tree68 243129 Are you advocating not bothering because the end result will be the same? No - I'm saying that regardless of the actions of the engineer, the results would have been the same.
243129 Are you advocating not bothering because the end result will be the same?
No - I'm saying that regardless of the actions of the engineer, the results would have been the same.
I have no way of knowing if the results would have been the same or different. It could have been either outcome. Why would you assume that only one outcome was possible?
It seems to me that you are saying exactly what Joe has asked you if you are saying.
EuclidIt seems to me that you are saying exactly what Joe has asked you if you are saying.
Nope.
I'm not advocating not taking action because it will make no difference. Physics and passenger comfort notwithstanding, there would be no reason not to make an emergency application once it became clear that such action should likely be taken.
I am also saying that in this particular circumstance, making an emergency application would likely have made no difference in the outcome.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
charlie hebdo tree68 Euclid And yet, there has been a lot of exaggeration of their alleged negligence. We have been told they required protection and acted without it, That was an option available to them. They did not use it. that they crossed over without 3-step protection, Hadn't that requirement been rescinded by EHH at that time? that they lacked common sense, I think awareness would be the better term, and as neither Amtrak engineer saw them look around, it's a pretty fair conclusion. and that they were trespassing. I believe that's been established as fact. And you think it is character assassination to question the brake response of the engineer? Beyond a certain point, yes. It was a rapidly evolving situation and none of us were sitting in that seat. And I believe that the information presented so far on stopping distance is an indication that little headway would have been taken off the train by an emergency application. The rate of decelleration is not linear. And the focus on the engineer of 175 is also an indication of another attempt to deflect blame from those who held their own fate in their hands. It's worse. Some folks are besmirching the character of the engineer on 175 who isn't here to defend herself. I think that is dishonorable at best. And they can throw a hissy fit. Who cares.? Not me. Engagement with their like is a waste.
tree68 Euclid And yet, there has been a lot of exaggeration of their alleged negligence. We have been told they required protection and acted without it, That was an option available to them. They did not use it. that they crossed over without 3-step protection, Hadn't that requirement been rescinded by EHH at that time? that they lacked common sense, I think awareness would be the better term, and as neither Amtrak engineer saw them look around, it's a pretty fair conclusion. and that they were trespassing. I believe that's been established as fact. And you think it is character assassination to question the brake response of the engineer? Beyond a certain point, yes. It was a rapidly evolving situation and none of us were sitting in that seat. And I believe that the information presented so far on stopping distance is an indication that little headway would have been taken off the train by an emergency application. The rate of decelleration is not linear. And the focus on the engineer of 175 is also an indication of another attempt to deflect blame from those who held their own fate in their hands.
Euclid And yet, there has been a lot of exaggeration of their alleged negligence. We have been told they required protection and acted without it,
That was an option available to them. They did not use it.
that they crossed over without 3-step protection,
Hadn't that requirement been rescinded by EHH at that time?
that they lacked common sense,
I think awareness would be the better term, and as neither Amtrak engineer saw them look around, it's a pretty fair conclusion.
and that they were trespassing.
I believe that's been established as fact.
And you think it is character assassination to question the brake response of the engineer?
Beyond a certain point, yes. It was a rapidly evolving situation and none of us were sitting in that seat.
And I believe that the information presented so far on stopping distance is an indication that little headway would have been taken off the train by an emergency application. The rate of decelleration is not linear.
And the focus on the engineer of 175 is also an indication of another attempt to deflect blame from those who held their own fate in their hands.
It's worse. Some folks are besmirching the character of the engineer on 175 who isn't here to defend herself. I think that is dishonorable at best. And they can throw a hissy fit. Who cares.? Not me. Engagement with their like is a waste.
So once again your snarkiness has surfaced. Like I said if you wish to engage I'll be more than happy to accommodate you. I see you are employing your dodge and run tactics again also. Don't forget Chuck you play nice I play nice. Your choice.
tree68I am also saying that in this particular circumstance, making an emergency application would likely have made no difference in the outcome.
Okay. You are saying that it is likely that making an emergency application immediately upon seeing the two victims would not have made a difference.
Your word likely means that it might have made a difference. I don't know whether it would have made a difference or not. However, in the chance that it would have made a difference, there would be a possible outcome of saving two lives. So what benefit would withholding the emergency application have that would outweigh the benefit making the emergency application, if in doing so, there was a chance of saving two lives?
It is not a rhetorical question. I want to know the answer.
Euclid I want to know the answer.
Then get out your tape measure, travel to Ivy City, and start measuring. When you have all of the exact measurements (after getting proper clearance from CSX and Amtrak), get the "tape" from the Amtrak locomotive so you know exactly how fast it was travelling as it rounded the curve north of the accident location.
When you have all of that, get out your calculator, and using the theoritical braking information, calculate exactly how much speed should have been taken off the train in the time and distance involved. Don't forget that the braking curve is not linear. The reduction of speed in fps/ps is much less at 85 than it is at 25.
Or maybe you can get DOT's test center in Colorado to duplicate the situation for you.
And while you're waiting for CSX and Amtrak to get back to you on all that, take a few minutes to watch "Sully," particularly the hearing at the end where they take the simulations from theoretical to real.
Don't forget your checkbook.
In the meantime, consider this timeline: Engineer sees reflective vests near track. Instantly (3/4 second) recognizes it is two railroaders walking in the "kill zone." Reaches for brake handle and pushes it to Emergency (1-2 seconds). Brakes take 2-3 seconds to fully apply throughout train. Decelleration begins.
In that four to six seconds the train has travelled 500 to 750 feet, with no decrease in speed.
Now let's look at reality: Engineer spots employees possibly on track. "Is that someone on the tracks?" Confirms it is, Begins braking. We've now added several seconds to the overall reaction - at 125 feet per second.
And don't forget blowing the horn during this time. And while the power will dump if the train goes into emergency, the engineer taking the throttle to idle may also occur - and the engineer only has two hands.
While there is the possibility that the crewmen may have been alerted if they heard 175 dumping the brakes - remember that there were also two horns blowing - it's entirely possible they still would not have been alerted to the oncoming train behind them. IMHO, an extra second or three would simply have slightly delayed the impact.
Unless they were keeping an eye out behind them, like they should have been doing, in which case we wouldn't be having this discussion.
tree68 Euclid I want to know the answer. Then get out your tape measure, travel to Ivy City, and start measuring. When you have all of the exact measurements (after getting proper clearance from CSX and Amtrak), get the "tape" from the Amtrak locomotive so you know exactly how fast it was travelling as it rounded the curve north of the accident location. When you have all of that, get out your calculator, and using the theoritical braking information, ...
When you have all of that, get out your calculator, and using the theoritical braking information, ...
That is not the question that I asked you to answer. In the my previous post, I said this:
"Okay. You are saying that it is likely that making an emergency application immediately upon seeing the two victims would not have made a difference.
It is not a rhetorical question. I want to know the answer."
The part in bold text is the question that I asked you to answer. It is a simple question that does not require tape measures and calculators. Your long explanation of how I should seek answers to a question of stopping distance, etc. will not answer the question I am asking you to answer. I have already sorted though all of those details in a post on the previous page. I concluded that there was no way to answer that question.
The question I am asking you is this:
So what benefit would withholding the emergency application have that would outweigh the benefit making the emergency application, if in doing so, there was a chance of saving two lives?
What is the responsibility of an engineer once he/she realizes impact with a vehicle, person, or another train is unavoidable?
Can he/she decide to not take emergency action based on their conclusion that it would not make any difference?
EuclidSo what benefit would withholding the emergency application have that would outweigh the benefit making the emergency application, if in doing so, there was a chance of saving two lives?
Given the circumstances - withholding the emergency application would have had the same effect as making the emergency application.
As I noted (and as reported in the incident report), the two CSX crew members never looked back. Had they at least maintained sufficient situational awareness, then perhaps a second or three might have given them a fighting chance.
But they weren't paying attention. Even if the train had slowed to 45 MPH at the point of impact, it may well have killed them, or at least seriously injured them. And they still wouldn't have known what hit them.
So, the answer to your question is (and you must include both parts of this answer): There was no benefit to withholding the emergency application in this incident. Nor was there any benefit to making an emergency application in this incident.
By all indications, the two crew members never knew what hit them. No action by the engineer of 175, other than figuring out how to stop the train in a quarter mile or less, would have changed the outcome.
The only operating condition where trains are operated on a line of sight basis is restricted speed. Operating on Signal Indication at track speed, trains cannot be stopped within their range of vision.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
AnthonyV What is the responsibility of an engineer once he/she realizes impact with a vehicle, person, or another train is unavoidable?
AnthonyVCan he/she decide to not take emergency action based on their conclusion that it would not make any difference?
Once the situation has passed the point of no return, the best action to take is whatever action will prevent the lawyers from nipping at your heels.
zardoz AnthonyV What is the responsibility of an engineer once he/she realizes impact with a vehicle, person, or another train is unavoidable? If on passenger, then just dump the air (less distance for the crew to walk back);if on freight, then bring the train to a stop as quickly as safe train-handling will permit. AnthonyV Can he/she decide to not take emergency action based on their conclusion that it would not make any difference? From a practical standpoint, yes, especially on freight; however, from a legal standpoint, then no. Someone with railroad experience will understand, most others would not ("Surely there must have been SOMETHING you could have done!!!"). Once the situation has passed the point of no return, the best action to take is whatever action will prevent the lawyers from nipping at your heels.
If on passenger, then just dump the air (less distance for the crew to walk back);if on freight, then bring the train to a stop as quickly as safe train-handling will permit.
AnthonyV Can he/she decide to not take emergency action based on their conclusion that it would not make any difference?
From a practical standpoint, yes, especially on freight; however, from a legal standpoint, then no. Someone with railroad experience will understand, most others would not ("Surely there must have been SOMETHING you could have done!!!").
Johnny
tree68 Euclid So what benefit would withholding the emergency application have that would outweigh the benefit making the emergency application, if in doing so, there was a chance of saving two lives? Given the circumstances - withholding the emergency application would have had the same effect as making the emergency application. As I noted (and as reported in the incident report), the two CSX crew members never looked back. Had they at least maintained sufficient situational awareness, then perhaps a second or three might have given them a fighting chance. But they weren't paying attention. Even if the train had slowed to 45 MPH at the point of impact, it may well have killed them, or at least seriously injured them. And they still wouldn't have known what hit them. So, the answer to your question is (and you must include both parts of this answer): There was no benefit to withholding the emergency application in this incident. Nor was there any benefit to making an emergency application in this incident. By all indications, the two crew members never knew what hit them. No action by the engineer of 175, other than figuring out how to stop the train in a quarter mile or less, would have changed the outcome.
Euclid So what benefit would withholding the emergency application have that would outweigh the benefit making the emergency application, if in doing so, there was a chance of saving two lives?
In the second post from the top of this page, you said this:
“I am also saying that in this particular circumstance, making an emergency application would likely have made no difference in the outcome.”
Now you say this:
“Given the circumstances - withholding the emergency application would have had the same effect as making the emergency application.”
Which way is it? In the first statement, you used the phrase, “likely made no difference.”
In the second statement, you changed that to, “would have had the same effect…”
Your two statements have two different meanings.
Regarding the second statement: A couple posts up, you suggested that I gather all the technical information to determine if how much longer (if any longer) the approach to impact would have been had the engineer made the emergency application upon first seeing the men on the track. Neither one of us have that technical information, so how can you say that making the emergency application earlier would have made no difference in the length of the approach to impact?
Or are you concluding that even if the early application yielded more time, it would not have made any difference? It sounds like you are concluding that to have been the case based on your comment that the two victims “never looked back.” By that, you seem to imply that they would not have looked back even with more time because they never looked back during their entire walk.
Of course, you have no way of knowing that. All we know is they never looked back during the final approach to impact. If they had walked 40 miles across the desert without ever looking back, then it might be reasonable to assume they would not look back during the last 15 seconds of their walk. But for all you know they looked back 20 times during their entire walk, and then forgot to look back as their attention was drawn to #66 coming at them. In that circumstance, they could have easily remembered to look back any moment during that final 15 seconds. So I don’t see how you can rule out that possibility. You have no evidence for that contention.
The CSX Employees demonstrated lack of situational awareness was responsible for their deaths. Nothing else.
BaltACD The CSX Employees demonstrated lack of situational awareness was responsible for their deaths. Nothing else.
It seems that's what the report says. To hoist some blame or responsibility on anyone else seems motivated by another agenda. The obsessive hair splitting over words and attacks on the engineer have driven this thread into the ditch.
charlie hebdoIt seems that's what the report says. To hoist some blame or responsibility on anyone else seems motivated by another agenda. The obsessive hair splitting over words and attacks on the engineer have driven this thread into the ditch.
Amen. It seems that some like dogs, enjoy chasing thier tails. Quit.
So you advocate not activating the emergency brake because this situation was hopeless?
175's engineer showed poor judgement and that fact will be borne out in the ensuing lawsuits. Her convoluted and sometimes indecipherable testimony coupled with her lack of experience will attest to that fact. As I stated previously a 'perfect storm' of events led to this tragedy.
AnthonyV What is the responsibility of an engineer once he/she realizes impact with a vehicle, person, or another train is unavoidable? Can he/she decide to not take emergency action based on their conclusion that it would not make any difference?
If it is a vehicle or person, the engineer will never know if impact is unavoidable unless the train is so close that impact is almost certain. In that case, there is no choice to make regarding when to make an emergency application because impact is only a second away.
Based on free will, an engineer can decide to not make an emergency application based on a conclusion that it would not make any difference. However, the engineer has no logical way to arrive at the conclusion that an emergency application would make no difference. Experts would never advise that it is okay to assume that an emergency application may be withheld because of a belief that it will not make any difference.
Euclid However, the engineer has no logical way to arrive at the conclusion that an emergeny application would make no difference. Experts would never advise that it is okay to assume that an emergeny application may be withheld because of a belief that it will not make any difference.
Precisely.
You two may find yourselves tied up in some civil legal proceedings. Good luck with that.
Electroliner 1935 charlie hebdo It seems that's what the report says. To hoist some blame or responsibility on anyone else seems motivated by another agenda. The obsessive hair splitting over words and attacks on the engineer have driven this thread into the ditch. Amen. It seems that some like dogs, enjoy chasing thier tails. Quit.
charlie hebdo It seems that's what the report says. To hoist some blame or responsibility on anyone else seems motivated by another agenda. The obsessive hair splitting over words and attacks on the engineer have driven this thread into the ditch.
Or like a dog returning to its vomit. A nasty bunch, especially attacking a fellow engineer. Very bad, especially since lawsuits (which he welcomes maybe) are likely.
Bucky is once again trying to get a black and white answer to a question that has no black and white answer.
If this, then that.
There are dozens of variables at play here, too many to list, but many already mentioned. Each has an effect on the final decision. Second guessing is all we can do as we were not there at the moment the incident occurred.
243129 charlie hebdo It seems that's what the report says. To hoist some blame or responsibility on anyone else seems motivated by another agenda. The obsessive hair splitting over words and attacks on the engineer have driven this thread into the ditch. So you advocate not activating the emergency brake because this situation was hopeless? 175's engineer showed poor judgement and that fact will be borne out in the ensuing lawsuits. Her convoluted and sometimes indecipherable testimony coupled with her lack of experience will attest to that fact. As I stated previously a 'perfect storm' of events led to this tragedy.
So charlie,again I ask/confront you with a question and again you run/ ignore as is your M.O.
Are you just content to snipe from the sidelines because you have nothing of substance to offer on the subject matter?
That being said, do you condone not activating the emergency brake because this situation was hopeless?
Euclid AnthonyV What is the responsibility of an engineer once he/she realizes impact with a vehicle, person, or another train is unavoidable? Can he/she decide to not take emergency action based on their conclusion that it would not make any difference? If it is a vehicle or person, the engineer will never know if impact is unavoidable unless the train is so close that impact is almost certain. In that case, there is no choice to make regarding when to make an emergency application because impact is only a second away. Based on free will, an engineer can decide to not make an emergency application based on a conclusion that it would not make any difference. However, the engineer has no logical way to arrive at the conclusion that an emergency application would make no difference. Experts would never advise that it is okay to assume that an emergency application may be withheld because of a belief that it will not make any difference.
I can receive but not reply to your PM. However I will take your counsel under consideration.
Overmod Euclid So what to do? Their decision does not seem that irresponsible to me. They were not required to have protection to foul the Amtrak track. Their engineer said he did not how to acquire protection if they desired. They were not prohibited from walking on the Amtrak track by rule or trespassing law... Except that ES23 required them to 'ensure protection' if more than 4' from a rail ... and that's any rail. It also requires them to KEEP looking in the direction a train could be expected to come from, and I don't think either train was running 'wrong main' at the point of impact. The general equivalent to NS rule 21(a) (which is like the old Southern Rule M) and 21(c)(6) which calls for vigilant lookout at ALL times, is in GS10 (the language includes 'be alert for and keep clear of', which they manifestly did not, did not, did not do, and no 'confusion' excused them from doing so)
Euclid So what to do? Their decision does not seem that irresponsible to me. They were not required to have protection to foul the Amtrak track. Their engineer said he did not how to acquire protection if they desired. They were not prohibited from walking on the Amtrak track by rule or trespassing law...
Except that ES23 required them to 'ensure protection' if more than 4' from a rail ... and that's any rail. It also requires them to KEEP looking in the direction a train could be expected to come from, and I don't think either train was running 'wrong main' at the point of impact. The general equivalent to NS rule 21(a) (which is like the old Southern Rule M) and 21(c)(6) which calls for vigilant lookout at ALL times, is in GS10 (the language includes 'be alert for and keep clear of', which they manifestly did not, did not, did not do, and no 'confusion' excused them from doing so)
Overmod,
What is ES23, and how would it have applied to this accident?
I am not excusing the victims for not paying attention. I am exploring the reasons why they did not pay attention. I see a particular pattern scenario in which employees are unusually prone to forgetting to pay attention. You cannot pay attention if you are not aware of the fact that you are not paying attention. But of course, if there is a rule that requires paying attention, and a person forgets to pay attention, that person has violated the rule with no excuses possible.
But I am just interested in analyzing a scenario in which employees are unusually prone to forgetting to pay attention. I think it is an extremely dangerous anomaly rooted in a certain set of circumstances, and the mechanics are mostly unrecognized. I am referring to the danger of two trains converging and their simultaneous warnings sounding like one train instead of two.
I have never seen a railroad rule or other form of regulation that specifically recognizes this unique danger. Instead, they cover it obliquely by saying something like, “Always be alert to danger.” This is adequate if the objective is to blame the correct person for the error. But a more useful objective would be to train people in how to avoid this type of error. If there is an obvious rule violation that seems to often occur almost as a trap with resulting death or injury, it is time to ask why. "Always be alert to danger" is easy. It goes without saying. Who doesn't think they are always alert to danger?
The closest that the industry gets to recognizing this unique danger is their recognition of the fact that drivers are often inclined to driving onto a grade crossing after a train clears, and then driving directly into the path of a second train on a parallel track. There is a thought process that the train has cleared and it is safe. They see the lights still flashing but, they dismiss that as just a leftover remnant of the operation. It is the clearing of the train that they “take to the bank” as assurance that the crossing is clear. They were waiting for one train and it has passed. The last thing they expect is another train right then and there. They are caught off guard. But while it is common to warn of this scenario of danger, I have never heard mention of the convergence of two trains on a person on the ground.
When people are properly wary of the possibility of an approaching train, they naturally think of one train. Thus, the next train to arrive validates and fulfills the need to be wary. So they naturally let their guard down. Also, the approach of the first train absorbs their attention. So together they suddenly have less sense of a need for caution and less attention to devote to caution. Then to make matters worse, the sudden loss of these protective faculties can also go completely unnoticed. Inherently, a person who is not paying attention is not aware of that fact.
ES 23 is one of the CSX 'safety' rules.
Every railroad has a provision in its rules like the old Southern rule M: "Expect a train on any track at any time". There is no exception for distraction, or weather, or orders of protection. ANY time. (Training that isn't going to be done by adding rules enforced with 'brownie' discipline, and finding effective ways is going to be a large part of proper response to this accident and some others like it.)
Overmod Except that ES23 required them to 'ensure protection' if more than 4' from a rail ... and that's any rail. It also requires them to KEEP looking in the direction a train could be expected to come from, and I don't think either train was running 'wrong main' at the point of impact. The general equivalent to NS rule 21(a) (which is like the old Southern Rule M) and 21(c)(6) which calls for vigilant lookout at ALL times, is in GS10 (the language includes 'be alert for and keep clear of', which they manifestly did not, did not, did not do, and no 'confusion' excused them from doing so)
I understand your point about ES23 requiring what is stated in CSX rule GS10 about the requirement to be alert for trains. But what I am wondering about is your mention of ES23 requiring employees to ensure protection if more than 4’ from a rail. Can you provide the full statement about that requirement as it appears in ES23 or in GS10? I don’t recall seeing anything like that in CSX Rule GS10, but I might have missed it.
Euclid... what I am wondering about is your mention of ES23 requiring employees to ensure protection if more than 4’ from a rail. Can you provide the full statement about that requirement as it appears in ES23 or in GS10?
See if you can get someone to provide you a current copy of the CSXT Safe Way. The copy I have is from 2012, and a PDF copy can be downloaded here.
My notes indicated that the requirement to ensure protection inside 4' (in other words, less than rather than more than four feet from a rail) was in ES23 (Section 2, "Engineering Department Safety Rules", page 6 of 6). These are MOW-centric rules, as you might expect. I recall the note about the 4' from rail being (a), "Ensure On-Track Worker Protection is in place when working within four feet of the nearest rail of any track", right ahead of "When observing passing trains or equipment always look in the direction from which the train or equipment is coming".
What this suggests as an approach to 'patch' CSX procedures might include:
1) Formalize the methods used to invoke 'On-Track Worker Protection' so they can be used by any worker, at any time, not just 'engineering' or MOW people;
2) Put this language about a 4' approach into GS as well as ES safety regulations and training, so that all workers understand they have a 'right' to protection when within 4' of any rail -- CSX, Amtrak, or other -- and their railroad's procedure is a 'gateway' to get that protection and then be able to check on or receive updates about it without "confusion".
(I am still looking for where the 4' comes from -- it might be a 'long metre' in conversion. The same 4' is specifically mentioned for arc flash and 480V exposure elsewhere in the Safe Way regulations.)
Of course this is contingent on what changes might have been made to Safe Way or associated training after Hunter's accession in 2017 and perhaps yet again more recently. I am looking forward with some interest (albeit with popcorn ready to hand) to see what NTSB recommmendations filtered through the lens of CSX policy-making actually produce as new Safe Way rule changes.
Overmod(I am still looking for where the 4' comes from -- it might be a 'long metre' in conversion.
It may just be a practical measurement. Most railcars widths are in the 10' 6" to 10' 8" range. The rails are 4' 8.5", leaving three feet of overhang on each side. Add a one foot "cushion" for safety's sake.
Dangling material (chains, straps, overwidth cargo) can take up that foot in no time. You don't want to get hit by steel strapping flapping off the side of a freight doing 50. The outcome will not be good. And you can't discount swaying cars.
The "rule of thumb" I've heard is that if the tips of your fingers, extended arms-length toward the rail, are over the rail, you are in the "kill zone."
tree68The "rule of thumb" I've heard is that if the tips of your fingers, extended arms-length toward the rail, are over the rail, you are in the "kill zone."
I'd revise that to 'if the tips of your fingers are over the ends of the ties' you are in the kill zone. At that distance you are going to be where you can be struck - if not killed then severely injured.
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