NS serious derailment late feb 3 ( ~2100 )

[BaltACD]

blue streak 1

Continue to ask where was the detctor before MP79 and what did it read?  Also if there had been a detector at ~~ MP 59 what might it have shown ?  It appears that ideal detector spacing is about 10 miles.  It certainly is around here on CSX.

More importantly all the data from systemwide detectors can easily be handled by computer  programs that flag rising readings and can quickly flag them.  However,  have to wonder is NS has cut too many persons monitoring trends to adequately manage trend warnings?

I have a copy of the NS ETT for their Pittsburgh Division from 1/1/2008 - 15 years ago.  On the Fort Wayne Line it shows Alliance as the junction point for trains from the Cleveland Line be at milepost PC 83.2, it shows Sebring at PC 79.6 to be a Hot Box/Dragging Equipment Detector, Salem at PC 69.0 is also a HBD/DED, Columbiana at PC 60.8 is shown to be a DED only, East Palestine at PC 49.8 is a HBD/DED.  The timetable shows two more detectors before the line gets to the Conway yard complex.

This is 15 years ago and NS could have made multiple changes between then and today.  How NS has Detector Sites configured is open to question - are the detectors notifying trains directly or are the results being filtered through a 'Mechanical Desk' and then reported to trains or is their some other form of communication being utilized?

[Falcon48]

FRA Safety Advisory 2023-01 issued in response to this accident.  It has additional information about what happened:

https://railroads.dot.gov/elibrary/safety-advisory-2023-01-evaluation-policies-and-procedures-related-use-and-maintenance-hot

[Overmod]

blue streak 1

5.  Now if the bad axle had been traveling #4 axle the front locos might have dragged bad hopper some what forward and train rear end might have stopped before hitting bad hopper.? Or, at least a slow speed collision? That would depend on what the engineer might have done?  Did he bail the Emergency brake to stretch what was left of his train?

Pretty clear to me that the axle had failed and its wheelset was generating the 'fire' and, as long as the train was stretched, the truck drag was kept moving and the train self-correcting in alignment.  Note the sequence: the engineer selected heavy dynamic, and almost immediately received a UDE.  That says to me that as soon as the hopper went into buff, the truck dug in and started the accordioning back from that point; I think it is obvious that the stacking occurred during the interval that the emergency application was actually setting up.

I'm not sure what good shelf couplers would have done; they are no better than normal couplers at restraining accordioning.  But imandating shelf couplers for interchange is something I expect to hear the government sources start advocating. 

[Euclid]

FRA makes safety recommendations for hotbox detector warnings

 

https://www.trains.com/trn/news-reviews/news-wire/fra-makes-safety-recommendations-for-hotbox-detector-warnings/

 

“Specifically, the FRA safety advisory recommends that railroads:

 

• Evaluate the temperature thresholds for inspections based on hot bearing detector data.”

 

I have concluded that the problem of hotbox detection has two options for a solution:

 

OPTION ONE:       Lower the threshold heat upper limit for warning.

 

OPTION TWO:        Reduce the distance between hotbox detectors by increasing their number.

 

Both options will reduce the chance of derailment.  The first option will increase the chance of unnecessarily delaying trains.  The second option will add the cost of added detectors. 

 

Assuming there is a wide variety of bearing failure development trends, it may be that option one is not practical.  The reason may be that if the settings for the heat action threshold are low enough to make the system able to deal with the wide variety of bearing failure progressions that are possible, that may cause excessive delay to trains due to false alarm situations. 

 

In the case of the first two detectors involved with the East Palestine bearing failure, temperatures were reported to the evaluation people who decided to let the train proceed past the reporting detectors.  I guess this is what is meant by the widely circulated claim that the detectors did not find a temperature high enough to trigger action to stop and inspect. 

 

But I wonder if this is accurate.  It implies that the detectors have a set heat level, above which automatically calls for stopping the train. But if that is the case, why have this human element that is evaluating the temperature reading?  If the detector has a specific heat level trigger, why not just leave decision to stop and inspect to the detector?  Why have humans deliberate on how serious the problem is?  How can they deliberate and come up with a decision that is nothing more than a guess? 

 

Also, what railroad employee wants to risk stopping and delaying a train with a false alarm?    How are they going to balance taking a chance on stopping a train versus causing a derailment?  Obviously, causing a derailment is far worse than delaying a train.  But still I wonder.  Delays happen every day, the cause is scrutinized.  Derailments seem like a distant event.  Just in the sense of railroad culture, I think there would be a strong bias favoring letting a warm bearing continue rather than stopping the train. 

[CSX Robert]

Euclid

In the case of the first two detectors involved with the East Palestine bearing failure, temperatures were reported to the evaluation people who decided to let the train proceed past the reporting detectors.  I guess this is what is meant by the widely circulated claim that the detectors did not find a temperature high enough to trigger action to stop and inspect.    But I wonder if this is accurate.  It implies that the detectors have a set heat level, above which automatically calls for stopping the train.

 

The Norfolk Southern hot bearing detector alarm thresholds are listed in the NTSB preliminary report:

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/RRD23MR005%20East%20Palestine%20OH%20Prelim.pdf

 

[tree68]

CSX Robert

The Norfolk Southern hot bearing detector alarm thresholds are listed in the NTSB preliminary report:

I would opine that the thresholds are based on experience as well as possibly the recommendations of the bearing manufacturers.

Thus, the spot temperatures were of no consequence by themselves.  It was the trend that should have been troubling.

 

[jeffhergert]

The detector remote readout would also have temps for the rest of the train.  If other cars had been higher over the second detector, someone reviewing the entire train's readout and seeing higher, but not to the threshold levels, temperatures on the failing bearing may conclude that the rise in temperature for that bearing was due to other factors.

Jeff

[ns145]

Euclid

FRA makes safety recommendations for hotbox detector warnings

 

https://www.trains.com/trn/news-reviews/news-wire/fra-makes-safety-recommendations-for-hotbox-detector-warnings/

 

“Specifically, the FRA safety advisory recommends that railroads:

 

• Evaluate the temperature thresholds for inspections based on hot bearing detector data.”

 

I have concluded that the problem of hotbox detection has two options for a solution:

 

OPTION ONE:       Lower the threshold heat upper limit for warning.

 

OPTION TWO:        Reduce the distance between hotbox detectors by increasing their number.

 

Both options will reduce the chance of derailment.  The first option will increase the chance of unnecessarily delaying trains.  The second option will add the cost of added detectors. 

 

Assuming there is a wide variety of bearing failure development trends, it may be that option one is not practical.  The reason may be that if the settings for the heat action threshold are low enough to make the system able to deal with the wide variety of bearing failure progressions that are possible, that may cause excessive delay to trains due to false alarm situations. 

 

In the case of the first two detectors involved with the East Palestine bearing failure, temperatures were reported to the evaluation people who decided to let the train proceed past the reporting detectors.  I guess this is what is meant by the widely circulated claim that the detectors did not find a temperature high enough to trigger action to stop and inspect. 

 

But I wonder if this is accurate.  It implies that the detectors have a set heat level, above which automatically calls for stopping the train. But if that is the case, why have this human element that is evaluating the temperature reading?  If the detector has a specific heat level trigger, why not just leave decision to stop and inspect to the detector?  Why have humans deliberate on how serious the problem is?  How can they deliberate and come up with a decision that is nothing more than a guess? 

 

Also, what railroad employee wants to risk stopping and delaying a train with a false alarm?    How are they going to balance taking a chance on stopping a train versus causing a derailment?  Obviously, causing a derailment is far worse than delaying a train.  But still I wonder.  Delays happen every day, the cause is scrutinized.  Derailments seem like a distant event.  Just in the sense of railroad culture, I think there would be a strong bias favoring letting a warm bearing continue rather than stopping the train. 

 

Euclid, this is the key concept to wrap your mind around: NS was trying to be proactive.  They were watching for potential problems as they were developing in real time, rather than using their HBD network as a simple pass/fail system.  Yes, some human judgement got inserted into the mix here, which doesn't look too good in 20/20 hindsight. But the nature of roller bearings is that they're good until they go bad.  And, as Jeff mentioned, there's other things than can being going on such as use of the train's air brakes that can generate significant amounts of heat that is below the critical alarm threshold.

[tree68]

ns145

And, as Jeff mentioned, there's other things than can being going on such as use of the train's air brakes that can generate significant amounts of heat that is below the critical alarm threshold.

Indeed - although dynamics are the option of choice these days, I'm sure we've all seen pictures of trains wreathed in brake smoke.  

[Falcon48]

Any bets on whether this will generate anywhere near the amount of adverse publicity that the NS East Palestine accident did?  Or maybe bets on whether Transportation Secretary Buttigieg will bestir himself enough to take a short drive from his office in WDC to Frederick for a press conference lambasting the trucking industry.

https://www.cbsnews.com/baltimore/news/deadly-tanker-truck-crash-frederick-county-fire-explosion-investigation/

[Attuvian1]

Falcon48

Any bets on whether this will generate anywhere near the amount of adverse publicity that the NS East Palestine accident did?  Or maybe bets on whether Transportation Secretary Buttigieg will bestir himself enough to take a short drive from his office in WDC to Frederick for a press conference lambasting the trucking industry.

https://www.cbsnews.com/baltimore/news/deadly-tanker-truck-crash-frederick-county-fire-explosion-investigation/

 

Depends on whether or not he figures that he needs a second whipping-boy.  I'm going to guess his advisers will tell him to take a long (private) lunch based on how well he handled the East Palestine matter. He's kind of in a bind with so many species of shark circling his office.  Darned if he does, darned if he doesn't.  I'm glad I'm retired - and have no designer boots for the media to notice.

 

John

[tree68]

A post on a railfan site stated that a "container" with hazmat had spilled into the Ohio River during the derailment...

While the incident did occur within the Ohio River watershed, statements like that are just pot stirring.  At the point of the derailment, one is nearly 20 miles from the Ohio River.

And I don't recall seeing any intermodal containers in the mess, so their probable mislabeling of a tank car as a "container" indicates they probably don't have clue of what they're talking about.

 

[charlie hebdo]

Another NS derailment, about 20 cars, near Soringfield, Ohio.  But no fires or Hazmat.

[Euclid]

ns145

 

 

Euclid

FRA makes safety recommendations for hotbox detector warnings

 

https://www.trains.com/trn/news-reviews/news-wire/fra-makes-safety-recommendations-for-hotbox-detector-warnings/

 

“Specifically, the FRA safety advisory recommends that railroads:

 

• Evaluate the temperature thresholds for inspections based on hot bearing detector data.”

 

I have concluded that the problem of hotbox detection has two options for a solution:

 

OPTION ONE:       Lower the threshold heat upper limit for warning.

 

OPTION TWO:        Reduce the distance between hotbox detectors by increasing their number.

 

Both options will reduce the chance of derailment.  The first option will increase the chance of unnecessarily delaying trains.  The second option will add the cost of added detectors. 

 

Assuming there is a wide variety of bearing failure development trends, it may be that option one is not practical.  The reason may be that if the settings for the heat action threshold are low enough to make the system able to deal with the wide variety of bearing failure progressions that are possible, that may cause excessive delay to trains due to false alarm situations. 

 

In the case of the first two detectors involved with the East Palestine bearing failure, temperatures were reported to the evaluation people who decided to let the train proceed past the reporting detectors.  I guess this is what is meant by the widely circulated claim that the detectors did not find a temperature high enough to trigger action to stop and inspect. 

 

But I wonder if this is accurate.  It implies that the detectors have a set heat level, above which automatically calls for stopping the train. But if that is the case, why have this human element that is evaluating the temperature reading?  If the detector has a specific heat level trigger, why not just leave decision to stop and inspect to the detector?  Why have humans deliberate on how serious the problem is?  How can they deliberate and come up with a decision that is nothing more than a guess? 

 

Also, what railroad employee wants to risk stopping and delaying a train with a false alarm?    How are they going to balance taking a chance on stopping a train versus causing a derailment?  Obviously, causing a derailment is far worse than delaying a train.  But still I wonder.  Delays happen every day, the cause is scrutinized.  Derailments seem like a distant event.  Just in the sense of railroad culture, I think there would be a strong bias favoring letting a warm bearing continue rather than stopping the train. 

 

 

 

 

Euclid, this is the key concept to wrap your mind around: NS was trying to be proactive.  They were watching for potential problems as they were developing in real time, rather than using their HBD network as a simple pass/fail system.  Yes, some human judgement got inserted into the mix here, which doesn't look too good in 20/20 hindsight. But the nature of roller bearings is that they're good until they go bad.  And, as Jeff mentioned, there's other things than can being going on such as use of the train's air brakes that can generate significant amounts of heat that is below the critical alarm threshold.

 

I am not sure what you are referring to in the first sentence of your reply.  I don't think anything I said was unfair to NS, or misrepresented the facts.  My main point was a question as to why they combine the objective detector readings with human judgement about the meaning of the readings.  I think a stronger system of detection that makes the decision whether to stop and inspect on its own would be the best option.  

 

I do understand that roller bearings can begin degradation that does not raise temperatures quickly, and then suddenly have internal interference that quickly leads to axle burn-off.  The problem that caused this wreck was that the 20-mile interval between detector #2 and #3 was too long to catch the rapid failure that developed after passing #2.  

[ns145]

I give up.  <Waving White flag>

[Falcon48]

If I were the CEO of Norfolk Southern right now (I'm not), I would be instructing my minions to come up with a strategy for exiting transportation of "high hazard" HMT (like the stuff involved in the East Palestine derailment)  My reasons for this would be:

 

(1) The handling of these materials is very dangerous.  It's impossible for a railroad to eliminate all of the potential causes of a catastrophic accident, because the railroad doesn't control everything that could cause a catastrophic accident.  The East Palestine accident, for example, was caused by a failed roller bearing (which may or may not have been avoidable).  But the same kind of accident could have easily occurred from causes outside of the railroad's control, (like hitting a loaded dump truck at a grade crossing, vandalism and other things like this that happen on a railroad from time to time).  Incidents that, with other commodities, would be just property damage, become major catastrophes  when "high hazard" HMT is involved.

 

(2) The risk (and occasional occurrence) of a catastrophic "high hazard" HMT accident makes the railroad the "big, bad guy" in the eyes of the public and government officials, leading to all kinds of adverse legislative and regulatory action that adversely impact the railroad's entire business. Just look at what's happening right now with the East Palestine accident. The "big, bad guys" are actually the shippers, who insist on their "right" to transport  HMT by rail in a "high hazard" form, without taking steps which would reduce the hazard (for example, the risks for some HMT can be reduced by the shipper adding a chemical "blanket" to loaded cars, which the shippers oppose because of the costs of removing the "blanket" at destination).. 

 

(3)  The transportation of "high hazard" HMT is NOT profitable.  It may look profitable when looked at on a "movement by movement" basis.  But a single "bad" accident involving "high hazard" HMT can be enough to wipe out the entire "profit" from years of hauling this stuff.   This will almost certainly be the case with the East Palestine accident.  

 

In my imaginary role as NS' CEO, I would expect that the "exit strategy" would involve things like embargoes on "high hazard" HMTs and non renewal of contracts for the movement of this stuff, coupled with an aggressive public information campaign.  I would not, however, expect that it is something we would be able to fully implement in the short term.  For one thing, in the short term, the shippers might well be able to get STB and/or the courts to force us to continue hauling this "high hazard" HMT  because of the so-called "common carrier obligation" in STB's governing statute.  But over the long term, I would expect this strategy would have some success, particularly if the environmental activists and politicians get behind it.

 

I'll take my bonus check now.

 

[Euclid]

Falcon48

Falcon48 wrote the following post an hour ago: If I were the CEO of Norfolk Southern right now (I'm not), I would be instructing my minions to come up with a strategy for exiting transportation of "high hazard" HMT (like the stuff involved in the East Palestine derailment)  My reasons for this would be: ...

I think that is an excellent idea.  The railroads can just tell the Government that the HAZMAT is too dangerous for them to haul.  Just take the side of the public who have already been convinced that it is true.  This would give the railroads fantastic leverage in the argument.  Put the ball right into the Government’s court.  Let Mayor Pete deicide how to satisfy the country’s demand for products that require transporting such dangerous chemicals.

 

Everybody is already convinced that trains are not able to handle the cargo safely.  Now is the time because exhibit “A” is right before our eyes with the East Palestine wreck.  So, the railroads would not have to work hard to make their case.  I think that is a perfect idea. 

[tree68]

Euclid

I think that is an excellent idea.  The railroads can just tell the Government that the HAZMAT is too dangerous for them to haul.

Yeah - Check out the truck fire in Maryland.

Consider that a unit train of ethanol, going from the Plains (where the corn is) to the east coast (where the stuff is mixed) will require ~300 semis to get the product where it needs to be.  Pretty much every day.  See that line of trucks on the Interstate as you drive to your own destination?  

And there are hardly enough truck drivers available now to move what is going over the road.  You'd be talking thousands more trucks.

Right now I'm watching a unit tank train (can't tell what - not enough resolution in the video to read the placards - generally either crude or ethanol) rolling through Deshler, and not a single car has crashed and burned.

[Euclid]

Nobody is suggesting hauling it on the highways.  The point is that if the hazmat traffic is not profitable, and everybody is criticizing the railroads for not safely hauling it; the railroads ought to just join all their critics in saying they want out because it is too dangerous to haul.  Maybe the government can haul it by rail and spend enough money to make it safe.    

[7j43k]

If the factories that use these materials were adjacent to the factories that made them, then the hazardous chemicals would have an extremely short haul.  Maybe a mile.  Or two.

As the costs rise for transporting hazardous chemicals, the above will be more enticing.

 

Ed

[BaltACD]

7j43k

If the factories that use these materials were adjacent to the factories that made them, then the hazardous chemicals would have an extremely short haul.  Maybe a mile.  Or two.

As the costs rise for transporting hazardous chemicals, the above will be more enticing.

 

Ed

Shippers and Consignees are where they are because that is where their PRIMARY resources are located - plus thousands of other considerations concerning work force, housing, qualities of life and on and on.

To implement your 'idea' would require scraping the Constitution and having a centrally managed directed economy.

[tree68]

7j43k

If the factories that use these materials were adjacent to the factories that made them, then the hazardous chemicals would have an extremely short haul.  Maybe a mile.  Or two.

Steel:  Coal from WV (and other) mines, iron ore from UP, etc, limestone from several sources.  Steel isn't hazmat, but it regularly travels the rails between producer and manufacturers.

Gasoline:  Crude from various sources, ethanol from the Midwest.  All hauled to where the refining takes place, which is near the markets.

Houston Ed made his living moving "stuff" around - incoming and outgoing - from Houston's chemical alley.  Because not all components of a given product come from the same place.

[Falcon48]

Let me try to put the East Palestine rail accident into a little perspective.  According to the National Safety Council, in 2020 (the most recent year available on the NSC website) 4,965 people were killed in large truck accidents in the U.S.  That's more than the entire population of East Palestine (4,718 in 2021).  In contrast, there were 744 U.S. railroad fatalities in 2020.  In other words, large truck fatalities were over 6 times the number of rail fatalities.  Guess truck accidents don't matter as much to the current Transportation Secretary as a good photo op.

[zugmann]

nevermind. 

[mudchicken]

( The other shoe has still yet to drop from 5 years ago.)

[jeffhergert]

Falcon48

Let me try to put the East Palestine rail accident into a little perspective.  According to the National Safety Council, in 2020 (the most recent year available on the NSC website) 4,965 people were killed in large truck accidents in the U.S.  That's more than the entire population of East Palestine (4,718 in 2021).  In contrast, there were 744 U.S. railroad fatalities in 2020.  In other words, large truck fatalities were over 6 times the number of rail fatalities.  Guess truck accidents don't matter as much to the current Transportation Secretary as a good photo op.

 

I caught a news snippet where the head of the NTSB said rail was still safer then trucks to transport hazmat.

A news item I came across on the news feed on my internet home page had statistics for the number of derailments for a period of years, ending with I think 2021.  I don't remember the exact length of time.  It gave the number of people killed by derailing trains.  It averaged to be about 4 per year.

Jeff

[mudchicken]

( The other shoe has still yet to drop from 5 years ago.)

[n012944]

Euclid

 

Everybody is already convinced that trains are not able to handle the cargo safely.  

 

Everybody?

[Euclid]

n012944

 

 

Euclid

 

Everybody is already convinced that trains are not able to handle the cargo safely.  

 

 

 

 

Everybody?

 

For all practical purposes, yes.  It is a general statement, and likewise with "...trains are not able to handle the cargo safely."  How safe is safely?  It is a public opinion that will not be defined by statistics.  It will be defined by news of the derailments and especaially the videos such as the one from the latest derailment showing a close up of a high speed derailment over the grade crossing.  Rarely has the public seen anything with that much clarity.  Rarely has the news media found a reason to promote such a video.  It is a public relations problem for the railroads.  

 

[tree68]

Euclid

For all practical purposes, yes.  It is a general statement, and likewise with "...trains are not able to handle the cargo safely."  How safe is safely?  It is a public opinion that will not be defined by statistics.  It will be defined by news of the derailments and especaially the videos such as the one from the latest derailment showing a close up of a high speed derailment over the grade crossing.  Rarely has the public seen anything with that much clarity.  Rarely has the news media found a reason to promote such a video.  It is a public relations problem for the railroads.  

Is this the same public that says "you mean they still use trains?"

Within a month, no one outside the industry will remember East Palestine. They'll still complain about getting stuck at crossings.

Vandalism is a much larger problem than image for the railroads.  It's a social problem, and I think people know that.  Tagging goes on everywhere - some places worse than others.  Walls, buildings, bridges, you name it.  It's just become part of the landscape.  One fellow is even celebrated for it to the point that people get upset when his work gets covered/removed.

The railroads do try to deal with it - but, as has been noted, the vast majority of railroad cars in service today are privately owned.  Thus it's up to the car owners to deal with it, not the railroads.  

The "artists" have, in many cases, gotten smart.  They've learned that if they leave the reporting marks, etc, intact, their creation is less likely to be "defaced" or completely removed.

I don't know what it costs to paint a car (I sure someone will chime in), but it ain't cheap.