schlimm greyhounds I don't say that there is evidence of sabotage. But neither is there any evidence that the engineer failed to properly do his job. No "evidence" that the engineer was negligent, but the CEO of the railroad, who is in a position to know more than you or the rest of us seemed to think it likely. And no reason to believe terrorism of any sort.
greyhounds I don't say that there is evidence of sabotage. But neither is there any evidence that the engineer failed to properly do his job.
No "evidence" that the engineer was negligent, but the CEO of the railroad, who is in a position to know more than you or the rest of us seemed to think it likely. And no reason to believe terrorism of any sort.
There's a huge gap between "seemed to think likely" and conclusive proof. I agree with greyhounds in that the investigation into possibilities of causes other than negligence - if for no other reason than to build a more solid case for criminal negligence if in fact the evidence points to negligence. On a corporate level, it makes sense to make plans based on the assumption of negligence if for no other reason than to prevent possible recurrences of this disaster.
On a somewhat related note, there is a court case about whether the airlines involved with the 9/11 attacks are liable for damages to the World Trade Center on the basis of being negligent in security screening.
Burkhardt may be in a position to know things, but he is discrediting himself by his own words.
The engineer of the train said he set sufficient hand brakes. There is no way of knowing whether that is true or false. But Burkhardt says the engineer’s claim is false because it is implausible. Implausible is the word he used. It means that it can not be true. If it cannot be true, it has to be false. He comes to that conclusion because the train would not have rolled if sufficient hand brakes were set.
Either Mr. Burkhardt is not intelligent enough to see the fallacy of his conclusion or he is deliberately lying in order to deceive the media and public.
Of course the engineer’s claim is NOT implausible, as Mr. Burkhardt says. It is entirely plausible that the engineer set the hand brakes as he claims and that the hand brakes were then released by someone else for a variety of possible reasons such as tampering, sabotage, or vandalism. And until a positive cause is found, you cannot rule out any possible cause. A lack of evidence that something happened does not prove that it did not happen.
Therefore, Burkhardt’s assertion that it is implausible that the engineer applied hand brakes is bogus, and that is plainly obvious to anybody with eyes to see.
The engineer probably has no witness to back up his claim of setting handbrakes. He may be facing prison time if a jury believes Mr. Burkhardt’s bogus assertion about what is plausible.
Burkhardt spoke with the engineer. Did you? Yet you say Burkhardt is engaging in fallacious assertions with zero information.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
erikemThere's a huge gap between "seemed to think likely" and conclusive proof. I agree with greyhounds in that the investigation into possibilities of causes other than negligence - if for no other reason than to build a more solid case for criminal negligence if in fact the evidence points to negligence. On a corporate level, it makes sense to make plans based on the assumption of negligence if for no other reason than to prevent possible recurrences of this disaster.
There is a much wider gap between "seemed to think likely" and ongoing repetitions that eco-terrorists are a high enough possibility to bother to mention. As far as corporate level, i believe mr. Burkhardt knows it would be less costly for his company if eco-terrorism or other sabotage were the primary cause than negligence by the railroad and its employee(s). Yet he seems to think negligence. That strongly suggests he knows more than he is saying.
But that’s just it, the rub so to speak, no one knows the brakes failed….they held the train still for what, an hour or more before the engine fire, and till the FD arrived, and obviously while they were there, and for some time, an hour or so after the FD left.
So they worked for at least 2, possible 3 hours…and I can tell you that hand brakes either work, or they don’t work, there is no in-between, especially on any grade so speak of.
With the amount of weight they were holding in place, you would know instantly if there was not enough brakes applied, or if they were not applied tight enough.
Folks are over thinking this thing…the train was sitting still when the engineer left, and when the fire department left, which means there were sufficient brakes (both air and hand brakes combined) at that time to hold the train.
If there wasn’t, the thing would have boogied on right then.
If they had failed in any sense of the word, it would have been immediately noticed.
If the Canadian version of the NTSB finds the head cut of cars with no hand brakes, what is to say that there were hand brakes, but they were intentionally released, or popped off at impact…(I have knocked a hand brake off a car kicking against it)…
How does Burkhart know the engineer didn’t tie the right number or sufficient number of brakes, the event recorder will not show the number of brakes being tied on the cars, and I am pretty sure he was not present when the engineer was tying the train down, (no one besides the engineer was there) so his knowledge is based on what?
If the handbrake wheel mounting bracket was mounted on the end of the outer shell of the tank cars, which most are, and the outer shell was deformed by the impact or fire, or the bracket was mounted to the crossover platform frame and the end of the cars were damaged in the accident, there is no way to tell if that brake had been applied or not.
So what we are left with is either the engineer did what he was supposed to do, or he didn’t.
If he did, then some outside party or action caused the train to move…if he didn’t, which I would find odd, after all, he makes this stop several times a week and knows the grade and territory, knows the town is down there, so why would he risk it?
You really think he would be dumb, lazy or crazy enough to walk away from a train he knew was not secured, on a down grade, with a town he was going to be spending the night in at the bottom of the grade?
I doubt the FD would have taken any hand brakes off the cars without having someone from the railroad present, at the least they would have informed the railroad of anything they did beyond putting out the fire, and the train was obviously still sitting there when they left.
So the alternative to the engineer failing to secure his train is either the railroads operating practices are not correct or safe, or some outside force affected the train and its brakes.
23 17 46 11
Talk to your LAWYERS or INSURANCE COMPANY, as Mr. Berkhard apparently did not.
They will tell you to keep you yap shut: Admit nothing, concede nothing, accuse nothing.
Be sympathetic, empathetic, and pathetic, do what you can but keep the yap shut. "It is under investigation, and we are cooperating fully with the investigation, and we are certainly taking steps to assure that nothing of the sort ever happens again."
Sometime it is hard for people just to shut up. Presidents (trains countries etc) never know when to shut up.
ROAR
The Route of the Broadway Lion The Largest Subway Layout in North Dakota.
Here there be cats. LIONS with CAMERAS
Ed,
Those are all good points. I don’t need to know what Burkhardt knows in order to know that he is either lying or making a mistake in his assertion that the engineer failed to set sufficient hand brakes.
Just to clarify something, Burkhardt has been all over the map in his characterization of this issue. He first insisted that the engineer did properly set enough hand brakes. Then he said his investigation showed that the engineer did not sufficiently set hand brakes.
Then he said that he "feels" that the engineer did not set sufficient hand brakes. Next he said that “we originally believed the engineer, and now we don’t.” And finally, he has said that it is implausible that the engineer set sufficient hand brakes. I say Burkhardt is wrong on the face of it because he does know what caused the train to roll, so he cannot attribute the roll to a lack of action on the part of the engineer. That is simple Logic 101.
Here is the mealy mouth doublespeak that I mentioned above as Burkhardt waffles back and forth with varying degrees of conviction during his blaming of the engineer Tom Harding.
(QUOTE FROM THE LINK)
Residents... are calling on the head of the railway to take more responsibility after he said an engineer failed to set the hand brakes on the runaway train.
“It’s very questionable whether the hand brakes were properly applied on this train,” Edward Burkhardt…told reporters yesterday. “As a matter of fact, I’ll say they weren’t, otherwise we wouldn’t have had this incident.”
Burkhardt laid the blame for the crash on his own engineer for failing to properly apply hand brakes on the rail cars… He said his company’s inspection indicated the brakes were applied on the locomotives, but not on the rail cars.
“We think he applied some hand brakes, the question is, did he apply enough of them?” Burkhardt said. “He’s told us that he applied 11 hand brakes and our general feeling now is that that is not true. Initially we took him at his word.”
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-10/rail-world-ceo-says-quebec-train-brakes-not-set-properly.html
Oh, I get the double speak issue….at this point, Burkhart has reduced himself to nothing more than a “talking head”
Regarding whether the engineer did or did not apply sufficient handbrakes, Burhardt says:
Our general feeling is…
We think he applied some…
The question is did he apply enough…
The engineer failed to set the hand brakes…
It’s very questionable whether hand brakes were properly applied on this train…
His company’s inspection indicated…
As a matter of fact, I’ll say they weren’t…
Here's an interesting question: if someone released the train hand brakes, would they be able to release them all before the train started to roll? If not they should find a couple brakes still on and the wheels and shoes burned from the 7 mile trip.
One other item, if this was a terrorist act, it would be an incredible coincidence that the locomotive fire happened the same night the terrorists acted!
So don't we have to assume that either the terrorists released the hand brakes and then set the fire (anticipating the shutdown of the locomotives) or terrorists had nothing to do with it? Just trying to apply a little logic to the overall problem.
This would be a good plot for a movie. Tony Scott where are you?
Ummm, Tony Scott is dead; he jumped off the Vincent Thomas Bridge in LA, august last year.
And logic seems to have become lost in the mix.
edblysard And logic seems to have become lost in the mix.
Maybe a group from the forum ought to take a trip to the accident site to see things first hand and then make a determination? Then we could end all the speculation and get on with beating another subject to death.
Moo....
She who has no signature! cinscocom-tmw
"Where have you gone Joe DiMaggio? A nation turns its lonely eyes to you." (Obviously, another call for help from someone who is dead).
Logic is just one of the ways to solve a problem:
Make a hypothesis, apply logic, see if the hypothesis is consistent.
We have to make the following consistent:
Statement of the engineer (no reason to doubt, except for the stupid statements of Burkhardt)
Rules that apply to the train operation.
Actions of the fire department (again just facts)
Timing of the runaway train.
Now, all the hypotheses may not be correct. In fact, most are incorrect. But, we can go thru many scenarios and see which fit.
Any other suggested scenarios?
Yeah - everyone involved in this was on some kind of drugs or drunk. I don't think that has been covered from 93 angles.
No, no other suggested scenarios, and on that note, I think I will bow out of this conversation, simply because it seems this tragedy has become a form of entertainment, and I think we (me) have lost sight of the fact that, not only have all those people in the town lost their lives, friends and everything important to them, everyone on the railroad has pretty much lost everything they have worked all their lives for.
Lots of lives destroyed.
Like the Mookie says, it seems like enough.
It is understandable why this would be a popular topic on the forum. And I must say that I do not consider this discussion to be a form of entertainment. Yes, what happened is a terrible tradgedy.
But you can bet the people of Lac-Megantic are talking about it. They are asking the same questions we are, and coming to some of the same conclusions about the characters and their roles in this story.
I don't believe the people of Lac-Megantic would be offended by our discussion or feel that we are using it for entertainment. But that is only my personal opinion. Others are free to look at this any way they choose. I would make no judgment about how they look at this this discussion or topic.
Ed,You and Mookie put it in words much better than I could.
Thank you.
.
I must reply to Greyhound;: The evidence that it MAY be a deliverate attack is that Canadian Security forces foiled two attempts against railways in the past four months.
The perpertrator may have set the loco fire as a diversion.
Were any tank cars on fire before the derailment?
Why were one or more cars leaking?
Virginia Creeper The National Post published an infographic that illustrates many of the topics discussed here: timeline, elevations, speeds, maps, air brake diagrams, and more. http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/07/12/graphic-the-lac-megantic-runaway-train-disaster/
http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/07/12/graphic-the-lac-megantic-runaway-train-disaster/
- Paul North.
While looking for something else, I found this PowerPoint presentation (32 pages/ slides, approx. 1.47 MB electronic file size in ".pdf" format) by the BLET in June 2006 which advocates key-type locks for air brake controls - a "locking air brake valve". It is sub-captioned as "RSAC V-1" (the FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee is "RSAC"):
"Securing Train Air Brakes" - https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/document.php?type=meeting&date=20060518&name=BLETair+brake+RSAC_v1.pdf
See especially slides/ pages 8 - 10 regarding "Unattended Trains", and then 31-32; draw your own conclusions.
edblysard No, no other suggested scenarios, and on that note, I think I will bow out of this conversation, simply because it seems this tragedy has become a form of entertainment, and I think we (me) have lost sight of the fact that, not only have all those people in the town lost their lives, friends and everything important to them, everyone on the railroad has pretty much lost everything they have worked all their lives for. Lots of lives destroyed. Like the Mookie says, it seems like enough. Well said Ed. Having been involved in aviation for the past thirty years I've watched all kinds of speculation on accidents, and that's what this thread has become. The truth will be known only after the investigators have finished their job.
Well said Ed. Having been involved in aviation for the past thirty years I've watched all kinds of speculation on accidents, and that's what this thread has become. The truth will be known only after the investigators have finished their job.
Norm
Paul_D_North_Jr While looking for something else, I found this PowerPoint presentation (32 pages/ slides, approx. 1.47 MB electronic file size in ".pdf" format) by the BLET in June 2006 which advocates key-type locks for air brake controls - a "locking air brake valve". It is sub-captioned as "RSAC V-1" (the FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee is "RSAC"): "Securing Train Air Brakes" - https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/document.php?type=meeting&date=20060518&name=BLETair+brake+RSAC_v1.pdf See especially slides/ pages 8 - 10 regarding "Unattended Trains", and then 31-32; draw your own conclusions. - Paul North.
Well, one obvious conclusion is that the BRT does not dismiss the possibility of tampering or sabotage just because they don’t see any at the moment.
I note that while this lock system would prevent releasing the air brakes, it would not prevent air brakes from inadvertently releasing on their own, or losing holding pressure over time.
The total solution for securing unintended trains would be a power brake acting on all cars simultaneously from a single control that could be locked with the security of the locking system detailed in the BRT report.
BucyrusThe total solution for securing unintended trains would be a power brake acting on all cars simultaneously from a single control that could be locked with the security of the locking system detailed in the BRT report.
Well, this is all well and good, and it applies to trains. But it cannot apply to railcars. Railcars must be moved by plant personnel for loading and repositioning equipment. Once a car is set out from a train, its air pipe is open to the atmosphere, and the pressure tank is bleed so that the brakes will release so the car can be moved within a plant. Once here only hand brakes can hold the car.
How to do this safely and to prevent vandalism, terrorism, or other unauthorized access?
1) LION thinks that any person should be able to set the brake at any time to a standing car.
2) ONLY a person with proper access can release the car. Keys are just too common. LION has keys. What can you do about it?
LION THINKS that the hand brakes should be able to be released from the locomotive once the brake line is properly charged. How? I do not know. And electrical portion on a coupler makes this a gimme, but using air pressure in a single pipe? Could a jolt of 200 psi be used to release hand brakes? Somebody would have to invent that valve--and then retrofit it to existing equipment.
In an industrial setting, could shop air be required to release a hand brake? Some other electric connection? Put on the old thinking caps! LION thinks maybe security at a loading or unloading facility that moves cars must provide their own security, and the hand brakes can be set or released by anybody present on the property.
For TRAINS parked away from home where no movement is to be expected, (and equipped with N2a couplers and electronics) it could be arranged that only the dispatcher (In Ft. Worth or wherever) can unlock the parking brakes. The engineer phones home, the dispatcher electronically inspects the train and then releases the parking brakes.
Security can be built in, but it is more difficult to retrofit it to an existing fleet of equipment. This is why LION thinks that it can be first implemented on new unit trains.
A locking air brake valve is only good as long as keys don't "leak" into unauthorized hands. Switch keys aren't supposed to be out there in unauthorized hands either, but they are. Just as the page with the switch keys on an internet auction site illustrates.
They have just started to issue us keys for the locks that many engines have for the front nose door. Rules require that on engines so equipped, the crew will lock the cab back door (assuming that lock works) and after leaving the locomotive, locking the front door. This is to be done when leaving a train unattended outside of a yard or terminal area. (Someone asked rhetorically, "What constitutes the yard/terminal limits?" I said, "It depends on the contingency of the moment. When they don't want you to make an outbound crew have to use extra time in boarding a train, it's in the 'terminal' area. The next time you do the same thing at the same place and something bad happens, it won't be a 'terminal' area.")
Some guys are telling the same thing when being issued the keys. They are being told, "Don't use them, especially in winter weather. The locks in cold temperatures will freeze hard enough that a fusee won't thaw them." The first engine I got on after getting my key, both I and the condr tried the key in the lock. Neither one of us could get the lock to work. It almost looked like the lock had been welded closed.
Jeff
BroadwayLion BucyrusThe total solution for securing unintended trains would be a power brake acting on all cars simultaneously from a single control that could be locked with the security of the locking system detailed in the BRT report. Well, this is all well and good, and it applies to trains. But it cannot apply to railcars. Railcars must be moved by plant personnel for loading and repositioning equipment. Once a car is set out from a train, its air pipe is open to the atmosphere, and the pressure tank is bleed so that the brakes will release so the car can be moved within a plant. Once here only hand brakes can hold the car.
I am proposing the type of powered, all inclusive, and simultaneous parking brake only for the new breed of high performance, crude oil unit trains that will soon be the law of the land. You set these parking brakes by setting the air brakes and then throwing a switch in the cab to set the brake locks. You release them by throwing the switch to release.
Once you bring all this control to one switch, you can connect that switch to any number of different authorizations that may lock or unlock the switch. The switch will be wired to also tell the world whether it is locked or unlocked.
You can still equip these special trains with hand brakes if you want to, but these unit trains will be a semi-permanently coupled, non-interchange consist, so there is no need for hand brakes for dealing with individual cars or cuts of cars. The main point is that these new oil trains will not rely on manually winding up several hand brakes, or making sure they stay wound up in order to prevent the trains from wiping out towns.
That graphic posted earlier about the wreck details shows some information that has not been revealed elsewhere. That is that all cars on the head end of the wreck derailed. Hand brakes would have been applied to the head end cars, if they were applied.
If it so happened that some of those head end cars were still upright and on the rails, and if the hand brakes on them had been applied, the brakes would still be applied after the wreck. And that would be evidence proving that the brakes had been applied as the engineer says. And conversely, if head end cars were on the rails with no hand brakes applied, that would be nearly conclusive evidence that they were not applied before the runaway.
All of the head end cars are derailed, but the first nine cars at the head end, while being derailed, are not heaped together as the ones further back. Instead, they are derailed, but separated from each other, and not zigzagged into an accordion pileup. So there is a fair chance that those head end cars might still show applied hand brakes if they had been applied; even if they are derailed.
There is even a chance that the cars in the heap might still show hand brakes having been set, but their greater damage would be more likely to have caused a set hand brake to release. But, in any case, those heaped cars are mostly beyond the eleventh car, which is the number of cars on which the engineer claims to have set hand brakes.
So those first nine cars should have been immediately checked by investigators as soon as they had cooled enough. Once they became cool enough to touch, there would have been strong motivations for someone to tamper, and set released hand brakes, or release set hand brakes.
Mr. Burkhardt stated that his company’s investigation indicated that no brakes had been applied to the cars. However, he did not say what evidence indicated that finding.
BucyrusThere is even a chance that the cars in the heap might still show hand brakes having been set, but their greater damage would be more likely to have caused a set hand brake to release. But, in any case, those heaped cars are mostly beyond the eleventh car, which is the number of cars on which the engineer claims to have set hand brakes.
??? They just set the required number of brakes from the front of the train?
LION thunked that they would set every 5th or 7th car.
Maybe him kneads more thunking.
Normal procedure is to set enough cars on the convenient end of the train. That is normally the end connected to the locomotives. Alternating cars (like every 5th car) has no advantage and would just take extra time. Setting the locomotives and 10 of the cars would easily hold the train.
The handbrakes shouldn't release just because of the wreck. The are ratchet systems connected to a chain and the position of the chain would indicate the status of the hand brakes.
Having the front set of cars not accordioned is not much evidence for hand brake conditions. The first few cars blasted thru town and some later car skipped the rails and started to go off the right-of-way. This physically ground the wheels into the ballast and started to slow everything down. The derailed cars behind then zig zagged into the front cars.
The evidence should be obvious.
BroadwayLion ??? They just set the required number of brakes from the front of the train? LION thunked that they would set every 5th or 7th car.
Brakes would be set on the downhill end of the train - not necessarily the front.
If the brakes are properly set, in the necessary number (which may differ from the required number), you're essentially creating a bumper for the rest of the train to come up against.
Setting every nth car would be a massive PITA, as a relieving crew would have to check the brakes on every single car to see what the relieved crew set. For a 100 car train, with a one man crew, in the dark...
Besides, that might mean having to walk unwalkable areas along the ROW (see the bridge thread).
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
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