Steam Locomotives versus Diesels

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by vsmith

Its my understanding that dieselization was well under way right before WW2 broke out, the RRs were already convinced by the shear economic savings over the much more labor intensive steam locos. This transition was put on hiatus during the duration due to the higher priority of diesels needed for naval vessels. Once the war was over, and after a period of time for the major diesel locomotive manufacturers to retool factories, the steady march to supply diesel engines resumed. Dont forget, almost no new locomotives, steam or deisel were built during the war years unless they were priority ordered for the war effort, so the RRs had to run what they had and they ran what they had right into the ground due to the demand of shipping frieght a wartime economy demanded.

By the end of the war, the RRs were going to have to replace the aging and wornout steamers with either new steamers, costly rebuildings of the worn old steamers, or buying less costly to operate new diesels locos. Its not hard to understand why the RRs chose to order the newer deisels, they were less expensive to operate and less expensive to maintain. Any loss in motive efficiency over steam was compensated by the economic gain. Money talks, especially to railroads.

Sad side note: When the move towards dieselization began to really take hold by the 1950's, entire roundhouse crews, shop crews, entire facilities, whistlestops, watering and coaling stations were eliminated very quickly, throwing hundreds of RR workers out of work.

Anyway thats all I got to say, very interesting topic[8D]

Lots of conclusions here, any facts?

best regards, Michael Sol

[Murphy Siding]

QUOTE: Originally posted by vsmith

Its my understanding that dieselization was well under way right before WW2 broke out, the RRs were already convinced by the shear economic savings over the much more labor intensive steam locos. This transition was put on hiatus during the duration due to the higher priority of diesels needed for naval vessels. Once the war was over, and after a period of time for the major diesel locomotive manufacturers to retool factories, the steady march to supply diesel engines resumed. Dont forget, almost no new locomotives, steam or deisel were built during the war years unless they were priority ordered for the war effort, so the RRs had to run what they had and they ran what they had right into the ground due to the demand of shipping frieght a wartime economy demanded.

By the end of the war, the RRs were going to have to replace the aging and wornout steamers with either new steamers, costly rebuildings of the worn old steamers, or buying less costly to operate new diesels locos. Its not hard to understand why the RRs chose to order the newer deisels, they were less expensive to operate and less expensive to maintain. Any loss in motive efficiency over steam was compensated by the economic gain. Money talks, especially to railroads.

Sad side note: When the move towards dieselization began to really take hold by the 1950's, entire roundhouse crews, shop crews, entire facilities, whistlestops, watering and coaling stations were eliminated very quickly, throwing hundreds of RR workers out of work.

Anyway thats all I got to say, very interesting topic[8D]

Do you have any numbers on that?[:D] Mere logic alone will not suffice[;)]

[MichaelSol]

Aaah, the power of logic without facts. Now we're getting somewhere.

Now, suppose in 1943 the steam builders were directed by the government to build only steam, based on pre-existing platforms, whereas EMD was allowed to continue development of its "alternative" power technology.

Suppose that EMD could offer GMAC financing. Instead of paying $120,000 for a steam engine, railroad could buy new power for as little as $11,771 in the first year, and likewise thereafter. And because the government had prohibited new steam research and development at a key point, those EMD products could seem pretty advanced because of that interesting "government boost."

And suppose that was just all too tempting even though you knew, as a manager, that down the road -- after you had retired -- your successors would ultimately end up paying $223,795 for that diesel, instead of the $120,000 had you paid cash for either the diesel or the steam. But, heck, at $11,771 you can get rid of a lot of old steam -- even though a lot of it is costing nothing in finance charges -- and you look all modern and progressive and, until those maintenance/hp curves that nobody knew about start to backfire a few years down the road --- but until then you look like a pretty clever manager.

Of course, at some point, your company is paying $223,795 for the locomotive, just as you realized you can't get the years of service out of it that you could have with the $120,000 steam locomotive. And you're discovering that you are now paying more per hp for maintenance than with steam, and you have to buy still more of these engines except now you have no choice b but to go with the $11,771 per year payment plan, except that now it is $15,000 a year for the new generation. But, the steam builders are out of business.

All of a sudden, diesel hp became mighty expensive for an industry that was used to 50 year service lives, flat maintenance curves, and low financing charges. It was an industry used to stability in its motive power fleet, and was incapable of being skeptical of claims made.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Murphy Siding]

MichaelSol: I'd like to be candid with you for a moment. If this ruffles your feathers, I apologize. I am not a railroad expert, or anything close. I am an interested party in train related subjects, nothing more.I read a lot, and I ask a lot of questions. You have an interest in train related subjects, and apparantly a railroad related expertise of some measure. What puzzles me, is that most of your posts aimed at me, and quite a few others, come off as "Boy, are you stupid-Charlie Brown". It's quite essy for me to get sarcastic when treated that way.(As you've seen.) Perhaps it's perception, but I, and I'm sure a lot of other posters, can't get much out of what you're trying to say, when it's dished out that way. I'm a good one for thinking "Hmmm that doesn't seem to make sense". It's hard to accept "this is correct, because I say it is."
Back to the thread at hand: You seem to be saying that (ALL) the railroads made a big mistake by switching to diesels. Rather than keep telling others that their opinions and thoughts must be wrong, can you expand on this theory? I'll try to word my questions in a more civil manner-I'm just curious. You could do well to understand that I don't have any numbers or studies to refer to. I'm not challenging, I'm just asking.

Thanks -Murphy Siding

[vsmith]

I was merely stating my understanding of the history, not making any statements of any absolute facts other than what I understood to be some of the history of dieselization...

1. The steady migration towards Dieselization did begin before the war. you could say it started the day the Pioneer Zephyr and the M-10000 took to the rails. Steam Old, Diesel New....Shiny Engines ...Progress, ya know?

2. The war did force almost every major RR in the US to heavily utilize whatever motive power they had and to work it hard. So hard that many engines were completely worn out and in need of major rebuilding by wars end.

3. That in the early days , diesels cost less to operate day to day ( just the savings in labor cost alone would be a big motivator) and were more versitile, at least in the eyes of management.

4. That many longtime RR workers did lose their jobs due to the lower maintanence requirements of the newfangled Diesels.

Please dont expect me to flood you with pages of "facts" as I dont have ready access to the "History of Railroads" Encyclopedia gigantica on my desktop...besides everything I have stated has also been restated by several others here...so just take what I say for what it is..as ones persons opinion, based on what I took to be the history.

Afterall thats what this forum is for , Opinions!

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by vsmith
Afterall thats what this forum is for , Opinions!

Well, there are plenty of those ....

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Anonymous]

Other thoughts:

Labor costs for locomotive crews do not enter into the steam vs diesel cost debate until consist tonnage began to exceed the abilities of the largest modern steam locomotives. Up until that point, you had to have an engineer and a fireman, steam or diesel. Once train tonnage exceeded steam's ability to handle that tonnage with a single locomotive, the diesel's MU ability skewed that cost factor in diesel's favor.

That being said, if someone had invented a way to MU steam locomotives, allowing a single engine crew to handle more than one steam locomotive, hmmmm.................(?)

There is an industrial analogy to the across the board dieselization of railroads in the 1950's and the associated financing "legacy" costs of mass dieseliztion. In the electric utility sector today, there is a push being made for mass AMR (Automated Meter Reading) installation, whereby utilities are replacing perfectly good analog meters with the AMR's, because as we all "know" the labor savings from eliminating meter readers will result in some great future savings for the company(s) down the road. Of course, there is a cost to this mass meter replacement, so the utilities have made sure each state's PUC authorizes a rate increase to pay for this project. Thus, these companies were allowed to use rate increases to pay for such a massive capital overhaul, whereas the railroads probably were not allowed to increase rates to pay for dieselization.

Problem is, not every state has authorized such a rate increase, so some utilities are having a cash flow crisis because they jumped head first into full scale meter replacement thinking the rate increase was a slam dunk, and when such a rate increase was turned down after the fact........well, you all get the picture.

The point is, a lot of ostensibly well managed well meaning American corporations will take actions akin to plunging head first into murky waters/burning bridges to the immediate past, etc., because they want to appear as "cutting edge" to their stockholders. It will be interesting to see if those utilities that AMR'ed before a rate increase to pay for it was authorized will be able to maintain ROI, or if those ROI's in future years will mirror the ROI trend of the railroads post dieselization.

[rrandb]

The very fact that the traditional manufactures attempted to swicth production from steam to diesel says it all. If nobody want s to buy something (steam) you just can not sell it. [2c]

[Anonymous]

My understanding is the railroads started loosing money during the 30's. Perhaps the 4% ROI during the 1940s was a high point caused by the war. Railroads were making lots of money and defering a lot of maintainence. What was the ROI during the 1930's and how did the post WWI ROI compare to the post WW2 period. Expanding the time frame might make things clearer.

EMD's financing plan should have actually improved ROI over what it would have been in the early years of dieselization, since the railroads were not paying the full cost of the equipment. There are other factors and numbers on both sides of the issue to consider, such as productivity i.e. revenue per employee. Also steam maintainence was largely PM done by lower wage workers. Dieselization meant higher skills were needed such as electricians, etc. A similar situation occurred with early business automation, where many green eye-shade accountants and clerks were replaced by expensive computers and higher paid programmers. ROI didn't improve, but eventually productivity did.

[oltmannd]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

Before you change the subject, because I am trying to nail down "all these other things" that affected the railroad ROI prior to 1960, I would still appreciate an answer as to how and to what extent the 100 ton car affected anything prior to 1960, how unit trains affected anything prior to 1960, and how intermodal affected railroads prior to 1960 as your proffered examples of things that overwhelmed the effects of dieselization of American railroads.

These were indeed significant impactors of the railroads, but you offered them in the context of alternate responsibility for a declining ROI, and offered them as examples for the specific period prior to 1960.

How did they negatively affect ROI? Particularly interested in the impact of the 100 ton car.

Best regards, Michael Sol

Impact of unit trians and 100 ton cars prior to 1960? None - obviously.

But they were common by 1970 and overall ROI didn't improve any. So, they were worthless? No so fast. A proper analysis would have to compare to what would have been without those inovations, not just the results of the preceding time period - and you aren't doing that with your dieseliztion assertions.

[oltmannd]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by oltmannd
70% from any heat engine would have to include waste heat recovery to a large degree.

I am confused about the what % of chemical energy from coal is captured by the gasification process (coal gas BTU/total coal BTU). What is the energy cost for the gassification? And, what is the thermal efficiency for the coal gas heat engine (gas turbine? boiler? what?) that is turning the generator?

The Wabash River plant generates 292 megawatts of electricity, and supplies- 262 megawatts to the electric grid . Presumably the rest goes back to the gasification process.

From the Department of Energy:
Efficiency gains are another benefit of coal gasification. In a typical coal combustion plant, heat from burning coal is used to boil water, making steam that drives a steam turbine-generator. Only a third of the energy value of coal is actually converted into electricity by most combustion plants, the rest is lost as waste heat.

A coal gasification power plant, however, typically gets dual duty from the gases it produces. First, the coal gases, cleaned of impurities, are fired in a gas turbine - much like natural gas - to generate one source of electricity. The hot exhaust of the gas turbine is then used to generate steam for a more conventional steam turbine-generator. This dual source of electric power, called a "combined cycle," is much more efficient in converting coal's energy into usable electricity. The fuel efficiency of a coal gasification power plant can be boosted to 50 percent or more.

Future concepts that incorporate a fuel cell or fuel cell-gas turbine hybrid could achieve efficiencies nearly twice today's typical coal combustion plants. If any of the remaining waste heat can be channeled into process steam or heat, perhaps for nearby factories or district heating plants, the overall fuel use efficiency of future gasification plants could reach 70 to 80 percent."

Probably there is a separate thread more appropriate to this, particularly since there are specific, actual railroad content and questions pending.

Best regards, Michael Sol

Thanks. That explains part of it. A stack boiler for waste heat recovery. Could even use the stack boiler turbine exhaust steam to preheat the coal for the gassification process and get a bit more out of it.

Still would like to know what they do with all the coke left over from the gassification process.....

[oltmannd]

QUOTE: Originally posted by oltmannd

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

Before you change the subject, because I am trying to nail down "all these other things" that affected the railroad ROI prior to 1960, I would still appreciate an answer as to how and to what extent the 100 ton car affected anything prior to 1960, how unit trains affected anything prior to 1960, and how intermodal affected railroads prior to 1960 as your proffered examples of things that overwhelmed the effects of dieselization of American railroads.

These were indeed significant impactors of the railroads, but you offered them in the context of alternate responsibility for a declining ROI, and offered them as examples for the specific period prior to 1960.

How did they negatively affect ROI? Particularly interested in the impact of the 100 ton car.

Best regards, Michael Sol

Impact of unit trians and 100 ton cars prior to 1960? None - obviously.

But they were common by 1970 and overall ROI didn't improve any. So, they were worthless? No so fast. A proper analysis would have to compare to what would have been without those inovations, not just the results of the preceding time period - and you aren't doing that with your dieseliztion assertions.

...and just to be clear. I'm not concluding ANYTHING here. I'm just trying to point out that you are jumping to conclusions by not projecting forward the results from the alternative(s) to dieselization.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by oltmannd

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

Before you change the subject, because I am trying to nail down "all these other things" that affected the railroad ROI prior to 1960, I would still appreciate an answer as to how and to what extent the 100 ton car affected anything prior to 1960, how unit trains affected anything prior to 1960, and how intermodal affected railroads prior to 1960 as your proffered examples of things that overwhelmed the effects of dieselization of American railroads.

These were indeed significant impactors of the railroads, but you offered them in the context of alternate responsibility for a declining ROI, and offered them as examples for the specific period prior to 1960.

How did they negatively affect ROI? Particularly interested in the impact of the 100 ton car.

Best regards, Michael Sol

Impact of unit trians and 100 ton cars prior to 1960? None - obviously.

But they were common by 1970 and overall ROI didn't improve any. So, they were worthless? No so fast. A proper analysis would have to compare to what would have been without those inovations, not just the results of the preceding time period - and you aren't doing that with your dieseliztion assertions.

And of course that begs the question as to why you brought up unit trains and 100 ton cars in the dieselization context; since of course they had nothing to do with that era.

And of course as you know, the impact of the 100 ton car and unit trains on the American railroad infrastructure has been the subject of considerable analysis and discussion, given the accelerated maintenance requirements that the railroads at the time couldn't afford on the scale necessary.

Did the railroads expect they would have to rebuild their mainlines almost completely to handle 100 tonners and especially when used in unit trains? Was there an understanding that the changeover would again require an unprecedented capital investment that railroads at the time could ill afford? And all the while still purchasing new road diesels at ever higher prices on the short life cycle times?

Not so fast indeed. We know exactly what the ultimate cost of those innovations were: the Rail Crisis of the 1970s, and which railroads only finally began to realize by 1968 ... when it was, once again, too late to change strategies, and ROI's once again took a plunge. Railway Age March 18, 1968, p. 29.

You will search in vain for any indications that railroads, in plunging into yet a new round of cost-saving "innovations" after the dieselization debacle, had any idea that the 100 ton car would decrease rail life by up to half, and ties and ballast by nearly 30% with the concomitant increase in expenses system-wide, offering an overall increase in ton-mile costs of between 32 and 48% depending on the underlying track quality, representing actual incremental cost increases of between 9 cents and 14 cents per ton-mile. [Ahlf, "The Implications of the 100-Ton Car," Modern Railroads, February, 1980, AAR study "Findings of Panel," 1981. Rather than an economic benefit, railroads suffered a net economic penalty of 6 cents per ton mile on an average 200 mile per day run, as a result of the introduction of the 100 ton car.

We know, in fact, that we don't have to compare with previous ROI and hypothetical results without the "innovations" to determine the net impact of the 100 ton car and the unit train because we have net results that speak for themselves because we have records for comparison.

To suggest that there is some consistency in these results, obtained by the same railroads across a broad spectrum of managements, operating in lockstep every time someone says "innovation" can be judged by the ROI over that 25 year period which, myriad excuses notwithstanding, still rested on key decisions with wide-ranging financial and operating implications and which resulted in continually declining ROIs.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[oltmannd]

QUOTE: Originally posted by oltmannd

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by oltmannd
70% from any heat engine would have to include waste heat recovery to a large degree.

I am confused about the what % of chemical energy from coal is captured by the gasification process (coal gas BTU/total coal BTU). What is the energy cost for the gassification? And, what is the thermal efficiency for the coal gas heat engine (gas turbine? boiler? what?) that is turning the generator?

The Wabash River plant generates 292 megawatts of electricity, and supplies- 262 megawatts to the electric grid . Presumably the rest goes back to the gasification process.

From the Department of Energy:
Efficiency gains are another benefit of coal gasification. In a typical coal combustion plant, heat from burning coal is used to boil water, making steam that drives a steam turbine-generator. Only a third of the energy value of coal is actually converted into electricity by most combustion plants, the rest is lost as waste heat.

A coal gasification power plant, however, typically gets dual duty from the gases it produces. First, the coal gases, cleaned of impurities, are fired in a gas turbine - much like natural gas - to generate one source of electricity. The hot exhaust of the gas turbine is then used to generate steam for a more conventional steam turbine-generator. This dual source of electric power, called a "combined cycle," is much more efficient in converting coal's energy into usable electricity. The fuel efficiency of a coal gasification power plant can be boosted to 50 percent or more.

Future concepts that incorporate a fuel cell or fuel cell-gas turbine hybrid could achieve efficiencies nearly twice today's typical coal combustion plants. If any of the remaining waste heat can be channeled into process steam or heat, perhaps for nearby factories or district heating plants, the overall fuel use efficiency of future gasification plants could reach 70 to 80 percent."

Probably there is a separate thread more appropriate to this, particularly since there are specific, actual railroad content and questions pending.

Best regards, Michael Sol

Thanks. That explains part of it. A stack boiler for waste heat recovery. Could even use the stack boiler turbine exhaust steam to preheat the coal for the gassification process and get a bit more out of it.

Still would like to know what they do with all the coke left over from the gassification process.....

I found the answer. The coal gasification process has about a 70% yield if you create "water gas" from the carbon after driving off the coal gasses and bind the resultant carbon monoxide. If you use a combined cycle gas/steam turbine at 50% thermal eff, your overall would be 35% - about the same as a straight coal generating station. But, less greenhouse gas....

[oltmannd]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by oltmannd

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

Before you change the subject, because I am trying to nail down "all these other things" that affected the railroad ROI prior to 1960, I would still appreciate an answer as to how and to what extent the 100 ton car affected anything prior to 1960, how unit trains affected anything prior to 1960, and how intermodal affected railroads prior to 1960 as your proffered examples of things that overwhelmed the effects of dieselization of American railroads.

These were indeed significant impactors of the railroads, but you offered them in the context of alternate responsibility for a declining ROI, and offered them as examples for the specific period prior to 1960.

How did they negatively affect ROI? Particularly interested in the impact of the 100 ton car.

Best regards, Michael Sol

Impact of unit trians and 100 ton cars prior to 1960? None - obviously.

But they were common by 1970 and overall ROI didn't improve any. So, they were worthless? No so fast. A proper analysis would have to compare to what would have been without those inovations, not just the results of the preceding time period - and you aren't doing that with your dieseliztion assertions.

And of course that begs the question as to why you brought up unit trains and 100 ton cars in the dieselization context; since of course they had nothing to do with that era.

And of course as you know, the impact of the 100 ton car and unit trains on the American railroad infrastructure has been the subject of considerable analysis and discussion, given the accelerated maintenance requirements that the railroads at the time couldn't afford on the scale necessary.

Did the railroads expect they would have to rebuild their mainlines almost completely to handle 100 tonners and especially when used in unit trains? Was there an understanding that the changeover would again require an unprecedented capital investment that railroads at the time could ill afford? And all the while still purchasing new road diesels at ever higher prices on the short life cycle times?

Not so fast indeed. We know exactly what the ultimate cost of those innovations were: the Rail Crisis of the 1970s, and which railroads only finally began to realize by 1968 ... when it was, once again, too late to change strategies, and ROI's once again took a plunge. Railway Age March 18, 1968, p. 29.

You will search in vain for any indications that railroads, in plunging into yet a new round of cost-saving "innovations" after the dieselization debacle, had any idea that the 100 ton car would decrease rail life by up to half, and ties and ballast by nearly 30% with the concomitant increase in expenses system-wide, offering an overall increase in ton-mile costs of between 32 and 48% depending on the underlying track quality, representing actual incremental cost increases of between 9 cents and 14 cents per ton-mile. [Ahlf, "The Implications of the 100-Ton Car," Modern Railroads, February, 1980, AAR study "Findings of Panel," 1981. Rather than an economic benefit, railroads suffered a net economic penalty of 6 cents per ton mile on an average 200 mile per day run, as a result of the introduction of the 100 ton car.

We know, in fact, that we don't have to compare with previous ROI and hypothetical results without the "innovations" to determine the net impact of the 100 ton car and the unit train because we have net results that speak for themselves because we have records for comparison.

To suggest that there is some consistency in these results, obtained by the same railroads across a broad spectrum of managements, operating in lockstep every time someone says "innovation" can be judged by the ROI over that 25 period which, myriad excuses notwithstanding, still rested on key decisions with wide-ranging financial and operating implications and which resulted in continually declining ROIs.

Best regards, Michael Sol

Are you just tying to pick a fight?[B)]

I can't believe you're not getting the point that when you compare "THEN" to "NOW", you are measuring the impact of ALL the changes that occured. If you want to measure the impact of a SINGLE change (like dieselization), you have to create an "alternate NOW" to compare to. e.g. "what would a RR look like in 1960 if they continued with steam rather than dieselize". The answer isn't "what a RR looked like in 1946". The really BIG change in american society 1946 - 1960 just swamps everything else. You would quibble with that?

You're not telling me anything new about 100 ton cars. Lots of accelerated rail wear and vehicle dynamic issues in the early years. All since resolved. Have now moved on to 286k with no real trouble. Attempts at 315k are mixed. Current "sweet spot" for bulk is 286k, at least for now.

There were unitended consequences from air brakes, hump yards, welded rail, CTC, EOTs, belt-packs, stack cars, end of car cushioning, disc braking, etc, etc. No doubt some of these killed the ROI on their investment in the early years, too.

In 1900, one in ten americans worked for a RR in 1900 (assuming 50M americans, that's 5,000,000). Now, there are only about 150,000 on the class ones (maybe double if you add in Amtrak, commuter rail and shortlines) - about one in a thousand. A 97% reduction in force! Yet, RRs are hauling more today - with a worse ROI. I'll betcha there was more going on in the past 100 years than layoffs!

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by oltmannd
[Are you just tying to pick a fight?[B)]

That's what I'm wondering. First you say this:

QUOTE: Originally posted by oltmannd
That there is a corelation between ROE and dieselization does not imply cause and effect. You might also argue that the decline was caused by the huge investment in passenger equipment. Or, intermodal equipment. Or, the introduction unit trains. Or, the introduction of 100 ton cars. All of which occurred during the same time period as dieseliztion.

Then you say this:

QUOTE: Originally posted by oltmannd
Impact of unit trians and 100 ton cars prior to 1960? None - obviously.
But they were common by 1970 and overall ROI didn't improve any. So, they were worthless?

But then:

QUOTE: Originally posted by oltmannd
You're not telling me anything new about 100 ton cars.

First you say that 100 ton cars were introduced "during the same time period as dieselization," then admit that they weren't. Now, were you just plain wrong, or was that an artful deception to pick a fight?

Then you say that that ROI didn't "improve" as a result of the introduction of the 100-ton car, but then admit that in fact you already knew "all about" the fact that they significantly damaged ROI as a statistical truth. Your answer that ROI "didn't improve" suggests to me you believed during the time frame in question you believed it should have, or that "other factors" affected ROI. Well, when we see that both operating losses and capital demands increased as a result of their use, which, yes, is part of a specific explanation of a declining ROI, you declare you knew all about that. If so, why did you imply something different? Again, just trying to start something?

Finally, we see the real reason that "facts" are just inconvenient to any discussion of railroad management and ROI, is because "the really BIG change in american society 1946 - 1960 just swamps everything else."

Good grief, regarding ROI, what does THAT mean?

The interesting, almost odd point you make is that while demanding detailed studies to show effect on ROI (which do in fact exist), you talk about the impact of "changes in American Society" with absolutely no embarassment over the fact that you are offering zero in the way of proof of that, even as you claim the necessity of studies for supporting such a claim.

And of course that has been my point on this thread. Your (and not just your's) arm-waiving approach to management decisions is just about useless, aside from the frequent fact-shiftng on your part which is designed to offer what, I have no idea.

There were, however, a series of specific management decisions for which detailed studies exist. For the 100-ton hopper car, the 1981 AAR study referred to previously. For dieselization, it is H.F.Brown, "Economic Results of Diesel Electric Motive Power on the Railways of the United States of America," Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 175:5 (1961).

I participated in an update of Brown's study in 1975 in which we brought the figures forward to 1973. Brown's conclusion was that, "in actual practice, dieselization has added to the financial burden of American Railways" at a time when they could not afford it. That is, for road diesels, the operating savings generated by cheaper fuel costs, lower maintenance costs, and increased productivity savings, were overwhelmed by the additional marginal costs of financing the purchases.

As this process -- dieselization -- moved forward, guess what? ROI declined. Notwithstanding the arguments on this thread to the contrary, that usually happens when costs exceed savings, and no additional revenue is generated.

By 1975, we had detailed life cycle studies of three generations of diesel-electric horsepower available, which Brown did not have. We also had the evidence of additional labor and additional facility costs imposed on railroads in the early and mid-60s as a result of the cost of the aging of the U.S. diesel fleet, and the fact that per hp maintenance costs were far beyond what was contemplated/advertised by EMD. We could see that for older diesels, these costs were significantly above that incurred for steam, because even though the steam costs were of an older generation, they were just about flat, which was emphatically not true for the diesel-electrrics. ROI continued to decline. That's consistent with the theory and was borne out by the evidence.

Then 100-ton cars came along.

The role of any business management is to manage, and assess structural and technological changes. This idea of yours that management is some kind of a victim of "changes in American society" and that ROI is a societal problem, not a management problem, is a place you and I disagree on.

I prefer the studies, and I have cited them.

Judging by your elastic reference to "facts," and to no studies at all, I think you might just like to argue.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[oltmannd]

I never meant to assert that 100 ton cars existed in the 1950s. I guess I wasn't clear.

I would be willing to buy the arguement that states the RRs had pretty much given up on there being any future for the RRs by 1950 and were doing whatever it took to keep being able to pay out a dividend. If that meant taking on a lot of debt in order to save a nickel in operations, so that nickel could be put towards a dividend, then that was probably in the best interest of the stockholders. Slow liquidation probably would have been better for the stockholders, but that was verboten. This fits with the lack of track maint in the 1950s - that was all operating expense that could be deferred in order to pay a dividend.

It also fits with the rhetoric of the RR annual reports in the late 40s and early 50s. The RRs laid out several "problem areas" each year in the late 40s: Full crews/labor costs, passenger losses, and regulation in the face of a changing industrial environment. Each year, they came back with the same issues with little progress to report (although they were always "hopeful"). By 1950, they stopped talking about those issues - even though nothing had changed. Instead they just discussed the operating numbers and were either "happy" if they went up, or "disappointed" if they went down.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by oltmannd
[I would be willing to buy the arguement that states the RRs had pretty much given up on there being any future for the RRs by 1950 and were doing whatever it took to keep being able to pay out a dividend. If that meant taking on a lot of debt in order to save a nickel in operations, so that nickel could be put towards a dividend, then that was probably in the best interest of the stockholders. ...this fits with the lack of track maint in the 1950s - that was all operating expense that could be deferred in order to pay a dividend.

Management attitudes undoubtedly played a role. Management competence undoubtedly played a role. The ROI chart I posted earlier reflects in an interesting fashion on the following maintenance data, which is not for all railroads but happens to be what I have at the office at the moment:

Maintenance $ available per mainline mile of track
MILW------- Great Northern
1950 9,580--7,963
1951 11,050-- 9,048
1952 12,411-- 9,763
1953 13,031-- 10,351
1954 11,614-- 10,092
1955 13,509--10,448
1956 13,007--10,936
1957 12,175--11,092
1958 11,408--8,228
1959 11,069-- 8,560
1960 9,770--8,364
1961 8,600--7,633
1962 9,019--7,973
1963 8,455--7,889
1964 8,641--8,249
1965 9,135--7,543
1966 10,922--7,928
1967 9,575-- 8,300
1968 11,656-- 8,266
1969 13,451

You can see that even as ROI continued to decline into the 1960s, it would have been worse had maintenance expenditures continued at the rate they were at during the 1950s. Debt from dieselization and high maint./h.p. operating expenses continued to corrode ROI and then, after a decade of substantially lower track maintenance, along comes the bright idea of the 100-ton car. This one deserves the Nobel Prize for Railroading. The train wreck was just a matter of time, literally as well as figuratively.

Railroading was making only a few major decisions with far-reaching ramifications, and we can see what those were. We know the effects of both. We saw the Rail Crisis of the 1970s.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Anonymous]

All right let's calm down. Basically you have said that railroads should not have switched to diesels because it caused them to loose money. Some facts I think are pertinent and needed to determine this.
How much more does a diesel cost to maintain than a steam engine in the shops?
Is this more than what is saved in maintenance on the road (i.e. things like water towers)
How much more did a diesel mechanic get paid, that you average roundhouse grunt that worked on steam engines?
What was the difference in fuel costs between the two?
You also stated that diesel locomotives had to be replaced sooner than a steamer. So what are the numbers on this?
How long did a steamer last compared to the average diesel of the era?


I know maybe these all can't be answered, or vary depending on the road, but definitely something to consider.

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Lotus098

All right let's calm down. Basically you have said that railroads should not have switched to diesels because it caused them to loose money. Some facts I think are pertinent and needed to determine this.
How much more does a diesel cost to maintain than a steam engine in the shops?
Is this more than what is saved in maintenance on the road (i.e. things like water towers)
How much more did a diesel mechanic get paid, that you average roundhouse grunt that worked on steam engines?
What was the difference in fuel costs between the two?
You also stated that diesel locomotives had to be replaced sooner than a steamer. So what are the numbers on this?
How long did a steamer last compared to the average diesel of the era?


I know maybe these all can't be answered, or vary depending on the road, but definitely something to consider.

Lotus,

What I think Micheal is getting at is not that railroads shoudn't have dieselized, it's that they (1)should not have gone into debt to dieselize en masse, and (2) should have taken more time to test the longevity claims by EMD before dieselizing via normal locomotive attrition.

Contrast that with today's situation, wherein coal is now so much cheaper than diesel that if there were steam locomotive manufacturers around (not to mention locomotive coaling facilities), it may very well be that modern steam would be preferable to modern diesel in terms of operating costs. It's something to keep an open mind about.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Lotus098

All right let's calm down. Basically you have said that railroads should not have switched to diesels because it caused them to loose money.

That's correct Dave. What I specifically said, on December 20, was this: "doesn't that offer support for the proposition that management entered into an important decision with regard to the timing and extent of dieselization without a full understanding of the facts, based in large part on demonstrated errors in the cost/benefit study assumptions."

The "timing and extent" is an important caveat. The Brown study cited above determined that in the case of yard locomotives, the investment had an improved ROI compared to comparable steam operation. It was in the case of road diesels that the opposite effect was seen. Further, the primary detriment was not only the surprisingly short economic service life of the road diesel compared to steam, but the fact that financing was so different than for steam and particularly in the instance where machines with useful service lives of 10, 20 or even 30 more years, which were paid for, were scrapped in favor of machines with 8-10 year economic service lives (for their intended use) and for which the companies incurred substantial long term debt.

This debt represented something that had not substantially existed before. It was spent to replace something the railroads already had and had already paid for. It is tough to argue that rate of return is not going to decline on an accounting basis when perfectly good assets are scrapped and their depreciation accelerated accordingly, i.e. "the write-off." And there was a lot of good steam, with a lot of years of both accounting and service life left.

That is what has been remarkable about this thread on that basis alone: not a single acknowledgement by experienced people that ROI would probably inevitably decline during a period of substantial changeoever of a substantial portion of a company's undepreciated asset base.

There would be a decline in ROI on that basis alone, before even getting to the later phenomenon of service life problems, depreciation recognition, and refinancing of new equipment while old equipment is still incurring finance charges because of the unexpectedly short service lives.

That substantial numbers of adults, inside and outside the industry, couldn't/can't see that the process is just about inevitable under those circumstances, tells you something about this industry.

QUOTE: Some facts I think are pertinent and needed to determine this.
How much more does a diesel cost to maintain than a steam engine in the shops?
Is this more than what is saved in maintenance on the road (i.e. things like water towers)
How much more did a diesel mechanic get paid, that you average roundhouse grunt that worked on steam engines?
What was the difference in fuel costs between the two?
You also stated that diesel locomotives had to be replaced sooner than a steamer. So what are the numbers on this?
How long did a steamer last compared to the average diesel of the era?
I know maybe these all can't be answered, or vary depending on the road, but definitely something to consider.

They have been answered and they have been considered.

The point of citations is to offer a source. In the case of your questions, I provided a direct cite to an important study by one of the most respected and well-known professional engineers (at Gibbs & Hill) of his generation on precisely the points raised by your questions.

The point of that particular citation is not just to offer answers to all your questions, but to offer a useful look at how information is gathered, analyzed, and processed, and conclusions derived in an engineering context.

Based on your questions, that process would be at least as useful to you as the statistical information. I suggest you go to interlibrary loan. It would be a useful education for you. And it is a good rule of thumb as well: always go to the source.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Murphy Siding]

Michael Sol: What do you make of the fact that the downside of dieselization never has gotten much publicity? Railroads (and railfans) tend to take it as a given that it was the right decision, at the right time. You mention that railroads incured additional labor and and facility costs in the mid-1960's, due to aging diesel fleets. Can you expand on that a little? Thanks

[Anonymous]

Thank you again MichaelSol for clearing things up. I think I see what you have been saying and found some of the answers.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding

Michael Sol: What do you make of the fact that the downside of dieselization never has gotten much publicity? Railroads (and railfans) tend to take it as a given that it was the right decision, at the right time. You mention that railroads incured additional labor and and facility costs in the mid-1960's, due to aging diesel fleets. Can you expand on that a little? Thanks

Railroads are poor historians and have little inclination to introspection.

Gabriel Kolko offers a good example. Generations of railroaders and rail historians, as well as academicians of all types, believed the original Interstate Commerce Act was anti-railroad. Indeed, it was touted for purely partisan political purposes as a triumph of the Progressive movement.

Kolko pointed out in The Triumph of Conservatism, that a substantial, compelling body of evidence existed to show that the reverse was true: that the original ICC Act was the result of railroad pressure and demands to control "cut-throat" competition between railroads.

Now, why did Kolko figure that out, and no one else did?

Which railroad mechanical officer wanted to confess that his decision was wrong? These jobs are as political as any county sheriff: you commit careers to business judgment decisions. Nobody hardly ever says "oops." Not to stockholders and investors after you just wiped out their investment.

And, which company was spending, literally, millions of dollars on both advertising and studies to show the compelling advantages of rapid dieselization? Call it propaganda, but what is propaganda designed to do? And who was funding the other side of the story?

Conventional wisdoms are compelling and controlling. That has nothing to do, ever, with whether they are correct or not.

Rail fans?

As near as I can tell, railfanning is a labor of love. Isn't love blind?

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Anonymous]

There were a lot of railroads for which the decision to dieselize was the correct one at that time. You can second-guess them all you want with the benefit of fifty years of 20-20 hindsight, but for the Southerns and the GM&Os and the PRRs and the Milwaukee Roads and all those dependent on a lot of old, obsolete steam power - even those who had a good quantity of what would be considered modern steam power - a lot of them would not have lasted ten more years - twenty at the outside - if they had to do business with steam in the 1960s and 1970s. Labor costs and inflation made the big difference. The labor cost savings alone in the 1950s can be quantified - go back and look them up. The data are available.

The whole point is moot and has been for decades. Lets move on.

Old Timer

[MichaelSol]

It appears I neglected to mention "studied ignorance."

What is interesting is that from a productivity standpoint, with one exception, "machinists, boilermakers, electricians, etc." showed the smallest productivity gains of any class of railroad employment, 1946-1972 according to Kent Healy in Performance of US Railroads Since World War II. p. 185.

Yet, dieselization is touted at one of the most significant forces for reducing employment, as you can see by the above comment, and yet that is simply not true. Employment related to motive power lagged nearly all other classes of railroad employment in terms of employee reductions.

However, as the old saying goes: "failure has no father."

Best regards, Michael Sol

[MJ4562]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol
There were, however, a series of specific management decisions for which detailed studies exist. For the 100-ton hopper car, the 1981 AAR study referred to previously. For dieselization, it is H.F.Brown, "Economic Results of Diesel Electric Motive Power on the Railways of the United States of America," Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, 175:5 (1961).

I participated in an update of Brown's study in 1975 in which we brought the figures forward to 1973. Brown's conclusion was that, "in actual practice, dieselization has added to the financial burden of American Railways" at a time when they could not afford it. That is, for road diesels, the operating savings generated by cheaper fuel costs, lower maintenance costs, and increased productivity savings, were overwhelmed by the additional marginal costs of financing the purchases.

Thank you for finally providing specifics. I look forward to reading the article.
Now that you've clarified your argument it makes a lot more sense.

[Murphy Siding]

Had the dieselization process gone on at a slower pace (if EMD's marketing hadn't been so succesfull), say, as replacement of steam locomotives as they reached the end of their usefull lives, would diesel manufacturers have had to produce better models sooner? The thought that comes to mind, is that EMD didn't seem to develop the GP 7 until the competion forced them to.

[Anonymous]

I just wany to point out when you say diesels were not the major factor for reducing the number of emploryees. Don't forget the engine crew, on a long train that required more than one steamer it required a crew for every loco while a desel only required one crew for the lead unit (not counting manned helper units). Perhaps not the number one reason, but certainly a top one.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Lotus098

I just wany to point out when you say diesels were not the major factor for reducing the number of emploryees. Don't forget the engine crew, on a long train that required more than one steamer it required a crew for every loco while a desel only required one crew for the lead unit (not counting manned helper units). Perhaps not the number one reason, but certainly a top one.

Well, that's interesting from the standpoint of the "exception" I referred to above.

The smallest decrease in railroad employment, 1947-1972, of all classes of railroad employment, was the engine crews. That is, engine crews were the single least improved of all classes of railroad employment categories. Indeed, crews decreased by a percentage fairly closely resembling the drop in carloadings over the same period. Engine crew employment decreased by 48%, carloadings handled decreased by 43%. It is arguable that it might have been no different, under steam, with the lower carloadings with consolidation of trains.

The crew number decrease compares highly unfavorably to the between 84% and 95% improvement in virtually all other categories of railroad employment over the same time period.

At the margin, the "improvement" in crew employment as a result of dieselization was remarkably small, tiny, considering the similar decrease in traffic, and this slight decrease was substantially lower than the productivity improvements in all other areas of railroad employment.

Best regards, Michael Sol