Here is a bit of detail from Wikipedia that changes everything. Certainly one might question the accuracy, but it is the most detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the fuel leak and so-called fire that I have seen. From this information, I conclude that there never was a fuel leak or a fire.
The news says there was a fire, and the public reported a strong fuel odor and heavy smoke. That would be a symptom of fuel leaking onto a hot manifold, but the smoke would be white. The smoke would also probably not contain droplets of liquid fuel as has been reported.
This new information says that the smoke was black, and that it was coming out of the exhaust stack. Black smoke comes out of an engine due to incomplete combustion. The description of black smoke and spitting oil coming from the exhaust stack sounds like a failed turbocharger. A failed turbo does not deliver enough combustion air, so the normal engine fuel delivery is excessive for the amount of air available. So the engine runs “fuel rich.”
The excess fuel makes heavy black smoke, which is also likely to contain droplets of unburned fuel. Both the droplets and the black smoke are combustible. So with this combustible trail of fuel and smoke leaving the cylinders, the cylinder combustion process carries right into the exhaust manifold and up the stack. This typically causes flames to blow several feet out of the exhaust stack along with extremely thick black smoke. The flames are called “torching.” Here is an example of torching: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yG0N58_dUuY
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Here is the quote regarding the smoke and flame incident at Nantes:
“After finishing his work, the engineer departed by taxi for a local hotel, l'Eau Berge in downtown Lac-Mégantic,[43] for the night.[44] While en route to the hotel, the engineer told the taxi driver that he felt unsafe leaving a train running while it was spitting oil and thick, black smoke. He said he wanted to call the U.S. office of the MMA (in Hermon, Maine) as they would be able to give him other directives.[45]
Witnesses recall having seen the train seemingly unattended and in distress around 22:45 that night.[46] People driving on the road that parallels the rail line near Nantes, recall seeing the train and having to slow down as they passed by the locomotives where there was a thick dark blue cloud of diesel smoke being emitted as well as sparks coming out of a locomotive's exhaust.[46]”
I interpret it to mean than there never was a fire or a fuel leak. The information strongly suggests this unusual scenario:
1) The engine had suffered a turbocharger failure which left the engine able to run and load, but do so with extreme fuel usage due to a starvation of air from the turbo.
2) Being that the engine was still able to run, it was deemed acceptable to let it idle as the one locomotive needed to keep one air compressor running.
3) There never was a fire. It was just visible flames and sparks in the heavy black smoke coming out of the exhaust stack. The smoke and stack flames probably grew more intense as the engine idled because the excess fuel would have accumulated in the exhaust manifold rather than being aggressively blown out the stack when the engine had been working.
4) Even though it was not on fire in the normal sense, it was presenting an extreme abnormality of heavy black smoke and flames, which the public driving down the highway interpreted as a fire.
5) The public reacted to the appearance of the engine being on fire by calling the fire department.
6) The fire department arrived and did the first thing they are trained to do with a locomotive fire, and that is to shut the engine off.
7) Shutting off the engine ended the black smoke and stack flames. The appearance of a fire emergency ended as the engine stopped running.
In this scenario, the MM&A is not irresponsible for ignoring an imminent danger of fire because there was no fire. However, the locomotive mimicked a fire to the untrained public witnesses. It probably never occurred to the MM&A supervisors that the public would interpret it as a locomotive being on fire and call the fire department; and that the fire department would shut off the engine. Other than that one wrinkle in the plan, it probably would not have been a problem to let the smoking engine idle.
Railroad companies have routinely continued to run locomotives with failed turbochargers while under pulling load, so they must have felt that it would not be too unreasonable to let one idle. However, pulling with a bad turbo is an emergency measure to get the train over the road. Whereas, letting an engine with a bad turbo idle just to pump air seems foolish when you have four good engines that are each capable of pumping air.
Since the locomotive was not on fire or in any danger of starting a fire, the MM&A did not take an undue risk by postponing dealing with that problem—a risk that might be evidence of a willingness to take a risk by not setting enough handbrakes.
But we are still left with the fact that they decided to let the controlling unit idle with a bad turbo that resulted in laying down a thick blanket of black smoke and fuel droplets. The public nuisance of that alone makes me question their judgment.
The engineer told the cab driver that he felt uneasy about doing that. He no doubt realized that unburned fuel vapor is incredibly bad to breathe. And it would readily get into peoples’ houses in the town. Unburned fuel vapor is diesel fuel in its liquid state, and if gets into your house, it penetrates all carpet and upholstery, fabrics, and it cannot be gotten out. It gets on every surface. If the surfaces are hard, it can be washed off. If not, the oil can only dissipate by very long term evaporation.
So the information tells us that the engineer was told by his supervisors to leave the smoking engine run, and that he was second-guessing that order to the extent that he intended to re-contact them to make sure they were advising the best approach. This indicates that the engineer did not think that the smoking engine should have been left running, but was overruled by his supervisor.
When viewing this whole incident in this new context, in my opinion, it is easy to see why Burkhardt came out swinging at the Nantes Fire Department. He was indignant that they shut off his locomotive. He felt they had no right to do that because the locomotive was not on fire. That is why he referred to shutting off the engine as “tampering.” He knew that his company was pushing the envelope by letting the smoking locomotive run. It came back to bite him in a most unusual and catastrophic way. I believe that is why he is so defensive about what the fire department did and why he is so intent of blaming others, including the engineer.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lac-M%C3%A9gantic_derailment
That article does not contain any information that has not already been published in various news reports.
Sounds like you're still on a 'fishing trip'.
Norm
We just knew there was a better explanation for the "fire" than those from the "eye witnesses". This makes far more sense than the locomotive being on fire. Still one wonders why not use another locomotive in the consist? Interesting how the eye witnesses reported a fire and a spray of fuel. Especially since there was a train left there nearly every day.
Norm48327 Sounds like you're still on a 'fishing trip'.
+1.
Still waiting for the OFFICIAL TSB report.
Dan
Fish are good for you.
The Route of the Broadway Lion The Largest Subway Layout in North Dakota.
Here there be cats. LIONS with CAMERAS
BroadwayLion Fish are good for you.
I prefer those things that crawl along the bottom; ie; Shrimp, Crab, Lobster.
Bucyrus This typically causes flames to blow several feet out of the exhaust stack along with extremely thick black smoke. The flames are called “torching.”..... .....Railroad companies have routinely continued to run locomotives with failed turbochargers while under pulling load, so they must have felt that it would not be too unreasonable to let one idle. However, pulling with a bad turbo is an emergency measure to get the train over the road.
This typically causes flames to blow several feet out of the exhaust stack along with extremely thick black smoke. The flames are called “torching.”.....
.....Railroad companies have routinely continued to run locomotives with failed turbochargers while under pulling load, so they must have felt that it would not be too unreasonable to let one idle. However, pulling with a bad turbo is an emergency measure to get the train over the road.
edblysard Oh look, an EMD pretending to be an Alco!
Oh look, an EMD pretending to be an Alco!
Which is a Diesel pretending to be a steam locomotive.
This from an engineer who runs ALCOs...
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Since all five MM&A engines were running when the train arrived at Nantes, any one of the five could have been left running when the other four were shut down. The engine with the failed turbo was the lead and controlling unit, and that is the one they left running to keep the air pumped up.
Here is my question: If they had shut down that controlling engine plus three others, and left the second engine running, would that be all the change required to have that second engine assume the role of pumping air? Or, would control changes be necessary in order to switch the air pumping function from the first engine to the second? If so, what would those control changes be, and how much time would they take?
edblysard Not long at all, less than 5 minutes if that. Basically set the second unit up as the lead, set the front unit up as a trailing unit, it makes no difference if it is in front or behind the unit you select as the lead. Flip a few switches, turn a brake valve selector , do the reverse on the other unit and done.
Not long at all, less than 5 minutes if that.
Basically set the second unit up as the lead, set the front unit up as a trailing unit, it makes no difference if it is in front or behind the unit you select as the lead.
Flip a few switches, turn a brake valve selector , do the reverse on the other unit and done.
Unless the lead engine is wired up weird, such that it dumps things when the breakers are dropped, or has all electric control of the air brakes, you shouldn't have to do all that.
Just leave the second (or whichever) unit running to supply the air, and the head unit can be left set up for lead. Air still runs through the piping and valves when an engine is shut down. This works on 26 air, not sure what is in use on MMA.
I've had a lead engine fail en route, made it into the terminal. Headlights and control circuits are run off the batteries and MU cable. Got cold, though, as the heaters won't work if the engine is shut down.
Mike WSOR engineer | HO scale since 1988 | Visit our club www.WCGandyDancers.com
Thanks Ed and WSOR 3801 for that information. It sounds like there was no good reason to let that damaged locomotive idle all night when they could have just shut it down and let another one run.
My first thought was that the MM&A took a risk by ignoring a substantial fire hazard, but, as I explained in my first post, I think that is an incorrect assumption because it appears that there was no fire hazard. But nevertheless, the MM&A did choose to let a distressed, excessively smoking locomotive run all night, posing a considerable nuisance to the residents and a visibility danger to drivers on the highway.
There appears to be no obvious reason why they chose this problematic course of action when it would have been just as easy to shut down the troubled locomotive and use another one. Again, this suggests an arbitrary decision to abruptly end the day’s work at Nantes; as does the apparent failure to complete the job of setting sufficient handbrakes.
Furthermore, we know that the decision to let the smoking locomotive run, to the detriment of the surroundings, was a decision made by MM&A management, and disagreed with by the locomotive engineer. Was the decision to not set sufficient handbrakes also a decision made by MM&A management?
I know this is just speculation and that the actual facts will probably come out in the investigation. Some say it is wrong to speculate. But in the meantime, a mighty burden has been placed on engineer, Tom Harding by the unproven accusation by MM&A President Burkhardt, that Mr. Harding’s negligence is the sole cause of this massive disaster. And while that too is just speculation, it matters because the burden that it places on Mr. Harding is real.
If it turns out that Mr. Harding is blameless, it will have been a great injustice to have accused him in a reckless and self-serving rush to judgment without any proof. I hope that anyone who believes that speculation is wrong will look at the speculation by Mr. Burkhardt. So I would like to offer a few thoughts as to reasons why the guilt of Mr. Harding may not be a forgone conclusion as Mr. Burkhardt contends.
Ed Burkhardt has expressed concern that the one running locomotive was shut down and that caused the air brakes to release. This is insightful because there should be no such concern. A running locomotive can shut down on its own at any time for any of a number of different reasons. Therefore, a running locomotive cannot be relied on the hold a train by its air brakes, and there is no safety rule that is predicated on a running locomotive to secure a train by keeping air brakes applied.
Yet, Burkhardt’s concern clearly shows that he believes that a running locomotive was essential to keeping the train from rolling away. He even reaffirms that belief by saying that he thinks that a second locomotive should be kept running as a backup in case one happens to shut down. This is completely wrong headed thinking on his part. And since it is coming from the top guy, it suggests to me that MM&A train securement rules might actually be based on this erroneous thinking.
Mr. Burkhardt’s concern over keeping the air pumped up might be an indication that it is MM&A practice that the air brakes and handbrakes are intended to work together to do the job of train securement. However, this premise is absolutely incorrect and unacceptable as a train securement policy. Train securement must not depend on the air brakes.
We don’t know what the MM&A rules are that govern train securement at Nantes. The individual railroad companies develop their own special instructions for how to comply with train securement rule 112 in Canada; and they are not required to make this information public, so they choose not to. It is easy to assume that the rules are in place, and if one follows the rules, the train won’t roll. But how do we know that the rules are correct? Ed Burkhardt’s regret about the locomotive being shut down is strong evidence that the MM&A securement rules are faulty.
When Ed Burkhardt was asked what the MM&A rules were for train securement at Nantes, he said he did not know. Maybe that is understandable, but what he did know and say is that 11 handbrakes were required. And yet, experts here have all agreed that there can be no prescribed number because the number has to be determined by the empirical push-pull test. So why would Burkhardt conclude that the engineer was at fault for the runaway because he failed to set 11 handbrakes?
Tom Harding, the engineer of the doomed oil train, has not spoken publicly at all since the runaway. Meanwhile, Ed Burkhardt has publically stated that he believes the engineer is guilty of causing the Lac-Megantic disaster because he failed to set sufficient handbrakes. But, what we don’t know is the MM&A rules that stipulated exactly what Mr. Harding’s duty was in securing that train with handbrakes. Considering Burkhardt’s comments about needing to make sure air brakes remain set to secure trains, and his apparent lack of knowledge about the MM&A train securement rules, I think there is a fair chance that the engineer did follow the rules, but the rules were flawed.
You must remember that anything said by anybody in the early hours of such a calamity is to be taken with a grain of salt. Most people will be speaking from 2nd hand knowledge or speculation and cannot be relied upon to be speaking facts about the present situation.
Consider Mr. Burkhardt's comments... I do not know his level of proficiency in practical day-to-day/rule-book railroading, but I suspect his expertise is in the managerial aspect of running the RR from a dollars and cents perspective. He knows there are rules, but he has never been responsible to apply them. (or maybe he has, I don't know)... but assuming that he only knows of the existence of the rules, then when this accident occurred and he read (or was told) about the initial reports of what was done and what should have been done, he defended his RR by referring to what he was told.... 11 handbrakes were set and that is by the rules... did he KNOW that for sure? meh... probably not, but that is what he was told so that is what he repeated. Later, people began to question the "known facts" as they became more clear (or more muddled, your choice) he has had to alter his defense of his RR to put the blame where it will do the least damage to his RR. i.e.: blame the engineer for not following the rules.
EVERYTHING that we get to read in the press is CYA junk at this point. Some might be facts, but most is speculation mashed over by people that have no idea what the words mean.
I suspect that the Engineer has a lawyer and that lawyer told him to make NO public comments about anything... PERIOD... it is too bad that all the other people involved (including Mr. Burkhardt) didn't get the exact same advice and then follow it.
What was that silly comment made by the politician several years ago about "known unknowns and unknown unknowns".
There are aspects to all accidents that must be investigated by experienced and knowledgeable investigators to determine if they have some bearing on the accident. Until those people have had a chance to examine the evidence and hear the eyewitness accounts (not 2nd hand guesses) to determine what is relevant and what is not, those that are placing blame are displaying ignorance, not intelligence.
Could it have been the Engineer's fault? Sure, it COULD have. It could also have been YOUR (you what am reading this) fault! But we cannot convict you until we prove it, and to blame you at this point would be irresponsible.
Speculation of possible causes, for us arm-chair Railroaders, is of interest because we have a lot more Unknown unknowns than the real Railroader, but we (non-RRer and RRer alike) really must refrain from convicting any of the principles in the catastrophe.
Semper Vaporo
Pkgs.
I still have yet to hear how the Full Service brake application was released. Even with no compressor operating the auxiliary reservoir on each car should have maintained an effective brake for more than 12 hours. i suspect that whoever shut the engine down also be accident or otherwise released the brakes.
BucyrusThis new information says that the smoke was black, and that it was coming out of the exhaust stack. Black smoke comes out of an engine due to incomplete combustion. The description of black smoke and spitting oil coming from the exhaust stack sounds like a failed turbocharger. A failed turbo does not deliver enough combustion air, so the normal engine fuel delivery is excessive for the amount of air available. So the engine runs “fuel rich.”
No, no, a thousand times no! Not on a GE locomotive. At idle the turbo is doing next to nothing. The engine is operating like a naturally aspirated engine. If there was black smoke, something was burning.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
Semper Vaporo...but we (non-RRer and RRer alike) really must refrain from convicting any of the principles in the catastrophe.
I think we are refraining from convicting or blaming anyone. I don’t recall one single comment on this forum where someone blamed anyone for the Lac-Megantic runaway. The only person I am aware of who has blamed anyone is Ed Burkhardt, president of the MM&A, blaming the engineer. I have not seen any news coverage or opinion pieces that blame anybody except for the news reporting on Burkhardt blaming the engineer.
According to Mr. Burkhardt, the train rolled because handbrakes were not sufficiently applied, and this can only mean that engineer, Tom Harding failed to apply handbrakes sufficiently.
I just wanted to point out the fact that the MM&A’s train securement rules might be insufficient, and that may be the reason why the train rolled away. I am not saying that the rules are insufficient. I am just saying that they could be unless it is proved otherwise.
Since Mr. Burhardt is confident enough to publicly place blame for violating his rules, it would only be fair for him to tell us what those rules are.
"I think we are refraining from convicting or blaming anyone. I don’t recall one single comment on this forum where someone blamed anyone for the Lac-Megantic runaway."
How can you possibly have the cajones to say that when in other threads on the topic you have all nut nailed the engineer to the cross? I suggest you go back and reread some of your earlier posts. My.
[quote Bucyrus]"I think we are refraining from convicting or blaming anyone. I don’t recall one single comment on this forum where someone blamed anyone for the Lac-Megantic runaway."
Norm48327 How can you possibly have the cajones to say that when in other threads on the topic you have all nut nailed the engineer to the cross? I suggest you go back and reread some of your earlier posts. My.
As I said, I don't recall anyone blaming anyone for the wreck. I have not blamed the engineer or anyone else for the wreck. I have actually gone out of my way to defend the engineer against a rush to judgment. I have been critical of Burkhardt, but not for causing the wreck.
But since you say that I have blamed the engineer for the wreck, please show me what I said.
This is only a forum. Whether folks want to blame the engineer or a moose from the woods is all part of something known as free speech, which is a fundamental right to be exercised. And as far as it goes, what anyone says on this thread or any other has no impact on the outcome of the investigation.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
If there was black smoke, something was burning.
OR, not burning...as in improper fuel/air ratio.
.
This accident appears to be a chain of items that caused the accident. If any one item had not happened the accident may not have happened.
There is the classic example of Eastern Air Lines flight 401 that crashed into the everglades. I believe there was a chain of 9 contributing items any one that had not occurred would have prevented the accident. That included a couple of omissions by air traffic control.
The UPS accident at Birmingham although preliminary already shows at least 2 items.
BigJim If there was black smoke, something was burning. OR, not burning...as in improper fuel/air ratio.
Don,
Well, my point was that the public reported seeing heavy black smoke, unburned fuel, and sparks— all of which were erupting from the exhaust stack, so they interpreted it as a fire and called the fire department.
Since this fire and smoke was coming from the exhaust stack, I surmised that the the so-called "fire", contrary to the news reports, was not a free burning fire onboard the locomotive such as a burning fuel from a leak or an electrical fire. Instead, I concluded that the so-called "fire" was an extension of the combustion process originating inside of the prime mover.
I theorized that it was a turbo that had failed, causing air starvation, and resulting in a fuel-rich ratio. But if a turbo can’t cause that, and if an injector nozzle can, then that sounds like a plausible explanation. Although, I am surprised that one could cause the extent of the symptoms reported.
In any case, my larger point is that the MM&A chose to let the ailing engine idle all night rather than shut it down and run one of the other four. And to me, this indicates a hurry to quit, and a lack of care that might have a connection to the lack of care in securing the train.
A still larger point is that this hurry and lack of care seems to have been a decision of the engineer’s supervisor, and was actually opposed by the engineer.
And so my largest point is that until we know that MM&A train securement rules and policy was not sloppy and inadequate, it is premature to blame the engineer. The failed train securement may have been caused by the MM&A rather than the engineer.
BucyrusBut in the meantime, a mighty burden has been placed on engineer, Tom Harding by the unproven accusation by MM&A President Burkhardt, that Mr. Harding’s negligence is the sole cause of this massive disaster.
BucyrusMr. Burkhardt’s concern over keeping the air pumped up might be an indication that it is MM&A practice that the air brakes and handbrakes are intended to work together to do the job of train securement. However, this premise is absolutely incorrect and unacceptable as a train securement policy.
If it is unfair to tar the engineer with this type of speculation, why is it okay to tar Burkhardt with the same sort of speculation?
BucyrusAnd yet, experts here have all agreed that there can be no prescribed number because the number has to be determined by the empirical push-pull test.
All agreed? Push-pull test? Say, what? I don't think so....
Bucyrus Don, Well, my point was that the public reported seeing heavy black smoke, unburned fuel, and sparks— all of which were erupting from the exhaust stack, so they interpreted it as a fire and called the fire department. Since this fire and smoke was coming from the exhaust stack, I surmised that the the so-called "fire", contrary to the news reports, was not a free burning fire onboard the locomotive such as a burning fuel from a leak or an electrical fire. Instead, I concluded that the so-called "fire" was an extension of the combustion process originating inside of the prime mover. I theorized that it was a turbo that had failed, causing air starvation, and resulting in a fuel-rich ratio. But if a turbo can’t cause that, and if an injector nozzle can, then that sounds like a plausible explanation. Although, I am surprised that one could cause the extent of the symptoms reported. In any case, my larger point is that the MM&A chose to let the ailing engine idle all night rather than shut it down and run one of the other four. And to me, this indicates a hurry to quit, and a lack of care that might have a connection to the lack of care in securing the train. A still larger point is that this hurry and lack of care seems to have been a decision of the engineer’s supervisor, and was actually opposed by the engineer. And so my largest point is that until we know that MM&A train securement rules and policy was not sloppy and inadequate, it is premature to blame the engineer. The failed train securement may have been caused by the MM&A rather than the engineer.
I'm not you have a point to make - too many nested "if" statements.
IF the problem was aided by an ailing locomotive
and
IF the engineer didn't properly tie down the train
IF the locomotive's problems started before the engineer taxied away
IF the problems were noticeable by the engineer at the time he left.
etc. etc.
This is really quite simple:
Did the engineer properly secure the train with handbrakes? That is, did he tie the train down and the see if it would move? That's the "belt". The air is just "suspenders." If the suspenders fail, the belt still holds up your pants.
If "no" then it's on the engineer, pure and simple.
If "yes" then, how did the train start to move at a later time? Either some human action occurred or the physics changed.
If some human action caused it, who did what? Intentional or unintentional?
If the physics changed, what was is and what do we do from now on?
That's it. Really.
oltmannd Bucyrus Don, Well, my point was that the public reported seeing heavy black smoke, unburned fuel, and sparks— all of which were erupting from the exhaust stack, so they interpreted it as a fire and called the fire department. Since this fire and smoke was coming from the exhaust stack, I surmised that the the so-called "fire", contrary to the news reports, was not a free burning fire onboard the locomotive such as a burning fuel from a leak or an electrical fire. Instead, I concluded that the so-called "fire" was an extension of the combustion process originating inside of the prime mover. I theorized that it was a turbo that had failed, causing air starvation, and resulting in a fuel-rich ratio. But if a turbo can’t cause that, and if an injector nozzle can, then that sounds like a plausible explanation. Although, I am surprised that one could cause the extent of the symptoms reported. In any case, my larger point is that the MM&A chose to let the ailing engine idle all night rather than shut it down and run one of the other four. And to me, this indicates a hurry to quit, and a lack of care that might have a connection to the lack of care in securing the train. A still larger point is that this hurry and lack of care seems to have been a decision of the engineer’s supervisor, and was actually opposed by the engineer. And so my largest point is that until we know that MM&A train securement rules and policy was not sloppy and inadequate, it is premature to blame the engineer. The failed train securement may have been caused by the MM&A rather than the engineer. I'm not you have a point to make - too many nested "if" statements. IF the problem was aided by an ailing locomotive and IF the engineer didn't properly tie down the train and IF the locomotive's problems started before the engineer taxied away and IF the problems were noticeable by the engineer at the time he left. and etc. etc. This is really quite simple: Did the engineer properly secure the train with handbrakes? That is, did he tie the train down and the see if it would move? That's the "belt". The air is just "suspenders." If the suspenders fail, the belt still holds up your pants. If "no" then it's on the engineer, pure and simple.
But you are responding to a picture that I did not paint.
In answer to your bullet points:
I don’t believe, nor have I ever suggested that the runaway problem was aided by the ailing locomotive.
The locomotive problems did start before the engineer taxied away.
The problems were noticeable by the engineer at the time he left, and he commented to the taxi driver that he did not favor leaving the locomotive idle in that condition, and he intended to re-contact the company to see if they might reconsider their decision to leave the locomotive idle.
I understand your belt = handbrakes and suspenders = air brakes analogy. But I believe the question goes beyond whether the engineer set handbrakes and performed a successful push-pull test. I think the question also includes the question of whether the MM&A required a push-pull test, and-or whether the MM&A rules called for a sufficient number of handbrakes in lieu of empirical proof of a push-pull test. As I carefully explained in my first post, there are reasons to doubt the MM&A train securement rules.
I find it rather suspicious that the entity that is so over the top in publicly rushing to condemn the engineer for causing the disaster is the very entity that is likely to be the cause if the engineer is vindicated.
I agree that it is quite simple. I see three possible causes for the runaway:
1) The engineer failed to set sufficient handbrakes per the train securement rules of MM&A.2) Somebody released the handbrakes after the engineer set them.3) The train securement rules of the MM&A are inadequate.
Bucyrus Don, ....... In any case, my larger point is that the MM&A chose to let the ailing engine idle all night rather than shut it down and run one of the other four. And to me, this indicates a hurry to quit, and a lack of care that might have a connection to the lack of care in securing the train. ..........
.......
..........
They did not need any locomotives to be running if sufficient handbrakes had been applied as required. As I understand it, the only reason to leave an engine running to pump air is to avoid the requirement and effort to perform a terminal air brake test before leaving the next day.
However, Mr. Burkhardt seems to believe that the reason to leave an engine running is to hold the train in place by keeping air brakes applied. In the wake of the disaster, he even concludes that leaving two engines running would be a better policy, so one engine can act as a backup.
When the top guy demonstrates that degree of misunderstanding of train securement, it tells me that there is a good chance that something is wrong with their train securement rules.
Our community is FREE to join. To participate you must either login or register for an account.