Montana Coal and the Milwaukee Road

[nanaimo73]

Michael,
you have Johnson Creek tunnel as 1973' on this page and 1783' on page 3. Was the tunnel shortened or was it a typo ?
I asked earlier about the Grand Trunk Corporation getting the line to Miles City. I was thinking about the coalfields around Decker up the Tongue River and not the gateway. I would think the GTC could have been hauling 20 million tons a year of coal for the last 20 years if they had spent $400,000,000 back in 1981.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by nanaimo73

Michael,
you have Johnson Creek tunnel as 1973' on this page and 1783' on page 3. Was the tunnel shortened or was it a typo ?
I asked earlier about the Grand Trunk Corporation getting the line to Miles City. I was thinking about the coalfields around Decker up the Tongue River and not the gateway. I would think the GTC could have been hauling 20 million tons a year of coal for the last 20 years if they had spent $400,000,000 back in 1981.

Well, I've got a sinus cold this week, and everything I read has multiple "i"s, multiple "l"s, and multiple "t"s, as well as fuzzy. The tunnel was not shortened, so one of those numbers is a typo. I will check when I get home. I've got an error in the Pipestone Pass grade as well. best -- Michael Sol

[arbfbe]

Michael,

Selby's had an office here in Missoula on North Ave right next door to Montana Tool.

I have only seen reference to the SOO Line & Pacific extension on the bottom of a serving platter for delivering cold bottles of beer to tables. It certainly piqued my interest at the antique store I saw it in but the price was too far out of line to bring it home. I wonder what they would have chosen as their destination. Seattle, Tacoma and Portland were pretty croweded and no one seemed to be very successful in establishing a deep water port between Portland and San Francisco. That left a lot of coast line with no rail or deepwater service but lots of mountain ranges to cross to get there.

I had not considered the effects of WWI and the collapse of the bond markets as a factor in the lack of rail line expansion after the MILW built the PCE. That and recessions make for interesting marker points in railroad and railroad equipment history. The recession of 1980-1981 sure ended the careers of F units and 40' boxcars in the railroad industry, for example. I am sure there are others that can be mentioned.

I hope you are feeling well soon. I have a CD-r of scans from Munson's field construction notes of the MILW mainline in the Butte area I can send if you are interested. Nice PDF files of his handwriting.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by arbfbe

Selby's had an office here in Missoula on North Ave right next door to Montana Tool.

Oh good grief, I recognize the name on the building, I thought it was an upholstery shop. I'll have to stop by there. Best, Michael Sol

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by nanaimo73

Michael,
you have Johnson Creek tunnel as 1973' on this page and 1783' on page 3. Was the tunnel shortened or was it a typo ?I

My corrections:

The Johnson Creek Tunnel is 1973' feet long.

Pipestone Pass is at 6347' elevation with a 2.0% grade westbound. Cadotte Pass would have crossed the same mountain range -- the Continental Divide -- with a 1% grade both ways at 5,293' elevation, a significantly better crossing than Marias Pass.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[VerMontanan]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol
[
In turn Cadotte compared to the Canadian Pacific crossing farther north of 5,329 feet, the Great Northern’s Marias Pass crossing at 5,214 feet the Santa Fe at 7,622 feet, the Union Pacific at Sherman Hill at 8,242 feet, the Central Pacific at 7,042 feet (in the Sierra’s), the Northern Pacific’s Homestake Pass at 6,200, or its Mullan Pass at 5600 feet.

Best regards, Michael Sol

The figure for the Santa Fe is misleading for it's the elevation at Raton Pass, which Santa Fe ceased using for most of its freight in 1908 when the Belen cutoff was constructed. The actual elevation is not relevant in any case anyway, and the Santa Fe is the best example. Its crest of the Continental Divide just east of Gallup, NM at 7,247 is actually one of the flatter portions of its line west of Mountainair, NM as the grade is much less than 1 percent in each direction. The high point on the Santa Fe freight route is the Arizona Divide west of Flagstaff at 7,313 feet, and this is probably the best determining characteristic of the route. Today, in the single crew district between Winslow and Needles, trains drop (or climb) from the Arizona Divide to the Colorado River at Needles, at 476 feet, nearly 7,000 feet in about 225 miles.

[VerMontanan]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

Presumably the line would have met with the Sun River branch of the Milwaukee at about Fairfield, then used the Great Falls-Lewistown line that was built in 1914, then east to Grass Range on new construction in cooperation with GN, then connecting the mainline at Melstone. This would have shortened MILW's Chicago/Seattle run by about 115 miles on a significantly easier grade.

Best regards, Michael Sol

This is interesting. The route MILW route mileage between Melstone and Missoula was 410. The current mileage on US 12 between Melstone and Missoula is 346, so this "what if" route over Cadotte Pass at 295 miles(410 minus the 115 mile saving) would be about 50 miles shorter than today's highway route. All the more interesting is when one considers that MILW mileage from Winnett to Great Falls (195) plus the the current highway mileage (167) from Great Falls to Missoula (highway 200 is a pretty straight shot) equals 362 miles alone. Clearly, the best access to Cadotte from the east for the MILW would have been to parallel GN's line from Slayton (the crossing of the Musselshell River) to Great Falls...much straighter and shorter. (For example, GN's line from Great Falls to Lewistown was 17 miles shorter than that of the MILW.) Looks to me that this route would be minimally shorter, at best.

From the "what if" standpoint of crossings of the Continental Divide in Montana, overlooked is the best crossing - and it's still in use - Deer Lodge Pass along I-15 south of Butte. I've always wondered why NP or MILW didn't build along the Big Hole River southwest of Twin Bridges and then link up with UP to its route from Dillon to Silver Bow. While a longer route, its one percent grade would certainly be preferable to others in the area. And that it survives today (and survival is always a prime factor in determining the viability of any route) is a testimony to its worth, while the routes over Pipestone, Homestake, and Elk Park no longer are.

[arbfbe]

It would seem from readings with the NPRHA, the NP considered Deer Lodge Pass but opted to go to Helena for political reasons as well as engineering considerations.

I have not ever heard about the CM&PS considering the Deer Lodge Pass route but I am sure they must have given it a look since its location was well known..

The fact that Deer Lodge Pass survives has more to do with big picture considerations than engineering realities. If the UP had decided to abandon an presence in Montana as the MILW did then Deer Lodge would have sufferred the same fate as Pipestone and St Paul Passes. Homestake Pass lost it's usefulness when there was no need to retain it for passenger train service and Elk Park Pass was a gonner when the GN merged with the NP. The UP could easily walk away from Butte/Silver Bow tomorrow and Deer Lodge Pass would just become another footnote to Montana railroad history .

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by arbfbe

It would seem from readings with the NPRHA, the NP considered Deer Lodge Pass but opted to go to Helena for political reasons as well as engineering considerations.

I have not ever heard about the CM&PS considering the Deer Lodge Pass route but I am sure they must have given it a look since its location was well known..

The fact that Deer Lodge Pass survives has more to do with big picture considerations than engineering realities. If the UP had decided to abandon an presence in Montana as the MILW did then Deer Lodge would have sufferred the same fate as Pipestone and St Paul Passes. Homestake Pass lost it's usefulness when there was no need to retain it for passenger train service and Elk Park Pass was a gonner when the GN merged with the NP. The UP could easily walk away from Butte/Silver Bow tomorrow and Deer Lodge Pass would just become another footnote to Montana railroad history .

According to The Northern Pacific by Charles Wood, the NP seriously considered Mullan, Little Pipestone, and Deer Lodge passes. "Chief Engineer Roberts selected Deer Lodge because, although it lengthened the route by 40 miles, it required no summet tunnel, but his successor, General Adna Anderson changed the location to Mullan Pass." (p. 29)

Why the Milwaukee ended up using Little Pipestone Pass is probably better answered by Mr. Sol. I am guessing that the Milwaukee had chosen Butte apriori as the dividing line between the eastern and western segments of the PCE, and once the route over the Jawbone was finalized, the Milwaukee seems to have had the same three choices as the NP 40 years earlier, e.g. Pipestone, Deer Lodge, or Mullan. (I'm not sure about Homestake, when did NP build over this route?)

I will add Elk Park Pass since this pass was now a known commodity. It may be that since both Deer Lodge and Mullan were both occupied, Pipestone was the *logical* choice. But if routing the mainline through Butte was not apriori, then the logical routing for a line touted as being the "shortest line to the PNW" would have been to parallel NP between Lombard all the way to Haugen by going over Mullan Pass. If Butte was still deemed apriori, then perhaps the best route would have been Elk Park Pass, with a route from Lombard west over the Warm Springs plateau to Boulder, where the line could parallel GN's Butte line. Elk Park Pass may have the best westbound approach gradewise to the Continental Divide, better than Marias Pass, allowing a shorter line than Pipestone with no need for a summit tunnel.

Thus, if elimination of the need for a summit tunnel is a priority, then I think Elk Park Pass would have been a better choice for the Butte-bound Milwaukee than Deer Lodge.

[arbfbe]

Perhaps the abandonment of Deer Lodge Pass is closer than we expect. Apparently UP is interested in selling the line but has doubts anyone would buy the line account the legal climate in Montana regarding injuries to railroaders.

http://www.montanastandard.com/articles/2005/09/23/newsbutte_top/newsbutte_top.txt

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by arbfbe

Perhaps the abandonment of Deer Lodge Pass is closer than we expect. Apparently UP is interested in selling the line but has doubts anyone would buy the line account the legal climate in Montana regarding injuries to railroaders.

http://www.montanastandard.com/articles/2005/09/23/newsbutte_top/newsbutte_top.txt

Didn't MRL once make a bid for the Silver Bow line, but BN blocked it? Obviously, MRL would be the logical takeover entity, but if BNSF is set on keeping MRL and UP from having interchange, then I cannot think of any other buyer ('cept maybe BNSF itself, and that would mean an invader into UP's sole territory of Southern Idaho.) Maybe BNSF and UP have made one of those "smoke filled room" backdoor deals: BNSF stays outa UP's Southern Idaho and UP exits from BNSF's Montana.

[bobwilcox]

QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal

QUOTE: Originally posted by arbfbe

Perhaps the abandonment of Deer Lodge Pass is closer than we expect. Apparently UP is interested in selling the line but has doubts anyone would buy the line account the legal climate in Montana regarding injuries to railroaders.

http://www.montanastandard.com/articles/2005/09/23/newsbutte_top/newsbutte_top.txt

Didn't MRL once make a bid for the Silver Bow line, but BN blocked it? Obviously, MRL would be the logical takeover entity, but if BNSF is set on keeping MRL and UP from having interchange, then I cannot think of any other buyer ('cept maybe BNSF itself, and that would mean an invader into UP's sole territory of Southern Idaho.) Maybe BNSF and UP have made one of those "smoke filled room" backdoor deals: BNSF stays outa UP's Southern Idaho and UP exits from BNSF's Montana.

What the UP does with their line in S. Montana is pretty simple. If it does not make an adequate return on investment they will dump the line. It is easier to do if a shortline operator is interested. If an operator is not interested the line gets scrapped. Montana can scream about an abandoment all they want but the money talks. The line probably should have been dumped when Butte shut down many years ago.

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by bobwilcox

QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal

QUOTE: Originally posted by arbfbe

Perhaps the abandonment of Deer Lodge Pass is closer than we expect. Apparently UP is interested in selling the line but has doubts anyone would buy the line account the legal climate in Montana regarding injuries to railroaders.

http://www.montanastandard.com/articles/2005/09/23/newsbutte_top/newsbutte_top.txt

Didn't MRL once make a bid for the Silver Bow line, but BN blocked it? Obviously, MRL would be the logical takeover entity, but if BNSF is set on keeping MRL and UP from having interchange, then I cannot think of any other buyer ('cept maybe BNSF itself, and that would mean an invader into UP's sole territory of Southern Idaho.) Maybe BNSF and UP have made one of those "smoke filled room" backdoor deals: BNSF stays outa UP's Southern Idaho and UP exits from BNSF's Montana.

What the UP does with their line in S. Montana is pretty simple. If it does not make an adequate return on investment they will dump the line. It is easier to do if a shortline operator is interested. If an operator is not interested the line gets scrapped. Montana can scream about an abandoment all they want but the money talks. The line probably should have been dumped when Butte shut down many years ago.

Aye, there's the rub. Certainly a shortline outfit would be willing to invest in the line if they were allowed to maximize it's revenue potential acting as a bridge line between UP and MRL. The whole I-15 corridor has great potential to be a major NAFTA rail route.

But of course neither UP nor BNSF will allow that to happen. One or the other will bottleneck it to death, and utlimately the line would be scrapped.

Now more than ever this nation needs anti-trust laws to be applied and enforced against the rail oligarchy. Otherwise we'll lose everything that makes Class I's useful to the nation, and all we'll be left with (in terms of railroad competitive pricing) are the Chinese import corridors.

[Murphy Siding]

Can someone explain why the PCE cost something like 3 times times the "estimated" cost? By 1906, there had been several transcons built over the big mountains. It should have been much easier for CMSP&P to figure how much it would cost, than for the railroads that went much sooner. How did they miss it by so far?

Thanks

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding

Can someone explain why the PCE cost something like 3 times times the "estimated" cost? .... How did they miss it by so far?

It didn't and they didn't.

It cost $99 million to complete the mainline and related construction, tunnels, bridges, yards, depots, etc., by the close of the construction era, August 1, 1909. This was about $14 million more than the engineering estimate. MILW's PCE cost less to construct than any other transcontinental, primarily because of technology and mutliple railheads. That final "cost" also included equipment, and if that is deducted, the construction "estimate" was very close to the final actual construction cost.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Murphy Siding]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding

Can someone explain why the PCE cost something like 3 times times the "estimated" cost? .... How did they miss it by so far?

It didn't and they didn't.

It cost $99 million to complete the mainline and related construction, tunnels, bridges, yards, depots, etc., by the close of the construction era, August 1, 1909. This was about $14 million more than the engineering estimate. MILW's PCE cost less to construct than any other transcontinental, primarily because of technology and mutliple railheads. That final "cost" also included equipment, and if that is deducted, the construction "estimate" was very close to the final actual construction cost.

Best regards, Michael Sol

OK. I'm going to have go look that one up. I've read that phrase "triple the estimate" in several different sources. Things that make you go hmmmm.......

Thanks

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding

Can someone explain why the PCE cost something like 3 times times the "estimated" cost? .... How did they miss it by so far?

It didn't and they didn't.

It cost $99 million to complete the mainline and related construction, tunnels, bridges, yards, depots, etc., by the close of the construction era, August 1, 1909. This was about $14 million more than the engineering estimate. MILW's PCE cost less to construct than any other transcontinental, primarily because of technology and mutliple railheads. That final "cost" also included equipment, and if that is deducted, the construction "estimate" was very close to the final actual construction cost.

Best regards, Michael Sol

OK. I'm going to have go look that one up. I've read that phrase "triple the estimate" in several different sources. Things that make you go hmmmm.......

Thanks

Oh, the quotes are out there all right. They will all trace back to a single source. The problem is that the source was wrong.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Murphy Siding]

I'm still searching for the "triple the estimate " quote. What I did find is this: The Historical Guide to North American Railroads, By George H. Drury. "In 1901...estimate...was $45 million........The cost of the extension was $234 million.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding

I'm still searching for the "triple the estimate " quote. What I did find is this: The Historical Guide to North American Railroads, By George H. Drury. "In 1901...estimate...was $45 million........The cost of the extension was $234 million.

This hghlights the problem of historical works that rely on secondary sources. Like the rumor that floats around high school, by the time its done, it barely resembles the original.

A 1901 survey was sent to determine the cost, using "modern technology" and mutliple railheads, and 1901 prices, of duplicating the Northern Pacific Railroad. The 1890s had been a period of deflation, and so 1901 prices looked pretty good by comparison with what came before, or came after. However, the 1901 estimate was only what it was: the prospective cost of duplicating the NP in that year. It was not the construction estimate used for the Pacific Extension Construction developed in 1905-1906 based on final route selection and the costs of construction of that later time period. The NP figure was never used as a basis for estimating the costs of the actual PCE construction, nor did Milwaukee Road contemplate building a line as poorly built and located as the NP. It was a hypothetical exercise. The $45 million is what the surveyor reported. There is no record of what D.J. Whittemore, Milwaukee's Chief Engineer, and one of the most experienced railroad engineers in the country, thought of the estimate since the estimate was not adopted by the Company for any purpose.

The $234 million figure was generated by a lawyer writing an expose about bankers and how they take over valuable properties. That was The Investor Pays by Max Lowenthal (Knopf, 1933).

Lowenthal took the figure from an engineering study done on the Milwaukee in 1925. In that study, a short reference was made to the running investment in Lines West, including costs of construction, costs of equipment, annual maintenance, additions and betterments, without any deductions for depreciation, scrap, retirements, etc. as of May 1, 1925. It was a different figure on May 1, 1924. and was a different figure at any given point in time as the bulk of it represented maintenance and equipment acquisition costs, and more so as time passed. By 1925, the PCE was a long ways from the construction era.

The engineers who prepared the study did not represent the $234 million as a cost of construction.

Nowhere do they even remotely suggest such a thing, and no Milwaukee Road record supports that assessment. It is simply wrong. Lowenthal not only took the number out of context in his book, he misrepresented its meaning entirely. Whether it was because he didn't understand it, not having anything resembling an engineering background, or purposely mis-stated it is an interesting question.

It would be as though you suggested that the Great Northern Railway cost $1.5 Billion to build and represented this far and wide as Jim Hill's hugely expensive blunder that could never be paid off. because you would lead everyone to believe that this was the cost of construction of the Great Northern mainline completed in 1893.

You would do that without disclosing that this was a 1970 "figure" and obtained only by adding in 80 years of maintenance, replacement, additions, betterments, all boxcars and equipment ever purchased, total cost of dieselization, and so forth, without any depreciation or other adjustments.

Did it really cost $1.5 Billion to build the Great Northern Railway? No, at least not in the context implied here. That method of assigning a "cost of construction" is as misleading as can possibly be because it represents everything under the sun besides the original cost of construction. "Total investment" is a constantly increasing figure with the passage of time and with the passage of time bears less and less relevance to the actual cost of construction. It is a peculiarly engineering concept that has no basis in accounting.

Lowenthal's use of a 1925 number was odd since the same engineering study that he relied on did, in fact, clearly show that the actual cost of construction through August 1, 1909 was $99 million. The last spikes were driven in April and May, 1909.

The $234 million figure is probably the single most repeated falsehood about the Milwaukee Road, because few, if any, writers go back to the primary source material to assess accuracy once these things appear in print.

Why use the 1925 figure, or a 1917 figure, or a 1952 figure, or a 1980 figure? None of them represent the "cost of construction" as commonly understood in the discussions of the cost of building the Milwaukee Road.

Lowenthal blundered on his interpretation of the figure and historians and politicians have relied on that blunder ever since. By now, you could cite to any of 100 or so publications all relying on that single source for that erroneous information.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Murphy Siding]

Thanks, that was interesting. Am I perceiving this right, that Lowenthal was aiming his dislike towards bankers, and not the Milwaukee Road?

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding

Thanks, that was interesting. Am I perceiving this right, that Lowenthal was aiming his dislike towards bankers, and not the Milwaukee Road?

At the time of the Milwaukee Receivership, 1925, Lowenthal was General Counsel of the Russian-American Import-Export Bank, a Soviet banking cover for various enterprises of the new Soviet government in Russia. By the time he wrote his book on the Milwaukee in 1933, he was firmly aligned with "Progressives" within the New Deal. He wasn't that particularly interested in the Milwaukee Road, per se, but rather the influence that he perceived on its receivership and ultimate control by First National City Bank of New York and in particular by Kuhn. Loeb & Company.

The book was part of a run-up to the political drive underscoring the need for securities regulation. This was an impetus to the passage Securities and Exchange Act, establishing the SEC in 1933 upon the theory that, without oversight and regulation of the stock market and publicly-traded companies of the type of regulation that existed for railroads through the ICC, "the Investor Pays," because the average investor is incapable of protecting themselves from corporate shenanigans and insider control activity.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

The book was part of run-up of the need for securities regulation, and an impetus to the Securities and Exchange Act, establishing the SEC in 1933 upon the theory that, without oversight and regulation of the stock market and publicly-traded companies of the type of regulation that existed for railroads through the ICC, "the Investor Pays," because the average investor is incapable of protecting themselves from corporate shenanigans and insider control activity.

Sounds like Lowenthall was ahead of his time, circa 1990's (the decade of fraud).

[nanaimo73]

Michael or arbfbe, do you know where this was taken ?
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=83211

[VerMontanan]

QUOTE: Originally posted by bobwilcox

What the UP does with their line in S. Montana is pretty simple. If it does not make an adequate return on investment they will dump the line. It is easier to do if a shortline operator is interested. If an operator is not interested the line gets scrapped. Montana can scream about an abandoment all they want but the money talks. The line probably should have been dumped when Butte shut down many years ago.

Traffic on the UP line south from Silver Bow was strong through the mid-1990s. I recall BN operating 10,000-ton trains between Great Falls and Helena or Garrison (BN retained the line between Helena and Garrison for 5 years after creation of the MRL) on a regular basis. Most of the traffic was destined for interchange with the UP at Silver Bow. Since then, most traffic is interchanged between CP and UP at Kingsgate/Eastport on a route that usually is longer and with steeper grades. But with BN (later BNSF) as UP's prime competitor, the two railroads tend not to participate in interchange with one another to create a through route. One exception to this is that UP must still rely on BNSF to forward substantial traffic between the Vancouver, BC area and Portland because it has no line of its own between the Vancouver area and Seattle.

[arbfbe]

nanaimo73,

That photo came up on the internet another time and I believe the photo was pegged as somewhere in Idaho. The exact location has left my mind, though.

[VerMontanan]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

Milwaukee could operate its 2% Pipestone crossing with Electrification more cheaply, faster, with heavier tonnage than GN could achieve on the 1.2%/1.8% Marias Pass crossing with steam. The "total engineering solution" of electrification combined with compensated curve track design was far superior to anything that could be achieved at that time with steam regardless of gradient. The engineering solution was economically and operationally superior to the 1% or less grade without the electrification.

GN's Ralph Budd kicked and screamed to get the Milwaukee's data on the first year of electrification and stormed off when Milwaukee's VP-Electrification avoided ever providing it to him.

Best regards, Michael Sol

While that Ralph Budd “kicked and screamed” makes a great story, this is another example of explaining why things turned out as they didn’t, and it’s important to interject a bit of reality here with regard to what we do know for sure. What we do know is that even the Milwaukee was the only of the Western “Transcontinentals” to use electrification to a great extent. It was also the only one to give it up, and the only one to be largely abandoned. And you can look at those facts in a number of ways.

First of all, if the “total engineering solution” could reduce the effect of a 2% grade on the Milwaukee Road, why was it not done elsewhere? Certainly grades such as the approach to Moffat Tunnel, Donner Pass, or the UP crossing of the Blue Mountains would certainly be good candidates. That others did not emulate the Milwaukee (to any great extent, the Great Northern did electrify Wenatchee to Skykomish when the “new” Cascade Tunnel was completed) certainly means something. And again, while everyone else could have been wrong and the Milwaukee Road the only one right, they were also the only one to give up this advantage and its route disappear altogether.

On the other hand, just because others didn’t do it doesn’t mean it was wrong for the Milwaukee either, for they had to do something. Between the eastern foothills of the Rocky Mountains in Montana and the Pacific Coast, the Milwaukee’s profile was vastly inferior to that of the Great Northern and even to that of the Northern Pacific. While Mr. Sol focuses on Pipestone Pass vs. Marias Pass example, again, the numerous other grades are overlooked. The first year of Milwaukee electrification was well before the line change at Loweth in 1956 where the grade was 2.05% westbound (reduced to 1.4% with the new line). So, Pipestone Pass was not the greatest of the Milwaukee’s worries. (Great Northern had no such corresponding hill to that of Loweth). Additionally eastbound, while GN trains after cresting Marias Pass encountered only short uphill segments (never exceeding .8 percent) enroute to Havre, eastward Milwaukee trains after cresting the Continental Divide faced nearly 50 miles of continuous one percent climb from Lombard to Loweth. Between the Continental Divide and the Spokane area, GN and NP had no comparable hills to the Milwaukee’s 1.7 percent crossing (each way) of the Bitterroots. In Washington, the Milwaukee had two major hills to cross (the Saddle Mountains and Cascades), while the GN and NP had just one: the Cascades. While it appears that indeed the Milwaukee did enjoy the superior crossing of at least one hill, the Cascades, compared to that of its competitors, it’s also true that unlike its competitors, the Milwaukee had no options how to route its traffic. Both GN and NP did utilize the gentle grades of subsidiary Spokane, Portland, and Seattle when an alternative was desired to their crossing of the Cascades. While the SP&S is generally considered the GN and NP route for traffic to and from Portland (the Milwaukee Road was also the only transcontinental railroad in the Northwest not to serve Portland, at least until trackage rights were granted with the BN merger), it was also used to relay traffic to GN and NP trains at Vancouver for movement northward. More miles, to be sure, but an alternate route, and one that’s water level much of the way and never more than .8 percent at that, is a tremendous asset. For example, while GN and NP could (and did) route cars from east of Spokane destined for Longview via SP&S to Vancouver (WA) and then north avoiding major grade, the Milwaukee had no choice but to pull this traffic over the 2.2 percent grade of the Saddle Mountains and the 3 percent grade of Tacoma Hill (which was not electrified). Again, that other railroads did not emulate the Milwaukee’s solution to conquering grades, or that the Milwaukee did not choose to keep this solution in operation makes one wonder as to whether it was, as Mr. Sol says, the “total engineering solution”, but with more hills to climb than the competitors, something had to be done. That the Great Northern did not seek that “total engineering solution” could also be a result of the fact that perhaps such a solution was not cost effective or necessary for them. In other words, such “solutions” are not necessary when your grades are minimal to begin with, and in the case of traversing Washington State, not as important when you have an alternate route.

Getting back to what we do know as certain, and that is that the Milwaukee’s “total engineering solution” wasn’t “total” in one respect: time. While Mr. Sol does use the phrase "at the time", time does not stand still. Even if (and that’s a big if, given that all other railroads did not follow suit) it did ameliorate the situation during steam operations, things changed: Dieselization, for sure, but by 1970, the difference between Pipestone Pass and Marias Pass was significant: While the Milwaukee crossing of the Continental Divide remained single track (as was all the Pacific Extension) without CTC, the GN crossing of Marias Pass featured long sections of double track (60 percent of the 150 miles between Shelby and Whitefish alone) with the remainder having long sidings and equipped with CTC. Therefore, while the Milwaukee’s “total engineering solution” wasn’t sufficiently total to save that route (after all, “total” is a very definitive word), the infrastructure that Great Northern created prior to the merger 35 years ago is capable of handling up to 50 daily trains today, and without significant changes over the years (signaling changes, upgrading double track to two main track CTC being the most notable). Due to the infrastructure in place, by 1972, Burlington Northern had eliminated the crew change at Cut Bank, and trains needed but one crew for the 255-mile run from Havre to Whitefish. Meanwhile, correspondingly, the 227 miles between Harlowton and Deer Lodge on the Milwaukee required two road crews (changing at Three Forks). When the Milwaukee discontinued electrification and the Butte helper in 1974, trailing tonnage was limited to about 5,500 tons westbound; meanwhile as more heavy cars entered service everywhere, BN was running westward trains over Marias Pass at 9,000 tons or more, without a helper.

Today, for obvious reasons, a comparison between the operations over Marias Pass and those over the numerous Milwaukee grades in Montana is not possible. But it is possible to get a glimpse of how Marias Pass is handling traffic. For example, this is a representative sample of westbound unit train traffic in a 30-hour stretch passing through Cut Bank, Montana beginning the afternoon of March 4, 2004:

G-MNSKAL9-29, by Cut Bank 1502-04, 14,898 tons (Marion, SD to Kalama, WA)
C-SCMCEC0-10 by Cut Bank 1925-04, 17,634 tons (Spring Creek, MT to Centralia,
WA)
G-PKRTAC9-28 by Cut Bank 0044-05, 14,552 tons (Parker, SD to Tacoma, WA)
G-SIOPAS1-26 by Cut Bank 0116-05, 13,965 tons (Sioux City, IA to Pasco, WA)
G-JSDKAL9-29 by Cut Bank 0743-05, 13,797 tons (Jefferson, SD to Kalama, WA)
G-SIOTAC9-02 by Cut Bank 1012-05, 15,007 tons (Sioux City, IA to Tacoma, WA)
G-GRFRGT1-29 by Cut Bank 1335-05, 12,881 tons (Great Falls, MT to Rivergate,
OR)
G-HVRKAL9-03 by Cut Bank 1825-05, 15,430 tons (Havre, MT to Kalama, WA)
G-HTIKAL9-02 by Cut Bank 1951-05, 14,051 tons (Hinton, IA to Kalama, WA)

As information, all the trains had 4 units each. Most of units were C44's, but there was one representative SD60, SD75, and SD40 in the bunch. All told, that's 132,215 tons of grain and coal moved in 30 hours with 36 total units averaging 1.1 horsepower per ton. All trains operated from origin to destination without helper crews (all operated with distributed power) and without additional helper power. Again, these represent only the westward unit trains by this one location in this 30 hour timeframe. All told, there were about 45 other trains operated during the same period, including three Amtrak trains, none of which was more than 20 minutes late.

There is no other route in the United States (CN, in Canada, could do it with less) where trains operate from east of the Rockies to a Pacific Coast State with less power today, and definitely no instance today where a 2 percent grade is operated with less power than this 1.2 percent grade. While a comparison with how such traffic would or could be handled over Milwaukee’s Pipestone Pass is a moot point due to its abandonment, it’s a good bet that it too, like all other routes currently operated, would require more power, and therefore result in a greater cost, than Marias. And that much of the infrastructure in use on Marias Pass today was in place back in 1970 gives a good insight as to why this is the primary east-west rail route across the Northern Tier today. Had the Milwaukee route survived to where today it could take advantage of changes in railroad technology, things certainly could have been different. Given the numerous steep grades on the Milwaukee route, distributed power would certainly be a natural, but it would require 75 to 150 percent (depending on destination) more power than what BNSF currently uses would certainly put it at a competitive disadvantage. That much of the capacity on Marias today was around 35 years ago suggests a similar operating advantage in that period, too… as well as a much better reason that things turned out as they did, instead of how they didn’t.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by VerMontanan it’s a good bet that it too, like all other routes currently operated, would require more power, and therefore result in a greater cost, than Marias.

Reposting the same baloney 400 times, selectively choosing your data to favor one railroad, while enhancing the deficiencies of another, is your sport.

Kind of like always leaving out the 2.2% grades and 10 degree curves on the Bieber line, making THREE 2.2% grades on the GN mainline, plus a tunnel that is the functional equivalent of yet another 2.2% grade except that it costs much more to operate than a 2.2% grade.

In terms of cost, you have the equivalent of more than four 2.2% grades on the Great Northern mainline. In terms of cost of operation, this is far worse than Milwaukee or NP.

And you always leave out those SEVENTEEN distinct 1.0% grades in the 156 mile distance between Havre and the beginnings of Marias Pass as well. That's not even in the mountains and the total rise to run over that distance is only 0.2%. There is no railroad in the West with anything like that.

Mountain grades cost more to operate, no doubt. But GN managed to make it an expensive proposition to cross relatively flat prarie and gained nothing by it. At least MILW and NP crossed real mountain ranges for the privilege.

These are the many reasons why Milwaukee could always beat GN on regular schedules.

Namely, GN's four 2.2% grades, long, slow, expensive tunnel operations, and a rolling washboard railroad of nothing but 1% grades, followed by a downhill, followed by another 1%, then another downhill, for over 150 miles. And not all of curves on those grades were compensated. And that's before GN even gets off the Plains into the real mountains. GN only gains 1657feet in elevation in that 157 miles, but has gradient to reach 8290 feet. Efficient engineering?

And you talk about costs.

"More power and therefore greater cost" is ridiculous in the context. The Milwaukee electrification was far cheaper to operate than GN's choice of steam, then diesel, plus 24 hour high cost tunnel clearing stations. As a "total engineering solution" the Milwaukee's transit times were faster, the cost to operate far less.

That is an engineering solution far more efficient than the steep grade, long tunnel, rollercoaster solution offered by the GN mainline.

I am sure the GN thread is the appropriate place for GN discussions, instead of Milwaukee threads where you show up only to insist on discussing, always, GN.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by arbfbe

nanaimo73,

That photo came up on the internet another time and I believe the photo was pegged as somewhere in Idaho. The exact location has left my mind, though.

It looks like just outside of St. Maries ID.

[Anonymous]

Basalt does break down, as the talus slopes along the Columbia River near Beverly (a few miles from the Boylston tunnel) can attest.

I have been through the GN Mansfield branch tunnel as well, back in 1985. It collapsed 2 years ago.

as was the one on the GN Mansfield branch also in basalt, which I have both walked and rode through.

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by VerMontanan

From the "what if" standpoint of crossings of the Continental Divide in Montana, overlooked is the best crossing - and it's still in use - Deer Lodge Pass along I-15 south of Butte.

Elk Park Pass had (has) the best westbound crossing of the Continental Divide, far better than either Deer Lodge or Marias.

QUOTE:
And that it survives today (and survival is always a prime factor in determining the viability of any route) is a testimony to its worth, while the routes over Pipestone, Homestake, and Elk Park no longer are.

This is such a peasant-minded conclusion. Deer Lodge survives (so far) only because it is UP's only line into Silver Bow and the BNSF connection. If UP had entered by Pipestone, then Pipestone would still be in existence as a rail route.

How about this statement:

*The fact that Mullan Pass survives today is a testimony to its superiority over Elk Park Pass*

In a real world analysis, the fact that Mullan Pass survives today is that it was NP's (and is MRL's) only viable mainline over the CD, while Elk Park Pass is gone because it was a one way in / one way out branchline into Butte for GN, and once the BN merger took place the ex-NP line from Garrison to Butte was sufficient for the amount of traffic generated for BN in Butte.

We could make all sorts of peasant minded conclusions about survivors vs goners:

*The fact that Stevens Pass survives today is a testimony to its superiority over Snoqualmie Pass* (Hmmm, 2.2% both ways plus 8 mile tunnel vs 1.7%/0.7% plus 2 mile tunnel)

*The fact that Stampede Pass survives today is a testimony to its superiority over Snoqualmie Pass (Again, 2.2% both ways vs 1.7%/0.7%)

*The fact that Bozeman Pass survives today is a testimony to its superiority over Sixteen Mile Canyon* (2.2 % both ways vs 1.0%/1.4%)

*The fact that the ex-NP line between Spokane and Pasco survives today is a testimony to its superiority over the ex-SP&S line*

We could go on and on as to why current lines survive while other lines are gone, but anyone who claims it is primarily due to alleged superior engineering of one over the other is being simple-minded. It is politics/managerial decisions/ and in some cases pure luck that some lines survive while others have perished.