
I also would not guess that if it happened by a dispatcher error, it would be headline news the day after it happened, as you say.
EuclidI am only saying that it is possible.
Many, many things are possible that are extremely unlikely, as has already been noted.
A dispatcher releasing authority on someone else's track isn't one of the possible things.
If an oncoming dispatch finds no blocks, work zones, etc in place when he comes on duty, and is not briefed about any, and there are no notices indicating that such should be the case, then he's free and clear to do with the track as he wishes.
If the dispatcher finds blocks, work zones, etc, with no correlating information, he's going to find out why. If he releases it of his own volition, it's his job to lose, which he probably will, as already noted.
As I noted before, we are occasionally obligated to "take the track home with us." And I've gotten "bright and early" phone calls looking for me to give up that track. The dispatcher has my cell phone number...
I suspect that we'll find that the EIC didn't establish a work zone on that track due to an oversight, or that he never planned on establishing a work zone on that track and the backhoe operator set on without the appropriate permissions. There may be variations on that theme, but none of them involve a dispatcher pulling a work zone unannounced.
And maybe the dispatcher contacted the EIC and asked for the track back (which is a possibility). If word wasn't properly passed, maybe the backhoe operator didn't get the word in a timely manner. Regardless, the dispatcher would have coordinated the cancellation with the EIC. He would not have simply pulled it.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
When I refer to the possibility of the dispatcher withdrawing foul time without being asked to withdraw it, I am referring to doing so as an error, as in the NTSB letter I quoted from what wanswheel posted a bit back. You will notice that the NTSB does not dismiss it as some real long shot possibility. They advise adding safeguards to prevent it.
I am certainly not saying that is what happened, but it is a possibility. So I will not rule it out. I leave it open for consideration. Beyond that, I will not speculate. Of course, everyone else is free to speculate, and some of your speculation may prove correct.
People are fallible. They make mistakes for many reasons: forgetfulness, confusion, inattention, poor judgement, etc., but rarely out of malice. Because of that, regardless of the rules or consequences (getting terminated), human errors have (as in the Massachusetts accident referred to) occurred and will continue to happen. That is why the FRA recommended the use of shunts.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Cotton Belt MP104Your posts are very knowledgeable and on point. It is obvious that you are an active/ employed/ “real”/ RR person, however is it possible that your position will preclude an open mind. You subscribe to explanations of actions per day to day experience you know very well. However there are cases when, getting fired or not, employees anywhere/any occupation will deviate for whatever reason (some insane) accepted protocol. You know, even though it is NOT legal/accepted practice they make very bad decisions. Thus, real world/tragedy/unfortunate HAPPENS!
Question: To whom were you replying?
EuclidWhen I refer to the possibility of the dispatcher withdrawing foul time without being asked to withdraw it, I am referring to doing so as an error, as in the NTSB letter I quoted from what wanswheel posted a bit back. You will notice that the NTSB does not dismiss it as some real long shot possibility. They advise adding safeguards to prevent it.
There are dozens of ways that a dispatcher could remove an authority. Some of them involve many steps and many errors, some involve very few errors. A lot of it depends on very specific details of which authority, what the dispatching system is and how it was issued. There are safeguards but with most systems there are ways to "defeat" or render the safeguards useless. Shunts (or any of the other methods of creating a track occupancy) is one such safeguard. They require the track gang to have shunts, to install them, to install them on the correct track, to install them correctly and veify that they are working. Skip any step and there is a chance of failure. The foul time could be defeated by the EIC not getting any, by the EIC giving the wrong information, the dispatcher getting the wrong information, the dispatcher repeating back the wrong information, the EIC not catching the error in read back, the dispatcher keying in the wrong information, the dispatcher not entering the information, the dispatcher putting the protection on the wrong track, the dispatcher putting the protection for the wrong time, the EIC asking for the wrong protection, the dispatcher granting the wrong protection, the dispatcher granting the protection on the wrong track, the EIC not communicating the protection to the gang, the EIC communicating the wrong protection to the gang, the gang not hearing the proper protection, the gang not working within the protection provided, the gang not working within the times the protection is provided, the gang not doing the work that was authorized, the gang not establishing their work zone on time, the dispatcher not giving the trains the proper paperwork, the trains not getting the proper paperwork, the crew not reading the paperwork, the dispatching system failing, the signal system failing and this doesn't even include any "willfull" mistakes.
So when you ask a really high level open ended like "the possibility of the dispatcher withdrawing foul time without being asked to withdraw it", the answer to pretty much any question is yes, there is a set of circumstances that could be built to allow a dispatcher to withdraw the foul time without being asked. That would require the dispatcher to actively remove it and ignore or circumvent the processes and protections that are built into the system. If there is a way to turn something on, then there is a way to turn it off.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
Cotton Belt MP104,
I agree that humans can and do make every mistake imaginable for a wide variety of reasons. Rules, good intentions, competence, intelligence, honesty and good character are not enough to assure such mistakes will not be made. So, in cases of train conflict at high speed, rules are often backed up by an automatic safety system that will override a human decision made in error.
The intent is to make every system “failsafe,” a term of art meaning that any failure can only happen when leaving the system in the safe mode. It does not mean that the system is immune to failure, but if it does fail, its failure leaves the elements of the situation that it is controlling in a safe condition.
Cotton Belt - I agree that there are many ways that things can go wrong. Dehusman illustrated them nicely.
What those of us familiar with railroad operations try to point out is that there are procedures in place to provide for safe operation. Those who work behind desks (dispatchers) take their responsibilities seriously - not only is their continued employment at risk if they don't, but so are lives out in the field.
Likewise, those working in the field know that operating within the established procedures is conducive to continued employment, and to going home at the end of their shift.
Those procedures work, as evidenced by the fact that we aren't discussing weekly or daily incidents, even though the work goes on every day.
Any failure that can't be ascribed to a completely random, unforeseeable event has a cause (or series thereof) which led to the occurance. We can try to engineer that cause out of the system, we can change rules and procedures to lessen the possibility of it happening.
But as long as we are engaged in activities which involve variables, stuff is going to happen, as you note. Then it comes down to figuring out why it did.
wanswheel Excerpt from NTSB preliminary report, Apr. 18 http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/DCA16FR007_prelim.aspx The locomotive engineer stated to National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigators that immediately prior to the accident, he initiated an emergency brake application after “seeing something” on main track 3. At the time of the accident, roadway workers were performing maintenance on main track 2 at the accident site over a planned 55-hour window, beginning on April 1, 2016, at 10:00 p.m. and extending to 5:00 a.m. on April 4, 2016. The work included ballast cleaning and remediating fouled ballast (mud spots) on main track 2. During the maintenance window, main track 2 was removed from service and intermittent foul time was granted on main tracks 1, 3, and 4 to protect the backhoe as it was used to assist in cutting away the fouled ballast. NTSB investigators are confirming what roadway worker protections were in place at the time of the accident.
That report begs the question of why a train was permitted through the work zone on an adjacent track at track speed. Track spacing appears to be about fifteen feet center to center. 110 MPH that close to working men and equipment doesn't seem safe under any conditions.
During the maintenance window, main track 2 was removed from service and intermittent foul time was granted on main tracks 1, 3, and 4 to protect the backhoe as it was used to assist in cutting away the fouled ballast.
I would say this is the most pivotal sentence in the whole press release and will more than likely have more to do with the cause than anything else.
Norm48327That report begs the question of why a train was permitted through the work zone on an adjacent track at track speed. Track spacing appears to be about fifteen feet center to center. 110 MPH that close to working men and equipment doesn't seem safe under any conditions.
Once again going back to what type of protection had been established. The MofW determines what protection they require based on the work being done. Not the dispatchers, not the train crews. They set up the requirements. If the whatever arrangements were not properly established or not established then there would be nothing preventing a train from going max speed. What determines teh speed of the passing trains is where thepeople are working in relationship to the live tracks. The dispatcher only knows what the MofW tells him. He can't see it, he doesn't know their rules on track worker safety. They do. They establish what is safe.
Once again it comes down to what arrangements had been made and were they executed. Previously the NTSB was quoted as saying that foul time on the other tracks was intermittant, which means they were putting it on and taking it off. That there were changes in the protection confirms the possibility that this accident happened during one of those changes and there could have been a lapse in protection due to the changes in the limits of the protection.
dehusmanintermittent foul time was granted on main tracks 1, 3, and 4 to protect the backhoe
Does that suggest that the work zone did not have entrance/exit markings for tracks 1, 3, and 4 because the foul time was intermittent. And how is intermittent time established? Sounds fraught with problems. And why wasn't train 78 aware of the possibility of work and allowed into a work zone at track speed without permission from the EIC?
Passing at train by a gang at max speed is done all the time on the western roads. Of course they have a different rule book and use different procedures. The crew has written notice where the gangs a wroking which was established more than 12 hours before the gang went to work. The gangs put out warning signs in advance of the work area and stop signs at the entrance. Each train approaching the work area has to contact the EIC and obtain verbal permission to pass the stop boards. The EIC can tell the train to stop, to pass through the limits at 25 or to pass through at max speed. Which speed is determined by what and where the gang is working. If the gang is clear of the active main track by 25 feet then the train can go max speed. The EIC often has a laptop witht eh dispatcher's computer screen on it so he can see which trains are approaching and can plan his work so when a hot train comes by they can clear and let it pass at max speed. For a long train it might be quicker to stop work and clear so the train can go by in minimal time than to let the train drag by a 25.
Electroliner 1935Does that suggest that the work zone did not have entrance/exit markings for tracks 1, 3, and 4 because the foul time was intermittent. And how is intermittent time established? Sounds fraught with problems. And why wasn't train 78 aware of the possibility of work and allowed into a work zone at track speed without permission from the EIC?
I am not familiar with Amtraks rules so I don't know the specifics on what kind of signage or paperwork they use. I would imagine that the western practice of having each approaching train contact the EIC would be impractical on the NEC given the volume, number of tracks and speeds of the trains. The only way contacting the EIC works is if the EIC can reach the train and transact the clearance process before the train gets to the limits of the work area. That is very difficult on the open prairie at 70 mph, I would only assume that it would be harder in a hilly or urban area at 100+ mph.
I don't think they are using "intermittant time" I think they are getting time intermittantly (track 1 from 7a-11a, track 3 from 10a-2pm, track 1 and 3 from 2p-9p, track 1 9p-1a, etc). They change where the protection is depending on where people are working. If the backhoe has to work off track one then they don't have protection on track 3, if they are working off 3 then they don't have it on 1. At least that seems to be what was implied by the way the NTSB used the term.
It is up to the track workers to acquire foul time and it is up to the dispatcher to deliver it. Once foul time is given, it is up to the track workers to abide by its limits, and up to the dispatcher to maintain it until the track workers relinquish it.
I see no reason to assume that a lack of foul time was the result of a failure to acquire it versus a failure to deliver it. A mistake could have been made in either side of the transaction. Interestingly, this news piece seems to conclude that the track on which the backhoe and train were on was out of service at the time of the crash. Apparently, it is misunderstanding of what the NTSB has said about that matter.
http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2016/04/18/backhoe-amtrak-wreck-had-periodic-right-tracks/83194478/
From the article:
“A backhoe and two longtime Amtrak employees, one from Delaware, were authorized to be on the railroad tracks on April 3 when a passenger train hit and killed them, federal investigators said Monday.”
Euclid It is up to the track workers to acquire foul time and it is up to the dispatcher to deliver it. Once foul time is given, it is up to the track workers to abide by its limits, and up to the dispatcher to maintain it until the track workers relinquish it. I see no reason to assume that a lack of foul time was the result of a failure to acquire it versus a failure to deliver it. A mistake could have been made in either side of the transaction. Interestingly, this news piece seems to conclude that the track on which the backhoe and train were on was out of service at the time of the crash. Apparently, it is misunderstanding of what the NTSB has said about that matter. http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2016/04/18/backhoe-amtrak-wreck-had-periodic-right-tracks/83194478/ From the article: “A backhoe and two longtime Amtrak employees, one from Delaware, were authorized to be on the railroad tracks on April 3 when a passenger train hit and killed them, federal investigators said Monday.”
People from Delaware are unable to read and comprehend the report, Nothing was said in the report (brief and cloudy wording) that inferred that MofW had protection on the track the train was operating on.
I get the impression that the news media is developing a stake in exonerating the backhoe operator. Obviously the information released by the NTSB is not sufficient to clear him of blame, but more than one story reads like the one I posted above, which clearly says that the backhoe operator had the right to be fouling the track at the time the train arrived. Other stories stop just sort of that conclusion such as this one where the reporter in the video says:
“The backhoe operator had a right to be on the tracks the day he was hit and killed by a train.”
The title of the video is this:
NTSB: Backhoe operator had a right to be on the tracks.
While the statement and the title may be technically correct, they could not be more misleading. They lead to this erroneous conclusion:
“The backhoe operator had a right to be on the tracks at the time he was hit and killed by a train.”
Obviously, many people reading the video title and hearing its narrative will conclude that they convey the meaning of my second (example) statement. But they do not convey that meaning because the NTSB has not said whether the backhoe had a right to be on the track it was on when the train struck it. All they have said is that the backhoe had the periodic right during a specific timeframe be on the track on which the train approached. What we need to draw any further conclusion is the knowledge of whether the periodic right existed at the time the train approached. The actual text of the article says this:
“A backhoe operator had a right to be on train tracks periodically on the weekend an Amtrak train slammed into it, killing the operator and a supervisor, federal crash investigators said Monday.”
In that statement, the inclusion of the word “periodically” is at least closer to being fair and objective than the vocal narrative of the video. But, still, when you open with even that statement in the text, it sounds like it clears the backhoe operator. What else can it mean? The actual facts of the statement offer no possible conclusion without knowing what is meant by “periodical.”
The actual facts of the statement tell us nothing. So, why did the NTSB release just this one little tidbit that tells us nothing, but lends itself to such easy spin and misinterpretation by the media? I think they should either tell us what happened sooner rather than later; or hold off on telling us anything until they can tell us everything.
To get a feel for the spin, Google this:
“backhoe operator had the right to be on the track”
Not sure of the intent of the article, but given the propensity of the media to get things wrong it is impossible to determine whether or not they are pushing an agenda. The media knows little or nothing about railroads and aviation yet they publish their garbage as if they had done their homework and knew of what they spoke.
When they say the backhoe operator had the right to be on the tracks they were accurate to a point. He had the right to be on the ROW and on a specific track. Their implication is he had rights on any track. That wouldn't necessarily be correct.
Were you to follow aviation accident reports and have knowledge of airplanes and their operation, you would know they were seriously misinforming their audience. It's very likely their lack of knowledge applies to railroads too.
DEH: The "25 foot rule" is an FRA sponsored rule, not just the domain of the western roads. This is why you see plenty of passing sidings and 2mt's widened or built new to something in excess of 20-25 feet. (rulemaking started in 1998 and was finally first published 2008)...Can't speak to other railroads, but BNSF was already designing this way in 1993.
...ie- less than 20 feet and M/W activities stop, people in the clear and train passes by at restricted speed.
You can still build at 14 or 15 foot (state rule sets that width) track centers, but you lose a lot of operating flexibility. (plus there are main tracks and side tracks back east grandfathered-in at 12'6" still in places). Bridges tend to be the main culprit followed by R/W issues where this still happens. The 11 foot dock and team track center spacing in now outlawed everywhere AFAIK)
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/PR20170126b.aspx
https://news.google.com/news/story?ncl=dVrV0takLI3Go-MKv-DznHrCP7QpM&q=AMTRAK+CHESTER+NTSB&lr=English&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjTta3W7eLRAhWDRiYKHRMpBPMQqgIIJzAA
In reference to this report:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-59999/59509/599674.pdf
In the report, it details that the engineer tested positive for drugs.
Several, if not the majority of news reports lead with this revelation in a way that seems to at least strongly imply that the accident was the fault of the engineer due to drug use. From what I know, regarding this crash sequence, there is no evidence showing that the engineer failed to perform his job in any way that could be the result of drug impairment.
Here is an example of such a story:
http://www.phillyvoice.com/ntsb-engineer-chester-amtrak-crash-tested-positive-marijuana-opioids/
However, there are other news stories that report that both track workers also tested positive for drugs. Here is an example:
http://www.providencejournal.com/news/20170127/investigators-report-3-amtrak-workers-in-fatal-crash-had-used-drugs
Quote from the link:
“All three of the people involved in a fatal Amtrak crash near Philadelphia last April tested positive for drug use, including the train's engineer and two members of a railway work crew who both were killed, according to federal investigators.”
So, what is the source for this information about the positive drug tests for the backhoe operator, Joseph Carter Jr., and supervisor, Peter John Adamovich?
And why would this information not be included in the NTSB report linked at the top of this post?
EuclidSo, what is the source for this information about the positive drug tests for the backhoe operator, Joseph Carter Jr., and supervisor, Peter John Adamovich? And why would this information not be included in the NTSB report linked at the top of this post?
That information on the two operators was included in the report. Drugs included cocaine and oxycodone, morphine and codeine. I suggest you look beyond page 1.
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