There is a photograph of the new diamond in this article.
Mudchicken and Paul North should like this quote:
"We're still working through that process to figure it all out and I don't want to jump to conclusions," he (Mark Shelton, district engineer with the Missouri Department of Transportation) said. "Our way of looking at it is this: Our bridge was there, doing its own thing, then a train hit it and it collapsed. So we're certainly looking at where the responsibility lies and doing what we can to minimize the cost to taxpayers."
James
Good points Ed. In this day and age we always have to find someone to blame.
Scapegoats please line up here.
Norm
"Pure speculation follows. The UP train had the interlocking when passing the last approach signal. Speed is either severely reduced or they stop between that last signal and the interlocking. (I don't know but assume they can't see the absolute at the interlocking.) They take off thinking they will have the signal. The delay is enough that the interlocking times out and gives a signal to the other route, the BNSF in this case. BNSF starts across after getting the light. UP train realizes, either by seeing a red absolute or the BNSF starting across, that they aren't lined up. Either way they can't stop short. "
I would think they were doing track speed and unable to see the absolute in time to stop because there is just over a mile of tangent track east of the diamond and the lights are narrowly focused.
Weren't there, so don't know for sure. Just thinking it's possible.
.
23 17 46 11
We were sent out a safety alert on this incident. I just glanced through it since it doesn't say much. Something that caught my eye was in the list of possible rules violated it mentioned something about restricted speed. I did a little searching.
Currently, the BNSF crossing is considered a Manual interlocking with a release box and M/W key release. I went to fog charts (fogchart.com, look for the Chester subdivision) and notice the Quarry siding begins on one side of the interlocking plant. We have a similar arrangement at Iowa Falls. We cross the CN (former IC/CC&P) and within the interlocking have a controlled switch to Argon siding. The UP dispatcher controls the switch, but not the crossing itself. Even though it's called a manual interlocking, it's to be treated as an automatic interlocking when approaching it under the rules when delayed between the approach/distant signal and the home/absolute signal. Simply put, if your speed drops under 25mph you have to be prepared that the interlocking (even though it says manual) may have timed out and the signal taken away from you.
Pure speculation follows. The UP train had the interlocking when passing the last approach signal. Speed is either severely reduced or they stop between that last signal and the interlocking. (I don't know but assume they can't see the absolute at the interlocking.) They take off thinking they will have the signal. The delay is enough that the interlocking times out and gives a signal to the other route, the BNSF in this case. BNSF starts across after getting the light. UP train realizes, either by seeing a red absolute or the BNSF starting across, that they aren't lined up. Either way they can't stop short.
One report I've read said the UP hit only 8 or so cars behind the engines of the BNSF train, not towards the rear end. That to me, makes the above more plausible. One other scenario although less likely, the UP train did have the signal and the BNSF missed theirs, pulling out right in front of the UP train. Something like that happened in Des Moines a few years ago. A UP train hit the IAIS a couple cars deep. Everyone, including me, thought the UP (KC based crew, you would be surprised at how much "us and them" mentality there is between terminals.) crew screwed up. Turned out they didn't, it actually was the IAIS crew's fault. They didn't stop at the absolute and went out in front of the UP at the last minute.
Jeff
According to the signal map I found online there is an advance signal at Quarry, 2 miles east of the diamond.
Chris,
IF the UP crew ran through a red signal at the crossing due to inattention, they also missed at least an approach signal and perhaps an advance approach. The overhead bridge is irrelevant as long as the crew can see the signal, which I am sure they could.
Mac
So, according to Willy, the UP DS controls the diamond and makes the BNSF trains wait for the UP trains to go by. That makes me wonder how often the UP trains have to hold for a crossing BNSF freight? Plus, with the diamond directly under the bridge and it being night, the visibilty at that location could be poor.
Just a guess from what I've read. I'm thinking a tired UP engineer and conductor weren't expecting the red signal or a crossing freight because they usually get the clearance. UP DS thought he / she could get the BNSF freight through but it was moving a bit slower than expected. UP crew ran the red signal, didn't see the BNSF freight on the crossing under the bridge until it was too late and tagged the rear of the crossing train.
CC
Paul_D_North_JrIf it were up to me, I wouldn't even go to the expense or complexity of using multiple individual columns in such an instance. Instead, I'd just pour a single massive wall with a simple rectangular form, and call it "Done !".
BTW do the MoDOT engineers design nearby bridges to accomodate a shaking from that nearby New Madrid fault zone?
Links to my Google Maps ---> Sunset Route overview, SoCal metro, Yuma sub, Gila sub, SR east of Tucson, BNSF Northern Transcon and Southern Transcon *** Why you should support Ukraine! ***
BaltACDFrom the lead picture in the article - It appears that the Roadmaster did not have the old diamond hidden in the weeds.
From the looks of that picture, even the weeds aren't hidden in the weeds!
Bruce
So shovel the coal, let this rattler roll.
"A Train is a Place Going Somewhere" CP Rail Public Timetable
"O. S. Irricana"
. . . __ . ______
The Butler Some pictures of the clean-up are in this article: Workers scramble to clean up after two trains collide
Some pictures of the clean-up are in this article:
From the lead picture in the article - It appears that the Roadmaster did not have the old diamond hidden in the weeds.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
The local news reports say that MODOT is going to seek compensation to rebuild the bridge from the "railroad". Estimated cost $3 Million. No mention of MODOT responsibility that the current bridge wasn't hardened against a crash, or that the new one would be.
mudchicken [snipped - PDN] . . . I wonder if the crossing frog got hurt in all of this? (spares just don't magically appear)...
mudchicken [snipped - PDN] . . . To this day, highway bridge designers complain ad-nausem about the added expense of the crash walls. . . .
The added expense of the crash walls is minimal - a few more cubic yards of concrete in a relatively simple formed shape, and a few thousand lbs. of rebar at most. In return, there are some substantial benefits:
If it were up to me, I wouldn't even go to the expense or complexity of using multiple individual columns in such an instance. Instead, I'd just pour a single massive wall with a simple rectangular form, and call it "Done !".
- Paul North. (Licensed/ Registered Professional Engineer [Civil] in Pennsylvania since 1982)
All you have to do is look at Google Earth (look at PDN's link)....
The fun will be watching MoDOT squirm in their regulatory shorts. I don't know a railroad field engineer or public works engineer that would not want the supports up-armored for new construction. (but they did not have final say in the matter -this incident will be cited for years to come)
With the jillions of bridges over rail lines in this country my educated guess is that this is one that has not been retrofitted with the crash barriers. Time will tell if I am educated or not.
matthewsaggie MC- is there a set distance between the centerline of the track and the bridge support beyond which barriers are not required?
MC- is there a set distance between the centerline of the track and the bridge support beyond which barriers are not required?
AREMA Standard is 25 feet. (25 Ft. Rule above) .... some have the distance at 35-50 feet with speed and bridge type as contributing factors.
Paul D North's posting on the previous page has several links to pictures and one to a pdf - the text in the linked pdf has distances for which a crash barrier is required in he State of Montana, and note that barrier height depends on the spacing from the centerline..
- Erik
K.P.'s Sunset Double track update has a good picture of a crash barrier protecting an overpass that he posted today.
Tomorrow, I expect we will be told that the signals were tested. If there was nothing wrong with the signals, what probable causes are left? What is the probability of ineffective braking?
I recall an incident near here where a train was approaching an interlocking crossing that the operator did not line up for some reason. The engineer discovered that he did not have any air that he could exhaust, so he reversed the engines. The air problem was said to be due to ice in the trainline.
Do railroads use any powered mainline derails in conjunction with interlocking systems these days?
MC,
Thanks!
AREMA 8.2.1.5.1 (1994) Crash wall a minimum of 2.5' thick x 12 long x 6' ATR high and meeting heavy construction standard. Crash wall should project at least a foot beyond the limit of any support or column so that contact is with the crash wall first.
The crash wall is NOT designed to overcome a head-on collision. It should protect against the glancing blows of railcars in a derailment. (like what happened here)
REINFORCING STRENGTH/SIZE OF REBAR IS A FUNCTION OF THE BRIDGE'S OVERALL STRENGTH. At minimimum, crash wall has the same size of reinforcing steel as the columns.
(*) methinks FRA and NTSB will also be looking at the crash wall "25 foot rule" (protection mandatory for obstructions less than 25 feet from tracks) that many roads enforced long before 1994 (back to 1950's?) and the UP Hermosa WY incident under I-80 in the early 1980's (IIRC).....To this day, highway bridge designers complain ad-nausem about the added expense of the crash walls.
I wonder if the crossing frog got hurt in all of this? (spares just don't magically appear)...also interesting is that this is a later SSW line (built 1898) and not the original narrow gage. (Still gets there before SLSF)
MC, PDN,
Are there any specifications as to the amount of reinforcing required in a crash wall? For that matter, I'd be curious about the amount of reinforcing in the original column - after the 1971 Sylmar temblor, Caltrans required hoop rebar of about the same diameter as the vertical rebar. Retrofits to pre-'71 constructions typical consists of steel or carbon fiber jackets around the column, though a few bridges had an additional layer of reinforced concrete placed around the original column.
The crossing agreement(s) at that location (actual station name is "Rockview") spell out in detail who is responsible for what. (The thing, over several inches thick by now, has most likely evolved from the original Construction, Operation & Maintenance agreement) .... Usually, he who gets there first forces the latecomer to do the maintenance. (in this case I suspect that the UP/SSW did some horsetrading with BNSF/SLSF back when they doubletracked their 1882 line and crossed the 1904 SLSF main from St Louis to Memphis down in the MO "bootheel" and then went through a series of line changes)
Railroads sue each other, but not as much as one thinks in derailment cases. (Most disputes wound up with ICC/STB acting as administrative law judge)
(*) After seeing PDN's view of the underside of the bridge, it screams "crash wall - required". MoDOT (successor to the Mo RR Commission/ PSC after 1985) ought to share some of the responsibility for replacing a $ 3 Million dollar bridge for that bad call by the rubber-tired bubbas for not protecting the piers)
Wow there are some houses really close to this intersection. I bet the ground shook when it all happened. Now can the RR that is innocent sue the other one for all of the damage?
Modeling the "Fargo Area Rapid Transit" in O scale 3 rail.
mudchicken PDN and I will be looking to see if the bridge bents/ support piling had crash rails or not. Crash rails are big concrete collars poured around the bridge supports for additional protection. Big controversy between the AREMA and the AASHTO/ASCE highway bubbas over this recently. The ex-Frisco River Sub is no slouch for traffic in this area as well. Plenty of chemical coast traffic on both. EDIT: It would appear from the CNN video that this bridge is relatively new and had NO crash/rail barricades at the site. The pig feathers will certainly fly on this one.
The ex-Frisco River Sub is no slouch for traffic in this area as well. Plenty of chemical coast traffic on both.
EDIT: It would appear from the CNN video that this bridge is relatively new and had NO crash/rail barricades at the site. The pig feathers will certainly fly on this one.
And the answer is "No" - see this oblique ("Bird's-Eye" view) from Bing Maps:
http://binged.it/159DEgF
Tough to find a good photo of such a "crash wall", but here are links to 2 TXDOT sketches of one:
http://onlinemanuals.txdot.gov/txdotmanuals/det/images/4-13.gif
http://onlinemanuals.txdot.gov/txdotmanuals/det/images/4-14.gif
See also "Sec. 21.2.3.4 - Pier Protection" on pages 6 and 8 of 11 at: http://www.docstoc.com/docs/45395248/Highway-Bridges-Over-Railroads---PDF
EDIT: Here's a link to a photo of a crash wall by K.P. Harrier: http://i236.photobucket.com/albums/ff19/kpharrier/cajon/XC-DSC02128.jpg
It's from the "Cajon Pass Triple-Tracking Updates" thread here - post of May 19, 2008, on page 10 of many, 4th photo down - at: http://cs.trains.com/trn/f/111/p/102777/1444807.aspx#1444807
- Paul North.
mudhicken PDN and I will be looking to see if the bridge bents/ support piling had crash rails or not. Crash rails are big concrete collars poured around the bridge supports for additional protection. Big controversy between the AREMA and the AASHTO/ASCE highway bubbas over this recently. The ex-Frisco River Sub is no slouch for traffic in this area as well. Plenty of chemical coast traffic on both. EDIT: It would appear from the CNN video that this bridge is relatively new and had NO crash/rail barricades at the site. The pig feathers will certainly fly on this one.
PDN and I will be looking to see if the bridge bents/ support piling had crash rails or not. Crash rails are big concrete collars poured around the bridge supports for additional protection. Big controversy between the AREMA and the AASHTO/ASCE highway bubbas over this recently.
To Paul North and Mudchicken:
The following link is to a photo of the accident under the High M Overpass showing pretty clearly that the concrete bridge piers were NOT protected by additional "Crash/rail " barricades.
http://www.sltrib.com/csp/cms/sites/sltrib/pages/slidegallery.csp?cid=56365832&pid=5099444
[The above link is to the story provided by Deggesty (Johnnie) for his link to a photo essay, and story in The Salt Lake Tribune.]
cacole If the UP crew had fallen asleep, shouldn't the alerter have automatically applied the brakes? I always thought that was the purpose of the alerter.
If the UP crew had fallen asleep, shouldn't the alerter have automatically applied the brakes? I always thought that was the purpose of the alerter.
This link should open page 14 of the thread below called One year later (sleep thread). Look at the two pieces I posted in blue on that page. The first one gives a detailed account of what is referred to as “sleeping on the alerter” or “alerter naps.” The more technical description is resetting the alerter “reflexively.”
In the described incident, the engineer resets the alerter several times while failing to respond to various wayside conditions calling for a response until he finally collides with a train. Basically the resetting is so unobtrusive that a person can do it without hardly waking up.
The second piece is the NTSB asking the FRA to redesign the alerter so they cannot be reset reflexively. Then the FRA assigns the task to a contractor and the contractor tells the FRA that there is no market for such an improved alerter. I have no idea why the contractor would get to make that call.
The link:
http://cs.trains.com/trn/f/111/p/217591/2402565.aspx#2402565
K. P. Harrier The report about the UP train ‘clipping’ the BNSF near its rear gives me the impression that the UP crew simply fell asleep … after all, the collision occurred at 2:30 A.M. It was good to hear that forum contributor wlilly lives somewhat nearby, so we might soon finally be able to get a knowledgeable onsite assessment of the situation.
The report about the UP train ‘clipping’ the BNSF near its rear gives me the impression that the UP crew simply fell asleep … after all, the collision occurred at 2:30 A.M.
It was good to hear that forum contributor wlilly lives somewhat nearby, so we might soon finally be able to get a knowledgeable onsite assessment of the situation.
With 'willy' stating that the crossing is controlled by the UP, I would conjecture that the UP Dispatcher would line the crossing for any UP traffic prior to lining the crossing for BNSF traffic. Until the NTSB publishes some data stating which train had the route, any assessment of which train had the route and which train did not is purely conjecture.
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