wyomingrailfan wrote:I figured that from previous info. I wonder if the metrolnk engineer survived
From what I've read, he's one of the deceased. If he did run the signal(s), he paid for his mistake with his life.
One of the concerns I have about this is that the first coach was "telescoped" by the MetroLink engine. This "telescoping" has traditionally been a cause of many deaths and severe injuries in passenger train accidents.
I was under the imprssion that devices such as tight lock couplers and "anti climbers", in addition to the FRSA required "buff" strength in rail cars were there to prevent this. Any one have an idea on why they didn't prevent the telescoping in this accident. The passengers don't have much of a chance when telescoping happens.
Here's a news report citing Metrolink as acknowledging that their "contract" engineer caused the wreck.
http://www.knbc.com/news/17462062/detail.html?dl=mainclick
Of course, the news report also says that a UP engine was inside the coach instead of the Metrolink engine, which is wrong.
greyhounds wrote: One of the concerns I have about this is that the first coach was "telescoped" by the MetroLink engine. This "telescoping" has traditionally been a cause of many deaths and severe injuries in passenger train accidents.
Passenger-car telescoping was one of the reasons railroads went from wooden to metal construction and why the Post Office required the same on RPOs. If the Metro's cars had been heavyweights made of heavy steel rather than of light-weight construction, one wonders if the accident's outcome would be less macabre.
Mark
hrbdizzle wrote:I work for UP, and we had a debriefing this morning before tying up from a run.The UP was taking the Siding had an engine in the siding and the Metro train ran the Red striking inbetween the first and second unit on the UP.There where 4 crew man on board, a Enginemen, Trainmen, Brakeman and a Student. Either CIT or BIT.UP was definitely on a diverging signal into the siding.
I just got done viewing the LA Times photos of the wreck site. I can't tell where the siding (passing) location is, but the track behind the Metrolink train is single-track, on a small fill. It definately sounds like the UP train had the authority, and that the Metrolink train ran a red absolute signal, but I can't see the control point from the collision photos.
Perhaps the siding is further behind the passenger train, and Metrolink simply ran the signal at the leaving end of the siding, and continued on the single track to the point of impact. It sure looks like a head-on, "cornfield meet" from the photos of the UP power nose-to-nose with the ill-fated Metrolink engine. Terrible, terrible damage, with the Metrolink F59 completely shoved into the shell of the first passenger car. I can't see how anyone could survive in the first 2/3rds of the front coach.
greyhounds wrote: One of the concerns I have about this is that the first coach was "telescoped" by the MetroLink engine. This "telescoping" has traditionally been a cause of many deaths and severe injuries in passenger train accidents.I was under the imprssion that devices such as tight lock couplers and "anti climbers", in addition to the FRSA required "buff" strength in rail cars were there to prevent this. Any one have an idea on why they didn't prevent the telescoping in this accident. The passengers don't have much of a chance when telescoping happens.
I think tightlocks and anti-climbers are effective, but at a combined 80 mph closing speed I don't think either is enough to prevent the damage we've seen. My prayers go out to all the victims... no reason to assign blame anymore now that we know the Metrolink hogger is deceased. It is what it is, and I'm not convinced ATS would have even prevented what happened, considering the speeds involved.
RIP.
Yes the control point is to the south of the collision. There is also another control point well to the northwest, where the Union Pacific train could have held for the Metrolink train, but it appears this was not the way the tracks were lined. And the latest reports seem to confirm my initial suspicions that the Metrolink train missed a signal.
In an earlier post, I linked to this map. Scroll to the south and you'll see the double to single track location.
What bothers me is if they ran the signal and opposing switch, wouldn't someone on board (possibly the conductor) notice the weird sound of the opposing spring switch? Many people onboard interviewed never mentioned sounds out of the ordinary until the actual collision. Not that hearing anything would have mattered as there was practically no window of time to do anything.
Another thing that I'm sure will come out of this, at least pushed by the media, local government, and possibly the public, is the implementation of some form of automatic train control. Metrolink is setup for Automatic Train Stop (ATS) for the portions where it still remains on the former Santa Fe San Diegan route. But even with ATS in this area, I'm not sure if it would fully have prevented this accident.
Terrible tragedy no matter how it happened. One I think we living in Southern California may not forget when we ride the rails for many years.
Matt from Anaheim, CA and Bayfield, COClick Here for my model train photo website
Clarification:
Metrolink F59PH #855
Coach 185
Coach 207
Cabcar 617
Wreck site is on single track away from siding. I just wanted to clarify the car numbers.
http://www.haworthengineering.com/
~Excellency in the Details ~
For better or worse, methinks this incident will trigger a requirement for Positive Train Control for passenger routes, just the NEC Amtrak-Conrail collision at Gunpow triggered drug and alcohol testing.
benburch wrote:If we have in-cab signaling in most commuter rail operations, how hard would it be to have the signaling system force an emergency brake application in such a circumstance?
Most commuter rail operations do not have cab signals or any form of Automatic Train Stop (ATS), or Automatic Train Control (ATC). METRA (Chicago) is in the process of implementing a Communications-Based Train-Control (CBTC) overlay which does enforce main track authority and speed limits automatically. This system is similar to the BNSF Electronic Train Management System (ETMS) currently in use on the Beardstown Subdivision in Illinois and scheduled for additional implementation on the BNSF system, to NS's CBTC system currently in development, and to UP's VTMS (Vital Train Management System) currently in development.
We do not know yet the full circumstances of this collision and presumption that this or that control system or control overlay "would have prevented it" is premature. However, if this collision was (as Metrolink has just stated) the result only of an engineman disregarding one or more wayside signal aspects and exceeding his train's authority, a CBTC system would likely have prevented its occurance. This would be the case whether the CBTC system was an overlay on a traditional wayside CTC signaling system, or a stand-alone "vital", safety-critical system.
CBTC systems employ predictive braking, and as they have knowledge of a train's braking characteristics, the track profile and configuration, the permanent and temporary speed restrictions that apply to the train, and monitor the exact authority limit of the train at all times and the physical relationship of the train to that limit, the CBTC system automatically brakes the train if the engineman disregards a signal aspect or his authority limits, in advance so that an authority excursion does not occur. The CBTC system can be thought of as erecting an "electronic fence." It continously measures the distance between the train and the fence, continuously calculates the braking distance necessary for the train to stop short of the fence for the speed the train is traveling, and at the moment that the train would otherwise approach the fence at a speed at which it cannot not stop short, brakes the train, plus a safety margin. The fence is graphically displayed to the engineman on a real-time basis on a cab display. Warnings are displayed visually and audibly if it appears to the system that the engineman is approaching the fail-safe braking point without initiating sufficient braking. Braking is implemented before the fail-safe point and once braking is automatically implemented the train is braked to a stop and the dispatching office alerted to the activation of automatic enforcement.
ATC and ATS are old copper-and-relay technology, expensive to install, expensive to maintain, and moreover do not completely enforce all authority excursions and overspeeds, and in many scenarios fall woefully short of automatically generating positive enforcement. ATC and ATS are yesterday's not-so-good solution. CBTC and similar systems, which fall under the rubric Positive Train Control, do fully enforce all authority excursions and overspeeds. (There are ways to defeat PTC but the ways in which it can be defeated are few and the likelihood of a defeat leading to a collision or derailment are very, very small.) The NTSB has made PTC a primary request to the FRA, and the FRA has implemented rules (Subpart H) which govern the implementation of PTC systems. The railroad industry is in the process of implementing PTC. Where, how, and why it's taken as long as it has to roll out PTC, what it will cost, and who will pay for it, is a long discussion, but if someone is interested I can address that.
RWM
greyhounds wrote: wyomingrailfan wrote:I figured that from previous info. I wonder if the metrolnk engineer survivedFrom what I've read, he's one of the deceased. If he did run the signal(s), he paid for his mistake with his life.One of the concerns I have about this is that the first coach was "telescoped" by the MetroLink engine. This "telescoping" has traditionally been a cause of many deaths and severe injuries in passenger train accidents.I was under the imprssion that devices such as tight lock couplers and "anti climbers", in addition to the FRSA required "buff" strength in rail cars were there to prevent this. Any one have an idea on why they didn't prevent the telescoping in this accident. The passengers don't have much of a chance when telescoping happens.
Passenger car crashworthiness standards provide a minimum level of protection for the occupants of the car. They are not sufficient to protect the occupants in all circumstances. Current FRA requirement for that car structure must be sufficient to resist longitudinal buff forces of 800 kips (800,000 lbs.) applied to the end of the cars without permanent deformation of the car structure. Actual longitudinal buff forces in a train derailment or collision may exceed 1,500 kips. Building a car structure sufficient to withstand forces of that magnitude is deemed impractical; in addition, even if the car structure could withstand it, the unsecured occupant inside the car would decelerate at a rate that would cause massive trauma or fatality to the occupant.
High-speed rail system design in Europe and Japan does not attempt to build car structures with anywhere near the structural strength required by the FRA. Instead, those systems seek to reduce likelihood of the collision occuring in the first place. An analogy would be in fire prevention the decision to accept the risk of fuel and decrease the risk of a spark. This has worked well except in two notable instances where an unforseen solid obstacle appeared on the track: in Germany where a mechanical failure caused an ICE train to derail and strike a concrete overpass structure and in England where a vehicle fell off an overpass and landed on the track. In both cases catastrophic failure of the passenger car structure resulted. FRA car strength requirements resulted in considerable weight being added to the Acela structure relative to its European and Japanese counterparts which in turn caused considerable difficulty with mechanical and electrical systems design and performance, and subsequent cost of construction and maintenance performance, and operating results.
For an excellent graphical depiction of U.S. passenger car standards see:
http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/22000/22600/22604/uscr_std.pdf
The photos show that the engine telescoped almost halfway into the first car. It seems to me that once the heavier and somewhat smaller object (the engine) breaks through the front bulkhead of the passenger car, there is little structure to slow the movement of the engine into the car. I'm not going to pretend to be a mechanical engineer, but I can't envision any design that would overcome that particular problem other than having the end of the car built like a tank. Then, as RWM notes, the sudden decelaration of the entire train would probably produce many more fatalities.
The photos seem to indicate little damage to the second and third car, so it would appear that most of the collision force was absorbed by the head car. Along that line, I suspect the NTSB will try to track the location of the injuries or fatalities as part of the development of any recommendations to improve safety.
As a side note, in recent rides on Chicago Metra line off rush trains, I have noted that the lead car on the trains have been locked off to passengers. They are probably open as needed during rush hours, but I think I would rather take a seat a car or two back from the head end.
"We have met the enemy and he is us." Pogo Possum "We have met the anemone... and he is Russ." Bucky Katt "Prediction is very difficult, especially if it's about the future." Niels Bohr, Nobel laureate in physics
jeaton wrote:The photos show that the engine telescoped almost halfway into the first car. It seems to me that once the heavier and somewhat smaller object (the engine) breaks through the front bulkhead of the passenger car, there is little structure to slow the movement of the engine into the car.
The photos show that the engine telescoped almost halfway into the first car. It seems to me that once the heavier and somewhat smaller object (the engine) breaks through the front bulkhead of the passenger car, there is little structure to slow the movement of the engine into the car.
The end posts of the car are the line of defense. Once defeated there is nothing beyond them. There isn't a bulkhead per se. Locomotives are similarly constructed; inside the nose of a locomotive the collision posts are obvious.
Railway Man wrote: jeaton wrote: The photos show that the engine telescoped almost halfway into the first car. It seems to me that once the heavier and somewhat smaller object (the engine) breaks through the front bulkhead of the passenger car, there is little structure to slow the movement of the engine into the car. The end posts of the car are the line of defense. Once defeated there is nothing beyond them. There isn't a bulkhead per se. Locomotives are similarly constructed; inside the nose of a locomotive the collision posts are obvious. RWM
jeaton wrote: The photos show that the engine telescoped almost halfway into the first car. It seems to me that once the heavier and somewhat smaller object (the engine) breaks through the front bulkhead of the passenger car, there is little structure to slow the movement of the engine into the car.
Couple of things don't seem to add up from the article where the MetroLink spokesperson admitted the contract engineer ran a red signal. One, the article says the UP locomotive was inside the first MetroLink car, which is not correct according to photographic evidence showing the lead UP unit on its side with its nose against the nose of the MetroLink engine and the first car telescoped around that engine. Two, the article says the northbound MetroLink train was supposed to have pulled off into the siding to allow the southbound UP tran to pass. However, it also states the MetroLink train had just made a station stop at the Northridge station, which is actually in the middle of the siding there. So was the MetroLink train in the siding during the station stop and then ran a red going from siding-to-main, or was the MetroLink train on the main at the station and ran a red while the UP was supposed to take the siding? Lots of conflicting statements at this time, which is understandable.
Finally, it looks like the north end of that siding is maybe 1/4 mile north of the Northridge station. It seems like the northbound signals should have been clearly visible the entire time the train was stopped at the station, regardless of the track the MetroLink train was on, and the signal should have been red the entire time if the UP train was cleared southbound by the dispatcher. Seems like this would have been a hard signal to miss. Oh well, I suppose that's what makes this all such a tragedy.
Jamie
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jeaton wrote: As a side note, in recent rides on Chicago Metra line off rush trains, I have noted that the lead car on the trains have been locked off to passengers. They are probably open as needed during rush hours, but I think I would rather take a seat a car or two back from the head end.
This is always what I thought - I try to board the last car of the train when I ride AMTK 365/364 or the Hiawatha's to and from N. Chicago. Problem is, with a business class ticket sometimes the cafe car is right behind the leading power or cabbage. I suppose I could downgrade myself and sit in coach in the last open car, but in a bad collision what would happen with an P42 pushing from the rear?
I guess when it's your time, it's your time, regardless of travel by air, train or automobile/bus. <shrug>
I saw photos of this tragic wreck last night.I was told that the Metrolink conductor survived,but has a broken leg.A news report this afternoon puts the death toll at 24 with more still not removed from the car.
Do metrolink trains have black boxes and are they required on commuter trains? Also what about cameras in the cabs of metrolink or other commuter trains? What about that specific UP train, would it have a camera?
morseman wrote:Do metrolink trains have black boxes and are they required on commuter trains? Also what about cameras in the cabs of metrolink or other commuter trains? What about that specific UP train, would it have a camera?
Modern locomotives have event recorders that record speed, air brake pressure, amperes of power and dynamic, controls setting, horn and bell activation, etc.
Cameras -- I do not know.
ridesteel wrote:my step-dad works for amtrak and is a huge railfan and has alot of friends in high places and he thinks that the engineer of metrolink 111 had either a siezure or heart attack and so does another metrolink conductor.
A TV report (don't remember which one) quoted a retired RR (Amtrak?) engineer as saying normal procedure at that point is for the Metrolink train to wait in the siding at the station for the freight to pass and then proceed when the signal shows clear. That seems to be different from my experience at that station, as I don't remember going into a siding.
I wonder if the time of day might have an impact. The turn on which the collision occurred presents the northbound engineer with a nice view of the westering sun in the late afternoon. I have seen how the signal colors at Fullerton are very hard to identify when backlit by the sun. That is one way in which the old semaphore signals were superior.
Jack
Railway Man wrote: ATC and ATS are old copper-and-relay technology, expensive to install, expensive to maintain, and moreover do not completely enforce all authority excursions and overspeeds, and in many scenarios fall woefully short of automatically generating positive enforcement. ATC and ATS are yesterday's not-so-good solution.
ATC and ATS are old copper-and-relay technology, expensive to install, expensive to maintain, and moreover do not completely enforce all authority excursions and overspeeds, and in many scenarios fall woefully short of automatically generating positive enforcement. ATC and ATS are yesterday's not-so-good solution.
The only thing ATS was ever good for was when the weather was so foggy that you couldn't see the signals at all, unless you happened to look at just the right place at just the right time. If you missed a restrictive indication, the ATS would trip and you'd get a penalty application and a severe puckering (you rails know what I mean...) until you came to a safe stop!
Jack_S wrote: I wonder if the time of day might have an impact. The turn on which the collision occurred presents the northbound engineer with a nice view of the westering sun in the late afternoon. I have seen how the signal colors at Fullerton are very hard to identify when backlit by the sun. That is one way in which the old semaphore signals were superior.Jack
The mainline and siding tracks at Chatsworth station are perfectly aligned north-south; the train leaving the station northbound would have the sun at about the 9:00 position (approx 90 degrees to the left). Also, as mentioned before, the signals should be clearly visible to a train waiting to depart the station, so it is not as if the engineer would have been surprised by a signal coming around a blind corner or something like that. Jamie
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