charlie hebdoAccording to the event recorder and the engineer interview, the Amtrak engineer responded immediately and applied emergency braking upon seeing the CSX employees walking near the tracks."
This being contradicted explicitly both by the actual event-recorder download and the actual text of the engineer interview in the docket.
Unless you embrace sophistry and interpret the sentence "the Amtrak engineer responded quickly with an increasing partial brake application, and applied emergency braking upon hitting the CSX employees walking near the tracks," which is what the record substantiates. I cannot believe this sentence construction is not intentional, although I refuse to speculate on the reason(s) for it.
EuclidThe proper horn signal in this type of emergency is a series of short horn blasts. This would have made it much more likely for the victims to be able to notice that there were two horns at work. With a series of short blasts, it would not be possible for the two signals to perfectly match their timing. If the horn signals failed match timing, it would have been more noticeable that there were two horns instead of one. That would be the most beneficial horn warning effect. It is exactly opposite of the effect of both engineers “laying on the horn.” Nevertheless, both engineers laid on the horn as though they believed more horn is better. Actually, if the engineer of #66 never blew the horn, I am certain that the two conductors would have realized the horn they were hearing was behind them.
It's similar to when you see animals on the tracks, expecially deer. The normal reaction is to "lay on the horn" in the hope of scaring them away. But a deer-in-the-headlights situation requires not only to do short blasts, but also to dim or extinguish the headlight at the same time--something that takes a bit of practice to do in a 'panic'.
Being able to ascertain in an instant regarding the proper action to take is a talent that improves with experience.
In the interview, the engineer said she applied emergency braking immediately upon striking the two conductors. She first saw the two men about 10-15 seconds earlier and did not apply emergency braking during that approach time frame.
In the interview, she said she expects people to normally move out of the way before being struck. An engineer who expects that, and relies on that expectation will not make an emergency application until they strike the person (or vehicle).
This avoids the chance of going into emergency for a reason that goes away before impact, and thus renders the emergency application to have been made for no reason. The reasoning by these engineers is often that they could not have stopped short of the collision even if they did make the emergency application as soon is the fouling was spotted. This of course, is flawed logic.
Job opening for our self announced experts
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Balt, the announcement showed up in my email, but not on the Trains site. I hope all of our self-appointed experts apply for this position, so they will have authority behind their statements.
Johnny
DeggestyBalt, the announcement showed up in my email, but not on the Trains site. I hope all of our self-appointed experts apply for this position, so they will have authority behind their statements.
I got it from the banner ad that displays on the Trains Forum page when I call up the forum.
Overmod charlie hebdo According to the event recorder and the engineer interview, the Amtrak engineer responded immediately and applied emergency braking upon seeing the CSX employees walking near the tracks." This being contradicted explicitly both by the actual event-recorder download and the actual text of the engineer interview in the docket. Unless you embrace sophistry and interpret the sentence "the Amtrak engineer responded quickly with an increasing partial brake application, and applied emergency braking upon hitting the CSX employees walking near the tracks," which is what the record substantiates. I cannot believe this sentence construction is not intentional, although I refuse to speculate on the reason(s) for it.
charlie hebdo According to the event recorder and the engineer interview, the Amtrak engineer responded immediately and applied emergency braking upon seeing the CSX employees walking near the tracks."
I was only posting the paragraphs to which he referred for clarity.
My opinion is that no one, railroad workers or public, should ever walk on a busy, 95mph track without permission being obtained.
zardoz Euclid The proper horn signal in this type of emergency is a series of short horn blasts. This would have made it much more likely for the victims to be able to notice that there were two horns at work. With a series of short blasts, it would not be possible for the two signals to perfectly match their timing. If the horn signals failed match timing, it would have been more noticeable that there were two horns instead of one. That would be the most beneficial horn warning effect. It is exactly opposite of the effect of both engineers “laying on the horn.” Nevertheless, both engineers laid on the horn as though they believed more horn is better. Actually, if the engineer of #66 never blew the horn, I am certain that the two conductors would have realized the horn they were hearing was behind them. Presuming that the sequence of events you mention is correct (I don't want to reread the report), I am wondering if the Engineers of both trains could see each other prior to impact. If yes, then what you say is correct; if not, then without knowing of the conflicting movement, there might be a tendency to "lay on the horn" (a panic reaction) instead of doing short blasts. It's similar to when you see animals on the tracks, expecially deer. The normal reaction is to "lay on the horn" in the hope of scaring them away. But a deer-in-the-headlights situation requires not only to do short blasts, but also to dim or extinguish the headlight at the same time--something that takes a bit of practice to do in a 'panic'. Being able to ascertain in an instant regarding the proper action to take is a talent that improves with experience.
Euclid The proper horn signal in this type of emergency is a series of short horn blasts. This would have made it much more likely for the victims to be able to notice that there were two horns at work. With a series of short blasts, it would not be possible for the two signals to perfectly match their timing. If the horn signals failed match timing, it would have been more noticeable that there were two horns instead of one. That would be the most beneficial horn warning effect. It is exactly opposite of the effect of both engineers “laying on the horn.” Nevertheless, both engineers laid on the horn as though they believed more horn is better. Actually, if the engineer of #66 never blew the horn, I am certain that the two conductors would have realized the horn they were hearing was behind them.
Presuming that the sequence of events you mention is correct (I don't want to reread the report), I am wondering if the Engineers of both trains could see each other prior to impact. If yes, then what you say is correct; if not, then without knowing of the conflicting movement, there might be a tendency to "lay on the horn" (a panic reaction) instead of doing short blasts.
Zardoz,
Most of the details come from the interviews of the engineers of #66 and #175. Although it is somewhat difficult to assimilate because the interview testimony is so cryptic with unfinished sentences that might be enough in a direct conversation.
I have read both interviews, but now I am just going by memory. I may go back and review them again. Generally, it seems that both trains passed each other almost at the exact location of the two conductors. The engineer of #66 said he witnessed the two conductors being struck by #175, so he had to be short of the actual passing point when they were struck in order to see that. I get the impression that he may have been less that 50 ft. away from the two conductors when they were struck. He said he saw it clearly, wereas the engineer of #175 was not able to see as much, if anything.
Both engineers said they saw the two victims, seemingly for their whole view range, prior to #175 striking them. The victims were wearing green safety vests and carrying lanterns. The two engineers seemed differ in their conclusions of where the two conductors were walking. One said they were walking on the outside ends of the ties, while the other said they were walking inside of the gage.
In looking at the event recorder report for the locomotive of #175, it appears that the engineer blew the horn continuously from the time the locomotive rounded the curve and had a clear view of the conductors until the train hit them. This would have been approx. 10-15 seconds based on the train speed which was 74 mph.
As I recall, the engineer of #66 also said that he laid on the horn in a similar sequence of approach and speed as #175. So basically, both engineers had a clear view of the opposing train and of the two conductors for the entire visual range of approach.
It is obvious that had they not been on the track, they would not have been hit. But the accident raises other questions and issues that are not so obvious. In an accident like this, investigators will look at anything that could have prevented it, and not just stop looking after the simplest and most obvious cause is found.
Two trains sounding like one and thus having the danger warning of the horn negated just when it is needed most is not obvious at all. Even when clearly explained I doubt that many people make the effort to grasp the concept in a way that they can relate to that experience. I don’t think that the three engineers understood that element. Surprisingly, the NTSB understood it perfectly and described it as well as it has ever been described.
I can understand the two conductors walking on the Amtrak side if there was a water-filled ditch on the non-Amtrak side. But what I can’t understand is why they walked on the ends of the ties rather than on the ballast between the Amtrak track and the CSX track. The concrete tie ends on the Amtrak track slope downward as they extend out from the rail. It looks like maybe a 10 degree slope. Aside from the train danger, why would anyone choose to walk on the sloping ties rather than on the flat crushed rock ballast? It makes me wonder if there is more to the explanation of what happened.
Consider this possible scenario: They were walking on the ballast in the clear between the two tracks. Then when they saw #66 approaching, they could not be sure which track it was on, and if it was on the track nearest the CSX track, they did not want to be in that narrow space between the CSX train and #66. Maybe it appeared to them that #66 was on the track nearest CSX, and so they suddenly made a snap decision to run across both Amtrak tracks in front of #66 in order to get in the clear with more space on the south side of the two Amtrak tracks. In the panic of that dash, they forgot to look east to see #175 approaching.
EuclidMost of the details come from the interviews of the engineers of #66 and #175. Although it is somewhat difficult to assimilate because the interview testimony is so cryptic with unfinished sentences that might be enough in a direct conversation. I have read both interviews, but now I am just going by memory. I may go back and review them again. Generally, it seems that both trains passed each other almost at the exact location of the two conductors. The engineer of #66 said he witnessed the two conductors being struck by #175, so he had to be short of the actual passing point when they were struck in order to see that.
Geez, the visual and emotional intensity is bad enough when you're about to stike a car or a pedestrian; at least the actual impact is hidden from view by the nose of the locomotive (although sometimes you have to go under the locomotive and extract body parts for the Coroner). But the poor Engineer of #66--he got to see everything close-up. I bet his memories of the event will never fade.
Lithonia Operator 243129 A perfect storm of events created this tragedy. Poor vetting ,poor training , poor supervision, and lack of common sense coupled with inexperience and bad decisions on the parts of the CSX crew and Amtrak 175 engineer. CSX and Amtrak also bear responsibility for this tragedy What did the engineer of Amtrak #175 do wrong?
243129 A perfect storm of events created this tragedy. Poor vetting ,poor training , poor supervision, and lack of common sense coupled with inexperience and bad decisions on the parts of the CSX crew and Amtrak 175 engineer. CSX and Amtrak also bear responsibility for this tragedy
A perfect storm of events created this tragedy. Poor vetting ,poor training , poor supervision, and lack of common sense coupled with inexperience and bad decisions on the parts of the CSX crew and Amtrak 175 engineer. CSX and Amtrak also bear responsibility for this tragedy
What did the engineer of Amtrak #175 do wrong?
Read her testimony here and if you have any operations knowledge her errors will be self evident. If you were not employed in railroad operations I will be happy to explain. Here is a preview:
"When I start seeing them, I start inching to full service.
Q. Okay. I'm just taking some notes here, just what you said. So you said you were in suppression when you saw them. And then you started inching towards full service --
A. Yes.
Q. -- after seeing them and blowing the horn simultaneously.
Q. And did you ever place your train in emergency?
Q. And did -- when did you do that?
A. Once I struck"
The full interview:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=470819&docketID=62103&mkey=95451
243129 Lithonia Operator 243129 A perfect storm of events created this tragedy. Poor vetting ,poor training , poor supervision, and lack of common sense coupled with inexperience and bad decisions on the parts of the CSX crew and Amtrak 175 engineer. CSX and Amtrak also bear responsibility for this tragedy What did the engineer of Amtrak #175 do wrong? Read her testimony here and if you have any operations knowledge her errors will be self evident. If you were not employed in railroad operations I will be happy to explain. Here is a preview: "When I start seeing them, I start inching to full service. Q. Okay. I'm just taking some notes here, just what you said. So you said you were in suppression when you saw them. And then you started inching towards full service -- A. Yes. Q. -- after seeing them and blowing the horn simultaneously. A. Yes. Q. And did you ever place your train in emergency? A. Yes. Q. And did -- when did you do that? A. Once I struck" The full interview: https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/document.cfm?docID=470819&docketID=62103&mkey=95451
The way I read her testimony, she had the workers in sight for 15 or 20 seconds. She saw that they wore reflective vests so it was unlikely they were ordinary trespassers. She saw them make no attempt to move out of the way or even turn their heads. Yet, other than braking for the next signal, she did nothing except blow her horn until impact.
I'm not an engineer and I wasn't in her shoes, but I hope I would have starting some hard braking once I observed what she said she observed.
Yes 243129, I would like to hear what you have to say.
Thanks.
AnthonyVYet, other than braking for the next signal, she did nothing except blow her horn until impact. I'm not an engineer and I wasn't in her shoes, but I hope I would have starting some hard braking once I observed what she said she observed.
1) you need to read through the thread, where this is discussed in some detail; it should be noted there was no way, even at full emergency, that 175 could be stopped or even have particular way off the train. The argument for emergency, other than sentiment, is that it might have provided the few milliseconds of additional time before impact necessary for at least one of the conductors to realize the danger and leap aside enough to avoid impact.
2) you need to carefully read the actual transcript. Sahara said she did more than 'nothing', in fact said she went to some pains (I thought excessive) to run slowly, more slowly than the requirements for restricted speed, when she knew workers would be present; she had a different conception of what measures to take when surprised by finding people on the track -- the engineer of 66 said in his interview they were not on the ends of the ties but actually walking in the gauge (i.e. not in the limits of the loading gage but actually between the rails). Even in the fragment Joe quoted, you will note that she started 'inching toward full service' as a separate action from reducing speed for the signal change.
In addition she vastly overestimated the actual time she could possibly have had to see and react to the situation; this too is discussed in the interview record and 'put together' by the NTSB.
Thanks Overmod. I was just sloppy. I originally took her comments to mean she was braking for the approach limited and inched toward full service as she saw the workers. It is obvious to me now (as you point out) she inched toward full service because she saw the workers, and as she got closer to them.
Because they were walking between the rails, and because they obviously did not realize that some of the horn noise was from #175, it seems impossible that the delay in impact that would have resulted from putting her train in emergency would have made any difference.
In my view, the blame for this very sad tragedy lies solely on the two CSX conductors. They were acting in an extremely unsafe manner, in contravention of simple common sense.
Sometimes in life there is no one to blame but yourself.
I think of #175’s engineer as a victim in this situation. Fault or not, she will have to relive this for the rest of her life. I feel bad for her.
Lithonia OperatorIn my view, the blame for this very sad tragedy lies solely on the two CSX conductors. They were acting in an extremely unsafe manner, in contravention of simple common sense.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Lithonia Operator Because they were walking between the rails, and because they obviously did not realize that some of the horn noise was from #175, it seems impossible that the delay in impact that would have resulted from putting her train in emergency would have made any difference. In my view, the blame for this very sad tragedy lies solely on the two CSX conductors. They were acting in an extremely unsafe manner, in contravention of simple common sense. Sometimes in life there is no one to blame but yourself. I think of #175’s engineer as a victim in this situation. Fault or not, she will have to relive this for the rest of her life. I feel bad for her.
The engineer of #175 had the best view and she claims they were walking outside of the rails on the ends of the ties.
It conceivable to me that because both trains passed the point of impact at about the same time, slowing #175 and delaying its arrival at the eventual point of impact might have allowed the conductors to realize there is train behind them by #175's light and horn.
The distance from coming out of the curve to point of impact is in the range of 1,500-1,800 ft. As a hypothetical, if the engineer placed the train in emergency say 1,500 ft away from the conductors doing 90 mph, what reduction in speed could we expect?
By putting the train to emergency you afford the victims a chance albeit a very slight chance. By not putting the train in emergency you take away any chance.
I just read the interview with Ms. Reece. She does make it clear that, in fact, the CSX conductors were not between the rails, but rather on the tie ends. But still, I don’t think that anything Ms. Reece could have done in those few seconds would have made any difference. None of this is on her head.
Lithonia Operator I just read the interview with Ms. Reece. She does make it clear that, in fact, the CSX conductors were not between the rails, but rather on the tie ends. But still, I don’t think that anything Ms. Reece could have done in those few seconds would have made any difference. None of this is on her head.
What would be a better use of those few seconds than taking a chance that they could save two lives? What was there to lose? What is the emgency application for?
AnthonyVThe distance from coming out of the curve to point of impact is in the range of 1,500-1,800 ft. As a hypothetical, if the engineer placed the train in emergency say 1,500 ft away from the conductors doing 90 mph, what reduction in speed could we expect?
An emergency application would take a second or two to propigate, then another second or two for full retardation to begin (so far the train has travelled about 525')--roughly 1/3 the stated distance. That still leaves five+ seconds for the speed to begin to reduce. If they were indeed walking on the outside of the rail, then a split-second might have been all they needed.
However, as I am unfamiliar with the braking characteristics of Amtrak trains, I will reserve speculation regarding whether the braking would have been sufficient to grant them that needed split-second.
EuclidWhat would be a better use of those few seconds than taking a chance that they could save two lives? What was there to lose? What is the emgency application for?
Monday morning quarterbacking is so easy.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
zugmann Euclid What would be a better use of those few seconds than taking a chance that they could save two lives? What was there to lose? What is the emgency application for? Monday morning quarterbacking is so easy.
Euclid What would be a better use of those few seconds than taking a chance that they could save two lives? What was there to lose? What is the emgency application for?
The horse is still dead and so are the CSX employees who were walking in the foul of Amtrak - any way you look at it.
zardoz AnthonyV The distance from coming out of the curve to point of impact is in the range of 1,500-1,800 ft. As a hypothetical, if the engineer placed the train in emergency say 1,500 ft away from the conductors doing 90 mph, what reduction in speed could we expect? 90mph=132fps. If we accept your numbers, there was approximately 12-15 seconds from first sighting until impact. An emergency application would take a second or two to propigate, then another second or two for full retardation to begin (so far the train has travelled about 525')--roughly 1/3 the stated distance. That still leaves five+ seconds for the speed to begin to reduce. If they were indeed walking on the outside of the rail, then a split-second might have been all they needed. However, as I am unfamiliar with the braking characteristics of Amtrak trains, I will reserve speculation regarding whether the braking would have been sufficient to grant them that needed split-second.
AnthonyV The distance from coming out of the curve to point of impact is in the range of 1,500-1,800 ft. As a hypothetical, if the engineer placed the train in emergency say 1,500 ft away from the conductors doing 90 mph, what reduction in speed could we expect?
90mph=132fps. If we accept your numbers, there was approximately 12-15 seconds from first sighting until impact.
Thanks zardoz.
For the record, I estimated the distance using Google Earth. One point was the impact point and the other point was the end of the curve. The impact location is indicated in the NTSB report and appears to be somewhat aligned with the right (east?) end of the Amtrak maintenance building. This distance along the tracks from the impact point to the end of the curve was calculated to be 0.35 miles or 1,848 ft. I decreased it to 1,500 to 1,800 ft to be conservative.
I just chose the 90 mph as a hypothetical. I don't know her speed coming out of the curve but I think her train struck the conductors at about 75 mph, so I just assumed it was 90 since she was braking at varying degrees the whole time.
As I have said before, I am not a railroad engineer and I have no idea what I would have done if I was in her shoes.
But, it is Monday morning quarterbacking in situations like these that have led to all the safety improvements we enjoy today.
AnthonyVBut, it is Monday morning quarterbacking in situations like these that have led to all the safety improvements we enjoy today.
If we talk about the situation and how to improve it from here going out - not get fixated on the actions of the individuals involved.
Overmod AnthonyV Yet, other than braking for the next signal, she did nothing except blow her horn until impact. I'm not an engineer and I wasn't in her shoes, but I hope I would have starting some hard braking once I observed what she said she observed. 1) you need to read through the thread, where this is discussed in some detail; it should be noted there was no way, even at full emergency, that 175 could be stopped or even have particular way off the train. The argument for emergency, other than sentiment, is that it might have provided the few milliseconds of additional time before impact necessary for at least one of the conductors to realize the danger and leap aside enough to avoid impact. 2) you need to carefully read the actual transcript. Sahara said she did more than 'nothing', in fact said she went to some pains (I thought excessive) to run slowly, more slowly than the requirements for restricted speed, when she knew workers would be present; she had a different conception of what measures to take when surprised by finding people on the track -- the engineer of 66 said in his interview they were not on the ends of the ties but actually walking in the gauge (i.e. not in the limits of the loading gage but actually between the rails). Even in the fragment Joe quoted, you will note that she started 'inching toward full service' as a separate action from reducing speed for the signal change. In addition she vastly overestimated the actual time she could possibly have had to see and react to the situation; this too is discussed in the interview record and 'put together' by the NTSB.
AnthonyV Yet, other than braking for the next signal, she did nothing except blow her horn until impact. I'm not an engineer and I wasn't in her shoes, but I hope I would have starting some hard braking once I observed what she said she observed.
Overmod,
I agree that the argument calling for making the emergency application at the point where the two conductors were first seen is that it would slightly lengthen the time remaining until impact. However, while that extra time would be miniscule, so too would be the time needed to realize the danger and get clear. I would estimate that a person could realize the danger and get clear within ½ second.
I cannot conclude what the engineer did in terms of braking prior to impact, or whether there was any extra braking related to the two men on the track. Also, if there was extra braking, I cannot conclude whether the cause was the need to comply with signals; or whether it was in anticipation of the conductors not getting clear in time.
I do not find any reference what you mention about the engineer going to pains to run slowly while passing the CXS train. Toward the end of the interview, she describes how she would slow to 15 mph if she knew ahead of time that there would workers on the ground. She did say that this was her own personal policy and that Amtrak had trained her to make such a policy as an option. But this had no application during the accident because she had not been notified that people would be on the ground.
You mention that the NTSB discussed that the engineer vastly overestimated the time she had to react before impact. I don’t recall seeing that, but what conclusions does it lead to? How would things have been different had she not over estimated her time?
She said she had 15-20 seconds. I looked at the event recorder data and it looked like it was maybe 10-15 seconds.
Lithonia OperatorI just read the interview with Ms. Reece. She does make it clear that, in fact, the CSX conductors were not between the rails, but rather on the tie ends.
The problem is that the engineer of 66, who is the only one to see the actual impact, is on record as stating they were in the gauge. While the interviewers were reluctant to ask him for more of the traumatic details, he did make something of a point emphasizing that.
I'm quite certain that the physical evidence of the strike would confirm the actual point of impact, but that's something I don't have enough 'need to know'.
If I remember correctly the event-recorder data provided the speed at impact, corroborated by the emergency application made 'at or just after' that time by Sahara's testimony.
The "15mph" business doesn't apply to the accident. She said it was her 'personal preference' (or words to that effect) when passing known railroad people, for example in a civil slow-order area. It would be uncharitable of me to speculate whether she was 'telling the Inquisition things she thought they'd want to hear'.
I am presuming that the Amtrak locomotives are equipped with forward facing video? If so, why are we talking about what the engineers 'thought' they saw.
We all know, that at times of stress, they human animal does not always see and remember what actually happened. I am not saying either engineer don't believe what they are saying - but there is the potential that their memories are not truly accurate.
I am wondering: How many engineers, traveling at 100 mph, would put their train into emergency IMMEDIATELY upon seeing a person on the track?
You engineers out there, you tell me. It’s an honest question.
I have never been an engineer (only a clerk/operator, but I would think that the initial response would be the horn, not the brakes. One would expect the trespasser(s) to hear and react. Ms. Reece could not be expected in a few seconds to process the idea that “oh, they are confusing my horn with #66’s horn.” The engineer would know there is no way to stop, or significantly slow the train. Yes, I guess she could have done both. But she had so little time to make a decision.
Isn’t there some danger of the train derailing when put into emergency? And what about any standing passengers? They would get injured, perhaps seriously.
Do you think Amtrak (or other) railroads train engineers to go to emergency instantly if someone is on the track? Will Amtrak fire her for not doing so?
Overmod, I did not read the other interview. But what Balt says is definitely true: eyewitness accounts, sincere ones, can differ widely. In any event, I think is academic. They were on the track and had lost situational awareness.
I think Ms. Reece deserves some slack here. These guys doomed themselves.
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