Thanks Overmod. I found that section about the 4 ft. zone. But just to be clear, this did not apply to the victims of the Ivy City accident, right? But you are looking for ways to accomplish that.
Let’s say the foul zone is within 4 ft. of the outer edge of the base of the nearest rail. Or maybe it would be simpler to say the center of the nearest rail. Or maybe the gage side would be more appropriate. In any case, the precise fouling boundary will never be exactly known for practical purposes, so the nominal maximum boundary should have a safety factor added to it. I would think at least a one foot safety factor would be prudent, but if the zone gets too wide, it might interfere with operations on adjacent tracks.
But once that is all decided, the question becomes this: when you decide you need protection within a portion of this zone, how do you go about acquiring a guarantee that no trains will operate in that area? And how could you for instance ride the side of a car moving though that zone of protection where no trains or equipment is supposed to be? Or what if you wanted to pull a pin on a cut of standing cars? Would you still need protection to get within 4 ft. of the rail? If so, what would it be protecting you from?
Yard trackage is not governed by signals, so how do you convey an order to all operations to stay out of a protected area?
EuclidI assume he did look back, and probably frequently.
Was not at least one of the engineers quoted in the report as saying the crewmembers did not look back?
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
tree68Was not at least one of the engineers quoted in the report as saying the crewmembers did not look back?
All the more reason for 175's engineer to apply the brake in emergency. No "yadda,yadda, yadda".
tree68 Euclid I assume he did look back, and probably frequently. Was not at least one of the engineers quoted in the report as saying the crewmembers did not look back?
Euclid I assume he did look back, and probably frequently.
I am referring to the entire time they were fouling the Amtrak track, when I say I assume they did look back frequently. It is just an assumption, but it is one I make because any reasonbly competent person would check back at some intervals.
You are referring to the interval where they were in sight of the engineer of 175 during the 15 or so seconds of the approach. I agree that they did not look back during that period. I think it is fair to conclude that the fact that they did not move into the clear is proof that they were not aware of 175, and therefore, they never looked back during that period.
But I do not think it is accurate to say they never looked back in a way that you are speaking of their entire time on the track.
In any case, if they had looked back at times prior to the arrival of 175, I can see how the arrival of 66 would have drawn all their attention, making it likely that they simply forgot about what might be happening behind them. Clearly they broke the rule requiring them to alert for trains, but nevertheless, there is an explanation as to why they broke the rule.
This accident actually has some parallel elements with the ATSF incident at Robbinson, NM in which the engineer of a passenger train in the hole was using the horn and lights to warn the fireman on the ground at the switch. He apparently became so distracted by what he thought the engineer was trying to tell him that he dashed to the switch which was lined correctly and he lined it wrong right in face of an approaching passenger train.
What brought this odd sequence on was that the fireman had intially approached that switch, and unlocked and released the locking treddle, thus making the engineer worry that he may have thrown the switch, which would have lined it into the siding. As the tension of the approaching passenger train rose, the doubt between the two men cascaded into runaway thought process that propelled the fireman into making the wrong decision.
243129 .
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
EuclidI think it is fair to conclude that the fact that they did not move into the clear is proof that they were not aware of 175, and therefore, they never looked back during that period.
Therefore, they were not expecting a train, at any time, in any direction. Add to that the fact that they were fouling the track with their back to oncoming flow of traffic.
Trying to discern if, and when, they looked back is a moot point. They didn't see the oncoming 175. They were not aware of their surroundings.
tree68 Euclid I think it is fair to conclude that the fact that they did not move into the clear is proof that they were not aware of 175, and therefore, they never looked back during that period. Therefore, they were not expecting a train, at any time, in any direction. Add to that the fact that they were fouling the track with their back to oncoming flow of traffic. Trying to discern if, and when, they looked back is a moot point. They didn't see the oncoming 175. They were not aware of their surroundings.
Euclid I think it is fair to conclude that the fact that they did not move into the clear is proof that they were not aware of 175, and therefore, they never looked back during that period.
Well, you did not think it was moot when you brought it up as an issue in the second post from the top of this page.
Murphy Siding 243129 . I think we all kind of understand how you feel about Amtrak's training ("Poor vetting ,poor training , poor supervision, and lack of common sense coupled with inexperience and bad decisions on the parts of the CSX crew and Amtrak 175 engineer") etc. Can you walk us through this event? If you are the engineer in this situation, what is the sequence of events and what should an engineer who had 'all the right stuff' have done?-Thanks
I think we all kind of understand how you feel about Amtrak's training ("Poor vetting ,poor training , poor supervision, and lack of common sense coupled with inexperience and bad decisions on the parts of the CSX crew and Amtrak 175 engineer") etc. Can you walk us through this event? If you are the engineer in this situation, what is the sequence of events and what should an engineer who had 'all the right stuff' have done?-Thanks
Where in the report does it say the 175 engineer was required to apply emergency brakes as soon as the CSX crew were seen (was that ~15seconds prior to impact)? Where does it say that would have saved their lives?
charlie hebdo Where in the report does it say the 175 engineer was required to apply emergency brakes as soon as the CSX crew were seen (was that ~15seconds prior to impact)? Where does it say that would have saved their lives?
Nobody can know that it would have saved their lives. But it is a fact that it could have saved their lives. Nobody can say what the odds of saving their lives would have been had an emergency application been made as early as possible. What would be a good reason not to take that chance?
The following is a link to the preliminary report. It's only two pages, but it shows a photo of the CSX train involved that night. I hadn't seen this photo before, It's incredible to me how tight the layout is, something that doesn't quite come across in the NTSB accident brief (at least to me anyway).
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/DCA17MR010-prelim.pdf
EuclidWell, you did not think it was moot when you brought it up as an issue in the second post from the top of this page.
Not really - If they had looked sufficiently, they'd be alive. They're not. Whether they looked back is, at this point, nothing but speculation. I would opine that the evidence shows that they did not.
Euclid charlie hebdo Where in the report does it say the 175 engineer was required to apply emergency brakes as soon as the CSX crew were seen (was that ~15seconds prior to impact)? Where does it say that would have saved their lives? Nobody can know that it would have saved their lives. But it is a fact that it could have saved their lives. Nobody can say what the odds of saving their lives would have been had an emergency application been made as early as possible. What would be a good reason not to take that chance?
1. It does not say the emergency brake could have saved their lives. The NTSB is far more expert and experienced in accident determinations than you or anyone else on here. You state that it is a fact. That is not a fact, only your opinion.
2. The NTSB did not say applying the emergency brake was required or even recommended. Yet some on here appoint themselves as experts. Nonsense.
There's another one or two disgraceful agendas at work here.
It doesn't. But if you're trying to pin the blame on someone other that the people who were fouling a ~90MPH track, with their backs to the flow of traffic, without indications of situational awareness, then such a claim becomes important.
tree68 charlie hebdo Where in the report does it say the 175 engineer was required to apply emergency brakes as soon as the CSX crew were seen (was that ~15seconds prior to impact)? Where does it say that would have saved their lives? It doesn't. But if you're trying to pin the blame on someone other that the people who were fouling a ~90MPH track, with their backs to the flow of traffic, without indications of situational awareness, then such a claim becomes important.
Yep, you nailed it.
tree68 Euclid Well, you did not think it was moot when you brought it up as an issue in the second post from the top of this page. Not really - If they had looked sufficiently, they'd be alive. They're not. Whether they looked back is, at this point, nothing but speculation. I would opine that the evidence shows that they did not.
Euclid Well, you did not think it was moot when you brought it up as an issue in the second post from the top of this page.
Obviously, they did not look back sufficiently. I never said otherwise. You say you opine that the evidence shows they did not look back. Define your terms. Do you mean never looked back at all during the walk? There is no evidence to show that.
Or do you mean never looked back when 175 was within view of their location? I agree that evidence does show that. In fact, I would say that evidence proves that.
I have said that several times in this thread. What is it that you disgree with?
EuclidObviously, they did not look back sufficiently. I never said otherwise. You say you opine that the evidence shows they did not look back. Define your terms. Do you mean never looked back at all during the walk? There is no evidence to show that. Or do you mean never looked back when 175 was within view of their location? I agree that evidence does show that. In fact, I would say that evidence proves that. I have said that several times in this thread. What is it that you disgree with?
....
Nah.
charlie hebdo1. It does not say the emergency brake could have saved their lives. The NTSB is far more expert and experienced in accident determinations than you or anyone else on here. You state that it is a fact. That is not a fact, only your opinion. 2. The NTSB did not say applying the emergency brake was required or even recommended.
2. The NTSB did not say applying the emergency brake was required or even recommended.
Common sense and logic is all that is needed to conclude that an emergency application made earlier as opposed to making it later could save lives. A person could realize their peril at any moment and escape the danger. So the more time they have to do so, the more likely they will do so. And that is all I said. It is a fact, not an opinion. I am not saying that it would have made a difference, only that it could have.
There are a lot of things that the NTSB report does not say. That does not mean that they are not a fact. The NTSB report publishes conflicting information on that very point of when the engineer of 175 made the emergency application. In one place, they say the application was made upon seeing the two men. In another place, they say it was made upon impact. The engineer said she made it upon impact. The NTSB does not necessarily turn over every stone in their investigations.
243129 Murphy Siding 243129 . I think we all kind of understand how you feel about Amtrak's training ("Poor vetting ,poor training , poor supervision, and lack of common sense coupled with inexperience and bad decisions on the parts of the CSX crew and Amtrak 175 engineer") etc. Can you walk us through this event? If you are the engineer in this situation, what is the sequence of events and what should an engineer who had 'all the right stuff' have done?-Thanks Two people walking on my track with their backs to me with a train on one side and an oncoming on the other signals disaster to me. Instantaneous emergency brake application and all the noise that I can possibly make.
Two people walking on my track with their backs to me with a train on one side and an oncoming on the other signals disaster to me. Instantaneous emergency brake application and all the noise that I can possibly make.
Euclid ............There are a lot of things that the NTSB report does not say. That does not mean that they are not a fact.......
............There are a lot of things that the NTSB report does not say. That does not mean that they are not a fact.......
charlie hebdoWhere in the report does it say the 175 engineer was required to apply emergency brakes as soon as the CSX crew were seen (was that ~15seconds prior to impact)?
Where does it say it was an option?
charlie hebdoWhere does it say that would have saved their lives?
Where does it say it would not have saved their lives?
Murphy SidingThat sounds pretty straightforward. Are you saying that Amtrak's training doesn't include what to do in such a situation?
I am not a victim of Amtrak's training regimen but when you have the unknowing teaching the unknowing it is a safe bet to say it does not include that.
charlie hebdoThere's another one or two disgraceful agendas at work here.
One of them is yours.
Again. The two CSX employees are primarily responsible for their demise. CSX is also culpable for poor training and poor supervison. The Amtrak engineer's poor judgement and lack of experience is due in large part to Amtrak's vetting and training procedures. Amtrak has people running trains who should not be running trains.
243129Where does it say it would not have saved their lives?
Given their lack of situational awareness, any slowing of 175 that did occur (which would have been minimal) would simply have delayed their demise ever so slightly.
At 85 MPH, 175 would travel 1875' in 15 seconds. Given reaction time of the engineer, and the time it took for the brakes to actually apply, the train would have travelled nearly a third of that before the brake shoes actually made contact with the wheels or disks.
Someone else can do the actual math of how much speed would come off in the remaining 1200 or so feet. Given that it's been pretty well established that a passenger train at speed will take upwards of a mile to stop, I'm guessing it's not going to have slowed much in that 1200 feet.
tree68 243129 Where does it say it would not have saved their lives? Given their lack of situational awareness, any slowing of 175 that did occur (which would have been minimal) would simply have delayed their demise ever so slightly. At 85 MPH, 175 would travel 1875' in 15 seconds. Given reaction time of the engineer, and the time it took for the brakes to actually apply, the train would have travelled nearly a third of that before the brake shoes actually made contact with the wheels or disks. Someone else can do the actual math of how much speed would come off in the remaining 1200 or so feet. Given that it's been pretty well established that a passenger train at speed will take upwards of a mile to stop, I'm guessing it's not going to have slowed much in that 1200 feet.
243129 Where does it say it would not have saved their lives?
So you "opine" that 175's engineer acted acceptably by not applying the brakes in emergency until after impact.
243129 Murphy Siding That sounds pretty straightforward. Are you saying that Amtrak's training doesn't include what to do in such a situation? I am not a victim of Amtrak's training regimen but when you have the unknowing teaching the unknowing it is a safe bet to say it does not include that.
Murphy Siding That sounds pretty straightforward. Are you saying that Amtrak's training doesn't include what to do in such a situation?
Murphy Siding Euclid ............There are a lot of things that the NTSB report does not say. That does not mean that they are not a fact....... Awe, come on man. Now you're just making up stuff on the fly to support whatever you are pushing as your truth. Once you take that stance, you can believe anything that you want to believe.
Awe, come on man. Now you're just making up stuff on the fly to support whatever you are pushing as your truth. Once you take that stance, you can believe anything that you want to believe.
You would see what I mean if you took the time to carefully read the report and the many associated documents such as the interviews with the three engineers. The report is full of ambiguous statements. It has conflicting statements. One of them is an error, and they have never corrected it. It is not subjective or debatable. It right there in written text. They say the cause was the two victims walking on the track without protection. They seem to say that protection was not available. They say they wish it was. They conclude by recommending that CSX make it avaiable. They say the two victims were not prohibited from walking on the live track, even though they say the cause was them walking on the live track without protection. The report is filled statements that can be interpreted in multiple ways. Read it a few times, and you will see what I mean.
You make the assumption that the two victims were completely without situational awareness, and never looking back. Then you asert that any extra time would have only delayed their demise. You seem to conclude that no extra time could have saved them because they were completely oblivious. Yet this only your assumed narrative. You have no way of knowing if any of that is true.
I do not know what the result of extra time would have been nor now much extra time was possible according to the physics. Neither do you.
EuclidYou make the assumption that the two victims were completely without situational awareness, and never looking back.
And you make the assumption that they "must have" been situationally aware. You make the assumption that given more time, they might have saved themselves.
The fact that that they were walking on live track, with their back to the flow of traffic, says quite plainly that they were not situationally aware. If they realized the potential implications of walking on a 90MPH track with their backs to the flow of traffic, one would think a rational person would have removed themselves from that situation. Clearly they did not. If they had, they would not have been struck.
As has been pointed out, we have no what of knowing what they were thinking. If we were, we might be able to learn why they placed themselves in harms way.
Everything else is conjecture - coulda, woulda, shoulda. Would even a first service application have been enough to allow them to save themselves? Maybe - if they saw the oncoming train. Would a full service application been enough to allow them to save themselves? Maybe, if they saw the oncoming train. Would a full-on emergency application have been enough to allow them to save themselves? Maybe, if they saw the oncoming train.
In the fifteen seconds from first sighting to impact, they never looked. They didn't see the oncoming train. They had fully fifteen seconds, even without an emergency application, to save themselves. But they never looked. They were not situationally aware.
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