243129So you are traveling in your auto and someone steps in front of you you will not bother to jam on the brake because you are going to hit them anyway?
When I was much much younger, I used to have an open bottle of cola on the front seat in the notch between the seat backs. I wondered whether I would try to keep it from spilling if I had to stop suddenly. Going down a narrow street with cars on both sides at about 25 mph, I saw a baseball roll out between the cars about five cars lengths ahead of me. The cola went all over the floor as I reacted as I wanted to giving a good feeling, particularly as a small boy came out after the ball. So yes, I will apply the brake.
243129You do not think it possible that by affording the subject a millisecond that they could possibly escape?
Now you believe that the engineer of #175 did not start to react to seeing the two men on the track and wasted time before slaming the throttle shut and reaching for the brake handle or so I think you are claiming that from the report. To repeat your favorite words, "HOW DO YOU KNOW THAT?
girarddepotIf the Wall St. Jourtnal is tobe believed, there is a serious problem with street drug use among Amtrak employees. In the case of these fatalities, small amounts of cocaine were found on one and cocaine plus meth on the other--not enough to be high but enough to impair judgement and reaction time. In any case, it's still a tragedy to have serious injury or loss of life.
I have not read anything stating that the CSX employees involved had any street drugs in their system. I suggest the individual that wrote the article for WSJ may have his own street drug problems.
I have no knowledge of what the percentage of drug failures that Amtrak experiences on their random drug testing (random drug testing is required of all railroads by the FRA - When a company's failure rate goes above a certain percentage of all tests - the testing proceeds to another level.) My understanding at the time I was employed by CSX, their failure rate was below whatever the rate necessary to invoke the 'enhanced' testing. In 18 years of working in Jacksonville, I was never tested. In 8 years of working in Baltimore on the same job I was working in Jacksonville I was tested 3 times - all without failing.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Electroliner 1935Now you believe that the engineer of #175 did not start to react to seeing the two men on the track and wasted time before slaming the throttle shut and reaching for the brake handle or so I think you are claiming that from the report. To repeat your favorite words, "HOW DO YOU KNOW THAT?
After all that work I did to find and post the link to Sahara's NTSB interview which contains her firsthand account of what she did. Shame on you.
She inched the brake toward service, thinking they would see her train and react. Said she only went to emergency when she knew she would have to stop after the impact. It's in the testimony.
Overmod She inched the brake toward service, thinking they would see her train and react. Said she only went to emergency when she knew she would have to stop after the impact. It's in the testimony.
What is the logic of going into emergency after impact?
It is in her (175's engineer) testimony.
BTW you do not have to slam the throttle shut, an emergency application would cut off traction power.
Ask me how I know that.
AnthonyVWhat is the logic of going into emergency after impact?
There isn't any.
243129 AnthonyV What is the logic of going into emergency after impact? There isn't any.
AnthonyV What is the logic of going into emergency after impact?
Do you have an opinion as to why the engineer of 175 put the train into emergency after impact, rather than stopping with a service application?
EuclidDo you have an opinion as to why the engineer of 175 put the train into emergency after impact, rather than stopping with a service application?
I have an opinion. It isn't pretty, and it has words I won't use on this forum, and I keep it to myself as (1) it doesn't change anything, and (2) it contributes little meaningful to this discussion.
As I have said, as a decided non-railroader I'd have done much what she did, in inching toward full service as soon as I became aware of people in the gauge (which is where the engineer of 66 said he saw them, and no one here or at the NTSB so far has controverted that -- I hope they do) rather than going to prompt emergency with the train (as I recall) around a fairly sharp curve. Were I a railroader I might have gone to emergency as Joe thinks right, for the reasons he thinks right (and, if I recall correctly, some of the reasons Euclid has argued for in his past discussions of the use of emergency).
But a focus on shoulda-woulda-coulda on the part of the engineer, who everyone acknowledges couldn't possibly have stopped, or even gotten significant way off the train, in the time she had, extends exactly as far as a prospective rule that says you apply emergency whenever you see people in the gauge or fouling expected clearance including wind (or people in vests there, if 'safeguarding our own'). I consider it within the NTSB's scope to recommend this, and perhaps within the FRA's to implement it. Whether it is sentiment or sentimentality would depend on particular accidents, but it certainly does offer milliseconds of potential salvation and better moral recovery for an engineer in even an unavoidable collision (they know they did 'all they could') vs. other considerations that are, more or less, related to quicker railroad operations for the benefit of the investors.
The issue we need to concentrate on, as far as a response here, has far less to do with brakes or horns or momentum than it does with maintaining situational awareness at all times, particularly those times when exasperation or a 'red mist' make judgment impaired. Go back if necessary and read the interviews, particularly to get a context of what those conductors had experienced, particularly with regard to the set-out car handling, as that's much more relevant here than most of the discussion considers it. We're tacitly insulting the dead by saying the senior conductor -- who came from a railroad family and almost certainly knew to 'expect a train on any track at any time' by the time he was weaned -- somehow mistrained his Padawan learner into lethal ignorance ... and yet, there they were, and didn't even look around before the moment of collision. We need to look carefully into what the probable reasons for that might be, and what strategies and approaches might best prevent 'this sort of thing' from happening again.
P.S. it is highly unlikely to be more or better 'rules' printed in lawyerese. Look how well that worked at Cayce.
Overmod: I think you brought up some very pertinent questions and observations. Given his background, a lack of vetting or training seem minor factors for the senior conductor. Earlier I brought up the hypothesis that attention and vigilance may have been reduced because there were two people walking together. This could have two negative factors. One, the distraction of talking with one another, and two, and more likely to be sugnuficant, the diffusion of responsibility for vigilance.
charlie hebdoEarlier I brought up the hypothesis that attention and vigilance may have been reduced because there were two people walking together. This could have two negative factors. One, the distraction of talking with one another, and two, and more likely to be sugnuficant, the diffusion of responsibility for vigilance.
I think there is a lot of validity in this theory, whether or not it actually applies in this case.
charlie hebdoGiven his background, a lack of vetting or training seem minor factors for the senior conductor.
Not to tar-baby-tize ... and thoroughly understanding the awful hell I may generate by saying this now ... I personally think there is a severe lack-of-training fault. One that is not even possible to address with all the 'rules classes' CSX might care to outsource or impose -- in fact, not one that CSX as an owner/manager could even meaningfully address. All the aspects of awareness and safety training pertaining strictly to individual well-being are not the things the rules really address, cute little mandatory 'safety meetings' and "Safety First" painted on footboards and so on notwithstanding. Those rules make 'getting trains through' the priority, keeping the 'human capital' working as cheaply as possible net of having to vet and train replacements for the maimed and dead. What is needed is effective training by and for the railroaders ... which might theoretically even be 'legislatable" or mandated, just not something that would ever be particularly practical if the railroads themselves or the Government tried to do it.
Earlier I brought up the hypothesis that attention and vigilance may have been reduced because there were two people walking together. This could have two negative factors. One, the distraction of talking with one another, and two, and more likely to be significant, the diffusion of responsibility for vigilance.
In a sense, I see this as the evil side of the 'buddy system': if you get yakkin' with your wingman you both might stop watching your sixes together. I don't see any way this could be addressed in rules without destroying much of the point behind a buddy system in the first place.
Meanwhile, and I think you can both comment on and research this better than I can, I have to wonder if some of the psychophysics behind road rage are operative here. The state of mind of those two, walking back where and when they were, is I think a critical thing here, and while of course we can't "know" it, we could certainly check discipline records, ask friends and family, and so forth about whether either or both men had a predilection or tendency to lose some aspects of critical thinking when agitated or distracted.
(Now, I understand this to be one of the specific things that Joe talks about when he mentions 'vetting', and I doubt that current CSX (or Amtrak, or other) railroad hiring policy specifically asks whether prospective employees remain calm under fire or frustration (as opposed to 'foaming' on company time or the like!) which is one of the things NTSB might actually suggest to help with 'default prevention' of this kind of accident in the future. Again, a good union-based behavioral program might be able to instill this kind of reflex -- the more frustrating the work, the more professional discipline gets observed as a conscious response. You won't get the necessary buy-in by employees if there is any mistrust whatsoever when doing this, though.
[/quote]
OvermodWe're tacitly insulting the dead by saying the senior conductor -- who came from a railroad family and almost certainly knew to 'expect a train on any track at any time' by the time he was weaned -- somehow mistrained his Padawan learner into lethal ignorance ... and yet, there they were, and didn't even look around before the moment of collision. We need to look carefully into what the probable reasons for that might be, and what strategies and approaches might best prevent 'this sort of thing' from happening again.
Yes, I absolutely agree. This detail that you cite (in red) is my only concern and focus of interest in this thread and earlier threads on this accident. Long before this accident, I had given a great deal of thought to just this specific type of accident which involves hearing two trains sounding as one, having attention locked to the first one seen, and getting struck by the second one. The Ivy City accident is a textbook example. I know of several accounts of this type of accident, and if thorough research were done, I expect that accounts of it happening would be a thousand or more.
This is a unique form of distraction that goes way beyond simple distraction from daydreaming, conversations with others, or stress from other events. Those things merely pull you off your concentration on the moment. With this two-train scenario, I see the type of distraction involved as being an illusion or deception that can kill even those who are completely focused on the task at hand such as expecting and watching for trains, and being alert to that purpose.
I am also convinced that the gravity of this hazard cannot be explained in words sufficiently for it to register in the listener. However, it has been identified as the cause of specific accidents including this one, for which the NTSB has identified it and explained it perfectly. And yet, I think nobody will understand it well enough to grasp the gravity of it.
Everyone is fallible to some extent, and this particular railroad hazard stands out as being the most capable of defeating a person’s defenses. The factor that most prevents this type of accident is NOT wariness, caution, alertness, and expecting trains. What most prevents it is the rarity of the coincidence of two trains converging on a person at the same moment. In other words, it strikes by chance rather than by carelessness.
The only way a people can hope to protect themselves from this is to understand it in the deepest terms. The only way they can do that is to come face to face with it in direct experience. Then they will realize the terror of just how deceptively pernicious this really is. This is what should be trained, and done so by direct experience of the deception. It would make the point.
charlie hebdoOvermod: I think you brought up some very pertinent questions and observations. Given his background, a lack of vetting or training seem minor factors for the senior conductor.
"Minor factors"? It cost them their lives. Clearly this 'senior' conductor did not posseess the acumen for railroad operations. Why would he choose to return to the head end via a live track on a foreign railroad when the option of returning on a safe track on his own railroad was available? Why were they both not vigilant for traffic in either direction? Inexperience, poor vetting and poor training along with poor supervision( there was a trainmaster on scene) is why. Again we have the unknowing 'instructing' the unknowing and supervised by the unknowing. Dupont, Frankford Jct., Cayce SC etc. , see a pattern here?
EuclidThe factor that most prevents this type of accident is NOT wariness, caution, alertness, and expecting trains. What most prevents it is the rarity of the coincidence of two trains converging on a person at the same moment. In other words, it strikes by chance rather than by carelessness.
In my opinion ... and it's just one person's opinion ... that could not be more wrong in terms of evolving any kind of policy going forward.
It happens that in this particular CIRCUMSTANCE there was a confusion of train approach, due in part to the horn and light confusion. But that remains only circumstantial: the issue of why the two of them were walking in the gauge of a railroad that didn't 'belong to them' in the first place is a much more relevant one. And addressing the factors that 'put' them there, doing what they were doing or not doing, is where the focus on our 'response' has to be.
Chalking this up to dreadful coincidence is fine. I have agreed that some sort of simulator could be built to experience the effect of 'multipath' directly, to give what I think is the full effect of 'direct experience of the deception'. But it is surely more important to train people how to stay out of the damn gauge in the first place, or to demand and wait to receive full protection (and take any consequences of that decision) if they even feel the want to.
To put this in a little context: I visited Enola circa 1975, about the time the first Amfleet shells were being built at Red Lion. Crossing the ready tracks to the engine house was the first time I'd ever experienced not being ready to miss all the moving trains safely ... even with my head on a swivel, carefully staying 10' or more from anything standing, I still had one person have to 'plug' a light GG1 to miss me. Trained railroaders evidently did not have this problem, but it was not for exercising less than 'total' attention when in harm's way ... any time in harm's way. The big training issue, perhaps, is that anytime you see a distraction that can't hurt you -- start making a conscious effort to watch for something that can. That one thing alone will likely save lives in any confusing combination of circumstances.
OvermodIt happens that in this particular CIRCUMSTANCE there was a confusion of train approach, due in part to the horn and light confusion. But that remains only circumstantial: the issue of why the two of them were walking in the gauge of a railroad that didn't 'belong to them' in the first place is a much more relevant one. And addressing the factors that 'put' them there, doing what they were doing or not doing, is where the focus on our 'response' has to be. Chalking this up to dreadful coincidence is fine. I have agreed that some sort of simulator could be built to experience the effect of 'multipath' directly, to give what I think is the full effect of 'direct experience of the deception'. But it is surely more important to train people how to stay out of the damn gauge in the first place, or to demand and wait to receive full protection (and take any consequences of that decision) if they even feel the want to.
This. Emphasis mine.
The confusion regarding the two trains would not have been a factor if they'd stayed off the track in the first place.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Overmod Euclid The factor that most prevents this type of accident is NOT wariness, caution, alertness, and expecting trains. What most prevents it is the rarity of the coincidence of two trains converging on a person at the same moment. In other words, it strikes by chance rather than by carelessness. In my opinion ... and it's just one person's opinion ... that could not be more wrong in terms of evolving any kind of policy going forward.
Euclid The factor that most prevents this type of accident is NOT wariness, caution, alertness, and expecting trains. What most prevents it is the rarity of the coincidence of two trains converging on a person at the same moment. In other words, it strikes by chance rather than by carelessness.
Don't get me wrong. I am not suggesting that the cause is only a matter of the fate of train coincidence. But that coincidence is required for this to occur. My point is that the rarity of that coincidence does more to prevent this type of accident than the normal safety precautions, even though they are also essential.
So what I am saying is that this type of distraction includes an unusual illusion that is much more likely to disarm normal protective wariness than the more usual distraction that does not involve the simultaneous apprach of two trains.
So the saving grace (if it can be called that) is that necessary circumstance of two train coincidence is relatively rare.
But I am not saying that safety training for this type of accident is pointless because it is just caused by fate. I am saying that it is so extra dangerous, that special rules and training are needed more than ever.
You can lead a horse to water - but you can't force them to drink.
You can train employees on safety. You can paper them in Safety Rules - but you can't force them to observe them - when you are not they to observe their actions and question their thought process.
The death of these employees, unfortunately, fall squarely on their own shoulders and thought processes.
Writing more rules and procedures for them to discount and fail to comply with is a continuing exercise in ultimate futility.
EuclidI am saying that it is so extra dangerous, that special rules and training are needed more than ever.
I know, but note that I think Balt is right: no amount of 'rules' or 'training' provided by CSX will have any meaningful effect on actually resolving the issues that led to these deaths.
There may be a parallel with the situation that led to the open switch at Cayce. All the 'rules' in the world didn't get those two to close that switch, specifically including the wacky government procedural 'safety' requirements. The only thing you'd likely produce with more and more putting-out-fires rules is more attitude problems and more distraction of foreground attention and the like.
Overmod Euclid I am saying that it is so extra dangerous, that special rules and training are needed more than ever. I know, but note that I think Balt is right: no amount of 'rules' or 'training' provided by CSX will have any meaningful effect on actually resolving the issues that led to these deaths. There may be a parallel with the situation that led to the open switch at Cayce. All the 'rules' in the world didn't get those two to close that switch, specifically including the wacky government procedural 'safety' requirements. The only thing you'd likely produce with more and more putting-out-fires rules is more attitude problems and more distraction of foreground attention and the like.
Euclid I am saying that it is so extra dangerous, that special rules and training are needed more than ever.
This is why I mention poor vetting and poor supervision.
There are lots of cases where adding more rules or replacing existing rules with better rules will make accidents less likely. To say that if someone gets killed by disobeying a rule, nothing more in the way of accident prevention could have prevented the accident is nonsense. People are told to keep their fingers out of table saws, and then we put guards on them. But we all know that no stinking’ guard would have prevented a person from putting their fingers into the saw, since they went ahead and put them in there while knowing not to. Nonsense.
Also, in this case, there was no rule that prohibited being on Amtrak track within the foul zone. So a new rule would not be an addition to an existing rule which is considered to be all that is necessary.
In this thread, we have learned that asking for protection was not required, but was somehow the right thing to do. We have also learned that no additional rules would have helped prevent death or injury in this accident or in future accidents because this accident was 100% caused by the victims, who failed to use all means necessary to prevent the accident. And if people fail to do that, nothing more can be done to make them safer. Therefore, no additional rules can be of any benefit.
Essentially, with NTSB’s official recommendation they call for the current protection, which is available to employees as an option if they ask for it, to be converted to being mandatory under conditions such as those in this Ivy City accident. This would be a new rule made for the purpose of preventing accidents and saving lives.
In a letter to Amtrak, the NTSB communicates their official recommendation in their report with a little added information:
The NTSB identified the following safety issue: • Better communication could be used to protect employees who find it necessary to occupy another railroad’s active tracks. Accordingly, the NTSB makes the following safety recommendation to Amtrak. Additional information regarding this recommendation can be found in the noted section of the report. • Prohibit employees from fouling adjacent tracks of another railroad unless the employees are provided protection from trains and/or equipment on the adjacent tracks by means of communication between the two railroads. (R-19-006) (See Safety Issue section) The NTSB is vitally interested in this recommendation because it is designed to prevent accidents and save lives.
Note that the NTSB is vitally interested in this addition of a rule, which would make protection mandatory because it will prevent accidents and save lives.
243129This is why I mention poor vetting and poor supervision.
And this is right, but neither is going to change things 'as they have become'.
We're not going to evolve any kind of cadre of CSX management to exercise 'vetting' oversight even in an era where the people interested in T&E have the 'right stuff' by classical standards. (The situation is much worse at Amtrak, I suspect, where politically correct thinking seems to be guiding some of the hiring policy, but that is not really relevant here.)
Likewise no amount of 'supervision', again by CSX management personnel, would likely have assisted here (other than by instilling something like a drone- and weed-weasel enforced state of general fear, which certainly seems to be the 'approach' taken by a number of railroads!)
This has to go back to what you were really calling for at the outset: basically a self-policing by the unions and similar organizations to perform some of the appropriate 'vetting', and all the appropriate training and perhaps mutual 'supervision', to keep all the brothers and sisters mutually safe. All the time, not just when company rules 'make' them so.
Euclid Better communication could be used to protect employees who find it necessary to occupy another railroad’s active tracks.
The question here being whether it was necessary to occupy another railroad's active tracks, or merely expedient.
Even their own engineer questioned why they were where they were.
I have no problem with NTSB's suggested rule, but in this case, it really wasn't necessary, had the crew exercised reasonable caution and taken the safe course.
tree68 Euclid Better communication could be used to protect employees who find it necessary to occupy another railroad’s active tracks. The question here being whether it was necessary to occupy another railroad's active tracks, or merely expedient. Even their own engineer questioned why they were where they were. I have no problem with NTSB's suggested rule, but in this case, it really wasn't necessary, had the crew exercised reasonable caution and taken the safe course.
The safe course is mandatory protection. It probably would have saved the lives of the two victims in this accident. What's wrong with that? People make mistakes. We provide backup safety measures. Sometimes they save people from injury or death.
EuclidThe safe course is mandatory protection. It probably would have saved the lives of the two victims in this accident. What's wrong with that? People make mistakes. We provide backup safety measures. Sometimes they save people from injury or death.
Had the rule been in place (and if they had been inclined to complied with it), I would opine that they would have crossed over to the other side of their consist rather than deal with the hassle of requesting and receiving foul time.
Had they crossed over in the first place, we wouldn't be having this discussion.
They didn't need to be walking on 95 MPH active rails. Even with existing rules, it was not the safe course.
I have no problem with the suggested rule, but it really wasn't necessary here.
tree68 Euclid The safe course is mandatory protection. It probably would have saved the lives of the two victims in this accident. What's wrong with that? People make mistakes. We provide backup safety measures. Sometimes they save people from injury or death. Had the rule been in place (and if they had been inclined to complied with it), I would opine that they would have crossed over to the other side of their consist rather than deal with the hassle of requesting and receiving foul time. Had they crossed over in the first place, we wouldn't be having this discussion. They didn't need to be walking on 95 MPH active rails. Even with existing rules, it was not the safe course. I have no problem with the suggested rule, but it really wasn't necessary here.
Euclid The safe course is mandatory protection. It probably would have saved the lives of the two victims in this accident. What's wrong with that? People make mistakes. We provide backup safety measures. Sometimes they save people from injury or death.
Well it very likely would have saved their lives even though it would not have been necessary if they had stayed off that track. But since they did walk on the track and were killed in the process, wouldn't it have been better with the new rule in place rather than not being in place?
Isn't a redundancy in rules worth it if it saves a life that would have been lost without the redundancy?
If the new rule was necessary to save their lives, wouldn't it have been necessary in this incident?
Wouldn't the addition of the new rule be a safer course that the current status without the new rule?
Euclid tree68 Euclid The safe course is mandatory protection. It probably would have saved the lives of the two victims in this accident. What's wrong with that? People make mistakes. We provide backup safety measures. Sometimes they save people from injury or death. Had the rule been in place (and if they had been inclined to complied with it), I would opine that they would have crossed over to the other side of their consist rather than deal with the hassle of requesting and receiving foul time. Had they crossed over in the first place, we wouldn't be having this discussion. They didn't need to be walking on 95 MPH active rails. Even with existing rules, it was not the safe course. I have no problem with the suggested rule, but it really wasn't necessary here. Well it very likely would have saved their lives even though it would not have been necessary if they had stayed off that track. But since they did walk on the track and were killed in the process, wouldn't it have been better with the new rule in place rather than not being in place? Isn't a redundancy in rules worth it if it saves a life that would have been lost without the redundancy?
Rules at present have reached the level of redundently redundant redundancy - break one rule and you have broken 3 to 5 or more. I guess Euclid won't be happy unless when you break one rule you have now broken 10 or 20.
Euclid ...it would not have been necessary if they had stayed off that track.
That's all you really need to say. Case closed.
BaltACDI guess Euclid won't be happy unless when you break one rule you have now broken 10 or 20.
The problem being that no matter how many rules you have, people ignoring them will still slip through the cracks ... or the rules you can remember aren't the things that would keep you alive.
I'm tempted to remember Mr. Salk's vaccine ... he had the equivalent of 100 rules or more, and still children died. What we need is an approach closer to Sabin's: what can effectively overcome any effects of inattention (or poor attitude, etc.) under any circumstance? -- formalize and teach that so people are mindful when necessary.
The next thing I expect will be taken up is the idea of 'sensing' where employees are (perhaps using some of the mechanisms that enable pervasive PTC) and have some sort of automatic method that imposes protection when the system detects actual or anticipated 'fouling'. Bella would just have loved it. Think of it as a PTC mandate for employees and not just trains.
Overmod BaltACD I guess Euclid won't be happy unless when you break one rule you have now broken 10 or 20. The problem being that no matter how many rules you have, people ignoring them will still slip through the cracks ... or the rules you can remember aren't the things that would keep you alive. I'm tempted to remember Mr. Salk's vaccine ... he had the equivalent of 100 rules or more, and still children died. What we need is an approach closer to Sabin's: what can effectively overcome any effects of inattention (or poor attitude, etc.) under any circumstance? -- formalize and teach that so people are mindful when necessary. The next thing I expect will be taken up is the idea of 'sensing' where employees are (perhaps using some of the mechanisms that enable pervasive PTC) and have some sort of automatic method that imposes protection when the system detects actual or anticipated 'fouling'. Bella would just have loved it. Think of it as a PTC mandate for employees and not just trains.
BaltACD I guess Euclid won't be happy unless when you break one rule you have now broken 10 or 20.
Think of it as robots - not humans with functioning brain waves. Think of brain waves as being similar to ocean waves - and we now have documentation that ocean waves occasionally generate 'rogue' waves - waves capable of sinking a vessel and not leaving a trace that it ever existed. Even the 'best' of real live humans are subject to that 'ah sh.t moment' - the thing that they KNEW better than doing but did it anyway for a unknown and uncharted reason. The human animal will never be a successful robot with 100% robotic efficiency.
tree68 Euclid ...it would not have been necessary if they had stayed off that track. That's all you really need to say. Case closed.
Oh but you took what I said out of context in order to make it match what you have been saying. That is a funny trick.
And you did not answer my question.
Here is what I said with the portion you extracted in blue:
"Well it [the new NTSB rule] very likely would have saved their lives even though it would not have been necessary if they had stayed off that track. But since they did walk on the track and were killed in the process, wouldn't it have been better with the new rule in place rather than not being in place?"
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