I'm locking this thread so that we can go on about new topics...the report will be out and we will have plenty to mull over then ....
Any argument carried far enough will end up in Semantics--Hartz's law of rhetoric Emerald. Leemer and Southern The route of the Sceptre Express Barry
I just started my blog site...more stuff to come...
http://modeltrainswithmusic.blogspot.ca/
This latest development addresses several questions raised in this thread. It has been discovered that the one running locomotive that was discharging smoke and flames was suffering from a broken piston. Apparently, that cylinder was not firing, and so it was torching and discharging unburned fuel out the exhast stack. The condition developed before the train arrived at Nantes.
Upon arrival, engineer Tom Harding reported the problem to the MM&A dispatcher. Mr. Burkhardt says that this locomotive should not have been left running in this condition.
The TSB has provided a lot of insight into their thinking about train securement and the variable effectiveness of handbrakes in their report on the QNS&L ore train runaway at Doree, Quebec on 12/11/11. It discusses handbrake torque, variation in force applied, lubrication, lever adjustment—all of which can cause variation in handbrake effectiveness. This analysis seems to be the heart of the concern that the TSB has regarding train securement:
http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2011/r11q0056/r11q0056.pdf
All of the following from the report:
Hand Brakes
The hand brake is a mechanical device allowing the brake shoes to be applied against the wheel treads to prevent the wheels from moving or to retard their motion. The force on the wheels is proportionate to the force exerted by the person applying the hand brake; however, other factors have to be taken into account such as hand-brake-gearing-system lubrication and lever adjustment. According to the Association of American Railroads (AAR) Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices Section S401 rules, to obtain an adequate braking force, the force applied to the wheels of a car by the brake shoes must be equal to about 10% of the car’s gross load (28 000 pounds for LIM cars) when a torque of 125 foot-pounds is applied on the hand brake wheel.
Rule 13 of the Field Manual of the AAR Interchange Rules states that the hand-brake mechanisms and fittings must be inspected, tested and lubricated when a car is on a repair track or in a shop.
The locomotive engineer applied 35 hand brakes and a sample of 15 cars was selected to measure the braking efficiency using a torque wrench. The average torque was approximately 80 foot-pounds, while 2 of the 15 sampled hand brakes had a torque higher than 115 foot-pounds, the lowest value being 45 foot-pounds.
Similar tests conducted as part of the accident that occurred in Edson in 1996 also determined that the torque applied to the hand brakes by an average railway employee could vary between 40 and 120 foot-pounds, with an average of 80 foot-pounds. These tests also revealed that, for a constant torque, for instance 80 foot-pounds, the applied force on the wheels varied between 12 000 pounds and 21 000 pounds.
Concurrent with the tests conducted by the TSB at Sept-Îles, on 31 January 2012, Wabtec Corporation tested the force applied by the brake shoes on a sample of cars. These tests, which use brake shoes with strain gauges, were performed on 3 of the cars on LIM-55 and on another car not involved in the incident. They were conducted at room temperature, in a QNS&L shop and a LIM shop in Sept-Îles. The 4 cars failed the hand-brake tests, measuring just below the minimum 10% force required by the AAR. During these tests, it was noted that excessive force had to be exerted to apply the necessary tension on the hand brake chains of these 4 cars because the hand brake mechanisms lacked lubrication and the lever was out of adjustment.
Wabtec Corporation performed single-car tests on the same sample of 4 cars. Two of these 4 cars passed the test in the empty mode and 3 of the 4 cars passed the test in the loaded mode, but just above the minimum threshold.
Hand-brake Condition
The runaway train travelled almost 15 miles and reached a speed of 63 mph. In such a case, with the brakes applied, it would be expected that the wheels would have overheated and been damaged on the grade. However, examination of the 35 first cars on LIM-55 revealed no abnormal wear on the wheels and brake shoes even though the locomotive engineer indicated that he applied the hand brakes on them before the train ran away.
The force on the wheels is proportional to the force exerted by the person applying the hand brake, but other factors also come into play, such as the lack of lubrication on the hand-brake mechanism and improper adjustment of its components. Each of these conditions, or a combination of these, could have given the operator the false impression that the brakes were sufficiently applied. The torque applied by the locomotive engineer was insufficient to effectively apply the brake shoes against the wheels and prevent their rotation.
Wabtec Corporation had noted that excessive force was needed to apply the necessary tension to the hand-brake chain of the 4 cars tested in Sept-Îles because the hand-brake mechanisms lacked lubrication and the lever was improperly adjusted. Furthermore, when the LIM cars were single-car tested following the incident, the hand-brake mechanisms had to be lubricated and adjusted on all the cars.
Hand-brake inspections required in accordance with Rule 13 of the Field Manual of the AAR Interchange Rules apply only when a car is on a repair track or in a shop. Therefore, these inspections would normally be performed at the same time as a single-car test. However, because single-car tests were not conducted on the vast majority of cars before they were put in service, the hand-brake defects were not identified.
Train Securement between Bybee and Tika
When a train stops in the slope between Bybee and Tika following emergency braking, it must be secured in accordance with CROR Rule 112 and related special instructions. Rule 112 special instructions specify the minimum number of hand brakes needed in general operating conditions, but do not give the number when specific conditions apply. It is up to the locomotive engineer to determine the number of hand brakes required. In this incident, for LIM-55, the locomotive engineer, taking into consideration conditions such as track grade and train specifications, determined that 35 hand brakes were sufficient. However, given the torque applied and the condition of the brakes, that number proved insufficient to prevent the train from running away.
Employees rely on their personal experience gained in situations where cars have either not moved or ran away to determine the sufficient number of hand brakes to be applied. Standard operating practices do not take into account that hand brakes can be applied in varying degrees, depending on the wheel torque. Yet, the amount of torque that employees can physically apply to the wheel varies from one to the other. Torque variability is affected by the design, condition and maintenance of hand brakes as well as differences in physical capabilities among locomotive engineers.
The car weight and type, track gradient where the cars are left and actual and possible wind speed and direction must also be considered when deciding the sufficient number of hand brakes needed to secure a train. Determining what constitutes a sufficient number of hand brakes requires more information than locomotive engineers may have available to them and a better comprehension of the relevant variables and their relationship. This means that each locomotive engineer is left with the decision to determine how many brakes should be applied and to what degree.
Locomotive engineers who apply hand brakes do not receive any definitive feedback to confirm that sufficient brake shoe force was attained. Furthermore, because it is impossible to verify hand-brake effectiveness by pulling or pushing cars on high grades, locomotive engineers cannot accurately know that management’s expectations have been met every time cars are secured in accordance with CROR Rule 112. Other railway companies in Canada have enhanced CROR Rule 112, on high-grade sections of track, by putting into place procedures detailing the application and the number of hand brakes required. Without specific instructions that take into consideration local conditions, there is a risk of underestimating the number of hand brakes required to secure a train on a steep grade such as between Bybee and Tika and consequently other trains could run away.
I agree that some of the micro-management is silly, but that can come from railroad management as well (i.e., CP and others not allowing trainmen enter/exit moving equipment because of the fear of lawsuits). But some form of regulation (which means confirmation) is necessary to keep railroad management from going too far in the other direction, cutting costs to the bone and "hoping for the best," which is fairly clearly the case in the MM&A accident. BTW, MM&A is trying to return to two-person minimum crews in the US but needs extra cash to so so. Their former one-person per 70 petro car train setup is a clear case of a company enjoying the benefits of a risky move while not paying most of the costs. Canada, through the TSB regulators, has wisely disallowed it, something the railroad did not do on its own until the damage was done.
jeffhergert I must say I'm beginning to hold the Canadian TSB in the same regards as our NTSB. Not very highly. I think they do a good job in finding out what went wrong, but their recommendations are sometimes (IMO) suspect. I feel that often their recommendations are for absolute risk free, perfect world outcomes that often aren't practical for real world situations. (It started years ago after a train/school bus accident where they were critical of objects on the train that made the impact worse on the bus and would like to see them removed. Things like the coupler.) The FRA's EO order now requires on key trains that the lead engine have the cab doors locked, or it that's not possible, to have the reverser removed when left unattended outside of terminals. Nothing wrong with that, but what about the trailing engine(s)? All right to leave them unlocked and accessible to anyone. Any one else see a problem there?
I must say I'm beginning to hold the Canadian TSB in the same regards as our NTSB. Not very highly. I think they do a good job in finding out what went wrong, but their recommendations are sometimes (IMO) suspect. I feel that often their recommendations are for absolute risk free, perfect world outcomes that often aren't practical for real world situations. (It started years ago after a train/school bus accident where they were critical of objects on the train that made the impact worse on the bus and would like to see them removed. Things like the coupler.) The FRA's EO order now requires on key trains that the lead engine have the cab doors locked, or it that's not possible, to have the reverser removed when left unattended outside of terminals. Nothing wrong with that, but what about the trailing engine(s)? All right to leave them unlocked and accessible to anyone. Any one else see a problem there?
Jeff,
Very insightful point you've made.
There is a difference in skill sets, knowledge and mindset needed to determine the root cause of an accident as opposed to the skill sets knowledge and mind sets needed create the policies necessary to prevent future accidents, especially when there are several contributing factors to the accident. Being government agencies, they are at best less sensitive to the economic fallout of implementing the suggested changes (e.g. PTC) - this is important as implementing a policy with a high cost per life saved will divert resources from implementing policies that save more lives for a given cost.
- Erik
It is easy to dismiss a government regulatory as not knowledgeable because it is composed of uniformed bureaucrats. However, it is also easy to check and see the the Canadian TSB has and seeks professionals from air, water and rail backgrounds for its investigative staff:
(from the TSB website): "Our investigators include people with backgrounds in the transportation industry and regulatory sectors as well as the military. If you are, just to name a few, an air traffic controller, aircraft pilot, helicopter pilot, aircraft maintenance engineer, master mariner, naval architect, marine chief engineer, locomotive engineer, rail equipment and infrastructure specialist or have engineering certification in pipeline, you may be interested in a change of career that allows you to channel your experience into a rewarding career as a TSB investigator.
Employees who work as investigators usually belong to these occupational groups:"
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Thanks for your comments. I am not sure what you are referring to regarding a means to get a handbrake really tight. I know of one, but it is dangerous and prohibited. I agree that the TSB’s reasoning about setting a prescribed number of handbrakes without a test is unreliable. But it sounds as though they think they can get around that problem by requiring a number of handbrakes that is far in excess of what would be actually necessary. So, while the securement would still be unreliable, they could reduce the probability of it failing to near zero.
It raises the question of how the TSB will find how many handbrakes are actually necessary. They could make calculations based on pure physics. Or they could conduct their own practical tests at each location with a variety of cars and tonnage.
But they have not actually announced their ideas, so we are left with only many fragments of their reasoning to anticipate where they are headed. In one article, it was presented as though crews would be given the option of either applying the high number of handbrakes required for a fixed number securement rule; or doing a push-pull test and using the number of handbrakes that the test determined. If that is what they intend, it seems really bizarre. It seems like a version of having your cake and eating it too—at the expense of not solving the problem.
I think I'd call that 4 Tequila thinking myself.
I do think the idea of hiring folk who know something of what they speak is a good idea...if the management of TSB are really connected to real world thinking.. but...we all know how that goes Will they get heard is something else...
jeffhergert I must say I'm beginning to hold the Canadian TSB in the same regards as our NTSB. Not very highly. I think they do a good job in finding out what went wrong, but their recommendations are sometimes (IMO) suspect. I feel that often their recommendations are for absolute risk free, perfect world outcomes that often aren't practical for real world situations. (It started years ago after a train/school bus accident where they were critical of objects on the train that made the impact worse on the bus and would like to see them removed. Things like the coupler.) The FRA's EO order now requires on key trains that the lead engine have the cab doors locked, or it that's not possible, to have the reverser removed when left unattended outside of terminals. Nothing wrong with that, but what about the trailing engine(s)? All right to leave them unlocked and accessible to anyone. Any one else see a problem there? Jeff
Jeff
Lock the lead unit and leave the rest of them unsecured? What kind of three-martini-lunch type of thinking is that? Sheesh!
Jeff, you raised a lot of very good points to ponder as well as providing a great deal of valuable information. To an outsider, it looks like the FRA EO order is an incomplete attempt at a solution that leaves you wondering, "what am I supposed to do about that?"
Bucyrus Norm48327 BucyrusBut the flaw in the prescription of a specific number of handbrakes is that there is no way to control how tightly somebody sets them, or how effective each handbrake will be according to its mechanical condition. I've never set a handbrake, but I would think an average person could tighten one securely enough to hold a car. I don't see any 800lb gorillas working on the railroad. Norm, When you set a handbrake, it amounts to turning a very “low gear” winch that gradually pulls the mechanical rigging that forces the brake shoes against the wheels. All of the rigging yields collectively like a spring under the pull of the brake wheel winch. It is not hard to set a handbrake tight enough to do the job. The issue is that there is no indication that tells the trainman when the handbrake is set to its maximum. When the company tells you to set a handbrake, they do not tell you how tight to set it. So when a person sets a handbrake, it may not be set as much as it could be to be fully effective. Or it is possible that the body builders could set a handbrake so tightly that the chain breaks. The issue of setting handbrakes for train securement is that it requires setting many of them. Their effect is cumulative. So if a person setting the handbrakes is inclined to set them in a childlike manner, thirty of them might be entirely insufficient to secure the train. If a person sets them robustly, ten of them might be sufficient. That is just the issue of how strongly the setter sets them. The other half of the equation is that handbrake mechanisms get differing amounts of cleaning and lubrication. So winding the wheel to a certain torque is only half the story. Two brakes wound to the same torque could yield vastly different amounts of braking due to the difference in maintenance, cleaning, and lubrication.
Norm48327 BucyrusBut the flaw in the prescription of a specific number of handbrakes is that there is no way to control how tightly somebody sets them, or how effective each handbrake will be according to its mechanical condition. I've never set a handbrake, but I would think an average person could tighten one securely enough to hold a car. I don't see any 800lb gorillas working on the railroad.
BucyrusBut the flaw in the prescription of a specific number of handbrakes is that there is no way to control how tightly somebody sets them, or how effective each handbrake will be according to its mechanical condition.
I've never set a handbrake, but I would think an average person could tighten one securely enough to hold a car. I don't see any 800lb gorillas working on the railroad.
Norm,
When you set a handbrake, it amounts to turning a very “low gear” winch that gradually pulls the mechanical rigging that forces the brake shoes against the wheels. All of the rigging yields collectively like a spring under the pull of the brake wheel winch.
It is not hard to set a handbrake tight enough to do the job. The issue is that there is no indication that tells the trainman when the handbrake is set to its maximum. When the company tells you to set a handbrake, they do not tell you how tight to set it. So when a person sets a handbrake, it may not be set as much as it could be to be fully effective. Or it is possible that the body builders could set a handbrake so tightly that the chain breaks.
The issue of setting handbrakes for train securement is that it requires setting many of them. Their effect is cumulative. So if a person setting the handbrakes is inclined to set them in a childlike manner, thirty of them might be entirely insufficient to secure the train. If a person sets them robustly, ten of them might be sufficient.
That is just the issue of how strongly the setter sets them. The other half of the equation is that handbrake mechanisms get differing amounts of cleaning and lubrication. So winding the wheel to a certain torque is only half the story. Two brakes wound to the same torque could yield vastly different amounts of braking due to the difference in maintenance, cleaning, and lubrication.
Most tighten the wheel until they can't turn it any more. Some may be able to get an extra "click" or two on the wheel over others. That cleaning and lubrication part to me seems a bit out there. Unless there's a mechanical problem, such as binding in the chain or rigging, the brake will be tight. If you really want to put a hand brake on really tight, there's a trick to do that if the car has air on it. I'll assume you know it, so I won't elaborate. (If anyone who doesn't know asks, I'll let you answer it too.)
Using the Canadian TSB's reasoning that the verification test is unreliable, you can't set out or leave unattended equipment any where at any time. Even if you applied the hand brake on every car on a blind siding, whether it be one or one hundred, since the verification test is unreliable you can't say you have applied a sufficient number of hand brakes.
Yes, I'm aware and have mentioned there is a chart for times when it is impractical to release the air. It's more for times when you are leaving a small number of cars on the end of a large cut. Such as leaving 6 or 7 empties off of a 100 car cut of loads. You could apply all the hand brakes on the cars which might be overkill for the 6 or 7 you're leaving, release the air and still have the rest of the cut move. It's not for times when you are leaving an entire train and engine. In that case they want to see the verification of the air brakes being released. I have seen some changes my company has recently made after the FRA's EO came out that suggest to me that eventually the chart may become the new minimum number, but still require a verification test in most cases.
Bucyrus But the flaw in the prescription of a specific number of handbrakes is that there is no way to control how tightly somebody sets them, or how effective each handbrake will be according to its mechanical condition.
But the flaw in the prescription of a specific number of handbrakes is that there is no way to control how tightly somebody sets them, or how effective each handbrake will be according to its mechanical condition.
Norm
tree68 BucyrusHowever, if the rule called for a specific number, there would be solid evidence of the rule compliance if cars ran away after securement. So what happens if the proper number of brakes are set, according to the rule, and the train runs away?
BucyrusHowever, if the rule called for a specific number, there would be solid evidence of the rule compliance if cars ran away after securement.
So what happens if the proper number of brakes are set, according to the rule, and the train runs away?
I don’t know the answer to that. The presumption is that the number of handbrakes specified in the rule will do the job. If it does not, I don’t see how the crew can be blamed if they set the number called for in the rule. But the flaw in the prescription of a specific number of handbrakes is that there is no way to control how tightly somebody sets them, or how effective each handbrake will be according to its mechanical condition.
I don’t see a practical way to get around that flaw. Apparently the only way the TSB sees to get around the flaw is to call for a number of handbrakes that greatly exceeds what is necessary. But then that adds excess cost to the business.
And it is still no guarantee of securement even though there is the assumption of a huge safety factor. I would say that this is what happens when bureaucracies roll their sleeves up and go to work on a problem.
tree68So what happens if the proper number of brakes are set, according to the rule, and the train runs away?
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Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
It is a bit strange, although understandable, that the TSB sees the lack of an absolute number of handbrakes to apply as a defect. It seems that they want to give orders to employees that are absolutely specific, and the only way to accomplish that is with a specific number.
The push-pull test does yield an absolute number, and it is a number proven to work by the very test that provides it. Yet the TSB seems not to trust that approach of letting the employees find the number. They seem to feel the testing method is a little too organic. In a way, it empowers the employees to make their own rule by performing a practical experiment.
The number dictated by the test is also a number that nobody can dispute after the fact. If the train runs a way, obviously the number was too low. Yet, if the employee says the push-pull test showed the number to be sufficient, it is their word against the company’s word.
However, if the rule called for a specific number, there would be solid evidence of the rule compliance if cars ran away after securement. The evidence would simply be finding and counting handbrakes set on the runaway cars. If the cars happen to derail, some of the evidence might be obliterated, but still, there is a fair chance of evidence.
Another point to consider is that rule compliance testing in the field could check handbrake securement after it had been completed by simply counting the number of set handbrakes. This compliance testing would not be possible if the number of handbrakes had been determined by a push-pull test. Therefore if the rule called for a specific number of handbrakes, thus making compliance testing possible; the threat of discipline would encourage more compliance.
BucyrusBut there is a problem with relying only on a requirement for setting a specific number of handbrakes. It is a two-part problem. One part is that the condition of handbrakes varies, so two brakes applied to the same tightness might not provide the same holding power. The second part of the problem is that there is no way to control how tightly a person applies the handbrakes.
I don't always agree with Bucyrus, but I will give credit where it is due, and he hit the nail on the head here.
It seems TSB (or whomever) is trying to find an absolute number. when it is possible that such a thing does not exist. I am lucky(?) enough to work in a yard that sits on a pretty good grade. And we switch cars without air most of the time. So, yeah. I deal with a lot of handbrakes. We have minimums for tracks, but also a requirement to test the handbrakes before cutting away. Almost like the push-pull test, but it more concerned with slack. There's times where the minimum is NOT enough to hold the cut of cars (maybe due to brake conditions, or the cars having truck-mounted brakes) and there's other times it is simply overkill.
You may need x number of brakes, but you're only putting x+1 cars on the track. Yet, you still put on x brakes, as that is the rule, and following the rules is part of the job. I know lawmakers and lawyers don't like answers that sound like "it depends", but hey, it is what it is.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
narig01More news. Possibility of arrests. http://trn.trains.com/Railroad%2520News/News%2520Wire/2013/09/Arrests%2520expected%2520in%2520Lac%2520M%25C3%25A9gantic%2520derailment.aspx And from the Toronto Globe & Mail https://www.google.com/url?q=http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/arrests-in-connection-to-lac-megantic-rail-disaster-looming/article14272125/&sa=U&ei=2D4yUu2SD4rV2QXI0oDYAg&ved=0CCQQqQIwAA&sig2=nyHFM9MmzIa2FvA7juyvmw&usg=AFQjCNGPgg3AwekyPha2d5qYkHo881viWg Also if my links don't post could someone fix. Thx It will be interesting to see who would be charged Rgds IGN
Thx for posting!!
OK guys, today alone I removed ten off topic posts from this thread and despite having been advised several times to keep the thread on topic. It's the same people every time (you know who you are) that are making the off topic postings. Now I'm telling you again, keep the thread on topic as per the subject title.
All through the media discussion of the rules, it is indicated that the authorities rely on the push-pull test as the ultimate indicator of proper securement, but at the same time, the authorities lament that a specific number of handbrakes is not stated in rules. They say this leaves trainmen guessing. Even though the push-pull test is supposed to eliminate the guesswork, its result can vary according the amount of force applied. There might be a tendency to use too little force because too much force will break a knuckle or jackknife the train. Using too little force might leave the test passing with too little safety margin.
The TSB has come right out and said that it is impossible to confirm the securement with the push-pull test. So they don’t like relying on the test. Instead they want to specify a specific number of handbrakes to apply. They say that takes the guesswork out of the operation. They have complained that CROR Rule 112 does not require a specific number of handbrakes.
But there is a problem with relying only on a requirement for setting a specific number of handbrakes. It is a two-part problem. One part is that the condition of handbrakes varies, so two brakes applied to the same tightness might not provide the same holding power. The second part of the problem is that there is no way to control how tightly a person applies the handbrakes.
Because of these variables in handbrake performance and operation, the actual effect of a given number of handbrakes cannot be determined. The only way to overcome this problem with calling for a specific number of handbrakes is to set that number much higher than it needs to be to actually do the job. The high number will provide a massive safety factor that is likely to overcome the performance variables. But the problem with that is that the massive safety factor requires a lot of extra time and money for the labor to set the excess brakes.
So, according to this latest information, the remedy to the excess labor is to allow an alternative to it. The alternative is that a person can disregard the high number specified in the rules if he does a push-pull test that indicates a lower number will get the job done. But isn’t this right back to where we started? Who is going to set an excess of handbrakes if they don’t have to? If you don’t have to set the high number specified in the rule, why specify it?
Here you go IGN:
http://trn.trains.com/en/Railroad%20News/News%20Wire/2013/09/Crude%20oil%20mislabeled%20in%20Lac%20M%C3%A9gantic%20incident.aspx
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/crude-that-exploded-in-lac-megantic-was-mislabelled-regulator-says/article14239877/
Eric, are you referring to the amount of heat available in each molecule? The more volatile liquids have less heat available per molecule because they have fewer carbon and hydrogen atoms per molecule. The higher hydrocarbons, which have more heat content, are less volatile. The more volatile liquids provide more vapor for ignition quickly; remember that it is not the liquid that burns, but the vapor that burns.
Johnny
The MM&A uses the special instructions for handbrakes that are used by Canadian Pacific Ry. Since the runaway, CP has made some two-dozen changes to the handbrake section of the General Operating Instructions. The company removed a chart that gave minimum hand brake requirements for trains based on the number of cars. That chart had said a minimum of nine hand brakes were needed on a train with 72 cars.
According to the article linked below, the CP has replaced the chart with new rules that say hand brakes must now be applied on at least 25 percent of the cars for trains parked on a slope of 1.2 percent (which is the grade of the tracks outside of Lac-Megantic); unless the brakes have been properly tested.
I don’t understand what they mean by saying “unless the brakes have been properly tested.” I assume that “tested” refers to the push-pull test required by CROR Rule 112. Why would the brakes not have been properly tested?
So, does that mean Rule 112 is now only an option, and if you choose to exercise it; and if it's push-pull test shows that less than 25% is satisfactory; then you are free to ignore the requirement of setting 25% and are permitted to set only the number of handbrakes required by the push-pull test?
And by the same token, are you free to not to exercise Rule 112 with its push-pull test if you set 25% of the handbrakes?
If that is the proper interpretation of what they have changed, it seems like a big change in the rule logic. It would amount to an option of using either of two different methods, and the two methods will not necessarily yield the same result.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/19/us-train-probe-idUSBRE96I0OO20130719
edblysardWrong…
Ed,
I understand what you are saying about companies being prohibited from making their own rules less restrictive than the federal rules. Nothing has been said to the contrary, so I don’t understand why you began your reply with “wrong.”
jeffhergert Bucyrus Any time a minimum is specified, it comes with the natural implication that the minimum is sufficient. Therefore, without the special instructions calling for the full requirements of Rule 112, it might be interpreted to mean that the special instructions are an alternative to Rule 112, or take precedence over the rule. And if that were the case, the minimum number of handbrakes required by the special instructions might be deemed adequate without a push-pull test which is a requirement of Rule 112. One might ask why a crew would go to the trouble of applying the minimum number of handbrakes and then not bother to do a push-pull test. The answer is that the test might indicate that more brakes need to be applied, and then tested a second time. This is more work, and if the crew believes that the minimum number of handbrakes is the full requirement, they might just leave it at that. In the real world, minimum means just that. What the powers that be have decreed must be applied. For some trains/cuts of cars it might be overkill, for others not enough. That's why the securement rules also specify a "sufficient number" and require (for us) a release test to verify. Even in those known cases leaning towards overkill, a release of the air brakes is still done. I will agree to a point, that some may start with the minimum required by local instructions. But they will do a release test and if it doesn't hold, they tie more brakes and do another release test. This is done until they are satisfied nothing is going to roll away. We do have a chart that shows the number of brakes to set without releasing the air brakes to verify, but it is (or at least has been) for those times when a release test was impractical. It's a good bet that the chart in most cases has a good safety factor built in, that the number is more than a "sufficient number." I see nothing wrong with the CROR securement rule as written and quoted. Jeff
Bucyrus Any time a minimum is specified, it comes with the natural implication that the minimum is sufficient. Therefore, without the special instructions calling for the full requirements of Rule 112, it might be interpreted to mean that the special instructions are an alternative to Rule 112, or take precedence over the rule. And if that were the case, the minimum number of handbrakes required by the special instructions might be deemed adequate without a push-pull test which is a requirement of Rule 112. One might ask why a crew would go to the trouble of applying the minimum number of handbrakes and then not bother to do a push-pull test. The answer is that the test might indicate that more brakes need to be applied, and then tested a second time. This is more work, and if the crew believes that the minimum number of handbrakes is the full requirement, they might just leave it at that.
Any time a minimum is specified, it comes with the natural implication that the minimum is sufficient. Therefore, without the special instructions calling for the full requirements of Rule 112, it might be interpreted to mean that the special instructions are an alternative to Rule 112, or take precedence over the rule. And if that were the case, the minimum number of handbrakes required by the special instructions might be deemed adequate without a push-pull test which is a requirement of Rule 112.
One might ask why a crew would go to the trouble of applying the minimum number of handbrakes and then not bother to do a push-pull test. The answer is that the test might indicate that more brakes need to be applied, and then tested a second time. This is more work, and if the crew believes that the minimum number of handbrakes is the full requirement, they might just leave it at that.
In the real world, minimum means just that. What the powers that be have decreed must be applied. For some trains/cuts of cars it might be overkill, for others not enough. That's why the securement rules also specify a "sufficient number" and require (for us) a release test to verify. Even in those known cases leaning towards overkill, a release of the air brakes is still done.
I will agree to a point, that some may start with the minimum required by local instructions. But they will do a release test and if it doesn't hold, they tie more brakes and do another release test. This is done until they are satisfied nothing is going to roll away.
We do have a chart that shows the number of brakes to set without releasing the air brakes to verify, but it is (or at least has been) for those times when a release test was impractical. It's a good bet that the chart in most cases has a good safety factor built in, that the number is more than a "sufficient number."
I see nothing wrong with the CROR securement rule as written and quoted.
I understand your points, and agree with them. Like you, I also see nothing wrong with Rule 112. It is the STB of Canada who has stated that they have found a problem with Rule 112. They say that it is impossible to verify securement with a push pull-test on high grades.
My point posted on the previous page is only about a possibility of misinterpreting Rule 112 by viewing it through a layer of special instructions. Specifically, such a possibility would be developing a routine of setting a certain number of handbrakes (the minimum) thought to be sufficient without testing.
Such a problem might arise from the language of the special instructions and/or improper interpretation of them. MM&A has been asked by the news media to reveal their special instructions for train securement at Nantes, but I understand they have refused to do so.
.
Bucyrus Murphy Siding jeffhergert We do have a chart that shows the number of brakes to set without releasing the air brakes to verify, but it is (or at least has been) for those times when a release test was impractical. It's a good bet that the chart in most cases has a good safety factor built in, that the number is more than a "sufficient number." I see nothing wrong with the CROR securement rule as written and quoted. Jeff And coming from someone who is a working railroader, I'd give your opinion a lot more weight than that coming from any non-railroader. Thanks for giving this some real-world perspective. What makes you think that Jeff and I disagree on this point?
Murphy Siding jeffhergert We do have a chart that shows the number of brakes to set without releasing the air brakes to verify, but it is (or at least has been) for those times when a release test was impractical. It's a good bet that the chart in most cases has a good safety factor built in, that the number is more than a "sufficient number." I see nothing wrong with the CROR securement rule as written and quoted. Jeff And coming from someone who is a working railroader, I'd give your opinion a lot more weight than that coming from any non-railroader. Thanks for giving this some real-world perspective.
jeffhergert We do have a chart that shows the number of brakes to set without releasing the air brakes to verify, but it is (or at least has been) for those times when a release test was impractical. It's a good bet that the chart in most cases has a good safety factor built in, that the number is more than a "sufficient number." I see nothing wrong with the CROR securement rule as written and quoted. Jeff
What makes you think that Jeff and I disagree on this point?
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
BucyrusTree, You are taking some of my comments out of their context, then assigning your own meaning to them, and then disagreeing with that meaning.
You are taking some of my comments out of their context, then assigning your own meaning to them, and then disagreeing with that meaning.
I'd ask you to explain further, but I'm afraid that we'd get dizzy.
Bucyrus Tree, You are taking some of my comments out of their context, then assigning your own meaning to them, and then disagreeing with that meaning.
Tree,
Don't know about y'all, but I think I need a map to follow that line of reasoning.
It's CROR. GCOR covers most railroads in the US, at least in the western portion of the country.
BucyrusRule 112 overrides the special instructions...
No - the special instructions supplement Rule 112.
BucyrusI agree that it would be essential to make it clear that special instructions cannot supplant GROR rules...
That's already been made clear:
CROR B - Special Instructions will be found in time tables, general operating instructions, operating bulletins or GBO. They may be appended to or included within copies of the Canadian Rail Operating Rules but do not diminish the intent of the rule unless official exemption has been granted.
BucyrusOne might wonder why they would have special instructions calling for a minimum number of handbrakes if that minimum is likely to be overridden by the push-pull test required in Rule 112, which calls for more than the minimum. Why not just let Rule 112 govern alone?
You're making this more difficult than it is. CROR sets a baseline standard, sufficient under "normal" circumstances. Special instructions may modify that by requiring more brakes be set under certain circumstances. Once that number of brakes is set, the ability of the brakes to hold the train can be tested and, if it is insufficient, more brakes will need to be set and the hold tested again.
The special instructions are going to be based on experience. If a given site has shown that it normally requires X more brakes than the minimum to prevent problems, the special instructions will reflect that.
Really. It's that simple. Railroaders understand how it works. It's not a new concept.
Rule 112 overrides the special instructions by requiring push-pull proof; and the special instructions override Rule 112 by calling for a minimum number of hand brakes; even if that minimum number is greater than what the push-pull test calls for. Therefore, in an odd way, the special instructions are a safety factor for the Rule 112 with its push-pull test; and rule 112 is a safety factor for the special instructions.
I agree that it would be essential to make it clear that special instructions cannot supplant GROR rules established by Transport Canada, even though the special instructions can override the results of the push-pull test of Rule 112 as explained above. But how this clarification might be stipulated I don’t know. Logically it would be stipulated in the special instructions and not in GROR because it goes without saying that GROR simply means what it says. There is no need to additionally stipulate that GROR must not be preempted by something else.
Therefore, the place to restate the supremacy of the GROR is in the special instructions. Without that clarification, the special instructions might be assumed to be the sole authority. The special instructions set the minimum performance and GROR either confirms that minimum is adequate or calls for a higher number until the push-pull test is satisfied.
The danger is that Rule 112 is ignored because the special instructions are interpreted to be adequate; due to the fact that the term minimum implies adequate.
One might wonder why they would have special instructions calling for a minimum number of handbrakes if that minimum is likely to be overridden by the push-pull test required in Rule 112, which calls for more than the minimum. Why not just let Rule 112 govern alone?
The only plausible explanation that I can see for that is that the minimum set in the special instructions is intended to be a number higher than the number established by a push-pull test. That way, the minimum includes a safety factor for the push-pull test. So, in other words, you might find that a push-pull test shows the train secured with 10 handbrakes applied, and yet the special instructions call for 15 minimum. That would provide a safety factor of 5 extra handbrakes.
However, knowing the minimum requirement of 15, a person would not stop at 10 and perform a push-pull test. It would be pointless. A person would set 15 handbrakes because that is the minimum required by the special instructions. But then knowing that 15 is intended to be more than enough, it would be easy to rationalize that once 15 handbrakes had been set, no push-pull test would be required because the minimum number of 15 has been designed to exceed the requirement of the push-pull test. That reasoning could seem logical and adequate even though it is against the rules. It would be like a high wire act performing without a net.
If crews became accustomed to that flawed reasoning, they might routinely ignore the push-pull test and rely on the minimum number of handbrakes called for in the special instructions. But that number varies according to tonnage and grade. Error might creep into that calculation. Error might also enter because some of the handbrakes are not working properly. Then without the confirmation of the push-pull test, the error might go undiscovered, leaving the train on the razor’s edge of securement. Then just a little thermal expansion or contraction might break the inertia and start the train rolling.
Bucyrus: I am sure there is a statement (rule) in the codified rules that says the railroad is not allowed to create a rule that is less restrictive than the GCOR rules.
Thus Rule 112 may call for a certain number of brakes to be set, and the RR can issue special instructions that set forth additional brakes to be set in various circumstances of higher tonnage or on various grades, but in no case may the RR override the minimum safety standard set by any GCOR rule..
Semper Vaporo
Pkgs.
Bucyrus My concern is with this sentence: “Special instructions will indicate the minimum hand brake requirements for all locations where equipment is left.”
My concern is with this sentence:
“Special instructions will indicate the minimum hand brake requirements for all locations where equipment is left.”
In order to analyze GROR Rule 112, one would need to see those special instructions that the TSB says may accompany Rule 112. As I understand it, those special instructions can vary from one company to another. So you would have national Rule 112 and private special instructions working together to define the terms of train securement. While Rule 112 is public information, special instructions are often not disclosed to the public.
The special instructions may stipulate a minimum number of handbrakes to secure a train on various grades, with various tonnages. Whereas, Rule 112 requires a push-pull test to prove the number of handbrakes set is adequate. In order for this to work, the special instructions would have to include a statement like this:
“All conditions of GROR Rule 112 must be met.”
If that were not included, the special instructions alone might be assumed to completely cover the issue of train securement.
Just a reminder that if you wish to discuss the topic try to remain somewhat civilized with each other please.
It is getting tiring deleting posts that just end up being Kindergartenklopperei fodder...ok?
I thought I posted the evidence of second oil train found on the main line without conformance to the rule (only locomotive handbrakes applied, no tankcar brakes) as enough evidence that MM&A lacked a "Safety Culture" and the higher the rank the greater the responsibility. Possibly my putting a good portion of the blame on Ed Burkhardt is the result of "My having been there," in his position, made the same kiind of mistake, but in a non-life-threatening situation. Before moving to Jerusalem 17 years ago, I did some work in Israel, usually having an Israeli coworker. A particular performance hall had a good sound system I designed, as well as the rest of the acoustical design, and I often attended performances there, once I moved to Jerusalem.. On occasion some of the performers were USA who were old friends. So attending performences was often a bit of heaven on earth. As time went on, I noticed a bit of deterioration in the sound system operation. Not bad enough to make speech unintelligible anywhere in the room, but just not really optimum. But I hesitated to say anything, because I was outside the structure of the building management, and neither the managers nor the workman were ethnically the same "tribe." (Several "tribes" are represented, but none mine, as far as I know.) But one day I could not enjoy the show because the sound was so bad that I had great trouble with intelligiblity in the corner seat where I sat. So, after the show. in the lobby I approached the head manager offering to help. He said, "David, we have a new system, and it will probably be some time before operations settle in to be satisfactory. " I went back into the hall and looked at the front of the ceiling and was shocked to see a staligtite with loudspeakers obviously not custom fitted for the purpose . Needless to say I don't attend shows there nearly as often. The system is operated a bit better now as I observe when I do attend, but there are seats where the sound system really reduces intelligibility instead of improving it. I have been asked a few times why I don't come as often, and I just reply, "because I feel insulted." I should have found a friendly way to criticize when the first deterioration occured. I feel Ed Burkhardt may have felt it was wise to let local people "do their thing" and not interfere. I may be wrong, but that is a possible explanation. Knowing Ed's history, to me it is a better explanation than greed.
Bucyrus People here have mentioned the parsing of Rule 112 with the implication that the rule is so nebulous that it only means whatever a person thinks it means. And therefore, when an official statement by a regulatory body finds a flaw in Rule 112, this can be rejected because nobody can say for certain what Rule 112 means. I don’t see the rule as being open to interpretation. It seems to me that it says exactly what it means if we can accept the fact that words have specific meanings. I know that some see the world in relative shades of gray where a person’s words mean only what the user intends them to mean. But, railroads are notorious for not looking at the world that way. The railroad world communicates in black and white. Otherwise things go bump in the night. The fact that railroads invented train orders is a powerful testimony to their belief in the fidelity of words with fixed definitions. Railroad rules are the same way. On a railroad, words have fixed, pre-determined meanings, and are used in language that is often uncommonly terse. Here again is GROR Rule 112: 112. Securing Equipment (a) When equipment is left at any point a sufficient number of hand brakes must be applied to prevent it from moving. Special instructions will indicate the minimum hand brake requirements for all locations where equipment is left. If equipment is left on a siding, it must be coupled to other equipment if any on such track unless it is necessary to provide separation at a public crossing at grade or elsewhere. (b) Before relying on the retarding force of the hand brake(s), whether leaving equipment or riding equipment to rest, the effectiveness of the hand brake(s) must be tested by fully applying the hand brake(s) and moving the cut of cars slightly to ensure sufficient retarding force is present to prevent the equipment from moving. When leaving a cut of cars secured, and after completion of this test, the cut should be observed while pulling away to ensure slack action has settled and that the cars remain in place. (c) Application of hand brakes must not be made while equipment is being pulled or shoved. For those who like to parse words and sentences, what are some examples of multiple meanings or ambiguities in Rule 112? I can see one small question, but I am wondering if others see anything.
People here have mentioned the parsing of Rule 112 with the implication that the rule is so nebulous that it only means whatever a person thinks it means. And therefore, when an official statement by a regulatory body finds a flaw in Rule 112, this can be rejected because nobody can say for certain what Rule 112 means.
I don’t see the rule as being open to interpretation. It seems to me that it says exactly what it means if we can accept the fact that words have specific meanings. I know that some see the world in relative shades of gray where a person’s words mean only what the user intends them to mean. But, railroads are notorious for not looking at the world that way. The railroad world communicates in black and white. Otherwise things go bump in the night.
The fact that railroads invented train orders is a powerful testimony to their belief in the fidelity of words with fixed definitions. Railroad rules are the same way. On a railroad, words have fixed, pre-determined meanings, and are used in language that is often uncommonly terse.
Here again is GROR Rule 112:
112. Securing Equipment
(a) When equipment is left at any point a sufficient number of hand brakes must be applied to prevent it from moving. Special instructions will indicate the minimum hand brake requirements for all locations where equipment is left. If equipment is left on a siding, it must be coupled to other equipment if any on such track unless it is necessary to provide separation at a public crossing at grade or elsewhere.
(b) Before relying on the retarding force of the hand brake(s), whether leaving equipment or riding equipment to rest, the effectiveness of the hand brake(s) must be tested by fully applying the hand brake(s) and moving the cut of cars slightly to ensure sufficient retarding force is present to prevent the equipment from moving. When leaving a cut of cars secured, and after completion of this test, the cut should be observed while pulling away to ensure slack action has settled and that the cars remain in place.
(c) Application of hand brakes must not be made while equipment is being pulled or shoved.
For those who like to parse words and sentences, what are some examples of multiple meanings or ambiguities in Rule 112? I can see one small question, but I am wondering if others see anything.
cp8905 You are reducing the whole question to a technical issue, of whether or not it is technically possible for one person to set sufficient brakes, without any other presumptions.
You are reducing the whole question to a technical issue, of whether or not it is technically possible for one person to set sufficient brakes, without any other presumptions.
You do know that on a two man crew, usually only one person sets handbrakes, right? So not only is it technically possible for one person to set suffcient brakes, it is done thousands of times every day.
An "expensive model collector"
Murphy Siding Will multiple, extended threads badmouthing a railroad executive cast poorly on Trains Magazine and hinder the ability to get interviews in the future?
Will multiple, extended threads badmouthing a railroad executive cast poorly on Trains Magazine and hinder the ability to get interviews in the future?
It's nice to see something other than labor taking some criticism for once.
Please folks, I just removed a whole page of off topic posts that shouldn't have have been posted here to begin with. Now please keep your postings on topic as per the title of this thread.
Now; Why would I know those roads so well? Spend time driving them; that's why.
The parsing and dissection of Rule 112 brings two things to mind for me.
The first is a complaint about my rugby officiating from one of the players, who I knew was an attorney in real life. He took a sentence from the rule book and removed it from all context in his complaint about a call that he thought I should have made. The context of the situation and other parts of the rules supported my non-call.
The second is the thought processes of Sheldon Cooper, PhD on "The Big Bang Theory". He goes through life with agreements (the roommate agreement and friendship agreement) that have a stipulation for every possible contingency and a few others that can't occur, leaving no room for flexibility, improvisation or judgment calls.
THE PROBLEM WITH CROR RULE 112
Here is CROR Rule 112 which specifies the train securement procedure that should have been used on the MM&A oil train left at Nantes. I have highlighted two sections in red for further reference:
***************************************************************
Regarding the first section highlighted in red:
The special instructions would be those of the individual railroad companies which they may formulate and adopt. I do not know if such special instructions are required by the TSB or must be approved by the TSB if they are adopted by an individual railroad company. I have not seen any news report saying whether the MM&A has such special instructions, or what they are if they do have them. However, the frequently reported reference to a need to set 11 handbrakes may be quoted from MM&A special instructions. In any case, Rule 112 stands on its own in completely covering the trains securement requirement, and it must be complied with.
Regarding the second section highlighted in red:
This is the so called “push-pull test” which is an essential procedure in order for Rule 112 to be complied with. I have not seen any news report saying whether the engineer claimed to have performed the push-pull test, or whether he was asked whether he performed it.
Here is what the TSB has said about the push-pull test which is a necessary component of Rule 112:
“Furthermore, because it is impossible to verify hand-brake effectiveness by pulling or pushing cars on high grades, locomotive engineers cannot accurately know that management's expectations have been met every time cars are secured in accordance with CROR Rule 112.”
If it is “impossible to verify hand-brake effectiveness” with a push-pull test, then Rule 112 cannot be complied with.
bottom line is if they are not where u left them there was a need to set more brakes
Dakguy201,
The objective is to set enough handbrakes to hold the train with air brakes fully released.
An empirical test is used to determine whether enough handbrakes have been applied to hold a train on a grade. One version of such testing is to apply enough handbrakes expected to hold the train, and then release the air brakes. If the train does not move, it is considered to be adequately secured with handbrakes.
Another version of the test is to apply enough handbrakes expected to hold the train, then release the air brakes, and push and pull on the train. If the train does not move, it is considered to be adequately secured with handbrakes. This is the actual push-pull test. I do not know if the term is also applied to the test where no pushing or pulling is done.
Doing the test with the push-pull component gives some sense of measure of a safety factor by feeling the train’s resistance. Without the push-pull component, if the handbrakes hold the train, it may be only by the tiniest margin, and offer no indication of that.
I do not know if special instructions indicate how much force to apply when pushing or pulling to see if the handbrakes are sufficient.
Bucyrus I am not convinced that there is a problem with Rule 112. Nobody has explained why the push-pull test is unreliable in Canada while it seems to be reliable in the U.S. <snip>
I am not convinced that there is a problem with Rule 112. Nobody has explained why the push-pull test is unreliable in Canada while it seems to be reliable in the U.S. <snip>
Could someone explain what exactly is a push-pull test is? Are there any standards for which a push-pull test must comply? Or do you put the locos in run 8 and note that all you are getting is massive wheel slip from the engines, or perhaps something more precise involved?
I am not convinced that there is a problem with Rule 112. Nobody has explained why the push-pull test is unreliable in Canada while it seems to be reliable in the U.S. But in any case, the problem has been publically identified by TC/TSB and they own it. Why they went public with it without a solution to the problem is beyond me. But, what makes it really prickly is the fact that Rule 112 played a central role in the MM&A runaway four years after the TC/TSB announced their knowledge of a defect with the rule that could lead to a runaway.
To my perception, the fact that Mr. Johnston, in his letter to TC/TSB, uses the phrase “may wish to review Rule 112” rather than “must review” is simply an indicator that the ball is in their court. It is a hot potato of their own making, and it belongs to them. So there is no point or need to order them to deal with the problem. In light of the gravity of the matter, Mr. Johnston telling them that they “may wish to review CROR Rule 112” almost sounds like a bit of sarcasm in the form of understating the obvious.
Next we will see parsing letters in words....oy.
As much as we would like to think politics is not a consideration in governmental accident investigations - it is. It is in no way as overt as an official campaign for office - but there are always political agendas that get pushed by the politically appointed board members to organizations such as the TSB and NTSB.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Bucyrus oltmanndSince we are reading not just between the lines, but parsing the letters of the spoken word,... No need to parse words or read between the lines. He said this: "CROR Rule 112 is not specific enough… …it has been demonstrated the push-pull test is not always a good indicator of whether an adequate number of hand brakes have been applied and not handbrakes are effective even when properly applied. Considering all these risks…"
oltmanndSince we are reading not just between the lines, but parsing the letters of the spoken word,...
No need to parse words or read between the lines. He said this:
"CROR Rule 112 is not specific enough…
…it has been demonstrated the push-pull test is not always a good indicator of whether an adequate number of hand brakes have been applied and not handbrakes are effective even when properly applied.
Considering all these risks…"
They why did he say "may" instead of "should"? Maybe he doesn't know what he really means? Has he been taking English lessons from Burkhardt?
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
Norm48327 Hey Don, You're wasting your breath.
Hey Don,
You're wasting your breath.
No wonder I'm tired...
tree68 Robert JohnsonHowever, CROR Rule 112 is not specific enough in that it does not indicate the number of hand brakes necessary to hold a given train tonnage on various grades and it continues to be left up to the operating employee to determine the number of hand brakes to apply. So now the crews will have to carry the equivalent of the Encyclopedia Brittanica so they can find out the specific number of brakes to set for their specific train for their specific location because it needs to be spelled out exactly in the rule. Yeah, right. RIP, horse.
Robert JohnsonHowever, CROR Rule 112 is not specific enough in that it does not indicate the number of hand brakes necessary to hold a given train tonnage on various grades and it continues to be left up to the operating employee to determine the number of hand brakes to apply.
So now the crews will have to carry the equivalent of the Encyclopedia Brittanica so they can find out the specific number of brakes to set for their specific train for their specific location because it needs to be spelled out exactly in the rule.
Yeah, right.
RIP, horse.
Yes, a complete instruction set would ridiculous. Imagine if the rule "stop at a stop sign" was an instruction instead....
"If you are going 50 mph or more, but less than 60 mph, depress the brake pedal with your right foot starting at a point no less than 300 feet from the sign as measured by your dashboard range finder. Deceleration must be 2 mph per second or greater no later than 3 seconds after the brake pedal is first depressed as measured by your dashboard accelerometer. Do not operate the accelerator with either foot during braking. Be alert for uneven braking and make sure that vehicle is steered in a path parallel to the roadway during braking (see instruction 10.0.12 (a) for "steering while braking"). If vehicle is descending a grade, increase distance for initial brake application by 10% for every degree of gradient as posted on roadside signage. If vehicle is ascending a grade, reduce braking force, such that deceleration does not exceed 3 mph per second. If speed exceeds 40 mph at 150 feet from stop sign, increase braking to 3 mph per second.... blah blah blah.
Or, next trip, just take the train.
Since we are reading not just between the lines, but parsing the letters of the spoken word, lets do this one:
Bucyrus Robert Johnston wrote: "Considering all these risks, Transport Canada may wish to review CROR Rule 112"
"May wish". Not "should", "is highly recommended to" or even "is strongly urged". Just plain'ol "may".
Bucyrus: The accident investigator is simply following various possible causes and Rule 112 is involved in one of those investigative pathways. He has expressed a need to understand the purpose of the rule and how the TSB intended it to be applied, with a caveat that they seem to have a contradiction in their own findings. Maybe just found a nice way to say, "HEY! Getcher act together!".
Since the investigative committee has not issued a final finding in this accident, I can't help but believe they are still researching all the possible causes, and there may be many that we here have not even thought of to harp about.
Someone may, at any point, say they have eliminated one or another cause, but that does not mean the investigative committee will not follow all leads, even if it is one that has been said to have been eliminated.
Rule 112 may very well be defective, but it may just as well have nothing whatsoever to do with the cause of this particular accident. Rule 112 may also be found to be sound in its intent, yet be the primary cause of this accident.
It is futile to grasp at any one media sound bite and run with it. The investigation is not complete and any speculation as to cause and effect on such incomplete information is just a path to frustration.
As someone that I hope is your friend in this forum, as someone that is just as curious as you as to the cause of this accident and to have an understanding of the rules and regulations and how they are applied and how they affect the operation of the railroad, I have to ask that you let this ride for a while until more information is available. Let the little sound bites float a week or two and let some official replies appear before leaping to conclusions.
Reporting the sound bites is one thing, jumping to conclusions is futile.
I have learned a lot in these discussions and some of the replies to your queries have been so excellent as to have blown my socks off. (And, yes, some of the replies have made me want to retrieve my socks and stuff them in a mouth or two!)
hello my friend. this former rrand b. I am always pleased and impreessed with the insight a not only working engineer can bring to the table, but a man many here respect. keep up the good work and some day i hope to have time to get down your way. richard mayo robinson.
BaltACD schlimm My word! 103 posts on this thread on whether or not Ed Burkhardt was in error. Numerous other threads on the tragedy, but mostly on how to set a handbrake. And it just goes on and on. The dead horses enjoy their beatings!
schlimm My word! 103 posts on this thread on whether or not Ed Burkhardt was in error. Numerous other threads on the tragedy, but mostly on how to set a handbrake. And it just goes on and on.
My word! 103 posts on this thread on whether or not Ed Burkhardt was in error. Numerous other threads on the tragedy, but mostly on how to set a handbrake. And it just goes on and on.
The dead horses enjoy their beatings!
X 10.
PROBLEMS WITH CROR RULE 112
As I understand it, train securement in Canada is governed by CROR Rule 112, which was produced by the TSB of Canada and/or Transport Canada. The rule includes a requirement for a push-pull test as a means of confirming whether the securement called for in the rule has been accomplished. And yet the TSB has also stated that such confirmation is “impossible” by the use of a push-pull test. That seems like a classic Catch-22 to me.
So I find it interesting that the Lac-Megantic accident investigator is asking the Transport Canada to check their Rule 112 to see if the push-pull test is an adequate indicator of proper securement, while the TSB has already answered that question by saying that it is not. Moreover, the accident investigator says, “It has been demonstrated” that the push-pull test is unreliable. If it has been demonstrated, what is there to review?
What I sense that the accident investigator is asking the TSB is for an explanation of why the TSB has concluded that it is impossible to confirm train securement by the use of the push-pull test.
Clearly, the accident investigator is shifting a burden onto the TSB/TC in the sense that their Rule 112 may be defective, and therefore part of the cause of the runaway oil train. That is huge. The basic national railroad rule that is supposed to prevent runaways may not always do the job.
Note that as a private observer, I am not asserting this alleged problem with Rule 112 to be a fact. I have only offered it as a possibility as item #5 in my FIVE POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR THE RUNAWAY posted above. And also note that other private observers here in the forum insist that the rule is 100% sufficient as is the similar rule governing U.S. rail operations. Nevertheless, the preeminent rail safety regulation authorities in Canada have said that the rule leaves employees with no way of knowing how many handbrakes to apply in order to secure a train.
Here is what the accident investigator, Robert Johnston has said in a letter to Luc Bourdon, Transport Canada’s director general, rail safety:
CROR Rule 112 ensures that hand brakes are applied to prevent unwanted movement of the train while providing flexibility for a railway’s operational needs. However, CROR Rule 112 is not specific enough in that it does not indicate the number of hand brakes necessary to hold a given train tonnage on various grades and it continues to be left up to the operating employee to determine the number of hand brakes to apply. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated the push-pull test is not always a good indicator of whether an adequate number of hand brakes have been applied and not handbrakes are effective even when properly applied. Considering all these risks, Transport Canada may wish to review CROR Rule 112 and all related railway special instructions to ensure that equipment and trains left unattended are properly secured in order to prevent unintended movements.
Yours sincerely,
Original signed by
Robert Johnston
Acting Director
Investigation Operations Rail/Pipeline
Refer to this link for full article:
http://www.canadianunderwriter.ca/news/transport-canada-may-wish-to-review-rail-rules-agency-investigating-lac-megantic-derailment/1002482141/
BucyrusI have not said that it proves anything except for what his words mean. If he did not intend them to mean that, then he should correct them.
Okay. That's your whole point?
It was all over the news media. But the news media quickly move on. Perhaps he did retract them later, but by then it was less newsworthy than updating the body count. Your speculation and theorizing in a knowledge vacuum is tedious. Give it a rest until the TSB report comes out.
All we know comes from the media reports, and they have a well-earned reputation for being unreliable, especially where the reporters know little about the subject. And a reporter who knows anything about the railways is an exceedingly rare character. The pictures on TV are (usually) truthful, but that doesn't automatically make the accompanying commentary reliable. We never know what was edited out of a long interview to fit a short time slot.
over and OUT
John
Bucyrus oltmanndSo, you don't think it's possible, in the heat of the moment, that he didn't know what he was talking about? Or, was confused? Or, since he's not been on "on the ground guy" for quite a few years, might be slow to remember what he knows? If he said red was blue, would that make it true? Sure, Burkhardt could have said something in the heat of the moment. Anything is possible, but he said what he said; and not just as a couple of words, but rather a line of reasoning. And he said it on more than one occasion. He got it on record. It is all over the news. He has had full opportunity to retract it if is not what he meant. I have not said that it proves anything except for what his words mean. If he did not intend them to mean that, then he should correct them.
oltmanndSo, you don't think it's possible, in the heat of the moment, that he didn't know what he was talking about? Or, was confused? Or, since he's not been on "on the ground guy" for quite a few years, might be slow to remember what he knows? If he said red was blue, would that make it true?
Sure, Burkhardt could have said something in the heat of the moment. Anything is possible, but he said what he said; and not just as a couple of words, but rather a line of reasoning. And he said it on more than one occasion. He got it on record. It is all over the news. He has had full opportunity to retract it if is not what he meant.
I have not said that it proves anything except for what his words mean. If he did not intend them to mean that, then he should correct them.
Again you are reducing it to a technical issue, when the point was about staffing levels and the ultimate cause of this accident.
Some of the responses in this post remind me of George C. Scott's character in Dr. Strangelove: the world is 18 minutes from ending because of a massive failure and he is saying things such as "We should hold off judgement until all the facts are in" or "I don't think it's quite fair to condemn a whole program because of single slip-up." These are weasel words, the words of people who don't want oversight, transparency, democracy, or more importantly, responsibility. Regulation = confirmation.
Luckily, the TSB has banned one-person crews in Canada, so this point is moot. We aren't required to defer to the superior technical knowledge of companies when those same companies potentially gain financially by cutting corners. I am done here.
BucyrusWhen Burkhardt said the train ran away because the firemen shut down the engine and that released the air brakes, he is saying that they were relying on those air brakes to hold the train. That has to be what he means. He stated it as the reason why the train ran away.
So, you don't think it's possible, in the heat of the moment, that he didn't know what he was talking about? Or, was confused? Or, since he's not been on "on the ground guy" for quite a few years, might be slow to remember what he knows? If he said red was blue, would that make it true?
Did he throw Harding "under the bus"? Maybe. But that's completely difference from your arguments.
CNW 6000 Norm48327 Thank you Ed for telling it like it really is. Ed's was the best post in any of these Lac Megantic threads. By far.
Norm48327 Thank you Ed for telling it like it really is.
Thank you Ed for telling it like it really is.
Agree! He nailed it.
Dan
Well said, Ed! Makes me wish you were heading up the investigation!
edblysardThe contention that an officer of the railroad ordered Harding to cease tying down the train is beyond ludicrous, while we have some pretty dense officials here, I know of none who are that stupid.
Nobody has contended that action as a fact. I simply contend that it is, in fact, an open possibility, nothing more and nothing less. Also, it does not have to be so clear cut as an official ordering Harding to cease tying down brakes. When you cite it as being that clear cut, it does make it the least likely. But, as you point out, things go wrong as a result of a series of less than perfect decisions where the final outcome is not so clear cut.
I see the possibility of this factor most likely being combined with other factors such as routinely compromising Rule 112. It would not be hard to rationalize that air and hand brakes together will do the job.
When Burkhardt said the train ran away because the firemen shut down the engine and that released the air brakes, he is saying that they were relying on those air brakes to hold the train. That has to be what he means. He stated it as the reason why the train ran away. So not only is this scenario of relying on a combination of air and handbrakes a possibility, there is clear evidence that it was done, in violation of CROR Rule 112.
Also, it would not be hard to rationalize that it is okay to send a man home if you intend to get somebody else out there in a “few minutes” to check things over, including the smoking engine. They did get somebody out there in a very short time when the fire department was called.
Nobody is hysterically trying to crucify anybody here. I am keeping an open mind and have not accused anybody of anything. My words are black and white. I am not trying to solve the mystery. I only want to show possibilities. That is lacking in the media as a total summation. I think it is useful to summarize it. You too have offered several possibilities above. I agree that they are all possibilities, and they are all detailed breakdowns of my five points of possible causes listed above.
I think it is important to look at the full range of possibilities because Mr. Burkhardt has limited that range in order to openly and publically accuse Tom Harding of being the sole cause of this enormous loss of property and the deaths of 47 people. He says that because the train rolled away, it has to be Harding’s fault. I disagree with that. So does the director of the accident investigation, Robert Johnston. I don’t think that pointing out these details in any way amounts to crucifying Burkhardt.
In the end, they will likely find that it was aliens who escaped from Area 51 that caused it all. Through tele-kinetic mind control, they commanded Bigfoot to disable the hand brakes and give the train a push. It was all a diversion to take attention away from impending news release about Paula Deen's love child with Bigfoot's alien offspring. The story will surely break soon in The National Enquirer.
"I could never belong to any club that would have me as a member."
Something I haven't seen mentioned, but which I'm sure the investigators are looking at, is whether there might have been a propane gas distribution facility or tanks near the derailment site that caused the explosion and fire, and not just the crude.
Bucyrus cp8905 oltmanndRidiculous. GCOR 32.1 is enough. Everything else is irrelevant. No it isn't if it were we wouldn't be talking about it and the families of the people burned alive wouldn't be mourning the loss of their loved ones. As I have said, this was an accident waiting to happen. I think it was an accident waiting to happen.
cp8905 oltmanndRidiculous. GCOR 32.1 is enough. Everything else is irrelevant. No it isn't if it were we wouldn't be talking about it and the families of the people burned alive wouldn't be mourning the loss of their loved ones. As I have said, this was an accident waiting to happen.
oltmanndRidiculous. GCOR 32.1 is enough. Everything else is irrelevant.
No it isn't if it were we wouldn't be talking about it and the families of the people burned alive wouldn't be mourning the loss of their loved ones. As I have said, this was an accident waiting to happen.
I think it was an accident waiting to happen.
I somewhat agree with you. But not in your narrow sense. The crude behaved in a way the experts found abnormal, and a derailment at speed could have occurred anywhere on the entire railroad network. In fact, fire as a result of a derailment is more likely to happen on a Class 1 since they are the ones with allowable fast track speeds. Broken rails, collisions, grade crossing accidents have all left trains piled up in a big mess.
While the immediate regulatory changes in the wake of Lac-Megantic have been directed at simple train operation, I expect to see more regulation based on the commodity. For example, use of the older design of tank car might be banned. As an interim measure until enough new tank cars become available, mandating slow speeds would reduce the risk. Maybe the tank cars require a special lining to resist the chemical mix.
In brief, changes resulting from what the investigators learn from Lac-Megantic may prevent a similar inferno happening in a town near you. But for the immediate future that accident is still waiting to happen, just in a new location on another railroad.
I have had to add one more item to my list of possible causes for the runaway, revising it as follows:
FIVE POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR THE RUNAWAY:
1) The engineer failed to set sufficient handbrakes per the train securement rules governing the MM&A.
2) Somebody released the handbrakes after the engineer set them.
3) The train securement rules of the MM&A at Nantes are inadequate, or non-existent.
4) The engineer was unable to complete the train securement because he was told to quit working by his supervisors.
5) CROR Rule 112 is inadequate.
I would say (my carrier) they have all the Safety, Train Handling and Operating Rules that crewmen have the strength to heft on and off the locomotives during their tour of duty. All of those rules being written in 'legalize gotcha' rather than simple declarative 3rd grade English that does not invite misunderstanding of meaning.
BaltACD Life is death waiting to happen.
Life is death waiting to happen.
Would you say that railroads don’t need any safety rules because everybody will die one day?
cp8905 This is really a stretch, a false dichotomy, the only option is a one person train crew or a six-person train crew? Quebec has a low cost of living? Compared to what- Nebraska? Or do you mean Manhattan? I have mostly kept silent about remarks like this one, but it reminds me of one of your American singers, Woody Guthrie, in "Waiting at the gate": ...... Canada has decided that we aren't going to take any more chances on one person, who is his own relief crew the next day (thus the train has to be parked) and thus discouraged from tieing down too many cars or venting the brake pipe for a full set becasue he will be required to release the hand brakes and do a terminal inspection the next day by himself, which is nearly impossible. The crew just sits there most of the time, except when they are responsible for tieing down enough hand brakes to keep a 70-car train of crude oil from incinerating a town. The epitome of an accident waiting to happen. Count on no more American low-cost outfits operating in Canada.
This is really a stretch, a false dichotomy, the only option is a one person train crew or a six-person train crew? Quebec has a low cost of living? Compared to what- Nebraska? Or do you mean Manhattan? I have mostly kept silent about remarks like this one, but it reminds me of one of your American singers, Woody Guthrie, in "Waiting at the gate":
......
Canada has decided that we aren't going to take any more chances on one person, who is his own relief crew the next day (thus the train has to be parked) and thus discouraged from tieing down too many cars or venting the brake pipe for a full set becasue he will be required to release the hand brakes and do a terminal inspection the next day by himself, which is nearly impossible. The crew just sits there most of the time, except when they are responsible for tieing down enough hand brakes to keep a 70-car train of crude oil from incinerating a town. The epitome of an accident waiting to happen.
Count on no more American low-cost outfits operating in Canada.
I was never suggesting that six man crews were needed, merely pointing out that the number required is a matter of opinion. The unions fought as the typical crew size dropped from 4 men to three, and then two as the caboose disappeared, on the grounds of safety. I think the results show that particular argument to have been unfounded. In this case even with a 2-man crew there is a high probability that the train would have been left in exactly the same manner. Only the conductor would be tieing down the freight cars while the engineer dealt with the engines. Both would be equally anxious to head for the motel and sleep.
And I believe you are in error saying he would be his own relief crew. The engineer would take the next westbound back to Farnham while a crew from Brownville Junction in Maine would take the crude oil train eastwards into the US.
I will point out that I am also Canadian. Unlike you, I am waiting for the results of the TSB investigation before jumping to the conclusion that shortcuts by the engineer are solely responsible. I agree that it seems the most obvious possibility, but I would like to have facts to prove it, not opinions. Other contributing factors, including some that may not have been considered by we amateurs, may turn out to be far more critical.
And while comparing Manhattan with rural Nebraska is a stretch, you can't deny that housing is generally much more affordable in a small rural town than in a big city. A smaller mortgage means less income is required for the same lifestyle. Walk to work, so a second car is not needed. National payscales help some people, penalize others quite severely.
And various American outfits are already operating short lines in Canada. That will continue, and I am happy to welcome them if it keeps a rail line from being abandoned. The MM&A used technical innovation to be able to operate safely with one man, and the CTA recognized that when they gave their approval. The recent change by the CTA is partly adding a few more needed safety measures, and partly knee-jerk reaction to public and political pressure.
oltmanndThis is really getting silly.
The families of those who died don't think it is silly
oltmanndYes, it's hard for a one man crew to tie down a train. Not impossible. Hard. Maybe extremely hard in some circumstances. If he cut corners, it's on him.
You are reducing the whole question to a technical issue, of whether or not it is technically possible for one person to set sufficient brakes, without any other presumptions. But that isn't enough. It isn't simply CAN one person safely park the train, it is also WILL that person safely park the train, every single time, even when he is at the end of his shift, in the dark at midnight, when he is his own relief crew the next morning and thus every minute he is setting brakes is cutting into the amount of sleep he gets, and every extra brake set will be one he will need to release himself the next day. And, I might add, without anyone monitoring the train while it is parked, nor apparently any mechanical staff to check on why an engine was reported to be on fire. If you add all of the hidden assumptions you are making, then we have this: One person can safely set enough brakes (if he is not out of hours, if he is not fatigued, if he is not being pressured to cut corners so as to get the train moving quickly the next morning, etc.). Every single time, because failure of any of these causes a tragedy.
oltmannd This is really getting silly. Ridiculous. GCOR 32.1 is enough. Everything else is irrelevant.
This is really getting silly.
Ridiculous. GCOR 32.1 is enough. Everything else is irrelevant.
In Canada, they use CROR Rule 112, and the investigator of the MM&A runaway is not convinced that it is enough.
Yes, it's hard for a one man crew to tie down a train. Not impossible. Hard. Maybe extremely hard in some circumstances. If he cut corners, it's on him.
Would it be easier to have two man crews? Sure. So?
If the one man crew expires before he gets the train tied down, then he needs to be relieved to have someone else finish the job. He can't just walk away and say nothing. If he did, it's on him. If there was a two man crew and they did the same, it'd be on them.
Are rules perfect? No. Nothing is. Could the rule be better? Maybe. Tie'em all down? That would be best. Okay. How hard? Issue everyone a torque wrench? A test after their set? What? A dynomometer coupler in every engine so you can measure the pull or push against the handbrakes? What if it rains, or snows or fire and brimestones after the test? Would the test still be valid?
Ridiculous. GCOR 32.1 is enough. Everything else is irrelevant. It's way more likely that someone with evil in their heart would turn and angle cock, dump the air, bleed the cars and knock of the hand brakes and create a runaway on purpose than a better test preventing another runaway.
Sunnyland,
Contrary to his own judgment, the engineer left the smoking engine running per instructions from his supervisor. He told the cab driver that he was going to re-contact his supervisor to see if he would reconsider the decision to leave the smoking engine running.
After the engineer had left, the public called the fire department and they arrived and shut down the engine according to the rules of the railroad. Contrary to what Mr. Burkhardt said, the MM&A had been fully informed of the fire and the call to the fire department. But then, Mr. Burkhardt might have been speaking in shades of gray rather than black and white when he told the public that the fire department never notified the railroad company.
After the fire department left, the engineer had several conversations with his supervisor about the fire and the supervisor informed the engineer that the fire was out and that everything was okay. It is unclear why these conversations did not resolve the issue of leaving no engines running to pump air. Certainly, the engineer’s supervisor knew that the one running engine had been shut down by the fire department because they told him that after they had finished their response at the scene.
I have a friend on Facebook who is a retired BNSF engineer and he said the crew should have set multiple hand brakes on the cars if they were leaving the engine in that situation. That should have prevented the cars from rolling after the fire dept shut down the lead engine because of supposed fire. I did not know who shut it off until I read this, thought maybe the crew had before they left. The engineer was concerned about leaving it, but someone higher up than him made a decision and he's the one who should be in trouble, not the engineer who only did what they told him.
I had never seen engines smoke and fire coming out of the stack like the video, it seems like the engine would catch on fire with this going on. I'll have to ask my friend about this latest development.
Here is a well detailed article on train securement with substantial information and insight provided by an ex-MM&A engineer, James Goodrich. It also includes some comments about a one-person crew:
http://www.montrealgazette.com/M%C3%A9gantic+clear+rules+train+hand+brakes/8679004/story.html
All of the following is from the article:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It’s unclear if the fact that he was the only MMA employee on the train contributed to the accident. MMA is one of only two railways in Canada using one-person crews.
For one person “to do the job right, requires a lot of extra effort,” said Paul-André Larose, a former Canadian National transportation engineer.
“There’s a tendency to cut corners — you get away with it today, and tomorrow you cut a few more corners and, eventually, tragedy strikes.”
Cutting corners could involve not setting enough hand brakes or not tightening them as securely as possible.
Larose said there can also be peer pressure to not set too many hand brakes because that creates more work for the replacement crew that will have to prepare the train for departure later.
“The most critical question is what was (Harding’s) on-duty time when he arrived at Nantes,” Goodrich [ex-MM&A engineer] said. “How much time did he have left to work, what was he legally able to do?”
Under strict Transport Canada rules, a railway employee’s single tour of duty cannot exceed 12 hours.
“What if he didn’t have time, what if he was being told: ‘You’re dead under hours of service — get in the cab and go to the hotel,’ ” Goodrich added.
In such a case, MMA should have known and sent a relief crew to complete any remaining tasks, he said.
A veteran locomotive engineer who works for a major Canadian railway who spoke on condition of not being identified wonders if MMA “put (Harding) in a situation where he couldn’t perform his job properly.
“After 12 hours, we’re not allowed to touch the equipment,” the engineer said. “If (Harding) gets there and he’s got 20 minutes to tie down his train, maybe he cut corners.”
cx500 schlimm This thread has begun to trivialize a tragedy, but one thing seems clear: there is plenty of blame to pass around, from the decision to try to run a railroad in a substandard manner to negligent behavior by the engineer and operations staff. Burkhardt's after the event comments may be ill-tempered, but have nothing to do with the accident. His attempt to run an unsafe railroad, however, does. If you can't run a railroad using proper levels of staffing and paying competitive wages with properly working equipment, then perhaps you should close it down. We don't tolerate that with airlines; why should a railroad be immune? Let me ask our professionals a question. If your line suddenly changed hand, your union was decertified and your wages cut 40% and your crew size cut to a one-man operation, do you think that would have some impact on you and your work standards? A few questions in return. What is the proper level of staffing? Are you suggesting that we should go back to 6-man crews, as certain States required for many years? Only one person can actually run a train at a time, and any additional bodies are just riding along, maybe doing paperwork or dozing half the time. The VIA train that went through a crossover at four times the maximum speed a couple of years ago had three men in the cab, well maintained track and working CTC signals. As for competitive wages, what is the competition? In that fairly rural area the wages were likely still competitive, even if they were considerably less than the unions negotiated for the big roads. But lower housing costs and quite likely more regular working hours could offset the lower earnings and result in a better lifestyle. Those three deceased Via engineers were union members and certainly paid what you consider a "competitive wage". I don't see an attempt to run an unsafe railroad. In most respects the operation was typical of just about every spin-off short line on this continent, and even some minor branch lines on the Class 1s. Slower speeds safely compensate for the older equipment and lesser track condition, that you see as running a railroad in "a substandard manner". Perhaps a second man might have made a difference but that is pure speculation. Mistakes are made and accidents happen. Which mistakes, and how many, were made to create this tragedy have yet to be revealed. Some may even trace back to the original point of loading. John
schlimm This thread has begun to trivialize a tragedy, but one thing seems clear: there is plenty of blame to pass around, from the decision to try to run a railroad in a substandard manner to negligent behavior by the engineer and operations staff. Burkhardt's after the event comments may be ill-tempered, but have nothing to do with the accident. His attempt to run an unsafe railroad, however, does. If you can't run a railroad using proper levels of staffing and paying competitive wages with properly working equipment, then perhaps you should close it down. We don't tolerate that with airlines; why should a railroad be immune? Let me ask our professionals a question. If your line suddenly changed hand, your union was decertified and your wages cut 40% and your crew size cut to a one-man operation, do you think that would have some impact on you and your work standards?
This thread has begun to trivialize a tragedy, but one thing seems clear: there is plenty of blame to pass around, from the decision to try to run a railroad in a substandard manner to negligent behavior by the engineer and operations staff. Burkhardt's after the event comments may be ill-tempered, but have nothing to do with the accident. His attempt to run an unsafe railroad, however, does. If you can't run a railroad using proper levels of staffing and paying competitive wages with properly working equipment, then perhaps you should close it down. We don't tolerate that with airlines; why should a railroad be immune?
Let me ask our professionals a question. If your line suddenly changed hand, your union was decertified and your wages cut 40% and your crew size cut to a one-man operation, do you think that would have some impact on you and your work standards?
A few questions in return. What is the proper level of staffing? Are you suggesting that we should go back to 6-man crews, as certain States required for many years? Only one person can actually run a train at a time, and any additional bodies are just riding along, maybe doing paperwork or dozing half the time. The VIA train that went through a crossover at four times the maximum speed a couple of years ago had three men in the cab, well maintained track and working CTC signals.
As for competitive wages, what is the competition? In that fairly rural area the wages were likely still competitive, even if they were considerably less than the unions negotiated for the big roads. But lower housing costs and quite likely more regular working hours could offset the lower earnings and result in a better lifestyle. Those three deceased Via engineers were union members and certainly paid what you consider a "competitive wage".
I don't see an attempt to run an unsafe railroad. In most respects the operation was typical of just about every spin-off short line on this continent, and even some minor branch lines on the Class 1s. Slower speeds safely compensate for the older equipment and lesser track condition, that you see as running a railroad in "a substandard manner". Perhaps a second man might have made a difference but that is pure speculation. Mistakes are made and accidents happen. Which mistakes, and how many, were made to create this tragedy have yet to be revealed. Some may even trace back to the original point of loading.
The inspector told the owner
it was more than a year ago
you're risking those men's lives in #5
that mine's full of fumes and dust
full of high explosive gas
but the boss says "we'll just have to take the chance"
oltmannd Bucyrus oltmanndHow do you know the MM&A has no such rule? I don't know that. What you quoted is my question to tgmidget asking how he knows what rules the engineer was supposed to follow in securring the train. I said the responsibility to secure the train is meaningless without a rule to define how the securement is done. Do you agree? Then you are speaking completely hypothetically. Do we know if the locomotive wheels had flanges? Wouldn't you agree that a locomotive wheel without flanges is more likely to derail than one with? MM&A likely uses GCOR or has a rule something very close to GCOR 32.1. Now, can a train in compliance with GCOR 32.1 run away? Very highly unlikely, but yes. But something had to change from the time the brakes were applied to the time the run away occurred.
Bucyrus oltmanndHow do you know the MM&A has no such rule? I don't know that. What you quoted is my question to tgmidget asking how he knows what rules the engineer was supposed to follow in securring the train. I said the responsibility to secure the train is meaningless without a rule to define how the securement is done. Do you agree?
oltmanndHow do you know the MM&A has no such rule?
I don't know that. What you quoted is my question to tgmidget asking how he knows what rules the engineer was supposed to follow in securring the train. I said the responsibility to secure the train is meaningless without a rule to define how the securement is done. Do you agree?
Then you are speaking completely hypothetically.
Do we know if the locomotive wheels had flanges? Wouldn't you agree that a locomotive wheel without flanges is more likely to derail than one with?
MM&A likely uses GCOR or has a rule something very close to GCOR 32.1.
Now, can a train in compliance with GCOR 32.1 run away? Very highly unlikely, but yes. But something had to change from the time the brakes were applied to the time the run away occurred.
Don,
Previously I listed item #3 as one of my FOUR POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR THE RUNAWAY as follows:
Is it a hypothetical premise? Sure it is. Is it irrelevant like your example question of whether a wheel without a flange is more likely to derail than a flanged wheel? I don’t think so.
While it may be hypothetical, the point is that if that hypothetical happens to be fact, then it diminishes or eliminates the engineer’s responsibility and places it on the defective rule. Therefore, it is critically important to find out whether the hypothetical point happens to be fact.
Apparently the Lac-Megantic accident investigators agree with me because they are asking the TSB to review their CRPR Rule 113 to check whether it is adequate.
This is detailed in this link:
From the link, here is a transcription of a letter from Robert Johnston asking the TSB to review Rule 112, and expressing his doubts about the sufficiency of the rule:
CROR Rule 112 ensures that hand brakes are applied to prevent unwanted movement of the train while providing flexibility for a railway’s operational needs. However, CROR Rule 112 is not specific enough in that it does not indicate the number of hand brakes necessary to hold a given train tonnage on various grades and it continues to be left up to the operating employee to determine the number of hand brakes to apply. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the push-pull test is not always a good indicat0or of whether an adequate number of hand brakes have been applied and not handbrakes are effective even when properly applied. Considering all these risk, Transport Canada may wish to review CROR Rule 112 and all related railway special instructions to ensure that equipment and trains left unattended are properly secured in order to prevent unintended movements.
Some questions.
1. Was there a west bound parked at the same location as the runaway ?
2. If so how long was the west boud parked there before the arrival of the oil train ?
3. If so was the west bound engineer scheduled to run the oil train once that engineer was rested ?
4. If so was there an understanding between engineers that they would always apply so many hand brakes ?
5. That begs the question how does a relieving crew(s) know how many hand brakes have been applied ? That is especially important if one or more cars hand brakes would not apply so the next car(s) would have to be applied ?
schlimmLet me ask our professionals a question. If your line suddenly changed hand, your union was decertified and your wages cut 40% and your crew size cut to a one-man operation, do you think that would have some impact on you and your work standards?
It depends on what I thought the alternative was. If it was RR unemployment (which is far worse than regular unemployment) followed by figuring out what to do next, then I don't think I'd be permanently unhappy with the pay cut - I might be happy that I still have a job. Of course I'd grouse about it ...I'm a RRer after all
Bucyrus Murphy Siding Irregardless of what you think, not all words spoken are used correctly. Does that mean that whatever people say must be disregarded because we cannot be sure that they used the correct words? By the way, “irregardless” is an erroneous word that, etymologically, means the exact opposite of what it is used to express. Are you using it for some special effect?
Murphy Siding Irregardless of what you think, not all words spoken are used correctly.
Does that mean that whatever people say must be disregarded because we cannot be sure that they used the correct words?
By the way, “irregardless” is an erroneous word that, etymologically, means the exact opposite of what it is used to express. Are you using it for some special effect?
BucyrusYou say that the engineer had the responsibility to secure his train. Yet that responsibility is meaningless without a rule defining what “secure” means. It is the responsibility of the MM&A to provide that rule.
How do you know the MM&A has no such rule? GCOR 32.1 is rather explicit. Even if MM&A doesn't use GCOR, they no doubt have something functionally equivalent.
BucyrusBy the way, “irregardless” is an erroneous word
It used to be. It's not any more...sort of like iterate and reiterate.
Bucyrus: Have you never, in a moment of crisis or panic, said or done things that with hindsight you realize should never have been done. Perhaps lashed out verbally at some jerk when it would have been better to stay silent. Mr. Burkhardt had just seen his dream of rescuing a railway utterly collapse into a disaster beyond his worst nightmares. That would still be very fresh in his mind at the news conference.
Spending a month parsing his every word from a news conference in front of a hostile audience shortly after the disaster is close to persecution. He was not directly involved in operating the railway, living and working something like a thousand miles away. We do not know what he had been told by his local management people, who at the time were probably focused on crisis management rather than a CSI type search for causes.
Schlimm: No doubt the cuts in wages and staff are exactly what happened when Mr. Burkhardt took on the task of running the MM&A. He did have alternatives. One was to throw his money down the drain subsidizing a money-losing operation. I can't imagine you were willing to cover any part of the losses yourself. The second alternative was abandonment, eliminating the staff entirely, selling the steel for scrap and the land to whomever wanted it. As events have shown, for 47 people in Megantic that might have been a better outcome. At the time however he would have been fiercely criticized for it.
Through cutting expenses to the bone and running a shoestring operation he enabled the railway to survive another 10 years, long enough for the new oil shipments to possibly make it a viable operation again. That oil traffic is the only reason that Irving has the slightest interest in the line surviving. They will have to weigh the cost of adding the MM&A to their New Brunswick railway versus the higher freight charges for alternative longer routes using CN to the north or Pan-Am to the south.
Bucyrus The word is tamper, and it has a clear definition. Tamper: to engage secretly or improperly in something. If your house catches fire, you call the fire department, and they spray water on it, do you accuse them of tampering with your house?
The word is tamper, and it has a clear definition. Tamper: to engage secretly or improperly in something.
If your house catches fire, you call the fire department, and they spray water on it, do you accuse them of tampering with your house?
Bucyrus My comments about Burkhardt in my last post were not about his general demeanor or his insensitivity. They were about examples of SPECIFIC CONTENT of what he said in that news conference. That was not repetition. Specifically, I questioned his use of the term, tampering when referring to the firemen following MM&A procedures in shutting down the locomotive when responding to a report of it being on fire. Calling that action tampering is dishonest and scapegoating, not just a personality trait. I am surprised that people are so sensitive about criticizing Mr. Burkhardt while being totally oblivious to the gravity of the fact that he is destroying another man’s life. Criticizing Burkhardt’s position in this, at this point, is like throwing a lifeline to his victim. There is a lot more going on with Burkhardt besides is personality.
My comments about Burkhardt in my last post were not about his general demeanor or his insensitivity. They were about examples of SPECIFIC CONTENT of what he said in that news conference. That was not repetition. Specifically, I questioned his use of the term, tampering when referring to the firemen following MM&A procedures in shutting down the locomotive when responding to a report of it being on fire. Calling that action tampering is dishonest and scapegoating, not just a personality trait.
I am surprised that people are so sensitive about criticizing Mr. Burkhardt while being totally oblivious to the gravity of the fact that he is destroying another man’s life. Criticizing Burkhardt’s position in this, at this point, is like throwing a lifeline to his victim. There is a lot more going on with Burkhardt besides is personality.
tdmidgetThe engineer had the responsibility of securing his train. That is what he should have done. He should have done it correctly and completely and then report to his dispatcher that it had been done. He was the captain of that ship. He should not have called and asked permission to do his job. Unless the brakes on the cars were released by someone, the engineer is at fault. You can't pass the buck to Burkhardt, a dispatcher, or anyone else.
Unless the brakes on the cars were released by someone, the engineer is at fault. You can't pass the buck to Burkhardt, a dispatcher, or anyone else.
tdmidget,
I disagree with your assertion that the engineer is at the top of the chain of command. Nobody has said that the engineer did not know what to do, and that he asked the dispatcher what to do; as you say. What has been reported is that one or more people with higher authority than the engineer ordered the engineer (against his better judgment) to leave the defective engine running, which jeopardized the health and safety of people nearby. So the engineer clearly was not the “captain of the ship” as you contend.
You say that the engineer had the responsibility to secure his train. Yet that responsibility is meaningless without a rule defining what “secure” means. It is the responsibility of the MM&A to provide that rule. So, the actions of the engineer are not the only component of making sure the train stayed put.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada has said that they will look into the MM&A train securement special instructions and procedures to see if they played a role in the disaster. They also said that it would be unusual for the responsibility of such a large disaster to fall only on the actions of one person. So they have no preconceived notions about the engineer being the captain of a ship.
tdmidgetRegardless of what kind of bizarre rules and micromanaging goes on there, a cardinal rule of any organization and especially one like MM&A is that it is always easier to ask forgiveness than permission. Do your job, do it right, and there will always be less explaining to do.
Doing your job is doing what the company wants you to do. So what is right?
As usual, Bucyrus takes the most obtuse point of view and beats it to death.
Now it's obvious that Burkhardt is a Bozo blowhard who is very impressed with himself. That however does not change the responsibilities of other individuals. The engineer had the responsibility of securing his train. That is what he should have done. He should have done it correctly and completely and then report to his dispatcher that it had been done. He was the captain of that ship. He should not have called and asked permission to do his job. Operations personnel operate, dispatchers dispatch, and mechanical people repair. The dispatcher had no need to know what unit was running, only that the train had arrived and was secured. So the engineer dropped the ball right there if he was so helpless that he asked the dispatcher what to do. The locomotives are a non factor in the runaway. The locomotive brakes, hand or air, DO NOT COUNT for train securement. The only reason that a unit needed to be left running was to eliminate the requirement for a terminal brake test. Leaving a less than reliable unit running does not meet that requirement. Regardless of what kind of bizarre rules and micromanaging goes on there, a cardinal rule of any organization and especially one like MM&A is that it is always easier to ask forgiveness than permission. Do your job, do it right, and there will always be less explaining to do.
The Toronto Star noted that when Burkhardt took over the MM&A in 2003, he cut employee wages by 40 per cent and locomotive crews were cut in half, replacing two workers with one. Burkhardt ran a shoestring operation that had an accident rate more than double the national average. His insensitive and foolish comments following a negligent accident are merely the icing on the cake.
pi ck up a phone---- He did that. The desk dispatcher (or whatever the supervisor's title is) OK's his putting out the fire and sent a track maintainer to watch, a MM&A employee who left after the fire was put out.
But he should have insisted an employee stay with the train or have on of his own people do so. And if there was no vandalism, the the desk dispatcher has the greatest share of the blame. Unless he wishes to pass the buck by saying he was followiing specific rules. (Which I think he was not!)
Of course the engineer has part of the blame. He should not have done something that he suspected as unsafe regardless of the dispatcher's decision based on hours of ser vice.
Of course, Ed has a major share, because the railroad obviously did not have a real SAFETY FIRST culture. When he took command, he probably wanted the French Canadians to do their own thing without interfering too much lest it look like USA Colonialism in Canada. This may have been the most important reason for the lack of a real safety culture.
If Ed had been a USA service veteran, he would not have fumbled the PR as badly as he did.
I think he's overwhelmed less than he's a jerk, though I fully admit I know next to nothing about the man beyond what I have seen of him in press conferences. He smiles a lot -- far too much. Even when answering very serious questions, there's this crooked, nervous little smile on his face the whole time. Unlike other people, I don't think this necessarily indicates the guy has a huge character flaw. Having said that, you get away with a lot more when you look like you're in as much agony as the people who have lost loved ones.
Were I Burkhardt, when I showed up to the town in the days after the disaster, I would have frowned the entire time. I might even have cried. Even if I couldn't manage to do it for real -- although I probably could; I am pretty emotional, and just looking at the devastation and knowing I had some hand in it would have destroyed me -- I would have faked some tears. Because I would know that it's not just important for me or my company for me to look compassionate, but that it's important for the people personally affected to see someone suffer with them. He did himself a real disservice not to look sad.
So Burkhardt is a jerk? You've said that over and over and over. Your obsession with the person is truly repetitive.
I have watched some videos of Burkhardt’s news conferences, and all I can say is it’s no wonder the people of Lac-Megantic are mad at him. Everything that comes out of his mouth demonstrates how hard it is to be compassionate and snarky at the same time.
He says the locomotive had been tampered with. He says emphatically that it is “definitely true.” He says the firemen are the ones who tampered with it. Then he says, “Now, were they negligent in their tampering? I think not.”
Well of course they weren’t negligent, but they weren’t tampering either. The word “tampering” means something even worse than negligence. It means to engage secretly or improperly in something. Obviously, Burkhardt has carefully chosen the word, “tampering” to make something sinister in order to create a straw man on which to deflect blame.
The only thing the firemen did is shut down the engine according to procedures that they had been trained on by the MM&A. They did not tamper by any stretch of the imagination. They did their job. This was not the first MM&A locomotive fire they have responded to.
In another exchange, a reporter says, “But you don’t accept full responsibility for this?” Then Burkhardt blows his stack at her and says he never said that. Then he goes on to say that he accepts plenty of responsibility, but not all of it. So he affirms something that he just angrily said he never said.
This is from the video with this news article. Both the article and the video paint an incredibly vivid picture:
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbaldoni/2013/07/15/how-edward-burkhardt-is-making-the-lac-megantic-accident-even-worse/
tree68 BucyrusHe did have sufficient brakes set to prevent the train from rolling, but Thank you.
BucyrusHe did have sufficient brakes set to prevent the train from rolling, but
Thank you.
Predictability!
tree68 While it's obvious that at some point in the timeline there were not sufficient brakes to hold the train, there is nothing to indicate that the engineer did not set sufficient brakes per MM&A rules. The fact that the train was not rolling away as he left it indicates that he did set sufficient brakes to hold the train at that point.
It does not indicate that. He did have sufficient brakes set to prevent the train from rolling, but that included all of the automatic air brakes and independent brakes. The engineer’s responsibility under rule 112 is to set sufficient handbrakes to hold the train, and that requirement must be met completely without air brakes being set.
The air brakes alone could have held the train, so we don’t know if the engineer set any handbrakes even though the train did not move when he left it. He was, of course, free to add air brakes to the securement, but air brakes cannot be counted in the fulfillment of the securement rule.
I agree that they may have done the same procedure without any problems many times in the past. However, it may be the case that their past securements were relying on air brakes to hold the train without enough handbrakes to hold it on their own. It may be that they did that repeatedly and were just lucky that the air brakes remained set. So, the mere fact that the train with air brakes set does not roll does not prove that the train securement handbrake rule has been fulfilled.
The problem is, we simply don't know enough about the mechanical state of the engine in order to pass judgment. For me, the key moment came when the fire department climbed on board the locomotive and -- reportedly -- turned it off. Broken or not, to that point, things were holding. Once someone shut off the engine and walked away, we now have a disaster.
You can wag a knowing finger at MMA for having shoddy equipment and whatnot, but we all know that many railroads in both countries operate on a strict mechanical budget, and things are often not fixed until it is absolutely imperative to do so. Without going too far, I will say that at some point, someone is going to need to look a bit closer at the actions of the members of the fire brigade, and whether or not they were overreacting (if not outright trespassing) in climbing aboard and the train and tampering with it without first placing a call to the railroad.
Unless lives were clearly in jeopardy from the locomotive fire, the first act should have been to pick up a phone.
Bucyrus FOUR POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR THE RUNAWAY: 1) The engineer failed to set sufficient handbrakes per the train securement rules of MM&A.
FOUR POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR THE RUNAWAY:
1) The engineer failed to set sufficient handbrakes per the train securement rules of MM&A.
That this was likely not the first such train parked there, and probably not the first train that this engineer had parked there, I would opine that the train securement practices in use up to that time were sufficient.
That's not to say that some unknown person did not indeed release brakes on some of the tank cars (or locomotives), but we'll have to wait for the official investigation to find out the answer to that.
2)Somebody released the handbrakes after the engineer set them.
This has been discussed. I would opine that no handbrakes were released as such, but as I've said before that the shutdown of the one running locomotive may have lead to the release of the independent brakes on the axles not secured by handbrakes. This could have been up to 20% of the secured axles.
While the rules for setting brakes at Nantes may have been inadequate, they are not non-existent. The general rules for setting brakes would still apply - and may well cover special situations, which puts this back at possibility number 1.
While I'll be the first to say "never say never," I find this very highly unlikely. Until the tapes (if they exist) are released, I'm going with the supervisors never having uttered such words.
Waiting on the "yes, but..."
I am revising my list of possible causes to include a fourth cause that I brought up in the part-one version of this thread. In that thread, some posters thought that in the case of item #4, the engineer should have done the right thing no matter what he was ordered to do, even if it meant getting fired from his job.
I have also revised item #3 to include the possibility that MM&A has no train securement rules for Nantes.
1) The engineer failed to set sufficient handbrakes per the train securement rules of MM&A.2) Somebody released the handbrakes after the engineer set them.3) The train securement rules of the MM&A at Nantes are inadequate, or non-existent.
What about doing the right thing in the case of item #3? If the rules simply call for 11 handbrakes, including the engines, should the engineer have gone further and tested the securement with a push-pull test even though the rules do not require it?
It is most certainly not that simple.
THREE POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR THE RUNAWAY:
1) The engineer failed to set sufficient handbrakes per the train securement rules of MM&A.2) Somebody released the handbrakes after the engineer set them.3) The train securement rules of the MM&A are inadequate.
The TSB of Canada has said they are investigating both item #1 and #3. My whole point of this thread is the possibility of item #3. The news media has questioned the possibility of item #3, but has been stonewalled by the refusal of MM&A to divulge their special instructions for train securement at Nantes.
oltmannd This is really quite simple: Did the engineer properly secure the train with handbrakes? That is, did he tie the train down and the see if it would move? That's the "belt". The air is just "suspenders." If the suspenders fail, the belt still holds up your pants. If "no" then it's on the engineer, pure and simple. If "yes" then, how did the train start to move at a later time? Either some human action occurred or the physics changed. If some human action caused it, who did what? Intentional or unintentional? If the physics changed, what was is and what do we do from now on? That's it. Really.
This is really quite simple:
Did the engineer properly secure the train with handbrakes? That is, did he tie the train down and the see if it would move? That's the "belt". The air is just "suspenders." If the suspenders fail, the belt still holds up your pants.
If "no" then it's on the engineer, pure and simple.
If "yes" then, how did the train start to move at a later time? Either some human action occurred or the physics changed.
If some human action caused it, who did what? Intentional or unintentional?
If the physics changed, what was is and what do we do from now on?
That's it. Really.
I agree with Don. Logically, this is not so hard to examine. If the engineer failed to secure the train with handbrakes, which appears to be the case or else the train would not have moved regardless of the engine and air application, then he is at fault.
All of these threads here...plenty of facts to go around. Gotta be a few extras...
Norm48327 Bucyrus PathfinderSo you are quite willing to try him in the court of the internet. I don’t have to start a trial here. There is already a trial of public opinion well underway. And it was started because just one man rushed to judgment—one man who refused to wait for the official investigation. One man with the world spotlight upon him has blamed this entire Lac-Megantic disaster on another man who is patiently bearing the burden of this premature accusation, waiting for his chance to tell his story. May I remind you that public opinion is not always correct nor is it a court of law. The TSB report will eventually disclose the facts.
Bucyrus PathfinderSo you are quite willing to try him in the court of the internet. I don’t have to start a trial here. There is already a trial of public opinion well underway. And it was started because just one man rushed to judgment—one man who refused to wait for the official investigation. One man with the world spotlight upon him has blamed this entire Lac-Megantic disaster on another man who is patiently bearing the burden of this premature accusation, waiting for his chance to tell his story.
PathfinderSo you are quite willing to try him in the court of the internet.
I don’t have to start a trial here. There is already a trial of public opinion well underway. And it was started because just one man rushed to judgment—one man who refused to wait for the official investigation. One man with the world spotlight upon him has blamed this entire Lac-Megantic disaster on another man who is patiently bearing the burden of this premature accusation, waiting for his chance to tell his story.
May I remind you that public opinion is not always correct nor is it a court of law. The TSB report will eventually disclose the facts.
And even then, some of the 'facts' may be presented with an political agenda.
Hi
I was talking with a CN conductor on Saturday evening at a family gathering.
He and his coworkers are really having difficulty understanding what could have happened. They are waiting to see what the TSB comes up with. In the meantime rule changes re handbrakes have come down the pipe (tonnage based per axle if I heard him correctly).
He is experienced in the yard and on the road. If he and his coworkers in TYE service are having difficulty making sense of this then perhaps we should hold off speculating, as I remarked at the beginning of this thread. There's more than enough hurt to go around as it is.
I'm with Pathfinder.
Charlie
Chilliwack, BC
Pathfinder Bucyrus AVRNUTI think when all is said & done on this, assigning blame will still be a moot point. No matter where the actual blame may fall, the end result will be the same: The MM&A will be history. Moot point? Are you kidding? How would you like to spend the rest of your life being falsely held responsible for killing 47 people and destroying half their town when you did not cause that to happen? It may be moot to the MM&A, but it is hardly moot to Tom Harding. So you are quite willing to try him in the court of the internet. You now have, how many topics on this one subject, 3? And they all seem to say the same thing "we now know..." Unless you have insider knowledge of the investigation, "I", "we" and "you" do not know anything except what has been reported by the TSB. Relying on Wikipedia and news reports as "facts" in a case like this is not a good practice. I was resident of a town that was put into a panic by "news" reports of a child killer (the father murdered his 3 children, within one block of where we lived) and I know what the news people will do just to get a story, and keep it going if it suites them. And I also know how easy it is to post to Wiki, and there are no checks or balances with that. I know it may be hard for the armchair investigators but we need to be patient and wait till the TSB has done its job and gotten the actual facts as closely as they can determine out. That may take a year or more in a case like this. Please remember that for us Canadians this is a very significant tragedy. I have had people who know I am interested in railways ask me my thoughts for the first time re anything railway related. I say the same as here, wait till the report is out. Personally I would like to see these topics closed as they do not seem to serve any purpose but to perpetuate unfounded rumors as "fact". My loony's worth, and no more from me..... Pfinder
Bucyrus AVRNUTI think when all is said & done on this, assigning blame will still be a moot point. No matter where the actual blame may fall, the end result will be the same: The MM&A will be history. Moot point? Are you kidding? How would you like to spend the rest of your life being falsely held responsible for killing 47 people and destroying half their town when you did not cause that to happen? It may be moot to the MM&A, but it is hardly moot to Tom Harding.
AVRNUTI think when all is said & done on this, assigning blame will still be a moot point. No matter where the actual blame may fall, the end result will be the same: The MM&A will be history.
Moot point? Are you kidding? How would you like to spend the rest of your life being falsely held responsible for killing 47 people and destroying half their town when you did not cause that to happen?
It may be moot to the MM&A, but it is hardly moot to Tom Harding.
So you are quite willing to try him in the court of the internet. You now have, how many topics on this one subject, 3? And they all seem to say the same thing "we now know..." Unless you have insider knowledge of the investigation, "I", "we" and "you" do not know anything except what has been reported by the TSB. Relying on Wikipedia and news reports as "facts" in a case like this is not a good practice.
I was resident of a town that was put into a panic by "news" reports of a child killer (the father murdered his 3 children, within one block of where we lived) and I know what the news people will do just to get a story, and keep it going if it suites them. And I also know how easy it is to post to Wiki, and there are no checks or balances with that.
I know it may be hard for the armchair investigators but we need to be patient and wait till the TSB has done its job and gotten the actual facts as closely as they can determine out. That may take a year or more in a case like this.
Please remember that for us Canadians this is a very significant tragedy. I have had people who know I am interested in railways ask me my thoughts for the first time re anything railway related. I say the same as here, wait till the report is out. Personally I would like to see these topics closed as they do not seem to serve any purpose but to perpetuate unfounded rumors as "fact".
My loony's worth, and no more from me.....
Pfinder
AMEN!
We should also consider that Ed Burkhardt was probably not involved in the day-to-day business of running this particular railway, even if technically "the buck stops here". I understand the MM&A was just one of several in the Railworld group, although possibly the only one in North America. It is the local managers who set the detailed operating rules and oversaw the MM&A employees. The local folks are also the ones with the detailed knowledge of the physical characteristics of the line.
In those stressful first few days he seems to have spoken foolishly, without much in the way of facts to support his statements. Many on this forum know even less, yet are even faster to jump to conclusions.
schlimmBucyrusWhen the top guy demonstrates that degree of misunderstanding of train securement, it tells me that there is a good chance that something is wrong with their train securement rules. Or perhaps Burkhardt knew that his operators don't reliably set nearly enough handbrakes when leaving a train unattended and their clock is up.
BucyrusWhen the top guy demonstrates that degree of misunderstanding of train securement, it tells me that there is a good chance that something is wrong with their train securement rules.
Or perhaps Burkhardt knew that his operators don't reliably set nearly enough handbrakes when leaving a train unattended and their clock is up.
That too could be the case. That is, that Burkhardt might have known that his people took short cuts against the rules, and then he looked the other way. But if that is what happened, the blame would still fall on the engineer if it could be proven that the engineer did not set enough handbrakes; and if nobody could prove that Burkhardt knew about the transgression.
However, if that were the case, Burkhardt is cooking his own goose by saying that the train ran away because the shutdown engine caused the air brakes to release. Therefore, it seems to me that he would not say that if he realized how damaging it is to his position, which is that the engineer is at fault.
Now just because Burkhardt is saying that a running locomotive is needed to aid in securing a train does not mean that his rules also say that. It very well could be that the rules are correct, and Burkhardt is simply unwittingly talking about the need for a running locomotive to prevent the train from rolling.
But it also could be that his rules do say that a running locomotive is part of the securement protocol, and that he is speaking in terms of those rules. Indeed, one would expect the company president to be speaking about the runaway cause in the context of the company rules intended to prevent runaways.
So I think Burkhardt is in a very strange position. He started out blaming the fire department, and then switched to blaming the engineer. But in a way, he seems like he is still blaming the fire department in addition to blaming the engineer.
By blaming the fire department, it must follow that the air brakes mattered. He says they did matter. If the air brakes mattered then it weekens his case against the engineer and a lack of handbrakes. So he is undermining his case against the engineer by adhering to his case against the fire department.
Has the MM&A held it's formal disciplinary investigation of the personnel associated with this incident yet?
I think when all is said & done on this, assigning blame will still be a moot point. No matter where the actual blame may fall, the end result will be the same: The MM&A will be history. They do indeed run a lot of older equipment & in their brief 10 year history their safety record is not exactly glowing. in fact,according to some reports I've read, incliding one the OP linked to early on one of the threads on this topic, their accident & incident record is nearly twice the national average.
There was a segment on our local news last night about the 40+ workers from the Brownville Junction yard that the MM&A laid off. They are already attending workshops that are designed to either re-train them for other work or to enable them to "transfer" their existing skills to other fields. I doubt any of these workers would be doing this already if they felt that getting that line & junction up & running again was going to be anytime soon or at all & that their jobs would still be there. They apparently know their jobs with MM&A are toast and that MM&A is not coming back. And the MM&A cannot operate without Brownville Junction.
Carl
They did not need any locomotives to be running if sufficient handbrakes had been applied as required. As I understand it, the only reason to leave an engine running to pump air is to avoid the requirement and effort to perform a terminal air brake test before leaving the next day.
However, Mr. Burkhardt seems to believe that the reason to leave an engine running is to hold the train in place by keeping air brakes applied. In the wake of the disaster, he even concludes that leaving two engines running would be a better policy, so one engine can act as a backup.
When the top guy demonstrates that degree of misunderstanding of train securement, it tells me that there is a good chance that something is wrong with their train securement rules.
Bucyrus Don, ....... In any case, my larger point is that the MM&A chose to let the ailing engine idle all night rather than shut it down and run one of the other four. And to me, this indicates a hurry to quit, and a lack of care that might have a connection to the lack of care in securing the train. ..........
.......
In any case, my larger point is that the MM&A chose to let the ailing engine idle all night rather than shut it down and run one of the other four. And to me, this indicates a hurry to quit, and a lack of care that might have a connection to the lack of care in securing the train.
..........
oltmannd Bucyrus Don, Well, my point was that the public reported seeing heavy black smoke, unburned fuel, and sparks— all of which were erupting from the exhaust stack, so they interpreted it as a fire and called the fire department. Since this fire and smoke was coming from the exhaust stack, I surmised that the the so-called "fire", contrary to the news reports, was not a free burning fire onboard the locomotive such as a burning fuel from a leak or an electrical fire. Instead, I concluded that the so-called "fire" was an extension of the combustion process originating inside of the prime mover. I theorized that it was a turbo that had failed, causing air starvation, and resulting in a fuel-rich ratio. But if a turbo can’t cause that, and if an injector nozzle can, then that sounds like a plausible explanation. Although, I am surprised that one could cause the extent of the symptoms reported. In any case, my larger point is that the MM&A chose to let the ailing engine idle all night rather than shut it down and run one of the other four. And to me, this indicates a hurry to quit, and a lack of care that might have a connection to the lack of care in securing the train. A still larger point is that this hurry and lack of care seems to have been a decision of the engineer’s supervisor, and was actually opposed by the engineer. And so my largest point is that until we know that MM&A train securement rules and policy was not sloppy and inadequate, it is premature to blame the engineer. The failed train securement may have been caused by the MM&A rather than the engineer. I'm not you have a point to make - too many nested "if" statements. IF the problem was aided by an ailing locomotive and IF the engineer didn't properly tie down the train and IF the locomotive's problems started before the engineer taxied away and IF the problems were noticeable by the engineer at the time he left. and etc. etc. This is really quite simple: Did the engineer properly secure the train with handbrakes? That is, did he tie the train down and the see if it would move? That's the "belt". The air is just "suspenders." If the suspenders fail, the belt still holds up your pants. If "no" then it's on the engineer, pure and simple.
Bucyrus Don, Well, my point was that the public reported seeing heavy black smoke, unburned fuel, and sparks— all of which were erupting from the exhaust stack, so they interpreted it as a fire and called the fire department. Since this fire and smoke was coming from the exhaust stack, I surmised that the the so-called "fire", contrary to the news reports, was not a free burning fire onboard the locomotive such as a burning fuel from a leak or an electrical fire. Instead, I concluded that the so-called "fire" was an extension of the combustion process originating inside of the prime mover. I theorized that it was a turbo that had failed, causing air starvation, and resulting in a fuel-rich ratio. But if a turbo can’t cause that, and if an injector nozzle can, then that sounds like a plausible explanation. Although, I am surprised that one could cause the extent of the symptoms reported. In any case, my larger point is that the MM&A chose to let the ailing engine idle all night rather than shut it down and run one of the other four. And to me, this indicates a hurry to quit, and a lack of care that might have a connection to the lack of care in securing the train. A still larger point is that this hurry and lack of care seems to have been a decision of the engineer’s supervisor, and was actually opposed by the engineer. And so my largest point is that until we know that MM&A train securement rules and policy was not sloppy and inadequate, it is premature to blame the engineer. The failed train securement may have been caused by the MM&A rather than the engineer.
Well, my point was that the public reported seeing heavy black smoke, unburned fuel, and sparks— all of which were erupting from the exhaust stack, so they interpreted it as a fire and called the fire department.
Since this fire and smoke was coming from the exhaust stack, I surmised that the the so-called "fire", contrary to the news reports, was not a free burning fire onboard the locomotive such as a burning fuel from a leak or an electrical fire. Instead, I concluded that the so-called "fire" was an extension of the combustion process originating inside of the prime mover.
I theorized that it was a turbo that had failed, causing air starvation, and resulting in a fuel-rich ratio. But if a turbo can’t cause that, and if an injector nozzle can, then that sounds like a plausible explanation. Although, I am surprised that one could cause the extent of the symptoms reported.
A still larger point is that this hurry and lack of care seems to have been a decision of the engineer’s supervisor, and was actually opposed by the engineer.
And so my largest point is that until we know that MM&A train securement rules and policy was not sloppy and inadequate, it is premature to blame the engineer. The failed train securement may have been caused by the MM&A rather than the engineer.
I'm not you have a point to make - too many nested "if" statements.
IF the problem was aided by an ailing locomotive
and
IF the engineer didn't properly tie down the train
IF the locomotive's problems started before the engineer taxied away
IF the problems were noticeable by the engineer at the time he left.
etc. etc.
But you are responding to a picture that I did not paint.
In answer to your bullet points:
I don’t believe, nor have I ever suggested that the runaway problem was aided by the ailing locomotive.
The locomotive problems did start before the engineer taxied away.
The problems were noticeable by the engineer at the time he left, and he commented to the taxi driver that he did not favor leaving the locomotive idle in that condition, and he intended to re-contact the company to see if they might reconsider their decision to leave the locomotive idle.
I understand your belt = handbrakes and suspenders = air brakes analogy. But I believe the question goes beyond whether the engineer set handbrakes and performed a successful push-pull test. I think the question also includes the question of whether the MM&A required a push-pull test, and-or whether the MM&A rules called for a sufficient number of handbrakes in lieu of empirical proof of a push-pull test. As I carefully explained in my first post, there are reasons to doubt the MM&A train securement rules.
I find it rather suspicious that the entity that is so over the top in publicly rushing to condemn the engineer for causing the disaster is the very entity that is likely to be the cause if the engineer is vindicated.
I agree that it is quite simple. I see three possible causes for the runaway:
BucyrusBut in the meantime, a mighty burden has been placed on engineer, Tom Harding by the unproven accusation by MM&A President Burkhardt, that Mr. Harding’s negligence is the sole cause of this massive disaster.
BucyrusMr. Burkhardt’s concern over keeping the air pumped up might be an indication that it is MM&A practice that the air brakes and handbrakes are intended to work together to do the job of train securement. However, this premise is absolutely incorrect and unacceptable as a train securement policy.
If it is unfair to tar the engineer with this type of speculation, why is it okay to tar Burkhardt with the same sort of speculation?
BucyrusAnd yet, experts here have all agreed that there can be no prescribed number because the number has to be determined by the empirical push-pull test.
All agreed? Push-pull test? Say, what? I don't think so....
BigJim If there was black smoke, something was burning. OR, not burning...as in improper fuel/air ratio.
If there was black smoke, something was burning.
OR, not burning...as in improper fuel/air ratio.
This accident appears to be a chain of items that caused the accident. If any one item had not happened the accident may not have happened.
There is the classic example of Eastern Air Lines flight 401 that crashed into the everglades. I believe there was a chain of 9 contributing items any one that had not occurred would have prevented the accident. That included a couple of omissions by air traffic control.
The UPS accident at Birmingham although preliminary already shows at least 2 items.
This is only a forum. Whether folks want to blame the engineer or a moose from the woods is all part of something known as free speech, which is a fundamental right to be exercised. And as far as it goes, what anyone says on this thread or any other has no impact on the outcome of the investigation.
[quote Bucyrus]"I think we are refraining from convicting or blaming anyone. I don’t recall one single comment on this forum where someone blamed anyone for the Lac-Megantic runaway."
Norm48327 How can you possibly have the cajones to say that when in other threads on the topic you have all nut nailed the engineer to the cross? I suggest you go back and reread some of your earlier posts. My.
As I said, I don't recall anyone blaming anyone for the wreck. I have not blamed the engineer or anyone else for the wreck. I have actually gone out of my way to defend the engineer against a rush to judgment. I have been critical of Burkhardt, but not for causing the wreck.
But since you say that I have blamed the engineer for the wreck, please show me what I said.
"I think we are refraining from convicting or blaming anyone. I don’t recall one single comment on this forum where someone blamed anyone for the Lac-Megantic runaway."
How can you possibly have the cajones to say that when in other threads on the topic you have all nut nailed the engineer to the cross? I suggest you go back and reread some of your earlier posts. My.
Semper Vaporo...but we (non-RRer and RRer alike) really must refrain from convicting any of the principles in the catastrophe.
I think we are refraining from convicting or blaming anyone. I don’t recall one single comment on this forum where someone blamed anyone for the Lac-Megantic runaway. The only person I am aware of who has blamed anyone is Ed Burkhardt, president of the MM&A, blaming the engineer. I have not seen any news coverage or opinion pieces that blame anybody except for the news reporting on Burkhardt blaming the engineer.
According to Mr. Burkhardt, the train rolled because handbrakes were not sufficiently applied, and this can only mean that engineer, Tom Harding failed to apply handbrakes sufficiently.
I just wanted to point out the fact that the MM&A’s train securement rules might be insufficient, and that may be the reason why the train rolled away. I am not saying that the rules are insufficient. I am just saying that they could be unless it is proved otherwise.
Since Mr. Burhardt is confident enough to publicly place blame for violating his rules, it would only be fair for him to tell us what those rules are.
BucyrusThis new information says that the smoke was black, and that it was coming out of the exhaust stack. Black smoke comes out of an engine due to incomplete combustion. The description of black smoke and spitting oil coming from the exhaust stack sounds like a failed turbocharger. A failed turbo does not deliver enough combustion air, so the normal engine fuel delivery is excessive for the amount of air available. So the engine runs “fuel rich.”
No, no, a thousand times no! Not on a GE locomotive. At idle the turbo is doing next to nothing. The engine is operating like a naturally aspirated engine. If there was black smoke, something was burning.
I still have yet to hear how the Full Service brake application was released. Even with no compressor operating the auxiliary reservoir on each car should have maintained an effective brake for more than 12 hours. i suspect that whoever shut the engine down also be accident or otherwise released the brakes.
You must remember that anything said by anybody in the early hours of such a calamity is to be taken with a grain of salt. Most people will be speaking from 2nd hand knowledge or speculation and cannot be relied upon to be speaking facts about the present situation.
Consider Mr. Burkhardt's comments... I do not know his level of proficiency in practical day-to-day/rule-book railroading, but I suspect his expertise is in the managerial aspect of running the RR from a dollars and cents perspective. He knows there are rules, but he has never been responsible to apply them. (or maybe he has, I don't know)... but assuming that he only knows of the existence of the rules, then when this accident occurred and he read (or was told) about the initial reports of what was done and what should have been done, he defended his RR by referring to what he was told.... 11 handbrakes were set and that is by the rules... did he KNOW that for sure? meh... probably not, but that is what he was told so that is what he repeated. Later, people began to question the "known facts" as they became more clear (or more muddled, your choice) he has had to alter his defense of his RR to put the blame where it will do the least damage to his RR. i.e.: blame the engineer for not following the rules.
EVERYTHING that we get to read in the press is CYA junk at this point. Some might be facts, but most is speculation mashed over by people that have no idea what the words mean.
I suspect that the Engineer has a lawyer and that lawyer told him to make NO public comments about anything... PERIOD... it is too bad that all the other people involved (including Mr. Burkhardt) didn't get the exact same advice and then follow it.
What was that silly comment made by the politician several years ago about "known unknowns and unknown unknowns".
There are aspects to all accidents that must be investigated by experienced and knowledgeable investigators to determine if they have some bearing on the accident. Until those people have had a chance to examine the evidence and hear the eyewitness accounts (not 2nd hand guesses) to determine what is relevant and what is not, those that are placing blame are displaying ignorance, not intelligence.
Could it have been the Engineer's fault? Sure, it COULD have. It could also have been YOUR (you what am reading this) fault! But we cannot convict you until we prove it, and to blame you at this point would be irresponsible.
Speculation of possible causes, for us arm-chair Railroaders, is of interest because we have a lot more Unknown unknowns than the real Railroader, but we (non-RRer and RRer alike) really must refrain from convicting any of the principles in the catastrophe.
I know this is just speculation and that the actual facts will probably come out in the investigation. Some say it is wrong to speculate. But in the meantime, a mighty burden has been placed on engineer, Tom Harding by the unproven accusation by MM&A President Burkhardt, that Mr. Harding’s negligence is the sole cause of this massive disaster. And while that too is just speculation, it matters because the burden that it places on Mr. Harding is real.
If it turns out that Mr. Harding is blameless, it will have been a great injustice to have accused him in a reckless and self-serving rush to judgment without any proof. I hope that anyone who believes that speculation is wrong will look at the speculation by Mr. Burkhardt. So I would like to offer a few thoughts as to reasons why the guilt of Mr. Harding may not be a forgone conclusion as Mr. Burkhardt contends.
Ed Burkhardt has expressed concern that the one running locomotive was shut down and that caused the air brakes to release. This is insightful because there should be no such concern. A running locomotive can shut down on its own at any time for any of a number of different reasons. Therefore, a running locomotive cannot be relied on the hold a train by its air brakes, and there is no safety rule that is predicated on a running locomotive to secure a train by keeping air brakes applied.
Yet, Burkhardt’s concern clearly shows that he believes that a running locomotive was essential to keeping the train from rolling away. He even reaffirms that belief by saying that he thinks that a second locomotive should be kept running as a backup in case one happens to shut down. This is completely wrong headed thinking on his part. And since it is coming from the top guy, it suggests to me that MM&A train securement rules might actually be based on this erroneous thinking.
Mr. Burkhardt’s concern over keeping the air pumped up might be an indication that it is MM&A practice that the air brakes and handbrakes are intended to work together to do the job of train securement. However, this premise is absolutely incorrect and unacceptable as a train securement policy. Train securement must not depend on the air brakes.
We don’t know what the MM&A rules are that govern train securement at Nantes. The individual railroad companies develop their own special instructions for how to comply with train securement rule 112 in Canada; and they are not required to make this information public, so they choose not to. It is easy to assume that the rules are in place, and if one follows the rules, the train won’t roll. But how do we know that the rules are correct? Ed Burkhardt’s regret about the locomotive being shut down is strong evidence that the MM&A securement rules are faulty.
When Ed Burkhardt was asked what the MM&A rules were for train securement at Nantes, he said he did not know. Maybe that is understandable, but what he did know and say is that 11 handbrakes were required. And yet, experts here have all agreed that there can be no prescribed number because the number has to be determined by the empirical push-pull test. So why would Burkhardt conclude that the engineer was at fault for the runaway because he failed to set 11 handbrakes?
Tom Harding, the engineer of the doomed oil train, has not spoken publicly at all since the runaway. Meanwhile, Ed Burkhardt has publically stated that he believes the engineer is guilty of causing the Lac-Megantic disaster because he failed to set sufficient handbrakes. But, what we don’t know is the MM&A rules that stipulated exactly what Mr. Harding’s duty was in securing that train with handbrakes. Considering Burkhardt’s comments about needing to make sure air brakes remain set to secure trains, and his apparent lack of knowledge about the MM&A train securement rules, I think there is a fair chance that the engineer did follow the rules, but the rules were flawed.
My first thought was that the MM&A took a risk by ignoring a substantial fire hazard, but, as I explained in my first post, I think that is an incorrect assumption because it appears that there was no fire hazard. But nevertheless, the MM&A did choose to let a distressed, excessively smoking locomotive run all night, posing a considerable nuisance to the residents and a visibility danger to drivers on the highway.
There appears to be no obvious reason why they chose this problematic course of action when it would have been just as easy to shut down the troubled locomotive and use another one. Again, this suggests an arbitrary decision to abruptly end the day’s work at Nantes; as does the apparent failure to complete the job of setting sufficient handbrakes.
Furthermore, we know that the decision to let the smoking locomotive run, to the detriment of the surroundings, was a decision made by MM&A management, and disagreed with by the locomotive engineer. Was the decision to not set sufficient handbrakes also a decision made by MM&A management?
Thanks Ed and WSOR 3801 for that information. It sounds like there was no good reason to let that damaged locomotive idle all night when they could have just shut it down and let another one run.
edblysard Not long at all, less than 5 minutes if that. Basically set the second unit up as the lead, set the front unit up as a trailing unit, it makes no difference if it is in front or behind the unit you select as the lead. Flip a few switches, turn a brake valve selector , do the reverse on the other unit and done.
Not long at all, less than 5 minutes if that.
Basically set the second unit up as the lead, set the front unit up as a trailing unit, it makes no difference if it is in front or behind the unit you select as the lead.
Flip a few switches, turn a brake valve selector , do the reverse on the other unit and done.
Unless the lead engine is wired up weird, such that it dumps things when the breakers are dropped, or has all electric control of the air brakes, you shouldn't have to do all that.
Just leave the second (or whichever) unit running to supply the air, and the head unit can be left set up for lead. Air still runs through the piping and valves when an engine is shut down. This works on 26 air, not sure what is in use on MMA.
I've had a lead engine fail en route, made it into the terminal. Headlights and control circuits are run off the batteries and MU cable. Got cold, though, as the heaters won't work if the engine is shut down.
Mike WSOR engineer | HO scale since 1988 | Visit our club www.WCGandyDancers.com
Since all five MM&A engines were running when the train arrived at Nantes, any one of the five could have been left running when the other four were shut down. The engine with the failed turbo was the lead and controlling unit, and that is the one they left running to keep the air pumped up.
Here is my question: If they had shut down that controlling engine plus three others, and left the second engine running, would that be all the change required to have that second engine assume the role of pumping air? Or, would control changes be necessary in order to switch the air pumping function from the first engine to the second? If so, what would those control changes be, and how much time would they take?
edblysard Oh look, an EMD pretending to be an Alco!
Oh look, an EMD pretending to be an Alco!
Which is a Diesel pretending to be a steam locomotive.
This from an engineer who runs ALCOs...
Bucyrus This typically causes flames to blow several feet out of the exhaust stack along with extremely thick black smoke. The flames are called “torching.”..... .....Railroad companies have routinely continued to run locomotives with failed turbochargers while under pulling load, so they must have felt that it would not be too unreasonable to let one idle. However, pulling with a bad turbo is an emergency measure to get the train over the road.
This typically causes flames to blow several feet out of the exhaust stack along with extremely thick black smoke. The flames are called “torching.”.....
.....Railroad companies have routinely continued to run locomotives with failed turbochargers while under pulling load, so they must have felt that it would not be too unreasonable to let one idle. However, pulling with a bad turbo is an emergency measure to get the train over the road.
BroadwayLion Fish are good for you.
Fish are good for you.
I prefer those things that crawl along the bottom; ie; Shrimp, Crab, Lobster.
The Route of the Broadway Lion The Largest Subway Layout in North Dakota.
Here there be cats. LIONS with CAMERAS
Norm48327 Sounds like you're still on a 'fishing trip'.
Sounds like you're still on a 'fishing trip'.
+1.
Still waiting for the OFFICIAL TSB report.
We just knew there was a better explanation for the "fire" than those from the "eye witnesses". This makes far more sense than the locomotive being on fire. Still one wonders why not use another locomotive in the consist? Interesting how the eye witnesses reported a fire and a spray of fuel. Especially since there was a train left there nearly every day.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lac-M%C3%A9gantic_derailment
That article does not contain any information that has not already been published in various news reports.
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