MerrilyWeRollAlong Unfortunately, I think the engineer dozed off somewhere between the last stop at Tarrytown (14 miles north) and about 10 seconds before the train entered the 30mph curve. Well since the line does not have a PTC or ACSES system, this may be the wake up call to have it installed as soon as possible.
Unfortunately, I think the engineer dozed off somewhere between the last stop at Tarrytown (14 miles north) and about 10 seconds before the train entered the 30mph curve. Well since the line does not have a PTC or ACSES system, this may be the wake up call to have it installed as soon as possible.
Possible...but too early to say that for sure. Many other things could have happened singly or in concert or by chance to be the cause or causes....
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The news media has speculated on track condition, push-pull operation, lack of equipment inspection, etc. as causes of this disaster. This is pure bunk resulting from their general ignorance of railroading.
The pertinent facts that have been released so far based on the event recorders are:
Prior to the accident the train had been going 82mph where track speed was 70mph.
6 sec before the derailment brakeline air pressure went to 0 indicating to me an emergency brake application.
5 sec before the derailment the throttle was shut off.
Unless further investigation discloses an equipment failure, I expect the engineer will be found to be at fault for improper operation of the train resulting in this disaster. For his sake I hope it will be found that he was impaired as a result of some medical condition. However I am afraid it is more likely he was distracted because of cell phone usage or texting as was the cause of the accident in the Chatsworth, CA accident a year or so ago. It is time to require in-cab video cameras to prevent engineers from engaging in such activity. I understand in-cab video has been strongly opposed by the railroad labor unions but they must now understand this is the only effective way to prevent such conduct and prove that engineers properly operate their trains.
Mark
I don't think pertinent facts have been presented or released but rather statement which could be understood by the media.. Understood, that is, but not fully comprehended in relation to the whole picture of the event. Catch phrases, exciting images, leading and misleading because the media wants to be able to tell their audience something whether it is true or not, matters or not, or even makes sense or not, but "look at me on TV!" or "read my by line in the paper", "see I'm on the job giving it to you." Of course the editors and publishers know as little as the reporters but have deadlines to meet and bottom lines to inflate.
KCSfan The news media has speculated on track condition, push-pull operation, lack of equipment inspection, etc. as causes of this disaster. This is pure bunk resulting from their general ignorance of railroading. The pertinent facts that have been released so far based on the event recorders are: Prior to the accident the train had been going 82mph where track speed was 70mph. 6 sec before the derailment brakeline air pressure went to 0 indicating to me an emergency brake application. 5 sec before the derailment the throttle was shut off. Unless further investigation discloses an equipment failure, I expect the engineer will be found to be at fault for improper operation of the train resulting in this disaster. For his sake I hope it will be found that he was impaired as a result of some medical condition. However I am afraid it is more likely he was distracted because of cell phone usage or texting as was the cause of the accident in the Chatsworth, CA accident a year or so ago. It is time to require in-cab video cameras to prevent engineers from engaging in such activity. I understand in-cab video has been strongly opposed by the railroad labor unions but they must now understand this is the only effective way to prevent such conduct and prove that engineers properly operate their trains. Mark
PTC and in-cab video will be demanded by the public, justifiably, union objections notwithstanding on the latter and railroad objections notwithstanding on the former.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Sorry, but I just can't see engineer error or distraction as an excuse for PTC, forcing the rails to be the sole form of transportation immune from accidents caused by human mistakes. Deaths on the rails are microscopic compared to those on the highway and in the air, including "general aviation." Why -- besides political hysteria -- should the rails have to be, at prohibitive cost, perfectly safe?
petitnj Just a note to help with definitions. Trainline is an electrical line that connects rail cars and locomotives for control, power and hotel loads. The hose that goes thru the length of the train for brake charging and application is the "brakepipe". Trains Magazine shows "Train Line" for the brake system in its glossary. That definition does not appear in GCOR or USOR.
Just a note to help with definitions. Trainline is an electrical line that connects rail cars and locomotives for control, power and hotel loads. The hose that goes thru the length of the train for brake charging and application is the "brakepipe". Trains Magazine shows "Train Line" for the brake system in its glossary. That definition does not appear in GCOR or USOR.
It does, however, appear in 49 CFR 232.211 - Class III brake tests-trainline continuity inspection.
Neither Conrail EC-99 nor GVT brake rules mention the trainline, either. Sometimes one just uses the first term that comes to mind...
Back to your normal programming.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
When someone says "train line," the first thing I think of is the brake pipe. Train line is used more often in that respect, even if not technically accurate, by most railroaders I know. Kind of like "triple valve" for control valve.
It is true, that when a trailing locomotive trips an alarm, the computer screen says, "train line alarm" (or sometimes "MU alarm") to indicate the problem is on a trailing unit and not the leader. Still, when someone says they are having a problem with their train line, it's usually a brake pipe issue they are talking about.
Jeff
jeffhergert petitnj Just a note to help with definitions. Trainline is an electrical line that connects rail cars and locomotives for control, power and hotel loads. The hose that goes thru the length of the train for brake charging and application is the "brakepipe". Trains Magazine shows "Train Line" for the brake system in its glossary. That definition does not appear in GCOR or USOR. When someone says "train line," the first thing I think of is the brake pipe. Train line is used more often in that respect, even if not technically accurate, by most railroaders I know. Kind of like "triple valve" for control valve. It is true, that when a trailing locomotive trips an alarm, the computer screen says, "train line alarm" (or sometimes "MU alarm") to indicate the problem is on a trailing unit and not the leader. Still, when someone says they are having a problem with their train line, it's usually a brake pipe issue they are talking about. Jeff
Exactly
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narig01Another comment. As much as I hate to say it. Morning right at sunrise(7AM). Cold cold day(+33f @ 5am). I would think the cab heat was probably turned up full blast. Then many minutes of boredom with no stops. My thoughts. Rgds IGN
As Jeff Hergert noted here a few years back: "Firings usually happen in pairs".
From a story in Trains by Jim Warsher back in the 1980's, from during the early days of Amtrak - an L&N conductor speaking to his engineer up in the cab about a similar situation:
"Homer, if we go inna the dee-itch, ah'm a-gonna have to tell the trewth." (sic)
- Paul North.
Stories of conductors or trainmen "pulling the air" in similar circumstances are legendary in railroad history. Probably a lost art now.
KCSfanI understand in-cab video has been strongly opposed by the railroad labor unions but they must now understand this is the only effective way to prevent such conduct and prove that engineers properly operate their trains.
How does watching or recording video of someone messing up prevent anything? Lets just do PTC with civil speed enforcement and be done with this stuff.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
In the US we must either blame or prove instead of avoiding. In European and other countries when it comes to railroad safety they work to avoid. So, PTC, etc., are all part of their railroad culture and operations. Here it is cheaper not to do anything constructive but continue the blame and prove process. Finger pointing is cheaper that PTC, and the lawyers make fortunes proving and disproving. The American way.
oltmannd KCSfanI understand in-cab video has been strongly opposed by the railroad labor unions but they must now understand this is the only effective way to prevent such conduct and prove that engineers properly operate their trains. How does watching or recording video of someone messing up prevent anything? Lets just do PTC with civil speed enforcement and be done with this stuff.
Very simply. Management regularly reviews video and if engineer is observed engaging in any prohibited activity or operating train improperly he/she will receive disciplinary action up to and including termination depending on the severity of the infraction. The likelihood of being observed (i.e. caught on tape) and foreknowledge of penalties will prevent 99.9% of offenses.
KCSfan Very simply. Management regularly reviews video and if engineer is observed engaging in any prohibited activity or operating train improperly he/she will receive disciplinary action up to and including termination depending on the severity of the infraction. Foreknowledge of penalties will prevent 99.9% of offenses. Mark
Very simply. Management regularly reviews video and if engineer is observed engaging in any prohibited activity or operating train improperly he/she will receive disciplinary action up to and including termination depending on the severity of the infraction. Foreknowledge of penalties will prevent 99.9% of offenses.
Management already reviews many items (through the wonders of wireless/satellites, pullling tapes, and good ol' fashioned weed weaseling). Discipline is handed out already - yet infractions still occur. I think it is foolish to think videoing everything will prevent "99.9%" of anything.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
henry6 In the US we must either blame or prove instead of avoiding. In European and other countries when it comes to railroad safety they work to avoid. So, PTC, etc., are all part of their railroad culture and operations. Here it is cheaper not to do anything constructive but continue the blame and prove process. Finger pointing is cheaper that PTC, and the lawyers make fortunes proving and disproving. The American way.
Europe(or rather, some countries in Europe) have had some severe passenger train accidents in the last couple of decades, the most recent one being the horrible derailment in Spain (which involved an engineer taking a curve at much too high aspeed) earlier this year. Granted that was on a section of line without ATS/PTC ect...
I would be curious as to what there average passenger injury/fatality-per-mile is as well as what that figure is in the U.S.
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MerrilyWeRollAlong Looks like he was speeding even through the 70mph stretch just before the curve. No brake application until 5 seconds before is bad for the engineer's side of the story. NEW YORK (CBSNewYork/AP) – The Metro-North Railroad train that derailed while rounding a riverside curve in the Bronx was traveling at 82 mph at the time, a National Transportation Safety Board official said Monday. Two event recorders from the train have been examined, and preliminary information indicates that the train went through the Spuyten Duyvil curve at 82 mph, in a zone where the speed limit drops from 70 mph to 30 mph, according to NTSB board member Earl Weener. The NTSB also found that about 5 seconds before the engine ground to a halt, brake pressure dropped from 120 psi to 0, Weener said. Investigators still must determine the functioning of the brakes and why the throttle went to 0, he said.
Looks like he was speeding even through the 70mph stretch just before the curve. No brake application until 5 seconds before is bad for the engineer's side of the story.
NEW YORK (CBSNewYork/AP) – The Metro-North Railroad train that derailed while rounding a riverside curve in the Bronx was traveling at 82 mph at the time, a National Transportation Safety Board official said Monday.
Two event recorders from the train have been examined, and preliminary information indicates that the train went through the Spuyten Duyvil curve at 82 mph, in a zone where the speed limit drops from 70 mph to 30 mph, according to NTSB board member Earl Weener.
The NTSB also found that about 5 seconds before the engine ground to a halt, brake pressure dropped from 120 psi to 0, Weener said. Investigators still must determine the functioning of the brakes and why the throttle went to 0, he said.
Brake Pressure question: Did that last 5 seconds occur as the rest of the train had already started to derail? I.e the air was lost as the rigging tore apart...
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-rt-us-usa-derailment-newyork-20131201,0,5916750.story
That really inspires confidence.
schlimmThat really inspires confidence.
This report has a lot to be commented on .First, the report itself does not identify sources so becomes a trial with judgment by press rather than law. It may be true, but definitely sensationalism on the part of the journalists, Reuters, and, in this case, the Chicago Tribune. Second, it brings up work studies of monotony and boredom...the "highway hypnosis" as identified in the article. What can prevent it? Company in the cab...not via cellphone, but via fireman or trainman, perhaps music as sentry and time and motion studies have found. I don't like the journalism but I do like what it brings up.
When the engineer dumps the air, the PCS makes the throttle go to idle. So that is why the tapes show the air going to zero, then a second later the throttle goes to zero.
Unfortunately, he pulled the air late.
I don't know what time he was on duty, but right around sunrise is one of the hardest times to stay awake if one has been on duty since 0100 or so. It is not a natural time to be awake.
Mike WSOR engineer | HO scale since 1988 | Visit our club www.WCGandyDancers.com
It's the old "If it bleeds it leads" philosophy. Anything to increase ratings or sell papers..
Norm
CNN was reporting something potentially interesting this morning -- that the event recorder indicated a rapid increase in train speed (from circa 70 to the reported 82) in no more than 1-2 miles, sometime very close to when the air was applied.
Can anyone corroborate this with more exact data, and perhaps a cross-reference of speed with MP number or GPS location?
WSOR 3801 .....but right around sunrise is one of the hardest times to stay awake if one has been on duty since 0100 or so.
.....but right around sunrise is one of the hardest times to stay awake if one has been on duty since 0100 or so.
narig01One other comment. Could the emergency brake application been an ATC function? IE the system detected an overspeed situation and dumped the air.
In my experience, overspeed will prompt a penalty application - a more gradual dump than emergency, which will take the brake pipe to zero almost instantaneously. Everything I've seen so far suggests an emergency application.
That said, and dependent on the profile, it would lend credence to the engineer's reported claim that he "zoned out." If that's a downgrade coming into that curve, his inattention may have allowed the train to accelerate as reported. Something may have caused him to "snap out of it" at which point he dumped the air.
tree68In my experience, overspeed will prompt a penalty application - a more gradual dump than emergency, which will take the brake pipe to zero almost instantaneously. Everything I've seen so far suggests an emergency application.
My information from an MNCR engineer is that the cab signal displays "MAS" and it is up to the engineer to know what MAS is for this piece of track. As far as the signal system is concerned, he was riding on a clear track at MAS.
Now then, on the Route of the Broadway LION, train speed *IS* controlled by the tracks:
The Route of the Broadway Lion The Largest Subway Layout in North Dakota.
Here there be cats. LIONS with CAMERAS
narig01Something I do not understand is Automatic Train Control. I had thought Metro-North ATC was primarily a signal system that allowed operation above 79mph. Like ATS(Automatic Train Stop). The Automatic in this operation being the ability to detect and enforce block occupancy. And that additionally this ATC had speed enforcement to apply brakes when speed exceeded the allowed speed. The Control being the ability to do speed enforcement. This is what is on Wikipedia 's Metro-North article.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metro-north#Signaling_and_Safety_AppliancesCould someone explain this?Thx IGN
The only speed function in present day ATC is when as signal displays LESS than a Clear indication. As long as a train is operating under a Clear signal indication ATC has NO KNOWLEDGE of track speed restrictions.
Reportedly, PTC when it is perfected and implmented will interact with carrier data bases and enforce track speed limits, both permanent and temporary. PTC, as of yet, is neither perfected or implemented.
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