Commuter & Freight Trains Collide North Of Los Angeles

[benburch]

I am reminded of an accident on Metra a couple of years back, 17 September 2005. In that accident the train was to change tracks at a crossover and should have been going at no faster than 10 MPH when it took the switch, but the engineer missed the signal 0.6 mile before the crossover, and the train hit the crossover at 69 mph and derailed. Two deaths, and 109 injuries resulted, over six million in property damage.

Now, at the time of the accident, it was reported that two cell phones were found in the cab, one belonging to Metra and one belonging to the engineer, and there was speculation in the press that cell phone distraction may have been an issue. The NTSB did not determine the reason the engineer missed the diverging signal. Prior to coming to work for Metra he had been a CSX employee where he was cited for use of an unauthorized radio in the cab, but Metra never received his records from CSX.

[AgentKid]

First off, my condolences to families who lost loved ones in this crash and in the Hurricane at Galveston.

Secondly, this incident puts me in mind of the head-on crash between The Canadian and a CN freight train at Hinton AB, in the winter of 1986. After the railway officials, the government investigators and the lawyers were done, they determined the freight train ran a red board. But to this very day they do not know exactly, and for sure, why the engineer did that. Some things are forever beyond our knowing.

AgentKid

[Jack_S]

The collision occurred at 4:23 PM.  Train number 111 was due to leave the station between 4:11 and 4:16 PM.  So it might have been a couple of minutes late but certainly not enough to confuse any decision-making.

My maps show that the station is on the east side of a N-S section of track, as others have stated.  A siding starts north of the station and runs south past the west side of any train in the station.  This is, obviously, the siding the UP train was heading for.  From what I have seen of Metrolink practice (they own the tracks at the crash site) a signal is to be expected at, or just before, the siding switch.  It should have been clearly visible from the station.  A retired Amtrak engineer was interviewed by one TV station and stated that SOP was for train 111 to wait in the station for the scheduled freight to take the siding.

As the trains approached each other the curve is sharp enough and the visual obstacles close enough to prevent each engineer from seeing the other train until they were too close to stop. 

Sadly, it seems to me that Metrolink's quick assignment of responsibility for the crash to the Metrolink engineer is all too likely to be accurrate. 

Jack 

[petitnj]

Just to straighten out the physics. Two trains at 40 mph each have kinetic energy proportional to the velocity squared. 40 squared X 2 = 3200. One 80 mph train has kinetic energy of 80 squared or 6400 or twice the energy of the two train crash.  The kinetic energy is what must be absorbed by the bending of steel and the deflection of the train. This is something most drivers don't understand and think a little more speed won't hurt them much.

 

 

[eolafan]

I am reminded of an accident on Metra a couple of years back, 17 September 2005. In that accident the train was to change tracks at a crossover and should have been going at no faster than 10 MPH when it took the switch, but the engineer missed the signal 0.6 mile before the crossover, and the train hit the crossover at 69 mph and derailed. Two deaths, and 109 injuries resulted, over six million in property damage.

Now, at the time of the accident, it was reported that two cell phones were found in the cab, one belonging to Metra and one belonging to the engineer, and there was speculation in the press that cell phone distraction may have been an issue. The NTSB did not determine the reason the engineer missed the diverging signal. Prior to coming to work for Metra he had been a CSX employee where he was cited for use of an unauthorized radio in the cab, but Metra never received his records from CSX.

Valid point and question raised here, and all will "come out in the wash" as it were. The Chicago Tribune this morning reported that the Metrolink dispatcher DID radio the train when he saw that the Metrolink train had run the red signal and was only able to reach the conductor (the accident had already occurred at that point).

[Anonymous]

I am picking up a distinct theme in much of the news coverage that the wreck was the fault of the "system" rather than being the fault of the engineer. 

Denise Tyrrell of Metrolink said she could not imagine a scenario where a Metrolink engineer would texting someone while driving a train.  I can't imagine anyone not being able to imagine that scenario. 

[Anonymous]

One thing I'm wondering: How would the UP train pass the commuter train without a switch being set? The UP train was apperently going to pass the Metrolink train somewhere, presumably at the station, so wouldn't the Metrolink train have to pass over a switch set for the opposite way at some point, wouldn't it? Or would the switch be thrown shortly before the UP train arrived?

Does this make sense?

[DMUinCT]

   For the time being, lets forget about the Engineer, lets look at the Dispatcher.

   Were the Switch Aspects controled under power by dispatching??

   Does the Switch have a Dwarf Signal???

   Did the Metrolink hold the Main Line or the Siding, did the crew know they were to hold at Chatsworth for on-comming traffic??? (By Radio or written Orders)

    If Dispatching had cleared the UP Freight to come through the two tunnels and take the second track at Chatsworth, WHY was the switch in front of the Metrolink LINED so it could take the Single Track Line when it should be lined to receive the UP Freight.    

    Did the Engineer see the switch go to green and assumed the rest???

    Without an investigation, Mertlink appears to be too fast to fix blame! 

Like most accidents, there WILL be more than one failure.

 

[dehusman]

 Were the Switch Aspects controled under power by dispatching??

It is CTC which means the dispatcher clears a route.  He does not select specific aspects (other than "Stop").

Does the Switch have a Dwarf Signal???

Probably has a full size mast signal.

  Did the Metrolink hold the Main Line or the Siding, 

Main, the local was lined in the siding.

did the crew know they were to hold at Chatsworth for on-comming traffic??? (By Radio or written Orders)

Not by radio or written order.  They were operating by CTC.  The authority is conveyed by signal indication.  Written or verbal instruction are only used in the cases of exceptions and a normal meet is not an "exception".

   If Dispatching had cleared the UP Freight to come through the two tunnels and take the second track at Chatsworth, WHY was the switch in front of the Metrolink LINED so it could take the Single Track Line when it should be lined to receive the UP Freight. 

You are mistaken.  The switch WAS lined for the UP freight to take the siding.  The Metrolink train ran through the switch.  That has been confirmed by the NTSB reports.

Did the Engineer see the switch go to green and assumed the rest???

The evidence shows the switch was lined against the engineer.  The only way the signal could have been other than stop was miss-wiring of the signal system or a catastrophic failure of the signal system, both of which are extremely rare.  Reports I have read have said that the signal system was functioning normally from the dispatcher's perspective prior to the incident, which doesn't help the signal failure scenario. 

In any other scenario, the signal would have been at stop.

Dave H.

[TH&B]

Just to straighten out the physics. Two trains at 40 mph each have kinetic energy proportional to the velocity squared. 40 squared X 2 = 3200. One 80 mph train has kinetic energy of 80 squared or 6400 or twice the energy of the two train crash.  The kinetic energy is what must be absorbed by the bending of steel and the deflection of the train. This is something most drivers don't understand and think a little more speed won't hurt them much.

 

 

 

And the freight train was probably many times heavier then the Metrolink train, traveling each about the same speed.  The UP freight would have been alot of force that wouldn't stop.  The lead UP engine tipped over and is probably what saved that crew.   I bet you not only was the metrolink train telescoped by it's own engine it probaly backed up at impact.   As you can see in the pictures the freight cars are all acordianed from the weight of the freight train itself.

[DMUinCT]

  CTC, a 50 year old technologies.  Worked well on lightly used lines.

[dehusman]

  CTC, a 50 year old technologies.  Worked well on lightly used lines.

Actually the concept is proably 75 or more years old and it is used on the most heavily trafficed lines in the US.  It works well there too.

Dave H. 

[petitnj]

The engineer ignored the rule that says if you stop after a signal you have to proceed at restricted speed until you are sure of the aspect of the next signal. From GCOR:

9.9 Train Delayed Within a Block
If a train has entered a block on a proceed indication that does not require restricted speed, and the train stops or its speed is reduced below 10 MPH, the train must:

A. ABS
Proceed at restricted speed. The train must maintain this speed until the next signal is visible, that signal displays a proceed indication, and the track to that signal is clear.

B. CTC or Manual Interlocking Limits
Proceed prepared to stop at the next signal until the next signal is visible and that signal displays a proceed indication.

C. ACS
Operate according to cab signal indication.

This is not a fault of the system -- just a fatal mistake.

[Anonymous]

The engineer ignored the rule that says if you stop after a signal you have to proceed at restricted speed until you are sure of the aspect of the next signal.

This is not a fault of the system -- just a fatal mistake.

When I referred to the news media being inclined to say the wreck was the fault of the system, I did not mean the system that is currently in place.  I believe they will all jump on the bandwagon and blame the current system for what it lacks, and that would be automatic train stop or some type of feature that overrides negligent engineers and prevents trains from running into each other.  Ultimately, they will blame the government for failing to have required this feature.  And I would not be surprised if they turn the engineer into a victim of this government failure.

[greyhounds]

Here's some more reporting.  It says that an NTSB member is confirming that the Metrolink engineer ran a red and went through a switch set against him.  Take it for what it's worth. 

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,422525,00.html

 

[dehusman]

From GCOR:

B. CTC or Manual Interlocking Limits
Proceed prepared to stop at the next signal until the next signal is visible and that signal displays a proceed indication.

That is the crux of the arguement that its too early to blame the engineer, determining what was the indication at the "next signal", in this case the siding switch. With the switch lined against the Metrolink train and an opposing train in the block beyond the signal, the signal should have been stop.  In order for it to be any aspect with a proceed indication there would have to be a huge flaw or failure in the signal system.  If the NTSB determines the signal system was working properly, then the focus shifts back to the engineer.

Dave H.

[EJE818]

The NTSB has determined the engineer on the Metrolink blew the red signal, and they will be riviewing the phone records of the railfan who was sending the text messages as well as the engineer, then they will determine if the texting had anything to do with the accident. http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080915/ap_on_re_us/train_collision

It was also said that the dispatcher did know the engineer ran the red signal and a alarm went off in his office, but by the time he called to tell the engineer it was too late.

[n012944]

  CTC, a 50 year old technologies.  Worked well on lightly used lines.

Works well on heavy traveled lines also.

[arkansasrailfan]

On the Teen Railfan thread some of us say teen railfans were texting the enginner

[petitnj]

Most likely the engineer ran the stop because he forgot about the yellow (approach) signal he saw before entering the station. Unfortunately the red stop light is usually within a few yards of the switch and foul point (to maximize the length of the siding).

Rule still applies and it was not followed.

[jeffhergert]

In that accident the train was to change tracks at a crossover and should have been going at no faster than 10 MPH when it took the switch, but the engineer missed the signal 0.6 mile before the crossover, and the train hit the crossover at 69 mph and derailed. 

I seem to remember this accident.  That engineer missed, or ignored, more than one signal if he hit a 10mph crossover at 69mph.

Jeff

 

[Railway Man]

The engineer ignored the rule that says if you stop after a signal you have to proceed at restricted speed until you are sure of the aspect of the next signal.

This is not a fault of the system -- just a fatal mistake.

When I referred to the news media being inclined to say the wreck was the fault of the system, I did not mean the system that is currently in place.  I believe they will all jump on the bandwagon and blame the current system for what it lacks, and that would be automatic train stop or some type of feature that overrides negligent engineers and prevents trains from running into each other.  Ultimately, they will blame the government for failing to have required this feature.  And I would not be surprised if they turn the engineer into a victim of this government failure.

ATS may or may not prevent this type of collision from occuring.  It depends upon the particular circumstance and how people react to the ATS system.  ATS is reactive, not predictive like PTC.  PTC prevents this type of collision from occurring in almost all cases on a safety-critical, high-reliability basis.  This is why the NTSB wants the FRA to mandate railroads to install PTC, not ATS.

RWM

[PaulWWoodring]

I was really shocked to hear the spokeswoman for Metrolink admit agency culpability for the accident (their engineer's actions).  First rule of any type of accident like this (or even a personal fender-bender) is say nothing, admit nothing, let the SOB's prove it!  She opened the agency up to hundreds of millions of $$$$ in lawsuits without a fight.  As has been said by others here, there is usually more than one factor involved in a major fatal accident.  The Metrolink engineer supposedly had something like 12 years, so he's no rookie, although I've seen veteran engineers do stupid stuff as well, but less likely he'd be "texting" than a younger guy.  There seems to be very little doubt at this point that the Metrolink train ran a red, but why is what the investigation will be all about.  

 

One thing that I think most would agree with, this will probably speed up the process of installing positive train control on just about every passenger route in the U. S. 

[dehusman]

One thing that I think most would agree with, this will probably speed up the process of installing positive train control on just about every passenger route in the U. S. 

.......... as soon as they get a working PTC system.  There have been several proposals out there, none of them has been entirely satifactory yet, all are still in testing and development stages.

Dave H.

[EJE818]

The NTSB also said the switch was aligned against the Metrolink train and was working properly and that the engineer blew the signal and the switch that was aligned against him. Also, I'm interested to see what kind of rule changes will come because of this. I think for one thing that new rules that mandate two people in the cab of a commuter train will be put into place. If there were two people in the cab the conductor could've informed the engineer that he was approaching the red. The problem with one person in the cab is that if the engineer goofs up, nobody can notify the engineer so he could correct the mistake in time.

[youngengineer]

I was really shocked to hear the spokeswoman for Metrolink admit agency culpability for the accident (their engineer's actions).  First rule of any type of accident like this (or even a personal fender-bender) is say nothing, admit nothing, let the SOB's prove it!  She opened the agency up to hundreds of millions of $$$$ in lawsuits without a fight.  As has been said by others here, there is usually more than one factor involved in a major fatal accident.  The Metrolink engineer supposedly had something like 12 years, so he's no rookie, although I've seen veteran engineers do stupid stuff as well, but less likely he'd be "texting" than a younger guy.  There seems to be very little doubt at this point that the Metrolink train ran a red, but why is what the investigation will be all about.  

One thing that I think most would agree with, this will probably speed up the process of installing positive train control on just about every passenger route in the U. S. 

My first reaction when I heard the spokeswoman for metrolink was, wow, shes not very good at her job, and it seems from what I've read she will no longer be working for them. 

[ChuckCobleigh]

ATS may or may not prevent this type of collision from occuring.  It depends upon the particular circumstance and how people react to the ATS system.  ATS is reactive, not predictive like PTC.  PTC prevents this type of collision from occurring in almost all cases on a safety-critical, high-reliability basis.  This is why the NTSB wants the FRA to mandate railroads to install PTC, not ATS.

RWM

Ah, a question I had answered, albeit requiring a reference to your earlier post on PTC and its similarity to the electric dog collar fence.  A system which relied on the event of blowing through the signal to initiate the stop like ATS would have been useless in this case, because even if the Metrolink train had come to a stop, it is unlikely that the UP could have stopped in time, given the lay of the land and the track geometry at the particular location. 

Talk about your "perfect storm" scenario. 

[Anonymous]

The engineer ignored the rule that says if you stop after a signal you have to proceed at restricted speed until you are sure of the aspect of the next signal.

This is not a fault of the system -- just a fatal mistake.

When I referred to the news media being inclined to say the wreck was the fault of the system, I did not mean the system that is currently in place.  I believe they will all jump on the bandwagon and blame the current system for what it lacks, and that would be automatic train stop or some type of feature that overrides negligent engineers and prevents trains from running into each other.  Ultimately, they will blame the government for failing to have required this feature.  And I would not be surprised if they turn the engineer into a victim of this government failure.

ATS may or may not prevent this type of collision from occuring.  It depends upon the particular circumstance and how people react to the ATS system.  ATS is reactive, not predictive like PTC.  PTC prevents this type of collision from occurring in almost all cases on a safety-critical, high-reliability basis.  This is why the NTSB wants the FRA to mandate railroads to install PTC, not ATS.

RWM

Thanks for that clarification RWM.  I just used the term, automatic train stop without understanding PTC.  But what I mean is something that would absolutely prevent trains from colliding.  I am watching ABC news right now, and they are going to tell us about the "little thing" that could have prevented this latest wreck.  As it turns out, PTC is the "little thing" that they recommend.  ABC said the railroads are balking at the cost, but after this crash, the railroads and the government may reconsider.

[BaltACD]

Thanks for that clarification RWM.  I just used the term, automatic train stop without understanding PTC.  But what I mean is something that would absolutely prevent trains from colliding.  I am watching ABC news right now, and they are going to tell us about the "little thing" that could have prevented this latest wreck.  As it turns out, PTC is the "little thing" that they recommend.  ABC said the railroads are balking at the cost, but after this crash, the railroads and the government may reconsider.

And your checkbook is good for how many billions to finance this.  No one is against PTC, however, no one wants to pay for it.

One question for those that inhabit S.California....How many highway traffic deaths occur in the greater L.A. area on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis?

[jeaton]

I was really shocked to hear the spokeswoman for Metrolink admit agency culpability for the accident (their engineer's actions).  First rule of any type of accident like this (or even a personal fender-bender) is say nothing, admit nothing, let the SOB's prove it!  She opened the agency up to hundreds of millions of $$$$ in lawsuits without a fight.  As has been said by others here, there is usually more than one factor involved in a major fatal accident.  The Metrolink engineer supposedly had something like 12 years, so he's no rookie, although I've seen veteran engineers do stupid stuff as well, but less likely he'd be "texting" than a younger guy.  There seems to be very little doubt at this point that the Metrolink train ran a red, but why is what the investigation will be all about.  

One thing that I think most would agree with, this will probably speed up the process of installing positive train control on just about every passenger route in the U. S. 

I wasn't shocked, but I was surprised to see the Metrolink spokeswoman making her remarks about their engineer running a stop signal.  Interestingly, it is reported that she resigned her position at Metrolink and perhaps there is a tie in between her public comments and her resignation.  In my experience the company media relations people are the ones who are seeing that no employee is releasing information ahead of the "appropriate" time. 

It is likely that lawsuits are being filed as we write.  Given the number of fatalities and the probability that some of the surviving injured may be permanently disable, compensatory damages for loss of income and medical care could well go to the hundreds of millions.