RME the system we use and have used is at Zero pressure the valve closes in less than 1/2 of a second and that is the industry standard on the emergency shutoff valves. They are a pump up to open and the total system volume of fluid in the trailer is less than 2 cups of fluid. The PSI required to open the valve is less than 200 PSI and if the pressure is removed it drops the valve to closed. This system is used by all Haz Mat OTR tanker trailers and has been for 40 years. The emergency releases are a breakable bolt looking device on every corner of the trailer and if there is an issue anywhere all you have to do is grab twist and snap. That releases the pressure and closes the valve. We have hauled acid for 30+ years and never had an issue like this until this week. In fact the only other issue we have ever had was where the valve refused to open on the trailer when pumped up for opening 20+ years ago. That we traced to a cracked emergancy release bolt.
I have sometimes wondered why the NTSB tells us anything until they finish their investigation and release the final report. I would tend to expect that as a natural consequence of the gravity of their official process taking precedence.
But, traditionally, that has not been the way they have handled it. Instead, they move fast and tell us what they find as they go. I think the reason is that they realize that the public has an interest in the safety in the public sector, and they are naturally anxious for explanations of a big accident. If an investigative agency came off as defensive, lawyerly, and tight lipped, it would antagonize the public; and a public agency needs public support.
So, the NTSB responsibly addresses the public desire to know what happened while an accident is fresh in the peoples’ minds. They don’t withhold every detail until the last stone has been turned over.
However, with this Hoboken crash, I sense a reversal of that NTSB policy about generously informing the public. I see indications that they have adopted precisely the attitude that they should not be expected to tell us anything until their work is finished.
So, the engineer says that he entered the station at 10 mph, but he does not remember the crash. The one black box recovered was not working during the trip because it was old. They can’t get to the other black box because it is too hard with all the wreckage, and there might be asbestos.
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/n-j-train-crash-one-data-recorder-wasn-t-working-n658256
Euclid So, the NTSB responsibly addresses the public desire to know what happened while an accident is fresh in the peoples’ minds. They don’t withhold every detail until the last stone has been turned over. However, with this Hoboken crash, I sense a reversal of that NTSB policy about generously informing the public. I see indications that they have adopted precisely the attitude that they should not be expected to tell us anything until their work is finished.
NTSB has been incredibly unsharing about the crash at Chester, PA. In my opinion. There was information they had early on that they COULD have shared, but didn't.
Niles, MI was another one. They knew stuff within a few days, and didn't tell until the final report. In my opinion.
The one in Midland, Texas (veterans, parade, flatbed) was a bit different. There was, what, 4 daily news conferences before they left. THAT was pretty sharing. In my opinion.
Now, perhaps there were regrets because of the "over" sharing at Midland. Because the locals dearly wanted to blame the UP, and the more the NTSB talked, the worse it looked for the city and the police. And perhaps those two groups cause political unhappiness outwards.
In my opinion.
Ed
Hoboken Terminal reopening is very much undecided.
http://www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf/2016/09/when_will_hoboken_terminal_reopen_experts_say_that.html#incart_river_indexp
7j43k...Chester, PA. <snip> Niles, MI...
Probably because they didn't get quite the major press coverage. A fair amount was heard about Chester in the trade press, but it still didn't get the general coverage that the incidents involving large numbers of people did. Niles - who cares about some stabbings? Everyday news... (I know, people do care about the stabbings, especially the victims, but in the 24 hour news cycle, it's pfft... Chester was "just" an industrial accident.)
We care about these incidents because we are interested in railroads. The general public, not so much. How much coverage have you seen about Chief Fahey?
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
They have clarified the rule on event recorders saying that the leading end of the train must have one that is working. This was in response to a question as to whether the one that was not working on the trailing end was required to have been working. The answer was left at “no” because only the lead end requires one to be working.
I am not familiar with this operation, but doesn’t either end of the train lead at various times? And if that is so, doesn’t that mean that a failed event recorder on the trailing locomotive going into the station was a violation?
Somehow, I get the feeling that when they finally get the debris cleared away and recover the second event recorder, that will not be working either.
Euclid So, the engineer says that he entered the station at 10 mph, but he does not remember the crash. The one black box recovered was not working during the trip because it was old. They can’t get to the other black box because it is too hard with all the wreckage, and there might be asbestos. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/n-j-train-crash-one-data-recorder-wasn-t-working-n658256
Sounds like Sleep Apnea and he passed out. Just like the Amtrak crash earlier. Maybe they should start testing Locomotive Engineers for Sleep Apnea.
tree68 Niles - who cares about some stabbings?
Niles - who cares about some stabbings?
I think he was talking about the 2012 derailment, not the stabbings.
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAB1306.pdf
An "expensive model collector"
Euclid And if that is so, doesn’t that mean that a failed event recorder on the trailing locomotive going into the station was a violation?
And if that is so, doesn’t that mean that a failed event recorder on the trailing locomotive going into the station was a violation?
It wouldn't be a violation until the outbound actually left.
CMStPnP Euclid So, the engineer says that he entered the station at 10 mph, but he does not remember the crash. The one black box recovered was not working during the trip because it was old. They can’t get to the other black box because it is too hard with all the wreckage, and there might be asbestos. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/n-j-train-crash-one-data-recorder-wasn-t-working-n658256 Sounds like Sleep Apnea and he passed out. Just like the Amtrak crash earlier. Maybe they should start testing Locomotive Engineers for Sleep Apnea.
Better still, equip all commuter train lines with PTC. Metro-North did. NJT could have. They still can once they get rid of Christie.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
n012944,
Here is what I am wondering about. If that rear event recorder had been not working for say a week or more, is it likely that it was leading a train at some point during that time? For this train that crashed, would it be likely that they moved the working event recorder to the leading end of the train every time they changed directions?
I think that was the basic point of a question asked at the NTSB press conference. It was whether a failed event recorder on a train suggested a violation, assuming that it had been bad order for some significant period of time.
schlimm CMStPnP Euclid So, the engineer says that he entered the station at 10 mph, but he does not remember the crash. The one black box recovered was not working during the trip because it was old. They can’t get to the other black box because it is too hard with all the wreckage, and there might be asbestos. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/n-j-train-crash-one-data-recorder-wasn-t-working-n658256 Sounds like Sleep Apnea and he passed out. Just like the Amtrak crash earlier. Maybe they should start testing Locomotive Engineers for Sleep Apnea. Better still, equip all commuter train lines with PTC. Metro-North did. NJT could have. They still can once they get rid of Christie.
PTC enforces response to Signal Indications. The Signal Indication into a dead end station track would be 'Restricting' - proceed at restricted speed (with all the other requirements restricted speed entails). IF train was proceeding at 10 MPH as the engineer asserts, it was moving in accordance within the limits that PTC would allow. The fact that the train did not stop short of the track blockage (bumping block) indicates man failure that PTC would not prevent.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
BaltACD schlimm CMStPnP Euclid So, the engineer says that he entered the station at 10 mph, but he does not remember the crash. The one black box recovered was not working during the trip because it was old. They can’t get to the other black box because it is too hard with all the wreckage, and there might be asbestos. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/n-j-train-crash-one-data-recorder-wasn-t-working-n658256 Sounds like Sleep Apnea and he passed out. Just like the Amtrak crash earlier. Maybe they should start testing Locomotive Engineers for Sleep Apnea. Better still, equip all commuter train lines with PTC. Metro-North did. NJT could have. They still can once they get rid of Christie. PTC enforces response to Signal Indications. The Signal Indication into a dead end station track would be 'Restricting' - proceed at restricted speed (with all the other requirements restricted speed entails). IF train was proceeding at 10 MPH as the engineer asserts, it was moving in accordance within the limits that PTC would allow. The fact that the train did not stop short of the track blockage (bumping block) indicates man failure that PTC would not prevent.
Experts have disputed that. The programming can enforce stops, not just speed limits.
As I understand this, the only means available with PTC for controlling trains pulling up to the bumper post, as this one was doing; would be to enforce the concept of “restricted speed.” Why would this not result in stopping the train before it hit the bumper post? Doesn’t “restricted speed” require stopping short of an obstruction?
Euclidn012944, Here is what I am wondering about. If that rear event recorder had been not working for say a week or more, is it likely that it was leading a train at some point during that time? For this train that crashed, would it be likely that they moved the working event recorder to the leading end of the train every time they changed directions?
Not how event recorders work. It's not like there's an "event recorder working" gauge in a locomotive. I've had engines where the roadforemen tried to get a download and they couldn't. Files get corrupted, CF cards don't work, etc.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Maybe more (passenger & commuter) trains need an auto-pilot as well as PTC?
schlimmExperts have disputed that. The programming can enforce stops, not just speed limits.
Would that entail having everything signalled right up to the bumping block? I think that's the problem - some of these stations are so full of swithces and tracks it would be a hell of a job to signal everything. Or can you have a sea of restricting with a stop signal at the end?
I honestly don't know.
News articles seem to report nothing not said by Ms. D-Z at the briefings, which of course are on NTSB youtube channel. Most recent video is generally first in the second row, ‘uploads.’
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCe5dWbxxvQqDAHmyMrEF7Kw
Euclid Doesn’t “restricted speed” require stopping short of an obstruction?
Within half the distance to the obstruction. Using that parameter, a train could never actually reach the bumper.
In this particular situation, we also have to question the resolution of whatever is being used to determine the position of the train. If it's GPS, the resolution can sometimes be to tens of feet, not to mention this incident occurred inside the train shed (from what I've seen), which is going to affect the GPS signal.
zugmann Euclid n012944, Here is what I am wondering about. If that rear event recorder had been not working for say a week or more, is it likely that it was leading a train at some point during that time? For this train that crashed, would it be likely that they moved the working event recorder to the leading end of the train every time they changed directions? Not how event recorders work. It's not like there's an "event recorder working" gauge in a locomotive. I've had engines where the roadforemen tried to get a download and they couldn't. Files get corrupted, CF cards don't work, etc.
Euclid n012944, Here is what I am wondering about. If that rear event recorder had been not working for say a week or more, is it likely that it was leading a train at some point during that time? For this train that crashed, would it be likely that they moved the working event recorder to the leading end of the train every time they changed directions?
I would think that it would be considered very important for an event recorder to be working, considering its role to capture critical information that is only availble during an event. While it may not be necessary to have an "event recorder operating" indicator, having such an indicator does not seem like overkill.
Short of that, however, would be a requirement to check the event recorder for operation at the start of a work shift. I understand the point that they can fail any time for several different reasons, and that this one that failed was not legally required for the operation underway during the crash.
But it raises a few questions when they first tell us that they will get information from the two event recorders, and then tell us that one of them was not operating with the apparent explanation that it was too old. The question that this raises was asked at a NTSB news conference, and it seemed clear to me that they dodged the question because it was a hot potato.
tree68 Euclid Doesn’t “restricted speed” require stopping short of an obstruction?
Dec. 30, 1939
schlimm Maybe more (passenger & commuter) trains need an auto-pilot as well as PTC?
Maybe it goes further than that , we still gotta share the road with this guy.
BANG! DING! OW!
The event recorder problems seem to be puzzling. Transport type aircraft have gone thru about 4 iterations of improvements. Most changes have been made retroactive when the airplanes go thru a "D" check or phased "D" check. Originally 11 parameters on analog metal tape, then to digital channels and now are at over 200+ parameters.
As well there are several indications that show on both the flight recorder and voice recorders that indicate they are working. Part of preflight check. In addition believe every 30 - 90 days an avionics tech must take a download of the units to verify they are working. The download also goes to the IT department to verify that the readings are reasonable and none are missing. IE -- airspeed of 2000 knots would indicate problems and order to replace recorder at next maintenance station sent.
Would think that the 92 day inspections would accomplish the same thing.
Another question. Since NJT operates this line under contract to MNRR why was the train short of regular number of cars ? Were the cars & loco owned by NJT or MNRR ?
Evidently the "SANDY" repairs did not include asbesdos removal ?
Any idea how the asbesdos will be neutralized ?
Since ACSES and the Amrak ATC systems are part of NJT as well why not have the systems with timer circuits to stop trains short of bumpers ? Of course these systems would not stop all trains but would stop most potential over runs.
Neutralize asbestos? The only way I can imagine is by enclosing it in something that can be hermetically sealed--making sure that no fibers get away.
Johnny
Euclid As I understand this, the only means available with PTC for controlling trains pulling up to the bumper post, as this one was doing; would be to enforce the concept of “restricted speed.” Why would this not result in stopping the train before it hit the bumper post? Doesn’t “restricted speed” require stopping short of an obstruction?
I think that when PTC enforces restricted speed, it is enforcing the top speed allowed by rule, 20 or 15 mph. A train comes up to a red number plated signal. (For me that's a Restricted Proceed, no stop required. For others it may still be a Stop and Proceed.) The train is allowed to pass the signal, proceeding at Restricted Speed, not exceeding 20 mph. PTC, from inputs from the signal system and the location of a preceeding trains engine, knows there is a train ahead, but may not know exactly where the rear end is. PTC allows the following train in and as long as it doesn't exceed 20 mph, and probably a margin of error slightly over 20 mph, PTC let's it keep going.
Our ATC is like this when you are running at restricted speed. It enforces the restricting cab signal, but won't cause a penalty brake application until your speed exceeds 22 mph.
Jeff
Deggesty Neutralize asbestos? The only way I can imagine is by enclosing it in something that can be hermetically sealed--making sure that no fibers get away.
That is what is commonly done when older buildings are rehabbed and the asbestos doesn't need to be disturbed or removed. I think some kind of sealant is sprayed over it that seals the asbestos (and any loose fibers) in. Asbestos that has to be disturbed or removed is a hazardous material, and must be handled and disposed of in accordance with the HM rules, which are DEFINITELY no laughing matter (been there, watched it being done, and signed the payments for the work).
Jeff,
I understand your point that PTC may only enforce the top speed allowed under “Restricted Speed” while not enforcing contingencies encountered that require stopping while under Restricted Speed.
David Schanoes writes about this issue in his blog piece called, “While We’re Waiting; A Look Ahead.”
http://www.ten90solutions.com/while_were_waiting_a_look_ahead
He makes interesting points about the discrepancy between the law and the regulation which accepts running through a switch as long as the speed is less than 20 mph.
In this piece, he also makes the following prediction about the forthcoming finding of cause by the NTSB, which is the failure of RJRT to install PTC:
“The NTSB agrees with the assertion of its vice-chairperson that the primary cause for this overspeed derailment is the failure of NJT Rail Operations to install PTC in Hoboken Terminal.
The NTSB finds that contributing causes to this derailment are: (a) FRA's approval of Main Line Track Exemptions for passenger terminals where speeds are restricted to no more than 20 mph and interlocking rules are in effect (b) failure of the locomotive engineer to properly control the speed of the train due to unknown reasons that may include, but are not limited to, obstructive sleep apnea, fatigue, pre-existing medical conditions, transient ischemic attack, distraction, distraction due to background radio communications between other trains and the control center, etc. etc.”
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