jeffhergertYes, we need to weed out those who might have a failure, possibly many years, in the future. You won't be hiring very many. Heck, you won't be hiring anyone - ever.
With an attitude such as yours, your acumen could come into question.
tree68 Lithonia Operator No, the SPAF didn't prevent this particular accident. But who knows how many accidents it HAS prevented. Cayce in no way shows that the SPAF is a bad idea. All it shows is that if people don't use a system in the way it was intended, it cannot provide that extra measure of safety. The SPAF may have helped prevent disaster in many other cases; it seems like a good idea to me. And it wasn't my intention to illustrate that the SPAF is a bad idea.
Lithonia Operator No, the SPAF didn't prevent this particular accident. But who knows how many accidents it HAS prevented. Cayce in no way shows that the SPAF is a bad idea. All it shows is that if people don't use a system in the way it was intended, it cannot provide that extra measure of safety. The SPAF may have helped prevent disaster in many other cases; it seems like a good idea to me.
No, the SPAF didn't prevent this particular accident. But who knows how many accidents it HAS prevented.
Cayce in no way shows that the SPAF is a bad idea. All it shows is that if people don't use a system in the way it was intended, it cannot provide that extra measure of safety.
The SPAF may have helped prevent disaster in many other cases; it seems like a good idea to me.
And it wasn't my intention to illustrate that the SPAF is a bad idea.
You're right, Euclid. I misread the report re where the engineer was. Thanks.
243129 jeffhergert Yes, we need to weed out those who might have a failure, possibly many years, in the future. You won't be hiring very many. Heck, you won't be hiring anyone - ever. With an attitude such as yours, your acumen could come into question.
jeffhergert Yes, we need to weed out those who might have a failure, possibly many years, in the future. You won't be hiring very many. Heck, you won't be hiring anyone - ever.
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
It's unfortunate that there can't be a discussion about this without defensive sarcasm and acrimony. If Jeff is even half serious, statements like his are what will lead to automated systems with the excuse of safety because new hires are not conscientious enough to follow simple procedures carefully, even though the pay is good. Isn't that the inevitable result?
RRers come from all sorts of walks of life. From high school dropouts, to military, to people with advanced degrees and everything in between. Men, women, every race imaginable. People fresh out of high school, and those that hired at 60 after several career. People who are railfans, and those that barely knew what a train was. People who could write doctoral dissertaions, and those that could barely spell their name.
I've worked with just about every type. I've yet to see a common theme to what makes someone a good RRer. Peope you wouldn't think would be good have been some of the best. Others that you think would be perfect quit or were fired in quick order.
I don't think there is a "RRer gene" that we can test for. It's such a different lifestyle/occupation than so many others, I don't think that someone can claim that they have a secret forumla. If they did, they would already be a millionaire selling that formula to the various roads.
If anything, I think it's just a combination of traits that you have to collect and know when to use. When to be patient, when to not. When to follow rules to a T and when to think creatively on your feet. When to play nice, and when to be an arrogant individual (many of us I think have that last one down). I doubt we'll ever get to the point of being able to pee in a cup and know.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
charlie hebdo ...because new hires are not conscientious enough to follow simple procedures carefully,...
Heck, there are those that feel that way about the up-and-coming generations even outside the railroad world.
How does one vet an 18 year old who may have never held a job before? They may go through training and ace every test, and go through OJT with glowing reports from their trainers, only to show that dangerous flaw months, or even years, down the road.
Are there tests available that measure a new hire's likelihood of failing to restore a switch?
Life happens, too. Spousal issues, kids, mortgages, etc and so on, can distract a perfectly conscientious employee from a key action with bad consequences.
One can only hope that such potential problems have been engineered out of happening (hence, the SPAF), but we all know the old adages about people finding a way around anything that's supposed to be foolproof.
Perhaps in this case, our practice of announcing that the switch has been restored on-the-air, with the engineer acknowledging same on-the-air might have resulted in an earlier recognition that the switch had not, in fact, been restored. Or not.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
I guess I missed a detail. What is SPAF?
zugmann If anything, I think it's just a combination of traits that you have to collect and know when to use. When to be patient, when to not. When to follow rules to a T and when to think creatively on your feet. When to play nice, and when to be an arrogant individual (many of us I think have that last one down). I doubt we'll ever get to the point of being able to pee in a cup and know.
Well said.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
Murphy Siding I guess I missed a detail. What is SPAF?
Switch Position Awarness Form. A written record of the use and restoration of hand throw switches in non-signalled territory. It can be an actual form, or like we use, entries made on a conductor's trip/signal report log.
Jeff
Is the SPAF used only for mainline switches? Surely crews in yards aren't doing this.
As for critical switches, I wonder if requiring a photo of the switch in the normal position would be practical. Maybe not realistic in rain or snow. But it seems like a really basic, rugged but cheap camera could be developed for such use. And it could be required for the conductor to radio in real time, "I have photographed the switch in its normal position."
Do mainline switches always have a switch stand marker, and an ID #? There would be a need to establish that the photo was of the pertinent switch.
In any event, I like what Larry said about having to announce it on the radio.
Does the FRA have absolute power to mandate rules?
Zug and Jeff: When you were hired or promoted to engineer, did you get some sort of psychological evaluation for personality traits?
Murphy SidingYou do a disservice by editing Jeff's quote to suit your needs.
Well then, perhaps you can explain to me how you read it.
charlie hebdo It's unfortunate that there can't be a discussion about this without defensive sarcasm and acrimony. If Jeff is even half serious, statements like his are what will lead to automated systems with the excuse of safety because new hires are not conscientious enough to follow simple procedures carefully, even though the pay is good. Isn't that the inevitable result?
Automated addiction then becomes a problem.
charlie hebdo Zug and Jeff: When you were hired or promoted to engineer, did you get some sort of psychological evaluation for personality traits?
The CNW gave a 'personality' test as part of their hiring sessions. The UP does not. There is no further evaluation along those lines when going into engine service.
The test the CNW gave was used to evaluate if a person would 'fit in' (for lack of a better term) with the lifestyle. The CNW also gave an aptitude test that the UP didn't.
I think because of the aptitude test, more than the personality test, the CNW tended to have new hires who made it through on the job training and successfully become full employees. The UP tends to lose more during and shortly after the OJT portion. They both ended up with about the same nmber successfully completing the process. It's just the CNW 'weeded' them out before hiring them, the UP after hiring them.
243129 Murphy Siding You do a disservice by editing Jeff's quote to suit your needs. Well then, perhaps you can explain to me how you read it.
Murphy Siding You do a disservice by editing Jeff's quote to suit your needs.
Yes, we need to weed out those who might have a failure, possibly many years, in the future. You won't be hiring very many. Heck, you won't be hiring anyone - ever.
But I've already had the feeling that no one in this day and age would meet the standards some want to set. Actually, in a way I understand this. Generally speaking, the attitude of many in the work force is different than it once was. At all age levels and in those fairly new and those who have a lot of time in.
Jeff I agree with Jeff. The world is changing. Having qualified people making sure that new employees meet the standards you are hoping for might be nigh-impossible if there's not a very deep well to draw from. We have the same issue in my business. It used to be hard to find good help. Now it's hard to find any help.
243129 charlie hebdo It's unfortunate that there can't be a discussion about this without defensive sarcasm and acrimony. If Jeff is even half serious, statements like his are what will lead to automated systems with the excuse of safety because new hires are not conscientious enough to follow simple procedures carefully, even though the pay is good. Isn't that the inevitable result? Automated addiction then becomes a problem.
Murphy : I only know what I meant in terms of automation of the operating side of railroads. If it looks like it will be difficult to hire new, young people to replace retirees, that will spur automation even more. Look at trucking. When the economy is really booming, they have chronic shortages of drivers. Maybe this is a function of permissive child-rearing practices or maybe qualified people don't want jobs with a highly variable work schedule. I don't know.
Murphy SidingI'm not sure I understand what automated addiction means. Can you explain?
Google is your friend.
I said what I said because anytime there is an incident, it is always brought up that it's due to poor vetting, training, and supervision. I spoke to the poor vetting process.
In the case of this incident under discussion, I don't know either of the two CSX employees involved. I don't know their length of service, their work or discipline records. I doubt anyone on this forum does. I didn't read the NTSB report, but I did read the FRA report. It mentions interviewing both employees and reviewing their respective records but doesn't reveal them.
I'm going to guess that since both were working off their respective extra boards, they were lower in seniority. However, going by my home terminal's board, it takes 12 years of seniority to hold either. For the engineer that also means 3 to 5 extra years as a trainman before going to engine service. With the associated cuts PSR brings, I'm going to guess that both CSX people have at least 5 years (and maybe more) worth of working experience.
Not knowing them or their records, to say they weren't vetted enough is ludicrous. It's (poor vetting) is being tossed out willy-nilly everytime there is an incident. Therefore, I said what I did. That, in essence, to be able to successfully vet out any prospective employee that might fail at some point is impossible. The only way to do so means a vetting process that results in no one ever being hired. I'm sorry if Chuck H doesn't like the 'ship happens' resemblence, but no one on this earth is perfect or infallable.
Lithonia OperatorSorry, Larry. I was actually not referring to you, but did not make that clear. I was referring to a comment by Overmod, who seemed to be saying the form is useless, if I read him correctly.
I tried to make the same correction but my phone wouldn't let me. In short, I think that some sort of SPAF procedure is quite reasonable, and in fact something like it ought to be trained as a 'backstop' to moves that involve mainline switching. My complaint is more with the way the NTSB recommendation and subsequent actions implemented the idea of 'documenting' switch position.
It's not that the SPAF is 'useless'; it's that it merely reinforces and bureaucratizes something that ought to be "standard procedure" and has the ugly additional effect of providing additional 'gotchas' if it isn't filled out precisely and properly -- for management, government, and lawyers' potential use. (In addition to which, as I recall, we were treated to Bella claiming it would address the problems in 2008 which were not at all solved by it at Cayce, which is something of a problem with these government ukases, like the PTC mandate, that throw out 'answers' without really comprehending the extent or even the source of the problems.
One thing the Cayce incident proved to me is that it's too easy to fake a SPAF (following the definitions of SPAF compliance in the NTSB 'recommendations'. If it could be done in this circumstance, under known conditions of signal suspension, I can only imagine what the actual compliance rate might be.
Meanwhile, at least in my opinion, a real 'safety' procedure shouldn't be something that can be reduced to rote, even though it becomes a reflex when properly trained. If 'safety compliance' becomes one additional annoying bureaucratic formality like truckers having to remember to buckle their seat belt when an officer tells them to move your truck a few yards, it may actually become counterproductive to actual enforcement on the grounds of safety. I would be far less pessimistic had I not seen such a long paper trail of NTSB and TCA mentions of paper 'violations' in accident response reports, with little actual relevance to the accident at hand...
There is a potential problem with 'reporting on the radio that a switch is open or closed' -- I think it would often be a distraction from the often-complex work of dispatching, and in part it would require a dispatcher not only to pause and note down the information appropriately in writing, but to trust that the communication is correct, recognize which crew makes it (and perhaps call back to confirm information if, for example, the transmission was partially 'stepped on', and then return seamlessly to whatever else they might have been doing. While of course the radio transmissions are being recorded, the dispatcher won't be able to 'rewind and replay' anything that might have been missed ... that not being the purpose of the recording, really ... so what is being added there is a bit like the Waffle House rule that makes everyone on a shift responsible for a shortage in the register from whatever cause; it spreads the potential liability around, in the name of assuring something that is only one or two men's responsibility and that the remote people have no way to prove, disprove, or monitor as correct.
Now, if you were to provide a CTC-like data overlay that confirmed not only the position of all switches but also the integrity of all locking mechanisms (including switch locks, something that is surprisingly easy to provide with modern technologies) you'd have 90% of the assurance necessary to back up a paper SPAF, with the radio call becoming what it always would have been: a means of CYA that the folks in the field went through the necessary steps to confirm the result, with the 'automatics' backing them up but not replacing their 'due vigilance'. Unfortunately, such a system would either have been suspended along with the rest of the legacy signaling at the time of the Cayce accident, or would have required independent data integrity which might be difficult to provide reliably even at great cost. If I understand the current melange of PTC implementation correctly, the current version does not provide the necessary independent datastream capability to implement a function like this.
The camera is a good idea ... except (1) it introduces whole new levels of Mickey Mouse mandatory/forbidden regulations regarding electronic devices and 'permissible times and uses thereof'; it presupposes communication at appropriate bandwidth to send an image of appropriate resolution to confirm the switch is properly fully open/closed and locked; it presupposes the camera will work in even the worst cold, inclement, or dark conditions as expected; it presupposes some unambiguous marker on or near the switch that confirms which switch, in a possibly complex or confusing layout, has been opened or closed; and perhaps most troublingly, it only reports whether the switch has been moved, not what it 'ought' to be lined for as the dispatcher might expect. We encountered this issue with the control modalities at nuclear plants like TMI, where the color-coding of the various valves was 'green' for open and 'red' for closed, regardless both of the normal operating position of the valve in service or whether it was part of a more complex system. (One conclusion for R10 was that a repeater board be provided showing an overlay of 'correct' positions, which would change as appropriate during commanded emergency procedures... for the record, I think a system to implement this in actual train dispatching would not be easy or particularly valuable to design and try to implement.)
It also presupposes that the person on the crew 'responsible' for switching will take the time to fumble the camera out, line up and take the shot, and put the camera away again every time. And that someone will remember to remind them if they 'forget' ... which won't happen unless someone is watching to detect the failure. I'd be reasonably certain much of the resulting omission would only be detected upon 'literature review' later ... by folks all too willing to hand down some discipline or worse if 20/20 hindsight reveals some problem with the information retrieval. (I'll also be cynical and say the nasty infectious virus that affects cab cameras in so many severe accidents would also affect critical pictures of switch positions when the time comes for the blame to be gamed ... but take that with the necessary grains of salt).
Jeff: You are engaging in a reductio ad absurdem argument to make your points. Obviously no vetting process and no psychological evaluation is 100% accurate in predicting future behavior. Not really close. But if it might improve the probability of weeding out people who are prone to carelessness or misplaced overconfidence, it should be implemented.
Stuff happens, yes, but it is sensible to try to reduce failures, both mechanical and human. What's wrong with that?
charlie hebdoStuff happens, yes, but it is sensible to try to reduce failures, both mechanical and human. What's wrong with that?
I agree completely with your premise in this post, and with the idea both of better selection of good employees and of better training (including the ongoing 'training' both from other employees and the results of experience) once hired on. But in the wider context of accidents like the one at Cayce, I think more care regarding the above quote should be taken.
The problem is that it usually isn't that simple, either in engineering or 'HR'.
First you need to consider the principle in the original Hippocratic oath (or in Pareto optimality): do no harm in what you implement. A 'safety' procedure, for example, that introduces additional potential points of failure or that fatigues proper vigilance or 'thoughtfulness' may be worse than the original concern; we have seen as recently as the 737MAX controversy the danger involved in 'automatic' safety systems that do not function appropriately in anomalous situations.
I think we are all in agreement that better 'weeding out' whether in "pre-vetting" or during the course of training is appropriate and beneficial. But I immediately think about the various ways this has been tinkered with in other contexts -- training for the fire service, for example, or for some organizations in the military -- where political priorities become more significant than assured 'job performance'. Implicit in Zug's comment a bit earlier is 'when to follow procedure' and 'when to think outside the box when needed' -- which further implies that proper 'training' has given employees the experience and acquired wisdom to know when and when not to use judgment in emergencies or unfamiliar situations that involve danger. (And very few things on the railroad do not involve danger, expected or unexpected but always threatening).
In some cases, recursion is appropriate, as for example in the arbitration between multiple processors in a safety-critical system like the Space Shuttle controls. A point to remember in this context is that common-mode failures have to be precluded or actively designed out of proper redundant systems if the redundancy is actually to mean something: requiring switchmen to take a picture to confirm the result of their SPAF that has been radioed to the dispatcher and noted on their Form 31 or whatever is just four separate steps to be overlooked if the crew intentionally ignores confirming switch position. It looks to bureaucrats as though one step will 'catch' any omissions in other steps, and perhaps in some cases this will be so: you will not hear me arguing against meaningful reminders to 'check your work' in critical safety. But if the common mode of failure is not to check in the first place, no paper means is likely to give additional assurance, and I think we have had ample evidence of how distracting complicated procedures can be in the presence of personal risk. I add that this is almost explicit in the language NTSB has used in their assessment of 'probable cause' of the Cayce accident.
243129 Murphy Siding I'm not sure I understand what automated addiction means. Can you explain? Google is your friend.
Murphy Siding I'm not sure I understand what automated addiction means. Can you explain?
Yes, the 100 - question test that asks the same questions several different ways. For example:
what is your idea of a perfect sunday?
A. Sitting at home reading a book
B.taking a leisurely walk or bike ride
C. Declaring yourself dictator and burning down large cities with a flamethrower
-----
Ha Ha ha
zugmannYes, the 100 - question test that asks the same questions several different ways. For example: what is your idea of a perfect sunday? A. Sitting at home reading a book B.taking a leisurely walk or bike ride C. Declaring yourself dictator and burning down large cities with a flamethrower
Hey Zug, why'd you forget D, the 'actual' answer to this question, "happily waiting at home for a two-hour call for a garbage train"
charlie hebdo Jeff: You are engaging in a reductio ad absurdem argument to make your points. Obviously no vetting process and no psychological evaluation is 100% accurate in predicting future behavior. Not really close. But if it might improve the probability of weeding out people who are prone to carelessness or misplaced overconfidence, it should be implemented. Stuff happens, yes, but it is sensible to try to reduce failures, both mechanical and human. What's wrong with that?
My argument isn't really with you. It's just to say EVERYTIME there is an incident that those responsible weren't vetted enough is getting old. Especially when the records of those involved aren't known.
I never said prospective new hires shouldn't be vetted. I'm guessing the major class ones (I can't say about others including Amtrak) do a better job than most employers, in or out of the industry. I'm sure even with the processes in place, some are still hired who maybe shouldn't and some who should be hired instead aren't. Because tests aren't infallable either.
About ten years ago, I caught the West Wayfreight off the extra board. The crew was me, about 5 years as an engineer (plus about 6 more as a conductor), the conductor with over 30 years and a new hire making his student trips. There was a Form B bulletin in effect that covered where the switch (CTC control point) from the yard to the main track was. Being inside the Form B, there was no red board located at the main track switch. We discussed this in the yard office when reviewing our track bulletins. We went out got our train of 10 or so cars together, did our air tests, headed towards the switch. We had talked to the dispatcher and we had a signal to leave (high green) as we approached.
They weren't working in that location. As we were getting close to the signal - still on the yard lead, I spotted a signal maintainer (his orange vest) up near a signal bungalow. "S@#$, there's a Form B out here!" I announced has I initiated a desired emergency. We stopped short of the signal, got clearance from the foreman and continued on. I apologized to the conductor and new hire about forgetting the B. The conductor did too, the new hire I think was still trying to process what just happened.
I guess the railroad didn't vet me enough because I failed. I may have caught it in time to not get fired, but the fact is I had a failure that day. The conductor is now retired, I don't know about the new hire - I don't remember who it was. So I suppose when I get back home, I should resign because obviously I don't have the makings of a good railroader and their vetting just didn't catch it.
OM: I agree. Vetting should be carefully handled by people outside the corporation to avoid corporate politics and have people who are skilled at the job-appropriate testing (Griggs v Duke Power, 1971). Some of the tests exist. Other metrics need to be developed. I had hoped our resident engineers might seriously answer my query., but no cigar.
I particularly think that having thousands of rules is ineffective or even dangerous because keeping them in mind is possibly a distraction.
Making sloppy errors can be fatal. How do other transportation industries manage this?
jeffhergertI guess the railroad didn't vet me enough because I failed.
No, the railroad vetted you quite correctly; you had the presence of mind to put the train in emergency while watching the surroundings, and then apologize to your people for the oversight.
Could it have been different if you were a perfect Stakhanovite railroader? Perhaps, but perfection is not what 'vetting' can practically accomplish -- it selects in part for precisely the kind of awareness that recovers from accidents most effectively. Which is the kind of awareness you showed that day and and demonstrated again that you have today.
As Joe repeatedly points out, what the vetting actually selects for is a kind of mindfulness and common sense, and ongoing attention to 'right' attitude, more than SAC-style 'zero-defects' roboticism that fails the first time something unusual upsets the routine.
Only you would know if the lapse was truly concerning as more than a momentary oversight, and you have certainly taken the event as a cautionary reminder, which is also an indication to me that you have the 'right stuff' attitude for the business.
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