The Toronto Star noted that when Burkhardt took over the MM&A in 2003, he cut employee wages by 40 per cent and locomotive crews were cut in half, replacing two workers with one. Burkhardt ran a shoestring operation that had an accident rate more than double the national average. His insensitive and foolish comments following a negligent accident are merely the icing on the cake.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
pi ck up a phone---- He did that. The desk dispatcher (or whatever the supervisor's title is) OK's his putting out the fire and sent a track maintainer to watch, a MM&A employee who left after the fire was put out.
But he should have insisted an employee stay with the train or have on of his own people do so. And if there was no vandalism, the the desk dispatcher has the greatest share of the blame. Unless he wishes to pass the buck by saying he was followiing specific rules. (Which I think he was not!)
Of course the engineer has part of the blame. He should not have done something that he suspected as unsafe regardless of the dispatcher's decision based on hours of ser vice.
Of course, Ed has a major share, because the railroad obviously did not have a real SAFETY FIRST culture. When he took command, he probably wanted the French Canadians to do their own thing without interfering too much lest it look like USA Colonialism in Canada. This may have been the most important reason for the lack of a real safety culture.
If Ed had been a USA service veteran, he would not have fumbled the PR as badly as he did.
I think he's overwhelmed less than he's a jerk, though I fully admit I know next to nothing about the man beyond what I have seen of him in press conferences. He smiles a lot -- far too much. Even when answering very serious questions, there's this crooked, nervous little smile on his face the whole time. Unlike other people, I don't think this necessarily indicates the guy has a huge character flaw. Having said that, you get away with a lot more when you look like you're in as much agony as the people who have lost loved ones.
Were I Burkhardt, when I showed up to the town in the days after the disaster, I would have frowned the entire time. I might even have cried. Even if I couldn't manage to do it for real -- although I probably could; I am pretty emotional, and just looking at the devastation and knowing I had some hand in it would have destroyed me -- I would have faked some tears. Because I would know that it's not just important for me or my company for me to look compassionate, but that it's important for the people personally affected to see someone suffer with them. He did himself a real disservice not to look sad.
So Burkhardt is a jerk? You've said that over and over and over. Your obsession with the person is truly repetitive.
I have watched some videos of Burkhardt’s news conferences, and all I can say is it’s no wonder the people of Lac-Megantic are mad at him. Everything that comes out of his mouth demonstrates how hard it is to be compassionate and snarky at the same time.
He says the locomotive had been tampered with. He says emphatically that it is “definitely true.” He says the firemen are the ones who tampered with it. Then he says, “Now, were they negligent in their tampering? I think not.”
Well of course they weren’t negligent, but they weren’t tampering either. The word “tampering” means something even worse than negligence. It means to engage secretly or improperly in something. Obviously, Burkhardt has carefully chosen the word, “tampering” to make something sinister in order to create a straw man on which to deflect blame.
The only thing the firemen did is shut down the engine according to procedures that they had been trained on by the MM&A. They did not tamper by any stretch of the imagination. They did their job. This was not the first MM&A locomotive fire they have responded to.
In another exchange, a reporter says, “But you don’t accept full responsibility for this?” Then Burkhardt blows his stack at her and says he never said that. Then he goes on to say that he accepts plenty of responsibility, but not all of it. So he affirms something that he just angrily said he never said.
This is from the video with this news article. Both the article and the video paint an incredibly vivid picture:
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbaldoni/2013/07/15/how-edward-burkhardt-is-making-the-lac-megantic-accident-even-worse/
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tree68 BucyrusHe did have sufficient brakes set to prevent the train from rolling, but Thank you.
BucyrusHe did have sufficient brakes set to prevent the train from rolling, but
Thank you.
Predictability!
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68 While it's obvious that at some point in the timeline there were not sufficient brakes to hold the train, there is nothing to indicate that the engineer did not set sufficient brakes per MM&A rules. The fact that the train was not rolling away as he left it indicates that he did set sufficient brakes to hold the train at that point.
It does not indicate that. He did have sufficient brakes set to prevent the train from rolling, but that included all of the automatic air brakes and independent brakes. The engineer’s responsibility under rule 112 is to set sufficient handbrakes to hold the train, and that requirement must be met completely without air brakes being set.
The air brakes alone could have held the train, so we don’t know if the engineer set any handbrakes even though the train did not move when he left it. He was, of course, free to add air brakes to the securement, but air brakes cannot be counted in the fulfillment of the securement rule.
I agree that they may have done the same procedure without any problems many times in the past. However, it may be the case that their past securements were relying on air brakes to hold the train without enough handbrakes to hold it on their own. It may be that they did that repeatedly and were just lucky that the air brakes remained set. So, the mere fact that the train with air brakes set does not roll does not prove that the train securement handbrake rule has been fulfilled.
The problem is, we simply don't know enough about the mechanical state of the engine in order to pass judgment. For me, the key moment came when the fire department climbed on board the locomotive and -- reportedly -- turned it off. Broken or not, to that point, things were holding. Once someone shut off the engine and walked away, we now have a disaster.
You can wag a knowing finger at MMA for having shoddy equipment and whatnot, but we all know that many railroads in both countries operate on a strict mechanical budget, and things are often not fixed until it is absolutely imperative to do so. Without going too far, I will say that at some point, someone is going to need to look a bit closer at the actions of the members of the fire brigade, and whether or not they were overreacting (if not outright trespassing) in climbing aboard and the train and tampering with it without first placing a call to the railroad.
Unless lives were clearly in jeopardy from the locomotive fire, the first act should have been to pick up a phone.
Bucyrus FOUR POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR THE RUNAWAY: 1) The engineer failed to set sufficient handbrakes per the train securement rules of MM&A.
FOUR POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR THE RUNAWAY:
1) The engineer failed to set sufficient handbrakes per the train securement rules of MM&A.
That this was likely not the first such train parked there, and probably not the first train that this engineer had parked there, I would opine that the train securement practices in use up to that time were sufficient.
That's not to say that some unknown person did not indeed release brakes on some of the tank cars (or locomotives), but we'll have to wait for the official investigation to find out the answer to that.
2)Somebody released the handbrakes after the engineer set them.
This has been discussed. I would opine that no handbrakes were released as such, but as I've said before that the shutdown of the one running locomotive may have lead to the release of the independent brakes on the axles not secured by handbrakes. This could have been up to 20% of the secured axles.
3) The train securement rules of the MM&A at Nantes are inadequate, or non-existent.
While the rules for setting brakes at Nantes may have been inadequate, they are not non-existent. The general rules for setting brakes would still apply - and may well cover special situations, which puts this back at possibility number 1.
4) The engineer was unable to complete the train securement because he was told to quit working by his supervisors.
While I'll be the first to say "never say never," I find this very highly unlikely. Until the tapes (if they exist) are released, I'm going with the supervisors never having uttered such words.
Waiting on the "yes, but..."
I am revising my list of possible causes to include a fourth cause that I brought up in the part-one version of this thread. In that thread, some posters thought that in the case of item #4, the engineer should have done the right thing no matter what he was ordered to do, even if it meant getting fired from his job.
I have also revised item #3 to include the possibility that MM&A has no train securement rules for Nantes.
1) The engineer failed to set sufficient handbrakes per the train securement rules of MM&A.2) Somebody released the handbrakes after the engineer set them.3) The train securement rules of the MM&A at Nantes are inadequate, or non-existent.
What about doing the right thing in the case of item #3? If the rules simply call for 11 handbrakes, including the engines, should the engineer have gone further and tested the securement with a push-pull test even though the rules do not require it?
It is most certainly not that simple.
THREE POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR THE RUNAWAY:
1) The engineer failed to set sufficient handbrakes per the train securement rules of MM&A.2) Somebody released the handbrakes after the engineer set them.3) The train securement rules of the MM&A are inadequate.
The TSB of Canada has said they are investigating both item #1 and #3. My whole point of this thread is the possibility of item #3. The news media has questioned the possibility of item #3, but has been stonewalled by the refusal of MM&A to divulge their special instructions for train securement at Nantes.
oltmannd This is really quite simple: Did the engineer properly secure the train with handbrakes? That is, did he tie the train down and the see if it would move? That's the "belt". The air is just "suspenders." If the suspenders fail, the belt still holds up your pants. If "no" then it's on the engineer, pure and simple. If "yes" then, how did the train start to move at a later time? Either some human action occurred or the physics changed. If some human action caused it, who did what? Intentional or unintentional? If the physics changed, what was is and what do we do from now on? That's it. Really.
This is really quite simple:
Did the engineer properly secure the train with handbrakes? That is, did he tie the train down and the see if it would move? That's the "belt". The air is just "suspenders." If the suspenders fail, the belt still holds up your pants.
If "no" then it's on the engineer, pure and simple.
If "yes" then, how did the train start to move at a later time? Either some human action occurred or the physics changed.
If some human action caused it, who did what? Intentional or unintentional?
If the physics changed, what was is and what do we do from now on?
That's it. Really.
I agree with Don. Logically, this is not so hard to examine. If the engineer failed to secure the train with handbrakes, which appears to be the case or else the train would not have moved regardless of the engine and air application, then he is at fault.
All of these threads here...plenty of facts to go around. Gotta be a few extras...
Dan
Norm48327 Bucyrus PathfinderSo you are quite willing to try him in the court of the internet. I don’t have to start a trial here. There is already a trial of public opinion well underway. And it was started because just one man rushed to judgment—one man who refused to wait for the official investigation. One man with the world spotlight upon him has blamed this entire Lac-Megantic disaster on another man who is patiently bearing the burden of this premature accusation, waiting for his chance to tell his story. May I remind you that public opinion is not always correct nor is it a court of law. The TSB report will eventually disclose the facts.
Bucyrus PathfinderSo you are quite willing to try him in the court of the internet. I don’t have to start a trial here. There is already a trial of public opinion well underway. And it was started because just one man rushed to judgment—one man who refused to wait for the official investigation. One man with the world spotlight upon him has blamed this entire Lac-Megantic disaster on another man who is patiently bearing the burden of this premature accusation, waiting for his chance to tell his story.
PathfinderSo you are quite willing to try him in the court of the internet.
I don’t have to start a trial here. There is already a trial of public opinion well underway. And it was started because just one man rushed to judgment—one man who refused to wait for the official investigation. One man with the world spotlight upon him has blamed this entire Lac-Megantic disaster on another man who is patiently bearing the burden of this premature accusation, waiting for his chance to tell his story.
May I remind you that public opinion is not always correct nor is it a court of law. The TSB report will eventually disclose the facts.
And even then, some of the 'facts' may be presented with an political agenda.
Norm
Hi
I was talking with a CN conductor on Saturday evening at a family gathering.
He and his coworkers are really having difficulty understanding what could have happened. They are waiting to see what the TSB comes up with. In the meantime rule changes re handbrakes have come down the pipe (tonnage based per axle if I heard him correctly).
He is experienced in the yard and on the road. If he and his coworkers in TYE service are having difficulty making sense of this then perhaps we should hold off speculating, as I remarked at the beginning of this thread. There's more than enough hurt to go around as it is.
I'm with Pathfinder.
Charlie
Chilliwack, BC
Pathfinder Bucyrus AVRNUTI think when all is said & done on this, assigning blame will still be a moot point. No matter where the actual blame may fall, the end result will be the same: The MM&A will be history. Moot point? Are you kidding? How would you like to spend the rest of your life being falsely held responsible for killing 47 people and destroying half their town when you did not cause that to happen? It may be moot to the MM&A, but it is hardly moot to Tom Harding. So you are quite willing to try him in the court of the internet. You now have, how many topics on this one subject, 3? And they all seem to say the same thing "we now know..." Unless you have insider knowledge of the investigation, "I", "we" and "you" do not know anything except what has been reported by the TSB. Relying on Wikipedia and news reports as "facts" in a case like this is not a good practice. I was resident of a town that was put into a panic by "news" reports of a child killer (the father murdered his 3 children, within one block of where we lived) and I know what the news people will do just to get a story, and keep it going if it suites them. And I also know how easy it is to post to Wiki, and there are no checks or balances with that. I know it may be hard for the armchair investigators but we need to be patient and wait till the TSB has done its job and gotten the actual facts as closely as they can determine out. That may take a year or more in a case like this. Please remember that for us Canadians this is a very significant tragedy. I have had people who know I am interested in railways ask me my thoughts for the first time re anything railway related. I say the same as here, wait till the report is out. Personally I would like to see these topics closed as they do not seem to serve any purpose but to perpetuate unfounded rumors as "fact". My loony's worth, and no more from me..... Pfinder
Bucyrus AVRNUTI think when all is said & done on this, assigning blame will still be a moot point. No matter where the actual blame may fall, the end result will be the same: The MM&A will be history. Moot point? Are you kidding? How would you like to spend the rest of your life being falsely held responsible for killing 47 people and destroying half their town when you did not cause that to happen? It may be moot to the MM&A, but it is hardly moot to Tom Harding.
AVRNUTI think when all is said & done on this, assigning blame will still be a moot point. No matter where the actual blame may fall, the end result will be the same: The MM&A will be history.
Moot point? Are you kidding? How would you like to spend the rest of your life being falsely held responsible for killing 47 people and destroying half their town when you did not cause that to happen?
It may be moot to the MM&A, but it is hardly moot to Tom Harding.
So you are quite willing to try him in the court of the internet. You now have, how many topics on this one subject, 3? And they all seem to say the same thing "we now know..." Unless you have insider knowledge of the investigation, "I", "we" and "you" do not know anything except what has been reported by the TSB. Relying on Wikipedia and news reports as "facts" in a case like this is not a good practice.
I was resident of a town that was put into a panic by "news" reports of a child killer (the father murdered his 3 children, within one block of where we lived) and I know what the news people will do just to get a story, and keep it going if it suites them. And I also know how easy it is to post to Wiki, and there are no checks or balances with that.
I know it may be hard for the armchair investigators but we need to be patient and wait till the TSB has done its job and gotten the actual facts as closely as they can determine out. That may take a year or more in a case like this.
Please remember that for us Canadians this is a very significant tragedy. I have had people who know I am interested in railways ask me my thoughts for the first time re anything railway related. I say the same as here, wait till the report is out. Personally I would like to see these topics closed as they do not seem to serve any purpose but to perpetuate unfounded rumors as "fact".
My loony's worth, and no more from me.....
Pfinder
AMEN!
We should also consider that Ed Burkhardt was probably not involved in the day-to-day business of running this particular railway, even if technically "the buck stops here". I understand the MM&A was just one of several in the Railworld group, although possibly the only one in North America. It is the local managers who set the detailed operating rules and oversaw the MM&A employees. The local folks are also the ones with the detailed knowledge of the physical characteristics of the line.
In those stressful first few days he seems to have spoken foolishly, without much in the way of facts to support his statements. Many on this forum know even less, yet are even faster to jump to conclusions.
John
schlimmBucyrusWhen the top guy demonstrates that degree of misunderstanding of train securement, it tells me that there is a good chance that something is wrong with their train securement rules. Or perhaps Burkhardt knew that his operators don't reliably set nearly enough handbrakes when leaving a train unattended and their clock is up.
BucyrusWhen the top guy demonstrates that degree of misunderstanding of train securement, it tells me that there is a good chance that something is wrong with their train securement rules.
Or perhaps Burkhardt knew that his operators don't reliably set nearly enough handbrakes when leaving a train unattended and their clock is up.
That too could be the case. That is, that Burkhardt might have known that his people took short cuts against the rules, and then he looked the other way. But if that is what happened, the blame would still fall on the engineer if it could be proven that the engineer did not set enough handbrakes; and if nobody could prove that Burkhardt knew about the transgression.
However, if that were the case, Burkhardt is cooking his own goose by saying that the train ran away because the shutdown engine caused the air brakes to release. Therefore, it seems to me that he would not say that if he realized how damaging it is to his position, which is that the engineer is at fault.
Now just because Burkhardt is saying that a running locomotive is needed to aid in securing a train does not mean that his rules also say that. It very well could be that the rules are correct, and Burkhardt is simply unwittingly talking about the need for a running locomotive to prevent the train from rolling.
But it also could be that his rules do say that a running locomotive is part of the securement protocol, and that he is speaking in terms of those rules. Indeed, one would expect the company president to be speaking about the runaway cause in the context of the company rules intended to prevent runaways.
So I think Burkhardt is in a very strange position. He started out blaming the fire department, and then switched to blaming the engineer. But in a way, he seems like he is still blaming the fire department in addition to blaming the engineer.
By blaming the fire department, it must follow that the air brakes mattered. He says they did matter. If the air brakes mattered then it weekens his case against the engineer and a lack of handbrakes. So he is undermining his case against the engineer by adhering to his case against the fire department.
Has the MM&A held it's formal disciplinary investigation of the personnel associated with this incident yet?
I think when all is said & done on this, assigning blame will still be a moot point. No matter where the actual blame may fall, the end result will be the same: The MM&A will be history. They do indeed run a lot of older equipment & in their brief 10 year history their safety record is not exactly glowing. in fact,according to some reports I've read, incliding one the OP linked to early on one of the threads on this topic, their accident & incident record is nearly twice the national average.
There was a segment on our local news last night about the 40+ workers from the Brownville Junction yard that the MM&A laid off. They are already attending workshops that are designed to either re-train them for other work or to enable them to "transfer" their existing skills to other fields. I doubt any of these workers would be doing this already if they felt that getting that line & junction up & running again was going to be anytime soon or at all & that their jobs would still be there. They apparently know their jobs with MM&A are toast and that MM&A is not coming back. And the MM&A cannot operate without Brownville Junction.
Carl
"I could never belong to any club that would have me as a member."
They did not need any locomotives to be running if sufficient handbrakes had been applied as required. As I understand it, the only reason to leave an engine running to pump air is to avoid the requirement and effort to perform a terminal air brake test before leaving the next day.
However, Mr. Burkhardt seems to believe that the reason to leave an engine running is to hold the train in place by keeping air brakes applied. In the wake of the disaster, he even concludes that leaving two engines running would be a better policy, so one engine can act as a backup.
When the top guy demonstrates that degree of misunderstanding of train securement, it tells me that there is a good chance that something is wrong with their train securement rules.
Bucyrus Don, ....... In any case, my larger point is that the MM&A chose to let the ailing engine idle all night rather than shut it down and run one of the other four. And to me, this indicates a hurry to quit, and a lack of care that might have a connection to the lack of care in securing the train. ..........
Don,
.......
In any case, my larger point is that the MM&A chose to let the ailing engine idle all night rather than shut it down and run one of the other four. And to me, this indicates a hurry to quit, and a lack of care that might have a connection to the lack of care in securing the train.
..........
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