Euclid Convicted One Euclid I certainly don't think that the two victims made a "dumb mistake", as you call it. Just to remain abundantly clear, what I said was 'this was not just the dumb mistake of one non-observant person' That is a far cry from me identifying the two victim's error as a dumb mistake. The reason I chose the wording I did is because there seems to be a popular mindset here among some, that anyone who does not share their priorities and their POV, must be morons. And I, like you, think there is a little more than just a lapse of common sense involved here. Unlike you, however, I don't believe that we can ever hope to have a set of safety rules so comprehensive that accidents will become completey avoidable. Human nature will assure that you won't. Okay, I see exactly what you meant now that I look at it again. Really, what you meant was that it was not a dumb mistake at all. I'm sorry for misinterpreting you. I am glad that you see what I see in this being more than a simple loss of common sense or something like not paying enough attention in a way that they were negligent. In terms of better training, I see two possible solutions. One would be to put in that rule I suggested earlier requiring anyone on any track of a multiple track mainline to get clear of the track immediatley upon the appearance of any train on any of the tracks in that mainline set. At least that is something with a specific meaning that is enforceable. And in learning the rule, one will also learn the reason for it, which is to not get caught by the illusion of two trains sounding like one. The other solution would be to train the actual experience of the illusion. This experience will register the danger far more effectively than just an explanation of it. Maybe some form of simulated virtual reality could give the actual experience. Show how a cautious thought process can be underway, and suddenly be caught off guard by this illusion. Then teach the danger signs for this trap, so people can learn to arm themselves against it. I would not expect it to prevent every accident of this type. But I think it could prevent 95% of them. In fact, I believe that far more of the unique two train illusion accidents could be prevented than the more common daydreaming loss of situational awareness accidents. I don't know how any of those could be prevented.
Convicted One Euclid I certainly don't think that the two victims made a "dumb mistake", as you call it. Just to remain abundantly clear, what I said was 'this was not just the dumb mistake of one non-observant person' That is a far cry from me identifying the two victim's error as a dumb mistake. The reason I chose the wording I did is because there seems to be a popular mindset here among some, that anyone who does not share their priorities and their POV, must be morons. And I, like you, think there is a little more than just a lapse of common sense involved here. Unlike you, however, I don't believe that we can ever hope to have a set of safety rules so comprehensive that accidents will become completey avoidable. Human nature will assure that you won't.
Euclid I certainly don't think that the two victims made a "dumb mistake", as you call it.
Just to remain abundantly clear, what I said was 'this was not just the dumb mistake of one non-observant person'
That is a far cry from me identifying the two victim's error as a dumb mistake.
The reason I chose the wording I did is because there seems to be a popular mindset here among some, that anyone who does not share their priorities and their POV, must be morons. And I, like you, think there is a little more than just a lapse of common sense involved here.
Unlike you, however, I don't believe that we can ever hope to have a set of safety rules so comprehensive that accidents will become completey avoidable.
Human nature will assure that you won't.
Okay, I see exactly what you meant now that I look at it again. Really, what you meant was that it was not a dumb mistake at all. I'm sorry for misinterpreting you. I am glad that you see what I see in this being more than a simple loss of common sense or something like not paying enough attention in a way that they were negligent.
In terms of better training, I see two possible solutions. One would be to put in that rule I suggested earlier requiring anyone on any track of a multiple track mainline to get clear of the track immediatley upon the appearance of any train on any of the tracks in that mainline set. At least that is something with a specific meaning that is enforceable. And in learning the rule, one will also learn the reason for it, which is to not get caught by the illusion of two trains sounding like one.
The other solution would be to train the actual experience of the illusion. This experience will register the danger far more effectively than just an explanation of it. Maybe some form of simulated virtual reality could give the actual experience. Show how a cautious thought process can be underway, and suddenly be caught off guard by this illusion. Then teach the danger signs for this trap, so people can learn to arm themselves against it.
I would not expect it to prevent every accident of this type. But I think it could prevent 95% of them. In fact, I believe that far more of the unique two train illusion accidents could be prevented than the more common daydreaming loss of situational awareness accidents. I don't know how any of those could be prevented.
So - is this incident the ONLY TIME a B&O/CSX crew has ever inspected a train in this location under these circumstance and thus there is a 100% failure. Or since the B&O & PRR have been operating trains on these tracks at this location with this track alignment since 1907 without a prior fatality (as far as I can find in the internet available DOT and NTSB reports) is this a singluar 'man failure' incident that was totally within the control of those who were struck.
CSX from my observations through the course of my employment has applied the Euclid form of overkilling the obvious with every incident creating more and more lawyer derived rules that in many cases require another lawyer to adjudicate the actions and/or reactions of employees to any and ever situation that comes into question.
The employee is responsible for their own safety in the performace of their duties.
Once upon a time - a railroad rule book was about 3.5 x 7 inches and about 150 - 160 pages of rules that were written in simple, declaritive English. In the present day a single rule can run to 7 pages in a 8.5 x 11 inch pages, written in the finest of legalize 'gotcha' (meaning that no matter what you do, you have violated some element of the rule).
If you can't protect them, kill them with paper.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
charlie hebdoThere is research to support the idea that having two people makes it less likely that either one will act cautiously. Each thinks the other is keeping watch.
BaltACDOnce upon a time - a railroad rule book was about 3.5 x 7 inches and about 150 - 160 pages of rules that were written in simple, declaritive English. In the present day a single rule can run to 7 pages in a 8.5 x 11 inch pages, written in the finest of legalize 'gotcha' (meaning that no matter what you do, you have violated some element of the rule).
Can you show us an example of one of those 7-page rules?
Before occupying the six foot adjacent to the Amtrak mainline those employees should have obtained protection from Amtrak. They did not for whatever reason and it cost them their lives. Poor vetting, poor training and poor supervision coupled with the conductor's inexperience are the root causes for this tragedy.
243129 Before occupying the six foot adjacent to the Amtrak mainline those employees should have obtained protection from Amtrak. They did not for whatever reason and it cost them their lives. Poor vetting, poor training and poor supervision coupled with the conductor's inexperience are the root causes for this tragedy.
The question would be how often such an event occurs. If it's common, then some sort of procedure should be in place. If it's once in a blue moon or less, existing rules already cover it.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
How would those employees have gone about obtaining protection from Amtrak? Walk me through the process. From what I gather, protection was not required. The only option I can see for them was to refuse to do the inspection without having protection.
tree68 243129 Before occupying the six foot adjacent to the Amtrak mainline those employees should have obtained protection from Amtrak. They did not for whatever reason and it cost them their lives. Poor vetting, poor training and poor supervision coupled with the conductor's inexperience are the root causes for this tragedy. The question would be how often such an event occurs. If it's common, then some sort of procedure should be in place. If it's once in a blue moon or less, existing rules already cover it.
There appears to be about 4 ft. of space between the boundaries of the foul zone of the CSX and Amtrak tracks. Is it okay for employees to occupy that 4 ft. space without protection?
If protection is not needed for working in that 4 ft. space, how do existing rules apply to working in that space? Would existing rules prohibit working in that 4 ft. space because doing so would not be the safest course?
tree68The question would be how often such an event occurs. If it's common, then some sort of procedure should be in place. If it's once in a blue moon or less, existing rules already cover it.
It is common and there is a procedure in place on Amtrak. CSX employees fouling Amtrak property are subject to Amtrak procedures and rules I would assume.
243129 tree68 The question would be how often such an event occurs. If it's common, then some sort of procedure should be in place. If it's once in a blue moon or less, existing rules already cover it. It is common and there is a procedure in place on Amtrak. CSX employees fouling Amtrak property are subject to Amtrak procedures and rules I would assume.
tree68 The question would be how often such an event occurs. If it's common, then some sort of procedure should be in place. If it's once in a blue moon or less, existing rules already cover it.
You know what ASS U ME is! Don't assume.
EuclidHow would those employees have gone about obtaining protection from Amtrak? Walk me through the process. From what I gather, protection was not required. The only option I can see for them was to refuse to do the inspection without having protection.
Through their dispatcher or with direct contact with the Amtrak dispatcher. Common sense would dictate that required inspection of both sides of the train, especially the side with 100+ MPH traffic, would require some sort of protection.
BaltACD 243129 tree68 The question would be how often such an event occurs. If it's common, then some sort of procedure should be in place. If it's once in a blue moon or less, existing rules already cover it. It is common and there is a procedure in place on Amtrak. CSX employees fouling Amtrak property are subject to Amtrak procedures and rules I would assume. You know what ASS U ME is! Don't assume.
Well then why don't you explain to me what CSX procedure is in this instance so I don't have to ASS U ME.
243129 Euclid How would those employees have gone about obtaining protection from Amtrak? Walk me through the process. From what I gather, protection was not required. The only option I can see for them was to refuse to do the inspection without having protection. Through their dispatcher or with direct contact with the Amtrak dispatcher. Common sense would dictate that required inspection of both sides of the train, especially the side with 100+ MPH traffic, would require some sort of protection.
Euclid How would those employees have gone about obtaining protection from Amtrak? Walk me through the process. From what I gather, protection was not required. The only option I can see for them was to refuse to do the inspection without having protection.
Below in red and blue is a quote from the NTSB report.
If protection is readily available if employees ask for it, why does the NTSB say what they say below in red? This red and blue section sounds to me like protection is not available, and that NTSB is recommending that it be made available.
However, there are circumstances when the operating employees cannot safely walk away from the other railroad’s tracks. In these situations, when the crew is fouling the other railroad’s adjacent track, they would need protection.9 A current process is readily available to provide this protection. For example, a train dispatcher will communicate with another train dispatcher from a different railroad if a derailed train has obstructed an adjacent railroad’s track. This derailment would be an emergency and has the possibility of contributing to an additional collision and derailment.
The NTSB believes that this same communication could be used to protect employees that find it necessary to occupy the other railroad’s active tracks. Therefore, to eliminate the hazard of unknown traffic on adjacent tracks of other railroads, the NTSB recommends that CSX and Amtrak prohibit employees from fouling adjacent tracks of another railroad unless the employees are provided protection from trains and/or equipment on the adjacent tracks by means of communication between the two railroads.
Recommendation
As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following new safety recommendation:
To CSX Transportation and the National Railroad Passenger Corporation:
Prohibit employees from fouling adjacent tracks of another railroad unless the employees are provided protection from trains and/or equipment on the adjacent tracks by means of communication between the two railroads. (R-19-006)
EuclidRecommendation As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following new safety recommendation: To CSX Transportation and the National Railroad Passenger Corporation: Prohibit employees from fouling adjacent tracks of another railroad unless the employees are provided protection from trains and/or equipment on the adjacent tracks by means of communication between the two railroads. (R-19-006)
Evidently NTSB is not aware that there is a 'procedure' in place on Amtrak. Not surprising. Now if BaltACD, a former CSX employee, would provide the information I requested of him perhaps we can get a better sense of the situation.
243129 Euclid Recommendation As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following new safety recommendation: To CSX Transportation and the National Railroad Passenger Corporation: Prohibit employees from fouling adjacent tracks of another railroad unless the employees are provided protection from trains and/or equipment on the adjacent tracks by means of communication between the two railroads. (R-19-006) Evidently NTSB is not aware that there is a 'procedure' in place on Amtrak. Not surprising. Now if BaltACD, a former CSX employee, would provide the information I requested of him perhaps we can get a better sense of the situation.
Euclid Recommendation As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following new safety recommendation: To CSX Transportation and the National Railroad Passenger Corporation: Prohibit employees from fouling adjacent tracks of another railroad unless the employees are provided protection from trains and/or equipment on the adjacent tracks by means of communication between the two railroads. (R-19-006)
IF protection were requested by the employees on the ground through the CSX Train Dispatcher - the Amtrak K Tower Operator would have been contacted - what procedures the K Tower Operator would use in establishing and granting protection with the Amtrak Train Dispatcher are unknown to me. After K Tower would advise that protection has been provided the CSX crew on the ground would be notified. How long it would take to move through that chain of communications is always problematical. The NTSB report does not indicate that protection was ever requested. The CSX Train Dispatcher DID NOT have direct communications with the Amtrak Train Dispatcher at the time of the incident - all communications were to be communicated through the K Tower Operator who controls all Amtrak signals in the Washington Union Station vicinity.
The BC (Capital & Metropolitan Subs) and BD (RF&P Sub) both work with the Operator at K Tower when protection is required on either property. I have no knowledge of how Amtrak Train Dispatchers control the signals on their territory - I know from experience 40+ years ago that the PRR preferred to have Operators control signals for 15 to 20 mile segments as opposed to having a single Dispatcher control 100 to 200 miles of railroad from a single CTC location. How the Train Dispatching districts are laid out on the NEC and how those signals are controlled, I have no idea.
BaltACDIF protection were requested by the employees on the ground through the CSX Train Dispatcher - the Amtrak K Tower Operator would have been contacted - what procedures the K Tower Operator would use in establishing and granting protection with the Amtrak Train Dispatcher are unknown to me. After K Tower would advise that protection has been provided the CSX crew on the ground would be notified. How long it would take to move through that chain of communications is always problematical.
It's so much fun to watch how procedures designed for MOW utterly fail when even considered for T&E.
Consider this accident. A likely tired, grumpy pair of conductors walk up the side of their train, until close to the head end where space to the adjacent track (a track known to belong to a different, and high-speed railroad) gets tight. Let's see what would be involved here.
Conductors stop, get on the radio to their tower. They request 'foul time'. Exactly what does this consist of? someone will have to specify a precise window of time for the protection to be active. That will certainly be more than the few minutes to walk the rest of the way up to the cab ... or request 3-step to cross to the other side and continue there. Now we relay this over to Amtrak, who then has to contact all the trains that will be operating within the foul time, and do ... what? As I recall one of Amtrak's principles was to avoid traffic on the track 'adjacent' to potential fouling, at least for maintenance purposes. So something would have had to be done with 175 to take it off that track before it reached the location in question, which in practice would have almost certainly meant Amtrak telling the K operator that foul time would not be granted until all the traffic had been correctly routed ... something that I doubt would be easily and quickly arranged in a few minutes without stopping trains or throwing them without warning down to full restricted speed. I can picture some of the blue language that would 'eventuate' if the K operator explained exactly why 'emergency' foul time (e.g., not prescheduled hours or days ahead of time) was being requested.
This is the best possible case; there may be actual procedures that are different but none that would be properly effective with any greater speed. Meanwhile, our hypothetical conductors, who remember are already fed up with procedures, are expected to ... what? Wait in that 4' or so until someone gets back to them on the radio? Look forward to being called on the carpet for delaying Amtrak traffic, perhaps seriously, for... tell me again what the nominal safety reason for this was?
According to the NTSB report:
Protection was not required for any of the two conductors’ activities, including walking on the Amtrak track.
The two conductors walking on Amtrak property was not a legal issue.
The two conductors walking on Amtrak property was not a rule violation.
If the two conductors had requested protection from Amtrak through CSX was not required to communicate the request to Amtrak.
Had the CSX asked for protection from Amtrak, it is unclear whether Amtrak was under any obligation to grant protection, or would have granted it voluntarily.
In the blue and red paragraphs from the NTSB report that I posted above, the meaning is painfully unclear. First they say that a procedure for CSX employees to be granted protection during fouling Amtrak track is READILY AVAILABLE. They give an example based on fouling equipment during a derailment.
Then they say that this same type of protection COULD BE USED in a case such as the Ivy City train inspection.
So--- a procedure of acquiring protection is available and could be used.
And then they turn around and recommend that this method of acquiring protection be instituted; as though it is NOT available and ready to be used.
This writing is utterly incomprehensible. If protection is available, there is no reason to recommend that it be made available.
My assumption about what they mean is this:
The protection is available as they describe, but it is not mandatory. The conductors were not prohibited from walking on the Amtrak track. But with NTSB's recommendation, the conductors would be prohibited from fouling the Amtrak track without protection.
It is the part in bold that is the NTSB recommendation. It does not currently exist, and NTSB is proposing that it be made to exist.
Overmod BaltACD IF protection were requested by the employees on the ground through the CSX Train Dispatcher - the Amtrak K Tower Operator would have been contacted - what procedures the K Tower Operator would use in establishing and granting protection with the Amtrak Train Dispatcher are unknown to me. After K Tower would advise that protection has been provided the CSX crew on the ground would be notified. How long it would take to move through that chain of communications is always problematical. It's so much fun to watch how procedures designed for MOW utterly fail when even considered for T&E. Consider this accident. A likely tired, grumpy pair of conductors walk up the side of their train, until close to the head end where space to the adjacent track (a track known to belong to a different, and high-speed railroad) gets tight. Let's see what would be involved here. Conductors stop, get on the radio to their tower. They request 'foul time'. Exactly what does this consist of? someone will have to specify a precise window of time for the protection to be active. That will certainly be more than the few minutes to walk the rest of the way up to the cab ... or request 3-step to cross to the other side and continue there. Now we relay this over to Amtrak, who then has to contact all the trains that will be operating within the foul time, and do ... what? As I recall one of Amtrak's principles was to avoid traffic on the track 'adjacent' to potential fouling, at least for maintenance purposes. So something would have had to be done with 175 to take it off that track before it reached the location in question, which in practice would have almost certainly meant Amtrak telling the K operator that foul time would not be granted until all the traffic had been correctly routed ... something that I doubt would be easily and quickly arranged in a few minutes without stopping trains or throwing them without warning down to full restricted speed. I can picture some of the blue language that would 'eventuate' if the K operator explained exactly why 'emergency' foul time (e.g., not prescheduled hours or days ahead of time) was being requested. This is the best possible case; there may be actual procedures that are different but none that would be properly effective with any greater speed. Meanwhile, our hypothetical conductors, who remember are already fed up with procedures, are expected to ... what? Wait in that 4' or so until someone gets back to them on the radio? Look forward to being called on the carpet for delaying Amtrak traffic, perhaps seriously, for... tell me again what the nominal safety reason for this was?
BaltACD IF protection were requested by the employees on the ground through the CSX Train Dispatcher - the Amtrak K Tower Operator would have been contacted - what procedures the K Tower Operator would use in establishing and granting protection with the Amtrak Train Dispatcher are unknown to me. After K Tower would advise that protection has been provided the CSX crew on the ground would be notified. How long it would take to move through that chain of communications is always problematical.
With the Conductor being 25 and the trainee being younger - they may have been grumpy, but they were not grumpy old men. They had been on duty for approximately 4 hours when the event began, so being 25 and younger they SHOULD not have been tired.
Calling for protection was totally within the Conductors perogitive, however it was not required. If the train had been entirely on one or the other of the CSX Main Tracks - the crew would have routinely asked for protection on the track they were not occupying and that request would have been granted consistent with traffic in progress for which the Conductor would be notified if any train were to be allowed to pass before protection would be established. The fact that their train blocked both CSX Mains 'may' have clouded the Conductors thought process in the need for protection against Amtrak.
Despite the lenghty communication chain, it takes nowhere near 4 hours for things to take place. Where a minute may seem like an hour a 4 or 5 minute wait for things to take place up and down the communication can seem like an eternity.
By and large, the Amtrak staff at K tower would have used the guidance in NORAC 11 with regard to setting up protection.
It appears that if the conductor had asked for protection he'd have gotten it from Amtrak. A call on the radio, a couple of phone calls by the CSX DS, and it would have been in place.
Such a request was apparently not made. Those radio communications are recorded. So that error falls on the conductor.
The conductor and the trainee chose to walk on a 95 MPH mainline without protection. That error falls on the crew members.
All the "shoulda, woulda, coulda" is moot as far at those crew members are concerned. They failed to exercise the protections given them in the rules, including being alert for movment of trains in both directions at both times.
In fact, it really appears that what NTSB is calling for is actually already in place.
As for moving away from an active track on the approach of a train, one could argue that a prudent individual would do just that. I believe most railroaders would do exactly that, because they know the inherent hazards of being too close to a passing train, no matter what kind.
We're never going to convince Bucky that the blame for this incident falls on anyone but the two victims. There's no sense even trying.
tree68 By and large, the Amtrak staff at K tower would have used the guidance in NORAC 11 with regard to setting up protection. It appears that if the conductor had asked for protection he'd have gotten it from Amtrak. A call on the radio, a couple of phone calls by the CSX DS, and it would have been in place. Such a request was apparently not made. Those radio communications are recorded. So that error falls on the conductor. The conductor and the trainee chose to walk on a 95 MPH mainline without protection. That error falls on the crew members. All the "shoulda, woulda, coulda" is moot as far at those crew members are concerned. They failed to exercise the protections given them in the rules, including being alert for movment of trains in both directions at both times. In fact, it really appears that what NTSB is calling for is actually already in place. As for moving away from an active track on the approach of a train, one could argue that a prudent individual would do just that. I believe most railroaders would do exactly that, because they know the inherent hazards of being too close to a passing train, no matter what kind. We're never going to convince Bucky that the blame for this incident falls on anyone but the two victims. There's no sense even trying.
Regarding your quote in red: I think you are jumping to an unfounded conclusion that had they asked for protection from Amtrak, they would have gotten it. CSX would have had to have been in on that agreement too. And why does NTSB recommend this procedure be installed for future use if it is already in place and ready to use?
Aside from those points, the two conductors were not required to have protection, no matter whether they walked on Amtrak track or just stayed next to their train and out of the Amtrak foul zone. Protection was only an option and not required.
The NTSB said the two conductors were NOT PROHIBITED from walking on the live track; and in their recommendation they recommented that protection be made mandatory for walking on live track.
If you will read what Balt posted, he said this: "Calling for protection was totally within the Conductors perogitive, however it was not required."
Regarding your conclusion in green: You have accused me of saying that the victims were 100% blameless more than once, and yet that is not my conclusion. You seem to have some reason for distorting my position on that matter. I have tried to look at this accident from all perspectives. A lot of people have made conflicting claims about where the fault lies. The NTSB report is confusing. So it is an interesting case. You can find the blame in a rule violation, and move on, or you can find out what happened and look at how it could have been prevented.
There's a difference often between liability legally and blame in reality.
At some point personal responsibility enters the picture. The Conductor and trainee DID NOT exercise their personal responsibiliy to prevent the incident from happening, and happening with the severity that claimed both men their lives.
tree68By and large, the Amtrak staff at K tower would have used the guidance in NORAC 11 with regard to setting up protection.
Agree.
tree68It appears that if the conductor had asked for protection he'd have gotten it from Amtrak. A call on the radio, a couple of phone calls by the CSX DS, and it would have been in place. Such a request was apparently not made. Those radio communications are recorded. So that error falls on the conductor. The conductor and the trainee chose to walk on a 95 MPH mainline without protection. That error falls on the crew members.
This is a lack of training, supervision and common sense.
tree68In fact, it really appears that what NTSB is calling for is actually already in place.
It is.
The blame for this incident falls on the two CSX employees and CSX for allowing an obviously inexperienced and poorly trained conductor, with a lack of common sense, instruct a new hire. Classic case of the unknowing 'teaching' the unknowing.
Oh and lest we forget.
The NTSB contradictory report:
After the impact, at 11:18 p.m., the engineer placed the train into emergency braking, announced emergency three times on the radio, and called the Amtrak dispatch center via the radio. After her train came to a complete stop, she called her conductor to come to the head end of the train. The crew inspected their train and waited for officials to arrive.
Page six, paragraph six, last sentence:
According to the event recorder and the engineer interview, the Amtrak engineer responded immediately and applied emergency braking upon seeing the CSX employees walking near the tracks.
Now factor in the convoluted testimony of 175's engineer and you have a real SNAFU.
Euclid You have accused me of saying that the victims were 100% blameless more than once, and yet that is not my conclusion.
Boy, it sure sounds that way. CSX should have done this, CSX should have done that, Amtrak should have... etc and so on.
This is the coulda, woulda, shoulda.
The comments just previous to this one rather point to the deceased personnel holding the lions share of the blame for their fate because they did not exercise the controls already in place to protect them.
They were walking on 95 MPH track with no protections in place.
As has been pointed out, they were, in fact, trespassing. In that respect, the NTSB report is wrong - there actually was (and is) a prohibition against them walking on the Amtrak ROW. Imagine the furor if Amtrak police had happened along and arrested them for trespassing. The arrest would be totally justified, although "professional courtesy" would probably prevail.
EuclidRegarding your quote in red: I think you are jumping to an unfounded conclusion that had they asked for protection from Amtrak, they would have gotten it. CSX would have had to have been in on that agreement too. And why does NTSB recommend this procedure be installed for future use if it is already in place and ready to use?
I dunno, I guess taking a former CSX dispatcher's word for it is a bit of a reach. Maybe what NTSB wants is for it to be codified, not just a procedure.
243129According to the event recorder and the engineer interview, the Amtrak engineer responded immediately and applied emergency braking upon seeing the CSX employees walking near the tracks.
I doubt that the event recorder registered the impact. Is that what you are saying? In my thinking, it is impossible to know (unless there are inward facing and forward looking cameras recording the event.) the exact sequence. And the rememberance of 175's engineer is subject to post event stress and the mind wanting to make a logical sequence out of what happened and how it should have happened. In any thing, it does not mater whether she applied the brakes before or after the impact. They were on the track, the train was doing over 88 ft/second. She could not have prevented the fatal accident. If she had zero reflex time and applied the brakes at the instant the men were in her line of sight, the train would still have struck them. I think that has been resolved. Are we trying to castigate the STB for an imperfect report? I concur that the report has flaws. Does it mater? I think the STB should improve the report. Is the recommendation appropriate? I agree with its recommendation that the men should have requested and gotten protection before walking on a live track and that the rules should be revised to require that. Do I think the two men were insufficiently trained. Yes. Do I think CSX is responsible for that. Yes.
I await your response.
tree68Maybe what NTSB wants is for it to be codified, not just a procedure.
Lawyerification! Nobody is responsible for their actions until those actions have been lawyerified.
Electroliner 1935I doubt that the event recorder registered the impact. Is that what you are saying?
No, that is what the NTSB said.
Electroliner 1935And the rememberance of 175's engineer is subject to post event stress and the mind wanting to make a logical sequence out of what happened and how it should have happened. In any thing, it does not mater whether she applied the brakes before or after the impact. They were on the track, the train was doing over 88 ft/second. She could not have prevented the fatal accident. If she had zero reflex time and applied th ebrakes at the instant the men were in her line of sight, the train would still have struck them.
Go to the NTSB report and read her testimony.
It certainly does matter whether she applied the brakes before or after impact. Milliseconds matter and not applying the brakes in emergency took those milliseconds away from the victims.
Electroliner 1935. Are we trying to castigate the STB for an imperfect report?
Yes, they deserve it.
Electroliner 1935 I agree with its recommendation that the men should have requested and gotten protection before walking on a live track and that the rules should be revised to require that.
Amtrak rules do require that.
Electroliner 1935 Do I think the two men were insufficiently trained. Yes. Do I think CSX is responsible for that. Yes.
Certainly.
tree68 Euclid I think you are jumping to an unfounded conclusion that had they asked for protection from Amtrak, they would have gotten it. CSX would have had to have been in on that agreement too. And why does NTSB recommend this procedure [protection] be installed for future use if it is already in place and ready to use? I dunno, I guess taking a former CSX dispatcher's word for it is a bit of a reach. Maybe what NTSB wants is for it to be codified, not just a procedure.
Euclid I think you are jumping to an unfounded conclusion that had they asked for protection from Amtrak, they would have gotten it. CSX would have had to have been in on that agreement too. And why does NTSB recommend this procedure [protection] be installed for future use if it is already in place and ready to use?
The NTSB’s recommendation is not that the protection “be codified, not just a procedure,” whatever that means. They plainly say what they want and there is no maybe about it. They would not say they want something if it already existed. It is Logic 101. This is their recommendation upon concluding their report:
Prohibit employees from fouling adjacent tracks of another railroad unless the employees are provided protection from trains and/or equipment on the adjacent tracks by means of communication between the two railroads.
That recommendation would change protection in a case like this from being an option to being required. So, that sounds like a new rule that the NTSB wants.
But if you believe that rule already exists, show it to us. There is a complex rule about how protection is to be executed, but it says nothing about it being required in a case such as the Ivy City accident. Show us the rule that requires it.
EuclidBut if you believe that rule already exists, show it to us. There is a complex rule about how protection is to be executed, but it says nothing about it being required in a case such as the Ivy City accident. Show us the rule that requires it.
NORAC:
132. Protection for the Safe Passage of Trains
Trains must be fully protected against any known condition that may interfere with their safe passage.
a. Protection When Fouling or Working on a Track If work on or adjacent to a track will create a condition interfering with the safe passage of trains, that work must not be attempted without permission of the employee in charge of the track. On tracks where ABS, DCS, or Interlocking rules are in effect, the Dispatcher (or Operator when authorized by the Dispatcher) must assure that protection against trains in both directions has been provided as follows:
1. If the work involves on-track equipment or will disturb the track or catenary structure so that it would be unsafe for Normal Speed, Form D line 4 or Form D line 5 must be issued.
2. If the work will not disturb the track or catenary structure, the Dispatcher may verbally authorize Foul Time in accordance with Rule 140. Form D line 4, Form D line 5, and Foul Time may be issued only to employees who are qualified on the operating rules and the physical characteristics of the territory involved. Form D line 13 may be issued in lieu of Form D line 4 when the information necessary to clearly delineate the limits of the affected track area will not physically fit on line
4. When Form D line 13 is used in this manner, the instructions it contains must be formatted as though issued on Form D line 4.
b. Protection in Unforeseen Conditions If an event occurs or conditions are found that may interfere with the safe passage of trains and no protection has been provided, employees must immediately attempt to stop trains by radio communication to trains and the Dispatcher. They must provide flag protection in both directions as prescribed by Rule 130, paragraph (b), “Flag Protection Against Trains on Adjacent Tracks.” Flag protection must be maintained until the unsafe condition has been corrected, or until employees are assured by the Dispatcher or Operator that other protection has been provided.
Larry, rule 132 involves danger to trains (e.g. from hitting equipment or track out of alignment from being worked on) and involves stopping the train to protect it, rather than stopping to protect employees.
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