Steam Locomotives versus Diesels

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by AnthonyV

Regarding obtaining the Brown reference, I meant to ask if it was available on line.

I've never seen it online.

QUOTE: Questions regarding two issues:

The first is how to post a graph in this forum - I don't know what to do after I click the insert image button. Also, what format must the image be in?

I'm not sure that I know. I was cussing a blue streak about posting graphs when one of my kids stopped by and showed me how to upload to some websites he operates, then I link to that website and the file. Whether that is how it is supposed to work, I have no idea, but it seems to work. If you wi***o email the file, I can post it in that fashion.

QUOTE: In your previous reply, you stated that Dieselization added to the financial burden of the railroads. How did it add to it when the cost/revenue ton levels are essentially constant when expressed in real terms?

This gets to be kind of a technical area, relating to productivity studies. However, from that standpoint what that tells you is that zero productivity gains resulted from the Dieselization process.

During the period 1945-1962, in order for that to have meaning, you would look at revenues 1945, $228,946,936, and compare that to revenues 1962, $227,664,109. Had Milwaukee simply remained as productive in 1962 as in 1945, Milwaukee should have earned $130,093,776.57 in constant 1945 dollars.

Let's use 1945 dollars that is, no inflation effects 1945-1962.

Fuel costs ... $9,638,564
Maintenc costs ..$12,133,493
Financing cost .$1,647,153
Total Direct costs $23,419,210

The total would be 10.23% of the total revenue that year.

Moving forward at constant dollars,
Fuel .....$4,137,173.71
Maint ....$6,236,249.71
Financing .... $6,484,935.65
Total Direct Costs ...$16,858,359.08

But, for productivity purposes, we have to look at 1962 revenue in constant dollars, $130,093,776.57.

The direct costs of motive power in 1945 was 10.23% of total revenue earned. The direct costs of motive power in 1962 was 12.96%, just about 13% of total revenue earned. In constant dollars, MOW dropped from 19.63% of revenues to 11.63%.

In order to maintain the same profitability, if all other expenses had remained equal, by 1962, total direct costs of motive power under steam (with no improvements because of attrition or productivity) would have been $23,290,038.35 rather than the $29,502,128 that it actually was, fully dieselized.

Costs of motive power was the single area of railroad operations that lost economic productivity relative to earnings.

It can be a headache correlating revenue tons with constant dollars over a 17 year period. In summary, though, Milwaukee had zero improvement in productivity on a revenue ton basis. Because the revenue tons dropped, Milwaukee incurred a 28.01% decline in associated costs in constant 1947dollars. Unfortunately, Milwaukee, like virtually all railroads, needed a minimum of a 43.18% decline in costs associated with Dieselization (that is to say, productivity increases) just to stay even.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

Today, for instance, the fuel cost substantially exceeds the financing cost on a locomotive hour basis, but the financing cost is still four times the cost as the period 1945-1957, and the cost of diesel fuel is a little over five times times higher than the equivalent cost of coal these days.

If the same decision were being made today, it would be an interesting argument because the key factors that favored Dieselization, 1945-1960, no longer offer any advantages, rather disadvantages.

I was thinking of starting a new topic to address a Y2K steam vs diesel hypothetical comparison, but for now I'll just add on....

Fuel costs are one thing that might favor modern steam over modern diesel, but wasn't the other great selling point of diesels embodied in the MU'ing and remote control capabilities?

This brings up some points to ponder:

1. Was it possible to MU diesel "B" units to steam back in late 40's early 50's changeover period? I've seen the old photos of diesels assisting steam, but I assume those diesels had their own crews. How hard would it have been to add the necessary hardwiring et al to steam locomotives to allow the engineer to simultaneously control add on "B" units while not compromising his ability to operate the steam locomotive? And wouldn't that have added a degree of productivity gain e.g. allowing diesel-assisted steamers to pull longer heavier loads per engine crew?

Even today, when steam is brought out for fan trips and such, a diesel unit or two is added as "protection" power. I assume those diesels have their own engineer as well, and adding diesel control equipment to a steam cab would "compromise" the integrity of the steamer's historic value. But, if such a thing as modern steam made it's way into production, wouldn't those engines be designed for multiple unti control, steam and diesel?

2. Was it possible in the 1950's to operate steam remotely from a lead cab? A stoker can be thermostatically operated even with 1950's technology, as witnessed by my grandfathers old coal fired central heating at the old farmstead. What about monitoring a trailing unit's steam gauges from a lead cab? How important was it for someone to be in the cab "feeling out" the running characteristics of a 1940's "modern" steam engine such as a Challenger? Was there any research heading in that direction before the diesel victory?

3. Micheal had mentioned that one of the disadvantages of diesels was their increased complexity which led to greater than expected maintenance costs. Fast forward to the modern steam concepts, which are weighted toward the idea of steam turbine-electrics. Wouldn't a steam-electric locomotive have the same complexity problems as a diesel-electric, more so than the reciprocating steam concept?

I've read through a few of the modern steam web pages, and I haven't really seen a proposal for a modern reciprocating steamer e.g. rods and such, but with modern condensers, high pressure boilers, et al. Same for direct drive steam turbines.

Assuming a 4 to 1 cost differential of synthetic coal vs diesel fuel, is it possible for the advantages of modern reciprocating steam or direct drive steam turbines to outweigh the "established" advantages of diesel-electrics in terms of remote control/MU capability, starting tractive effort, braking power, etc.?

[Anonymous]

Twelve more pages to go, and nothing proven yet.

Old Timer

[ajmiller]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Old Timer

Twelve more pages to go, and nothing proven yet.

Old Timer

What do you want them to prove?

[rrandb]

It would be easeir to control a diesel from a steamer. It would be very hard to MU steam engines together. The savings from diesels was labor and MUing was the sales pitch. The other savings were the huge reductions in helper dictricts. Even railroads with the luxuary of elecrified divisions fell to diesel ( except NE division). Even the roads that bought second hand steam really cheap fell to diesel. If you could show how the railroad could save money by returning to steam they will beat a path to your door. The decision to switch was based on more than just a good job by EMD's salesmen. History speakes for itself and they all made the same "mistake"... [2c] [soapbox]

[AnthonyV]

Txhighballer:

Thanks.

The reason I asked is I was trying to understand in my own mind how the Diesel locomotive could have changed railroad operations due to its different characteristcs, especially in the context of this topic (steam vs Diesels).

For example, I was thinking that if the Diesel allowed for longer, heavier and fewer trains, fewer pushers, etc. it could have affected overall operating costs beyond the cost numbers discussed.

Diesel performance is discussed nicely in the Diesel Victory, although there are not enough numbers to discern the effect on the bottom line.

Thanks again.

Anthony V.

[daveklepper]

The Clinchfield was the only railroad I know of to put diesel controls in a steamer (its excursion 4-6-0) which regularly ran with an F-7B(?) controlled from the steamer in excursion and Sante Claus service.

[AnthonyV]

Michael:

I gave up for the time being on how to post a graph. I will present the results of my analysis of your data in tabular form instead. Shown are your annual locomotive expenditures ($/revenue ton) shown in 1944 dollars along with the revenue index you presented earlier also shown in 1944 dollars.

Although mathematically it is consistent either way, I prefer to represent the data in terms of constant dollars because it gives a more realistic perspective on what is occurring (for me anyway). At first glance, one could get the impression that locomotive costs rose dramatically while revenues stayed fairly constant from 1944 to 1962. However, when expressed in constant dollars a different interpretation emerges, especially when plotted on a graph.

Year ...... Loco cost ...... Revenue Index
1944 ...... 0.42 ...... 100.0
1945 ...... 0.44 ...... 98.4
1946 ...... 0.47 ...... 81.8
1947 ...... 0.44 ...... 90.5
1948 ...... 0.49 ...... 86.7
1949 ...... 0.50 ...... 75.4
1950 ...... 0.47 ...... 83.4
1951 ...... 0.49 ...... 87.5
1952 ...... 0.45 ...... 79.1
1953 ...... 0.44 ...... 76.1
1954 ...... 0.44 ...... 65.8
1955 ...... 0.42 ...... 67.5
1956 ...... 0.45 ...... 72.2
1957 ...... 0.48 ...... 71.1
1958 ...... 0.46 ...... 65.7
1959 ...... 0.47 ...... 62.8
1960 ...... 0.47 ...... 59.8
1961 ...... 0.45 ...... 57.2
1962 ...... 0.43 ...... 57.7


The results indicate that locomotive expenditures in $/revenue ton rose in the late 1940's reaching a high of 18 percent greater, but averaging about 9 percent greater over the period. By 1962 locomotive costs in 1962 were practically at the 1944 level. These increases are much lower than the 25 percent increase you presented in your earlier post.

Revenues, on the other hand, dropped almost continuously during the period, averaging about 25 percent lower during the period. Revenues in 1962 were 43 percent lower than in 1944.

These results suggest it was the dramatic loss in revenue that caused the financial difficulties of the Milwaukee Road. I do not understand how a increase in locomotive costs ranging from a few percent to 25 percent (depending on the analysis) can offset the effect of a 43 percent decline in revenue.

The Milwaukee Road hadn't turned a profit from 1921 to 1940, so maybe its demise should have happened sooner except that WWII got in the way. For more information check out the web site www.mrha.com/history/cfm which presents a brief history of the Milwaukee Road.

Your (and Brown's) thesis is that the railroad could have responded better to the revenue loss if it had modified its approach to Dieselization. You contend that the higher locomotive costs resulted in reduced MOW spending which hurt the railroad. What increase in $/mile would have been possible with this extra money? What are your thoughts on how this would have changed the fate of the Milwaukee Road?

I have taken this analysis as far as I can since I have no additional data. It would be interesting to review historical data for total cost/revenue ton-mile (rather than per revenue ton) industry wide and for specific railroads pre and post Dieselization.

Thanks
Anthony V.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by AnthonyV
By 1962 locomotive costs in 1962 were practically at the 1944 level. These increases are much lower than the 25 percent increase you presented in your earlier post.

We have the same results. The problem with using a productivity tool is that you have to do a productivity analysis, all the numbers have to be changed; then you have to find a metric to compare these to, within the industry, to determine what the numbers mean. Productivity does in fact change with time and something like this, that stays pegged at virtually one spot for 16 years, is just plain weird in real world industrial and business terms. It wouldn't have happened had railroads stayed with steam.

Plus, the Korean war, rampant inflation for three years (which changes budgeting decisions), a variety of things happened. The year 1944 is a poor index year, for instance, because it represented maximum utilization of the fleet. The year 1945 would represent something closer to "normal" and 1950 would have avoided the high inflation years. One thing that clearly did not happen over the span chosen, however, is clearly that economic efficiency of the motive power fleet did not change one iota.

Yet, $113,084,848 was invested into what was supposed to substantially increase the economic efficiency of the motive power fleet.

The second thing that can be discerned is that during a decade of massive productivity improvements throughout the rail industry -- labor reductions of 85-95% were achieved in most areas, with substantial reductions in operating costs, nothing, nothing at all like that happened with regard to motive power, including both shop and train crews.

Costs didn't budge.

The picture you paint of the Milwaukee was shared by all railroads. If you did a constant dollar analysis for all of them, you would have found that just about all Class I's had substantially lower revenues in 1962 than they did in 1944. Milwaukee Road was just about in the middle of the pack as far as that was concerned.

This is why Brown's conclusions vividly support what we see for the Milwaukee, even though Brown didn't look at Milwaukee as an example. This was an industry wide phenomenon.

Insofar as motive power and the Milwaukee's receivership, it's not something I've ever looked at although I've long suspected that two large motive power purchases -- well, by then everything was a capital lease -- at a key point in time may have played a role. That was $94 million worth of motive power at 14% and 16% rates, purchased 1972-1976, running up new costs of $18,686,462 per year. The accumulated charges by 1977 being far in excess of the losses of the Railroad company that put it into receivership. I've mentioned that a couple of times to Worth Smith, and I understand his reasoning for those decisions, but they didn't make the numbers any better.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by AnthonyV
The Milwaukee Road hadn't turned a profit from 1921 to 1940, so maybe its demise should have happened sooner except that WWII got in the way.
For more information check out the web site www.mrha.com/history/cfm which presents a brief history of the Milwaukee Road.

This is a little bit of an urban legend. I've read it in several places. The Company's operating income in 1928 and 1929, for example, was a healthy $30 million each year.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[oltmannd]

The really interesting question here that is at the center of this discussion is whether the revenue decline that occurred in the 1950s was understood and/or anticipated by 1950?

If it WASN'T, and mgt dieselized for a traffic base that greatly eroded over the decade, then, or course, unit costs are going to look really lousy. Management can be rightfully blamed for not understanding their business.

If it WAS, then either mgt was stupid OR dieselization was part of a move to suck money from a sinking ship - reducing real operating costs THIS YEAR, in lieu of some future loan payment in some future year after the RR has already been sucked dry, abandoned or sold off.

In either case, the problem is the eroding revenue base and the root causes of this eroding traffic base are what need to be determined. I'd have to agree with others that deiselization was not one of the primary causes of the eroding revenue base - but more likely a reaction to it - for one reason or another.

[AnthonyV]

Michael:

I should have said the company only had three years with profits from 1921 through 1940. The company filed for bankrupcy in 1925. This information comes from a Milwaulkee Road publication from around 1968.

Further calculations with your data indicate that from 1944 to 1962 the Milwaukee Road spend a total of $39 million in 1944 dollars on additional locomotive costs relative to the case if it remained at the all-steam number of 1944. However, decreases in revenue over the same period totalled over $1 billion in 1944 dollars. Actual revenues totaled $3.3 billion compared to a total of $4.3 billion if revenues had remained constant at the 1944 level.

Thus the increased locomotive cost represents only about one percent of the overall revenues.

Also, I think oltmannd said it well in his previous post.

Thanks

Anthony V.

[rrandb]

A reason i have not heard yet is that a large part of the need for new motive power was based on the fact that there motive power was streched to the breaking point by the huge volume of traffic from WWII. Steam or diesel they all needed new engines and in a greater quanity than they normally ordered. Many roads were forced to order steam because diesels were back ordered. The finance charges would be accrued no matter which type was ordered. The odds of all rairoads managments simaltaineously making the same bad choices are astronomical. The fact that even the ones who stuck with steam came around proves the opposite. History has proven without dieselization and there inherant savings we would have many more "fallen flags". [2c] [soapbox] as allways ENJOY

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by AnthonyV
[Thus the increased locomotive cost represents only about one percent of the overall revenues.

Well, as I say, without a full-blown productivity study, taken in isolation, 1% doesn't seem like much. But, you are using a productivity measure, without a productivity assessment.

You could generate a rough productivity index by using the revenue index. What you have is a productivity "figure", combined with an revenue "index". Productivity and revenue are two different things, a meaningless comparison. However, the revenue index is suggestive of the productivity index because revenues did in fact stay pretty closely attached to expenses. Milwaukee actually did a little better than that over the period in question. So, we need to link your productivity measure to a productivity index, that is, make the revenue index a productivity measure and then link the two so that they are both indexes of the same thing.

Your chart:

Year ...... Loco cost ...... Revenue Index
1944 ...... 0.42 ...... 100.0
1945 ...... 0.44 ...... 98.4
1946 ...... 0.47 ...... 81.8
1947 ...... 0.44 ...... 90.5
1948 ...... 0.49 ...... 86.7
1949 ...... 0.50 ...... 75.4
1950 ...... 0.47 ...... 83.4
1951 ...... 0.49 ...... 87.5
1952 ...... 0.45 ...... 79.1
1953 ...... 0.44 ...... 76.1
1954 ...... 0.44 ...... 65.8
1955 ...... 0.42 ...... 67.5
1956 ...... 0.45 ...... 72.2
1957 ...... 0.48 ...... 71.1
1958 ...... 0.46 ...... 65.7
1959 ...... 0.47 ...... 62.8
1960 ...... 0.47 ...... 59.8
1961 ...... 0.45 ...... 57.2
1962 ...... 0.43 ...... 57.7

The revenue index roughly represents productivity increases on the railroad in general. To show the relationship to productivity, the motive power cost productivity relative to the productivity index would be, for the years in question

1944 ..1.00
1945..1.06
1946..1.37
1947..1.16
1948..1.35
1949..1.58
1950..1.34
1951..1.33
1952..1.35
1953..1.38
1954..1.59
1955..1.48
1956..1.48
1957..1.61
1958..1.67
1959..1.78
1960..1.87
1961..1.87
1962..1.77

Although I would prefer to show this differently, from a productivity study standpoint, I am trying to work with your format. This is an extremely poor productivity curve. Nobody, and I mean nobody stays in business when an important part of their business "goes the wrong direction" on productivity. And this is because productivity normally increases: it is the norm, cost per unit output goes down. That's what you want. Dieselization is just about the single thing that the American railroad industry did -- and the biggest thing that it did -- that went the wrong way on productivity compared to "normal" productivity measures.

Put it in perspective. This was a period when virtually all other expenses were decreasing by 50-100%. A 1% increase seems insignificant only if the productivity index remains constant. A 1% increase is enormous in an industry that actually had a productivity increase of 50% or more (decrease in costs). It means something is really, really wrong.

Anthony, you concluded:

QUOTE: Thus the increased locomotive cost represents only about one percent of the overall revenues.

Now, think about this for a second, and your use of the word "only."

In an industry that was only earning on the average between 1 and 4% on its overall revenues, anything that represented a one percent increase compared to overall revenues was huge -- representing between 25% and 100% of the net earnings. Does that represent Brown's "net burden on American railways"? You betcha.

Let alone impact on ROI.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Anonymous]

Another flame war...[V]

[tree68]

QUOTE: Originally posted by rgroeling

Another flame war...[V]

Yes, but with so much class!

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by tree68

QUOTE: Originally posted by rgroeling

Another flame war...[V]

Yes, but with so much class!

I am sick of seeing the same threads running so many pages of just solid flaming! [banghead] Find something else to argue about!

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by rgroeling

Another flame war...[V]

No, no. If there is to be an understanding of what happened, this needs to be looked at as many different ways as possible, through as many eyes as possible. Anthony's put in some hard work and raised thorough questions.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by rgroeling

Another flame war...[V]

No, no. If there is to be an understanding of what happened, this needs to be looked at as many different ways as possible, through as many eyes as possible. Anthony's put in some hard work and raised thorough questions.

Best regards, Michael Sol

So, its not a flame war like futuremodal's threads which seems to alwasy turn ugly?

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by rgroeling

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by rgroeling

Another flame war...[V]

No, no. If there is to be an understanding of what happened, this needs to be looked at as many different ways as possible, through as many eyes as possible. Anthony's put in some hard work and raised thorough questions.

Best regards, Michael Sol

So, its not a flame war like futuremodal's threads which seems to alwasy turn ugly?

Yes, but I am not the one who turns them ugly. I leave that up to the opposition.

[vsmith]

Wow 15 pages of basically the same arguments being restated. ..kinda like watching 2 Bucks head-butt each other over and over and over again...[banghead]

I'm getting a headache just reading it, where's my Tylenol?

Tastes Great - Less Filling[;)]

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by daveklepper

The Clinchfield was the only railroad I know of to put diesel controls in a steamer (its excursion 4-6-0) which regularly ran with an F-7B(?) controlled from the steamer in excursion and Sante Claus service.

Thanks for the tip, Dave. Do you know what year(s) this co-operation occured, and any details as to operational problems?

Here's the point I'm trying to make: Since one of the major selling points of diesel over steam was the ability to add horsepower at will e.g. MU'ing, all controlled by a single engine crew, what if diesels had been added soley to supplement the horsepower of the still new modern steamers by adding diesel controls to the steamers, rather than diesels being bought en masse to replace the steamers? Now you can run those longer heavier consists while still using the steamers, simpy add a few "B" units as needed. You're continuing to utilize the depreciable lifespan of the steamers (so no wasted investment there), and you're purchasing diesels incrementally as cash flow allows rather than going into debt for large lot purchases of diesels.

[bobwilcox]

The pettifogs have struck. Like humor? See http://www.lawyer-jokes.us/. Google shows 1,650,000 hits under "lawyer jokes" but zip for "bnsf jokes". Obviously Montana's railroad is slipping behind in another area!

[AnthonyV]

Michael:

On P&L issue, I agree completely.

My comment regarding the size of the additional expenditures relative to revenues was intended to show how small the CALCULATED increase in locomotive costs is relative to ACTUAL revenue and revenue loss data. Built in to this analysis is a 18-year growth projection of annual fuel, maintenance, and finance cost for steam, which was optimistically assumed to be zero.

If I was a railroad executive, would a 9 percent increase in calculated locomotive costs over 18 years make me uncomfortable? Definitely. But I would feel even more uncomfortable drawing firm conclusions about 18 year projections without seeing all the data and without performing sensitivity studies to determine the robustness of the results. I would also analyze all the productivity increases over the 18 year period and determine which, if any, can be attributed to Dieselization.

This is why I definitely have to get a copy of Brown's report.

Thanks

Anthony V.

[germanium]

re futuremodals comment on Daveklepper's report on MU'ing steam and diesel n the same consist -
I would be dubious about this sort of MU'ing in regular operation. How would the tractive forces of the two forms of power be synchronised ? It might bring a whole new meaning to "jerk" !! I'm fully open to rebuttal of my point.

[oltmannd]

QUOTE: Originally posted by germanium

re futuremodals comment on Daveklepper's report on MU'ing steam and diesel n the same consist -
I would be dubious about this sort of MU'ing in regular operation. How would the tractive forces of the two forms of power be synchronised ? It might bring a whole new meaning to "jerk" !! I'm fully open to rebuttal of my point.

MU is probably the wrong term. It's really remote operation of the diesel from the steam engine. You have a control stand for the diesel in the steam engine which only operates the trailing diesels. The steam loco controls remain independent. You could tailor the operation of each to operate the train smoothly.

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by oltmannd

The really interesting question here that is at the center of this discussion is whether the revenue decline that occurred in the 1950s was understood and/or anticipated by 1950?

If it WASN'T, and mgt dieselized for a traffic base that greatly eroded over the decade, then, or course, unit costs are going to look really lousy. Management can be rightfully blamed for not understanding their business.

If it WAS, then either mgt was stupid OR dieselization was part of a move to suck money from a sinking ship - reducing real operating costs THIS YEAR, in lieu of some future loan payment in some future year after the RR has already been sucked dry, abandoned or sold off.

In either case, the problem is the eroding revenue base and the root causes of this eroding traffic base are what need to be determined. I'd have to agree with others that deiselization was not one of the primary causes of the eroding revenue base - but more likely a reaction to it - for one reason or another.

Additional considerations at the time may have been the availablility of low interest reconstruction loans to convert industry back to peacetime production and get the economy going again. Also labor gained a great deal of strength under FDR and many business leaders may have felt things would go back to 'normal' under Ike. War and the immediate post war period cause significant economic disruptions and make forecasting very difficult. This is a little like saying stealth technology was responsible for the decline in earnings of defense contractors during the 90s.

A much better approach would be to compare 2 similar railroads over the same time period, one which dieselized very quickly with one that didn't. If the data is available it might even be possible to compare divisions on the same railroad.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by oltmannd

QUOTE: Originally posted by germanium

re futuremodals comment on Daveklepper's report on MU'ing steam and diesel n the same consist -
I would be dubious about this sort of MU'ing in regular operation. How would the tractive forces of the two forms of power be synchronised ? It might bring a whole new meaning to "jerk" !! I'm fully open to rebuttal of my point.

MU is probably the wrong term. It's really remote operation of the diesel from the steam engine. You have a control stand for the diesel in the steam engine which only operates the trailing diesels. The steam loco controls remain independent. You could tailor the operation of each to operate the train smoothly.

A "Diesel Synchronous Controller" was devised to coordinate operations between Milwaukee's electrics and diesels. It worked extraordinarily well, despite a considerable difference in driver size, horsepower, GE vs EMD designs, even adhesion, between the power types. I have one sitting here, from Little Joe E-79. Everything hard-wired to take into account power differences at all throttle settings. In electrified territory, the diesels were designated "helpers" while the electrics were the primary motive power. When diesels were needed, a pin engaged the throttle and the MU system for complete synchronization (normal), or even operating them separately, otherwise the diesels idled through the territory until needed. Milwaukee had converted any number of steam engines to oil, no doubt much easier to convert to electronic controls than coal-fired machines.

The attached photograph shows the Diesel Synchronous Controller in the cab of Little Joe E-21, one of the "Passenger Joes" assigned to Olympian Hiawatha after the diesels designed for that service were found to be unable to keep the schedule times in mountain territories. The throttle is in the lower center of the photograph, a squarish box with the auxiliary throttle handle on top.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[techguy57]

I got to admit that while Vic is right that this thread is 6 pages of the same argument there have been some interesting points made and I've learned more than I suspected I would by reading this. Of course, some of it is information overload to my brain, but overall I've still enjoyed reading it.

Michael,
While, I readily admit I'm no expert on the subject it would seem to me that railroad management went with dieselfication based on the assumption that it would pan out to be profitable in the long run. I'm guessing that they saw dollar signs in the fact that diesels meant less crews and presumably easier maintenance (on paper it would seem easier to change out a mass produced traction motor or generator than custom rebuilding a boiler) and that greed led them to believe that diesels were the future. It left them nearsighted to the shifting trend of passenger travels which the interstate highway system as well as the transition to jet airliners drastically changed the revenues of passenger trains. During the change to diesel, its only natural that the railroads presumed their passenger revenues would remain steady during much of he process. Of course they did not. Please know that I'm very intrigued by your points so far and frankly I'd be curious to hear your thoughts on this.

Beside being a large capital investment, would restictions on locomotive emissions from federal and state agencies, like the EPA, make it difficult for steam to be profitable in current times?

Thanks,

Mike

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol
The throttle is in the lower center of the photograph, a squarish box with the auxiliary throttle handle on top.

Best regards, Michael Sol

Not sure I see it. Just below he corner of the windshield I see two cylinders. The one of the left looks like a coffee mug. To left of that is a square valley in the control stand. Lots of stuff going on in that valley (looks like some small handles of some type?). Is the special controller in there?

As for operation, if I understand correctly, the little lever on the special controller was simply hard-connected to the main throttle level by a link and pin - Is that right? If so, that's a nice simple solution.