Semper Vaporo zugmann Semper Vaporo Seems to me that any place that is a restricted speed would be the intended place where PTC would be of most value. Problem is that restrcited speed isn't a speed - it's a method of operation. How do you enforce it through PTC? It's the most basic of operations - pretty much "don't hit stuff". A lot of that stuff can be things that aren't connected to the signal system, but you still can't hit. 80. MOVEMENT AT RESTRICTED SPEED Movements made at Restricted Speed must apply the following three requirements as the method of operation: 1. Control the movement to permit stopping within one half the range of vision short of: a. Other trains or railroad equipment occupying or fouling the track, b. Obstructions, c. Switches not properly lined for movement, d. Derails set in the derailing position, e. Any signal requiring a stop, AND 2. Look out for broken rail and misaligned track. AND 3. Do not exceed 20 MPH outside interlocking limits and 15 MPH within interlocking limits. This restriction applies to the entire movement, unless otherwise specified in the rule or instruction that requires Restricted Speed. Thank you for the explanation. Helps to have a good definition of the terms. Still, point 3. above seems to be something that PTC could be used to limit the speed to one of those as a maximum. Something that in the present event was above those values.
zugmann Semper Vaporo Seems to me that any place that is a restricted speed would be the intended place where PTC would be of most value. Problem is that restrcited speed isn't a speed - it's a method of operation. How do you enforce it through PTC? It's the most basic of operations - pretty much "don't hit stuff". A lot of that stuff can be things that aren't connected to the signal system, but you still can't hit. 80. MOVEMENT AT RESTRICTED SPEED Movements made at Restricted Speed must apply the following three requirements as the method of operation: 1. Control the movement to permit stopping within one half the range of vision short of: a. Other trains or railroad equipment occupying or fouling the track, b. Obstructions, c. Switches not properly lined for movement, d. Derails set in the derailing position, e. Any signal requiring a stop, AND 2. Look out for broken rail and misaligned track. AND 3. Do not exceed 20 MPH outside interlocking limits and 15 MPH within interlocking limits. This restriction applies to the entire movement, unless otherwise specified in the rule or instruction that requires Restricted Speed.
Semper Vaporo Seems to me that any place that is a restricted speed would be the intended place where PTC would be of most value.
Problem is that restrcited speed isn't a speed - it's a method of operation. How do you enforce it through PTC? It's the most basic of operations - pretty much "don't hit stuff". A lot of that stuff can be things that aren't connected to the signal system, but you still can't hit.
80. MOVEMENT AT RESTRICTED SPEED Movements made at Restricted Speed must apply the following three requirements as the method of operation: 1. Control the movement to permit stopping within one half the range of vision short of: a. Other trains or railroad equipment occupying or fouling the track, b. Obstructions, c. Switches not properly lined for movement, d. Derails set in the derailing position, e. Any signal requiring a stop, AND 2. Look out for broken rail and misaligned track. AND 3. Do not exceed 20 MPH outside interlocking limits and 15 MPH within interlocking limits. This restriction applies to the entire movement, unless otherwise specified in the rule or instruction that requires Restricted Speed.
Thank you for the explanation. Helps to have a good definition of the terms.
Still, point 3. above seems to be something that PTC could be used to limit the speed to one of those as a maximum. Something that in the present event was above those values.
I believe that PTC will limit trains to 20 mph (or slightly over) when restricted speed is allowed, such as at an intermediate red signal. I'm not sure, maybe even at an absolute. There has to be a way to allow trains to be "flagged" by an absolute. Still, 20 mph is sometimes too fast for conditions. (We don't have the 15 mph for interlocking limits.) A few fatal collisions have happened within the parameters of Restricted Speed. I'm waiting for when one happens after PTC is implemented and the public finds out that it can't prevent everything. (We won't mention the 2012 Niles MI Amtrak derailment where on a PTC equipped line a train went through an open switch. It wasn't a failure of the PTC itself, but a human caused failure in the signal system. Still new PTC systems have to interface and work with existing systems. A failure in one subsystem can mean a failure in the entire system. Something I don't think the public realizes.)
Now, can you go too slow at Restricted Speed?
Jeff
I remember back when the trains at Chicago Union Station used to have to stop 100 feet before the bumping post then proceed closer to it. They don't seem to do that anymore though that I have noticed. Wonder why?
EuclidI agree that PTC could have prevented this crash by simply controlling the speed. That would have nothing to do with what is called Restricted Speed.
Don't even need PTC for that. Could just install a form of pullback protection similar to what remote engines use at some places.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
jeffhergertNow, can you go too slow at Restricted Speed?
Nope.
I've already done 1mph while running restricted. I've heard of tiems wehre the engineer sent the conductor to walk ahead to make sure the route is clear on a particular nasty stretch of railroad when restricted speed was required (severe downhill grade, blind curves, short visibilty for signals, etc).
CMStPnP I remember back when the trains at Chicago Union Station used to have to stop 100 feet before the bumping post then proceed closer to it. They don't seem to do that anymore though that I have noticed. Wonder why?
NJT hasn't installed PTC because they did not apply for a long-term, low-interest loan under the PRIIA. By contrast, in NY, Metro North did.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Buslist Euclid I agree that PTC could have prevented this crash by simply controlling the speed. That would have nothing to do with what is called Restricted Speed. but it does. Read the PTC requirements, they are available on the net. This was a point of contention at the PTC RSAC group.
Euclid I agree that PTC could have prevented this crash by simply controlling the speed. That would have nothing to do with what is called Restricted Speed.
I agree that PTC could have prevented this crash by simply controlling the speed. That would have nothing to do with what is called Restricted Speed.
but it does. Read the PTC requirements, they are available on the net. This was a point of contention at the PTC RSAC group.
Ron, listen to him. You need to know more about the history of the PTC mandate and the industry response to understand what the system does and does not do.
RME Buslist Euclid I agree that PTC could have prevented this crash by simply controlling the speed. That would have nothing to do with what is called Restricted Speed. but it does. Read the PTC requirements, they are available on the net. This was a point of contention at the PTC RSAC group. Ron, listen to him. You need to know more about the history of the PTC mandate and the industry response to understand what the system does and does not do.
This began by a general point earlier that seemed to suggest that PTC would have prevented this crash. Then there seemed to be a counterpoint that PTC could not have prevented the crash because it cannot override mistakes in judgement while running at restricted speed, and restricted speed is the rule that governs the terminal operation where the crash occurred.
My only point was that some type of automatic system could be installed that would override the control of the engineer in case his train was approaching the bumper too fast to stop short of it. Is this possible or not?
EuclidMy only point was that some type of automatic system could be installed that would override the control of the engineer in case his train was approaching the bumper too fast to stop short of it. Is this possible or not?
In a word, yes. And I agree that this ought to be implemented anywhere passenger trains approach terminal bumpers. I don't know if anyone has yet brought up the Chicago Transit horror, where the woman ran the train up the escalator ... that, too, might have been prevented with an automatic system, and in fact I believe there was an automatic system that required slow approach ... to a point halfway down the platform. As with Amtrak 188, quite a bit of mischief can occur in just a few seconds' worth of acceleration at the wrong point.
I tend to agree (in theory) that a transponder-based approach, with proper redundancy in the design, is the 'right' starting point. No matter what the approach, the train is set to 10 to 15mph going into the platform, is held to reasonable restricted-speed (brakes kept set to where a stop in 'half the remaining distance' can be made from the cab when needed), and is brought to a controlled smooth stop at a point clear of the bumper even if there may be slick rail for some reason. It's not a trivial design exercise, but it is certainly neither rocket-science engineering nor a particularly difficult set of conditions to include.
However, one initial concern is that such a system shouldn't be included in a 'global' PTC mandate, any more than PAR should be required for all airports at all times. If it were applied to any "public" system used for the transportation of passengers into passenger facilities, it would make far better sense, but that would literally require a proper 'act of Congress' separate from the 2008 et seq. PTC business.
Nothing and I mean Nothing can be designed 100% failsafe. I just got thru yesterday having to read a report from one of my companies drivers that the system that valve that is supposed to stop the flow of acid when the hydraulic fluid is removed from it will drop closed in an emergency failed. We use a pressure system that you have to pressurize the system to even open a butterfly valve to get the acid to flow. Well yesterday one of our drivers had a pipe failure on the consignee side and needed to stop unloading he went to break the emergency valve release off and the unloading valve stayed wide open. 1500 gallons of acid was spilled into the containment basin. He had the valve replaced and I got the report. Now this is a closed system guess what was the cause in a sealed system a speck of lint had somehow gotten into the hydraulic clyinder and plugged the line. We are retrofitting filters on all our acid tanks as a precaution on our own.
Regardless of how well you engineer something how well the rules are written how well you test sometimes the smallest little item will cause a multi million dollar failure.
Shadow the Cats ownerRegardless of how well you engineer something how well the rules are written how well you test sometimes the smallest little item will cause a multi million dollar failure.
One of my best college friends lost his father due to the failure of a 39-cent light bulb on a military 707. It would have told him (IIRC) the flaps had not locked properly extended on takeoff; he concluded when the aircraft would not rotate properly on takeoff that he needed emergency power, and one of the engine spools disintegrated when he throttled up quickly.
Note that redundant indication, and perhaps even a simple mechanical arming lock on the acid valve, would have precluded the inadvertent release; something as simple as a spring-powered stop valve or linkage (analogous to truck brakes) would have allowed closing it within no more than a few seconds. I am personally of the opinion that any critical hazmat system needs to have some BITE-like functionality so that it continually diagnoses and reports any fault, or at the very least does a self-check and confirmation before going through any operating cycle. But in a world where fixes to inadequate technology involve more layers of themselves-failure-prone deterministic layers, I'm not as sanguine as I probably should pretend to be.
zugmann jeffhergert Now, can you go too slow at Restricted Speed? Nope. I've already done 1mph while running restricted. I've heard of tiems wehre the engineer sent the conductor to walk ahead to make sure the route is clear on a particular nasty stretch of railroad when restricted speed was required (severe downhill grade, blind curves, short visibilty for signals, etc).
jeffhergert Now, can you go too slow at Restricted Speed?
While I agree with you, I've heard of an engineer being disciplined for going too slow at restricted speed. I don't know all the details, but the manager thought the engineer could be going faster for the conditions. It was upheld in arbitration.
One of my co-workers was threatened with "Malicious Rules Compliance" for going slow at Restricted Speed in an area where they like to test. In that area, if I'm at Restricted Speed, 5 mph is about the highest I'll go because of the twists and turns the tracks make through town.
Murphy is a railroader. If it can fail, it will. If it can't fail, it will fail.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
schlimm NJT hasn't installed PTC because they did not apply for a long-term, low-interest loan under the PRIIA. By contrast, in NY, Metro North did.
Seems irrelevent, as it appears PTC will not be in use at the Hoboken Terminal.
http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/blogs/david-schanoes/preventing-not-chasing-the-ambulance.html?channel=63
"Would PTC have prevented this accident? Yes and no. In theory, yes. In reality, no. Why? Because FRA, in its wisdom, allows railroads to apply for a Main Line Track Exclusion Addendum (MTEA). Meaning? Meaning that in its PTC Implementation Plan (PTCIP), a railroad can designate a passenger terminal exception from PTC requirements for trackage used exclusively as yard or terminal tracks by or in support of regularly scheduled intercity or commuter passenger service where the application for the MTEA relief:
• Describes in detail the physical boundaries of the trackage in question, its use and characteristics (including track and signal charts).
• The maximum authorized speed for all train movements is not greater than 20 mph.
• That 20 mph is enforced by PTC equipment active and installed on the trains within the yard or terminal (i.e. the onboard equipment “reads” non-PTC territory as a speed restriction not exceeding 20 mph).
• Interlocking rules are in effect prohibiting reverse movements without signal indication or verbal permission.
• No freight operations are permitted, or if permitted, no passengers will be aboard passenger trains within the defined limits.
NJT received approval for its PTCIP. The PTCIP included the application of the MTEA for Hoboken Terminal."
An "expensive model collector"
n012944 schlimm NJT hasn't installed PTC because they did not apply for a long-term, low-interest loan under the PRIIA. By contrast, in NY, Metro North did. Seems irrelevent, as it appears PTC will not be in use at the Hoboken Terminal. http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/blogs/david-schanoes/preventing-not-chasing-the-ambulance.html?channel=63 "Would PTC have prevented this accident? Yes and no. In theory, yes. In reality, no. Why? Because FRA, in its wisdom, allows railroads to apply for a Main Line Track Exclusion Addendum (MTEA). Meaning? Meaning that in its PTC Implementation Plan (PTCIP), a railroad can designate a passenger terminal exception from PTC requirements for trackage used exclusively as yard or terminal tracks by or in support of regularly scheduled intercity or commuter passenger service where the application for the MTEA relief: • Describes in detail the physical boundaries of the trackage in question, its use and characteristics (including track and signal charts). • The maximum authorized speed for all train movements is not greater than 20 mph. • That 20 mph is enforced by PTC equipment active and installed on the trains within the yard or terminal (i.e. the onboard equipment “reads” non-PTC territory as a speed restriction not exceeding 20 mph). • Interlocking rules are in effect prohibiting reverse movements without signal indication or verbal permission. • No freight operations are permitted, or if permitted, no passengers will be aboard passenger trains within the defined limits. NJT received approval for its PTCIP. The PTCIP included the application of the MTEA for Hoboken Terminal."
This seems to say that you can apply for a PTC exemption in a yard:
That 20 mph is enforced by PTC equipment active and installed on the trains within the yard or terminal (i.e. the onboard equipment “reads” non-PTC territory as a speed restriction not exceeding 20 mph).
I suppose there is more to the story, however, the PTC law can be amended to allow for new circumstances that present themselves.
Until effective PTC is installed, is it possible that the conductor could go forward in the terminal zone, and either join the engineer in a large enough cab, or look out the front door window with access to an emergency brake to stop the train if the engineer is incapacitated? If that is not practical, how about another engineer or supervisor getting on the train at Secaucus to add a second pair of eyes into the terminal? They will need to do something to answer safety demands, and bring back passengers.
MidlandMike n012944 schlimm NJT hasn't installed PTC because they did not apply for a long-term, low-interest loan under the PRIIA. By contrast, in NY, Metro North did. Seems irrelevent, as it appears PTC will not be in use at the Hoboken Terminal. http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/blogs/david-schanoes/preventing-not-chasing-the-ambulance.html?channel=63 "Would PTC have prevented this accident? Yes and no. In theory, yes. In reality, no. Why? Because FRA, in its wisdom, allows railroads to apply for a Main Line Track Exclusion Addendum (MTEA). Meaning? Meaning that in its PTC Implementation Plan (PTCIP), a railroad can designate a passenger terminal exception from PTC requirements for trackage used exclusively as yard or terminal tracks by or in support of regularly scheduled intercity or commuter passenger service where the application for the MTEA relief: • Describes in detail the physical boundaries of the trackage in question, its use and characteristics (including track and signal charts). • The maximum authorized speed for all train movements is not greater than 20 mph. • That 20 mph is enforced by PTC equipment active and installed on the trains within the yard or terminal (i.e. the onboard equipment “reads” non-PTC territory as a speed restriction not exceeding 20 mph). • Interlocking rules are in effect prohibiting reverse movements without signal indication or verbal permission. • No freight operations are permitted, or if permitted, no passengers will be aboard passenger trains within the defined limits. NJT received approval for its PTCIP. The PTCIP included the application of the MTEA for Hoboken Terminal." This seems to say that you can apply for a PTC exemption in a yard: That 20 mph is enforced by PTC equipment active and installed on the trains within the yard or terminal (i.e. the onboard equipment “reads” non-PTC territory as a speed restriction not exceeding 20 mph). I suppose there is more to the story, however, the PTC law can be amended to allow for new circumstances that present themselves.
This is not an adment to the law but an practical rule surrounding it. It was decided by the PTC RSAC ( Rail Safety Advisory Council). To be fair I should state that I was a member of that group.
BuslistThis is not an adment to the law but an practical rule surrounding it. It was decided by the PTC RSAC ( Rail Safety Advisory Council). To be fair I should state that I was a member of that group.
Just for clarification, would/could terminals such as Hoboken and the approach tracks potentially be covered by PTC?
This is not even speculation but if a train is a runaway how can the engineer warn persons on the ground ? Reason asked is that we seem to recall engineer of the PRR Federal runaway was blowing his horn a certain way and a tower operator called and warned the terminal of the runaway ?
I believe a series of short blasts is a danger signal.
Norm
Norm48327 I believe a series of short blasts is a danger signal.
Johnny
GoodtimingI doubt if NJT will lose passengers. This was an accident; a one time thing. When was the last bad one in Hoboken?
TV news reports showed a number of people saying they would not be riding the trains in the foreseeable future.
MidlandMike Goodtiming TV news reports showed a number of people saying they would not be riding the trains in the foreseeable future.
Goodtiming
The future will end Monday when the alternative takes twice as long, gives multiple life threatening thrills each way and if they want to park a vehicle in New York, can the find a Mortgage to finance the parking spot.
I have worked over 35 years in IT, from key-coder to now Project Manager. The rule used to determine risk and mitigation plans is simple, "if an error is possible, someone will find the trigger."
BaltACD MidlandMike TV news reports showed a number of people saying they would not be riding the trains in the foreseeable future. The future will end Monday when the alternative takes twice as long, gives multiple life threatening thrills each way and if they want to park a vehicle in New York, can the find a Mortgage to finance the parking spot.
MidlandMike TV news reports showed a number of people saying they would not be riding the trains in the foreseeable future.
It's been a while since I lived in the NY area, but there are other alternatives such as carpool, rideshare, buses, and shuttle vans. NJT rail would be ill advised to think that people did not have options.
seppburgh2I have worked over 35 years in IT, from key-coder to now Project Manager. The rule used to determine risk and mitigation plans is simple, "if an error is possible, someone will find the trigger."
And it only took 107 years to find it.
Excerpt from Hoboken Terminal's 100th anniversary newsletter, February 2007
http://www.njtransit.com/pdf/nn_EnRouteSpclEdtn.pdf
In a small, corner office above the concourse of Hoboken Terminal, NJ TRANSIT staff works behind the darkened glass to coordinate the movement of customers and trains in and out of Hoboken Terminal.
Overlooking Tracks 1-17, the only hint that they are there comes from the glow of the computer monitors that link them to the core of their mission, which is to make sure our customers move through the terminal safely and on time. Customers exiting a train or pursuing their next destination might glance upward and wonder what actually goes on in the small, bustling workspace affectionately called the “dugout.”
“We closely monitor every train that comes and goes, using the Train Management and Control (TMAC) system,” said Chief Trainmaster, Hoboken Rita Whitley. “We can see the whole railroad just as a train dispatcher does.” NJ TRANSIT uses TMAC to track and control all of the railmovements on its system.
The dugout houses the chief trainmaster, senior trainmaster and others who coordinate all train and crew movements into and out of Hoboken Terminal. The room is open about 20 hours a day, coordinated with the rail schedules of the Hoboken Division. The Hoboken Division includes all trains on the Morris & Essex, Main/Bergen County, Pascack Valley, Montclair-Boonton and Port Jervis lines, and some trains on the North Jersey Coast and Raritan Valley lines.
“We are in charge if there is any kind of problem with the trains, be it mechanical, crew or passenger,” Rita said. “We have to get that train moving and make sure all the customers get on their way.”
The room originally was positioned above the newspaper stand, overlooking the tracks. After the recent renovation of the terminal’s waiting area, the dugout can now be found in the corner of the main building, across from the entrance to NY Waterway...
I've been following this on www.NorthJersey.com and www.NJ.com. The event recorder's been recovered from the locomotive, but not the event recorder from the cab car, it's still too dangerous to go in there.
The engineer's 48 years old. He might have had a health issue but we don't know yet. From the other NJT stories I'm suspecting there may have been a mechanical failure of some kind but that's just speculation on my part.
For a good photo tour and history of the NJT Lackawanna Terminal in Hoboken go to www.subwaynut.com and follow the New Jersey Transit Rail headings. It's pretty interesting.
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