Lithonia OperatorI am wondering: How many engineers, traveling at 100 mph, would put their train into emergency IMMEDIATELY upon seeing a person on the track?
In the situation at Ivy City an experienced engineer, which she was not, would have assessed the scenario almost immediately. They are walking away from her, on her track, with a train, theirs on their right, and a train (66) on their left coming toward them and this engineer could not see the dire situation unfolding?
Lithonia OperatorMs. Reece could not be expected in a few seconds to process the idea that “oh, they are confusing my horn with #66’s horn.”
She certainly should have been expected to react in a few seconds. Amtrak's 'state of the art' training facility in Wilmington has a simulator. If she were vetted and trained properly situations similar to Ivy City, Frankford Jct and Dupont WA could be simulated to assess the candidates acumen.
Lithonia OperatorThese guys doomed themselves.
Yes they did but the reaction of 175's engineer exposes Amtrak's inadequate hiring and training procedures
Serious question: roughly much blame for the outcome can be attached to #175's engineer? To Amtrak vetting, training and supervision?
charlie hebdoroughly much blame for the outcome can be attached to #175's engineer?
None, the CSX and the two employees who were killed are to blame.
Blame for 175's engineer reaction or lack of is a direct result of Amtrak's poor vetting, poor training and poor supervision.
charlie hebdo Serious question: roughly much blame for the outcome can be attached to #175's engineer? To Amtrak vetting, training and supervision?
Given the laws of physics, my take would be just about zero. Even slamming the brake handle to emergency immediately would have had almost no effect on the forward speed of her train. And the blasting horn would probably have covered the sound of the emergency application propogating through the train.
And I'd opine that no amount of training or experience of either engineer would have changed the ultimate outcome. As has been mentioned before, it was a perfect storm.
Simply glancing down to check speed, and possibly cab signal indication, would have taken time away from the sighting of the CSX crew members.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Duplication
243129 charlie hebdo roughly much blame for the outcome can be attached to #175's engineer? None, the CSX and the two employees who were killed are to blame. Blame for 175's engineer reaction or lack of is a direct result of Amtrak's poor vetting, poor training and poor supervision.
charlie hebdo roughly much blame for the outcome can be attached to #175's engineer?
1) If the engineer of #175 had been properly trained by Amtrak to "read" the situation and make the emergency application immediately, as you mentioned earlier; and if her reaction was the same as in this accident scenario; then how much of the blame would you assign to her?
2) If the engineer had made an emergency application 20 seconds before impact; while traveling at 74 mph; how many seconds would have been added to the 20-second interval preceding impact?
tree68 Even slamming the brake handle to emergency immediately would have had almost no effect on the forward speed of her train
It could have afforded milleseconds to the victims. Her reaction, or lack of, afforded none.
Serious question: Why do trains have emergency brakes at all? Apparently they aren't very effective in slowing the train and it's not worth going into emergency because of the derailment risk. It seems it is safe and effective to go into emergency after impact though.
Note: These comments are not directed specifically at Ms. Reece, but to the commentary I have read on this forum about emergency braking. I must admit as a layman, I scratch my head and say Whaaat?
AnthonyVSerious question: Why do trains have emergency brakes at all? Apparently they aren't very effective in slowing the train and it's not worth going into emergency because of the derailment risk. I seems it is safe and effective to go into emergency after impact though.
It may help to look at the technical description of the difference between emergency braking and 'full service' to get an idea of the difference. Emergency offers both a higher cylinder pressure (and shoe-to-wheel force) and a quicker setup to achieve that pressure: it is intended as a 'quickest way' to get the brakes applied as hard as they can be.
This is "the most effective" any air brake can be in slowing a train of a given weight. It isn't very effective in many cases, such as this one, because the kinetic energy is so massive, and the available contact area between wheel and rail that actually accomplishes the braking is so small and relatively slippery by comparison, that a long time is required for the actual stop.
A good way to understand the mechanical difference is to compare the published statistics for electronically proportional brakes (ECP or EP; the system Sarah at FRA wanted to prioritize here) vs. regular 'quick-action' air in service braking (where there is an enormous difference) vs. emergency braking (where there is only about a 3% difference).
Obviously you don't want to use emergency unless you have to: the risk of skidding wheels, breaking the train in two for various reasons, or causing a derailment is nontrivial, as is the likely effect on passengers if done without warning (which is a highly likely consequence of anything requiring or deserving emergency braking in the first place!) As noted, the 'practical' effect of going into emergency is not a carlike quick stop -- the problem being that in a case like the Midnight Rider accident, not going into emergency 'because it wouldn't have mattered' -- in fact, apparently not applying the brakes at all until after hitting the bed on the bridge -- will be presented almost as depraved indifference by plaintiff's attorneys... they will ask why a best effort wasn't made, and expert witnesses will not look good to a carefully-selected 'jury of peers' if they cannot substantiate why a situation resulting in death wasn't sufficient 'emergency' to use the 'emergency' brake functionality.
There are effective technologies to stop a freight train in a very short distance, but they don't involve braking the wheels, are more or less disruptive to the track structure, cost even more than EP brakes per car, and pose an enormous risk of causing derailments and other accidents if part of the apparatus fails or falsely engages (or if part of it fails to engage when other parts do). You wouldn't want to use such a thing on a fast passenger train, as the deceleration rate can easily be in the range causing aortic dissection and similar injuries to passengers who are walking in the aisle or even are unbelted. As you know or can guess, there are large numbers of people in North America who would press for an 'unfunded mandate' to require such a system, in as short a time as possible, once they think it is possible.
As I think I said before, I have my own opinion of going to emergency only when 'you know you're going to have to stop' when the reason you know you're going to have to stop is that you've actually hit somebody. That opinion does not matter here.
AnthonyV Serious question: Why do trains have emergency brakes at all? Apparently they aren't very effective in slowing the train and it's not worth going into emergency because of the derailment risk. I seems it is safe and effective to go into emergency after impact though. Note: These comments are not directed specifically at Ms. Reece, but to the commentary I have read on this forum about emergency braking. I must admit as a layman, I scratch my head and say Whaaat?
Serious question: Why do trains have emergency brakes at all? Apparently they aren't very effective in slowing the train and it's not worth going into emergency because of the derailment risk. I seems it is safe and effective to go into emergency after impact though.
An “emergency application” is the most effective and quickest way of stopping a train. That is why it is available. But, takes more time to recover from than does a “service application,” which is for routine stopping.
In previous threads here, we have discussed the question of whether an engineer should make an emergency application and risk derailing the train when a collision seems probable, even though it is not certain. The reasoning was that if you make an emergency application prior to impact, the person or vehicle might clear in time. So then you have derailed the train for nothing. This is an interesting question, so I contacted the FRA and talked to one of their people. The guy I talked to has been in train service as a conductor, and he used to have a role in instructing others in the company. He sounded very clear and logical.
He told me that he has heard people say they would not make an emergency application until actual impact occurred. But he said he did not know if they would actually do that or if it was just something they claimed they would do. I asked him about the risk of derailing the train because of making the emergency application. He said he hears that, but the risk of derailing the train is being overblown according to him. He said the emergency application is there for a reason, and you should not hesitate to use it if there is any hint that it is called for. He said trains go into emergency all the time and they seldom derail because of that. He said that the risk of derailment is not an acceptable reason to withhold making an emergency application when a situation calls for it.
He said that there is another reason to make the emergency application that people might not be aware of. He said that if you do make the emergency application and someone is killed, you will at least have the peace of mind in knowing that you did everything within your power to prevent the death. But if you don’t make the emergency application, you will be haunted by the question of whether you failed to take an action that might have prevented the death. He said, for that reason alone, you should make the emergency application as soon as a collision seems likely.
Another point to consider:
If making an emergency application prior to impact poses too much risk for derailing the train or injuring passengers, why make an emergency application after impact when it is no longer needed? After impact, an emergency application does no good, but it still poses the alleged risk of derailment and passenger injury.
In this accident, the engineer of #175 did not make an emergency application prior to impact where it might have saved lives, but did make an emergency application immediately after impact.
The engineer of #66 also believed he was involved in the accident, and yet he did not make an emergency application after impact. Instead, he stopped with a service application.
Unfortunately over the course of my career I have been involved in several 'pedestrian'/trespasser fatalities and near misses. When presented with a situation that can cause death or injury you use every means available to you to mitigate the incident. 175's engineer did not and as Overmod implied the plaintiffs attorneys will home in on that fact. I highly doubt that any railroad would instruct their employees not to apply emergency brakes in an emergency situation such as this because of the danger of derailment and or passenger injury.
EuclidThe engineer of #66 also believed he was involved in the accident, and yet he did not make an emergency application after impact. Instead, he stopped with a service applicatio
Good point. He also saw, as he states, the situation unfolding so why did he not place his train in emergency? Two Amtrak engineers, graduates of Amtrak's training program and both of their reactions, or non reactions, are the same? That gives credence to the fact that Amtrak's training program is inadequate.
The testimony of the engineers of 175 and 66 are so convoluted, somewhat indecipherable and contradictory that it is mind boggling. NTSB not picking up on the contradictory testimony is surprising (or not).
66 engineer statement(s):
"So maybe about 30 feet away, just before we passed, I noticed it was two people in the tracks, and that's when 175 struck them."
"I was also -- you know, 175 was also blowing and the light was so bright. That's why when I got about, like I say, about 30 feet away -- that's the only reason -- that's the only time I saw them, when I actually really saw it was two individuals"
NTSB question:Q. Great. This is Steve Jenner. Thank you so far. Just to clarify, how far away, either in distance or in seconds, from the impact when you first saw the first person on the tracks?
Engineer 66 answer:
A. I would say about maybe -- I am going to say about eight car lengths
Just for reference, at 85 MPH, a train is travelling at 124 feet per second. Twenty seconds would mean the train would cover 2,480 feet in that time - nearly a half mile.
Perhaps someone has the means to figure out the line-of-sight distance coming off the curve southbound (or northbound, for that matter) at that location. I'm not sure that twenty seconds is accurate. It may be more like the "twenty minutes" it seems to take the fire department to reach your house when your house is on fire. Which is usually under half that.
243129He also saw, as he states, the situation unfolding so why did he not place his train in emergency? Two Amtrak engineers, graduates of Amtrak's training program and both of their reactions, or non reactions, are the same?
Without in any way saying the Amtrak training is not inadequate...
The reactions of the two engineers should have been different. Only Sahara "needed" to go to emergency (to give the conductors the milliseconds more time), and I would argue there was little point to use 'emergency' after the collision, where full service would do the necessary job as well or better. But the engineer on 66 had no reason to go to emergency at any point, since the only way the conductors would need "more time" would be if they jumped that way by mistake ... in which case they would have been just as dead, milliseconds or not ... they couldn't possibly have made it all the way across one and a half mains in the delta-T involved. So why go through all the equipment abuse and passenger discomfort that goes with emergency when EP blended service will do the job as well as needs to be done?
Sentiment, not sentimentality needs to be the effective watchword of practical training.
Overmod 243129 He also saw, as he states, the situation unfolding so why did he not place his train in emergency? Two Amtrak engineers, graduates of Amtrak's training program and both of their reactions, or non reactions, are the same? Without in any way saying the Amtrak training is not inadequate... The reactions of the two engineers should have been different. Only Sahara "needed" to go to emergency (to give the conductors the milliseconds more time), and I would argue there was little point to use 'emergency' after the collision, where full service would do the necessary job as well or better. But the engineer on 66 had no reason to go to emergency at any point, since the only way the conductors would need "more time" would be if they jumped that way by mistake ... in which case they would have been just as dead, milliseconds or not ... they couldn't possibly have made it all the way across one and a half mains in the delta-T involved. So why go through all the equipment abuse and passenger discomfort that goes with emergency when EP blended service will do the job as well as needs to be done? Sentiment, not sentimentality needs to be the effective watchword of practical training.
243129 He also saw, as he states, the situation unfolding so why did he not place his train in emergency? Two Amtrak engineers, graduates of Amtrak's training program and both of their reactions, or non reactions, are the same?
In other news: Balt, do you have or can you procure the post-2017 language for rykes GS10 and ES23, which cover track fouling, and TS15, which was interesting in that it contained no qualifier on crossing under standing equipment with 'occupied locomotive' attached (as NS rule 20(b)(2) does, restricting it to 'unless duties require') other than three-step. What specifically governs crossing under or fouling standing equipment now? [Incidentally the 2012 Safe Way is extremely unhelpful about exactly what you do to implement the third step; the relevant section of TS15 says only 'place generator field in the off position' without indicating whether this is the generator-field SWITCH or the generator-field BREAKER. That seems like a weird oversight for a 'technical' rule]
Overmod,
3-step protection was not available nor required at this accident.
EuclidThe engineer of #66 had exactly the same need to make an emergency application upon seeing the two victims as did the engineer of #175. Neither engineer knew where the victims would be when the two trains reached their location area.
But this is completely missing the important point: there are only two possible outcomes for train 66 -- either they jump and are killed whether or not he goes to emergency, or they stay where they are and are unhit by his train. There is NO other meaningful thing that going to emergency other than full service would assure... other than giving them MORE time to get foul of 66 if they were to start jumping that way.
This is precisely what I mean by ruling out sentimentality here.
Euclid3-step protection was not available nor required at this accident.
The issue involved is how the conductors came to be on the 'foul' side of the train in the first place. NS has a rule forbidding crossing 'under the train' unless "required", whereas CSX freely allowed it up to 2017 with nothing more than an acknowledged request for 3-step; my question to Balt includes what the direct rule post-Harrison's cancellation of three-step now involves.
Had the conductor on the 'Amtrak side' crossed over, this would not have happened. If they reached the end of the cut, crossing behind it away from the Amtrak side, this would not have happened. You yourself raised this a while back as a relevant point.
I do agree that it made no sense to go to emergency after the impact. She may have made some mistakes in the heat of a traumatic moment, but I hope she is not hung out to dry for this.
It does seem that Amtrak‘s training may be inadequate. Clearly it was, grossly, in the Cascade incident; so if that was indicative of national Amtrak standards, then, well, yikes.
How desirable are the Amtrak positions? If AMTK were to require, say, three years experience in Class 1 mainline or commuter train experience, would they get enough applicants?
Or is there some overriding reason to promote conductors from within?
Lithonia OperatorHow desirable are the Amtrak positions?
Here is the problem: some of the criteria Amtrak uses are, probably imposed at some level of twentysomething Government administrative action, concerned with 'furthering diversity' rather than finding and fully qualifying/training the best potential T&E people. As long as there is preference other than for the most reliable and qualified people ... assessed by railroaders or similarly 'distinctly qualified' people for strict railroad purposes ... you're likely to have strange attitudes when it comes to things that high-speed single person operation requires.
I don't think the 'three years experience' is likely to be much more valuable than a general guide, especially if it's with commuter agencies that are often likewise concerned with political or paper qualifications unrelated to performance or safety. Joe is right that both attitude and aptitude are of prime importance, regardless of whether the result matches key or desirable demographic targets or whatever.
Note that this has nothing whatsoever to do with outreach to diverse or underrepresented groups, or establishing programs perhaps early in education to foster and support the required character or skills to make running high-speed passenger trains a 'calling' instead of a mere career. There's almost no way you could spend too much on those, or go wrong employing the folks who 'get it.'
In thinking more about this, I tend to agree with your point about the question of whether the engineer of 66 should have made an emergency application. With 66, there was no need for more time to allow for the possiblity of the conductors to become aware of 66, whereas there was that need with 175. I assume that the conductors were fully aware of 66 during the entire accident sequence.
I would think that when the lives of people are at risk, you would want the most qualified people available in charge of any situation, and you would endeavor to make certain that all such responsible people are fully qualified for the responsibility.
On the average, how long did firemen serve as firemen before being considered for promotion?
Johnny
Overmod Euclid 3-step protection was not available nor required at this accident. The issue involved is how the conductors came to be on the 'foul' side of the train in the first place.
Euclid 3-step protection was not available nor required at this accident.
The issue involved is how the conductors came to be on the 'foul' side of the train in the first place.
If I were to cross over a train, I would prefer using a covered hopper, from stirrup, to grabiron, over the cross running board, over the couplers, and down the other side. I would never consider going under the cars.
But as I understand it, the two conductors rode the cars from the first inspection stop to the second stop at the accident site. So when they got off at that second stop, I assume they just both got off on that Amtrak side. So there would have been no reason to cross over.
But even if there was a reason to cross over, and even they did cross over, so what? It would not have violated any rule. And trainmen have done it since the beginning of time without considering it any more risky than typical switching activities.
Aside from that, the engineer stated that in lieu of 3-step protection, they had a discussion to agree upon a safety procedure that would accomplish the safety goals of 3-step protection.
They could have walked on either side, and if they had walked on the non-Amtrak side, indeed the accident would never had happened. But I think there is good evidence in the CSX engineer interview that there was steep ballast leading down to a water-filled ditch on the non-Amtrak side. Walking there would require walking on a steep slope of loose ballast, and fighting the gravitational pull to slide down the slope and into water. Anyone with common sense would choose not to walk on that side.
So they walked on the Amtrak side, and began in an area where they could walk on the empty CSX track rather than near the Amtrak track. But then in the last 300 feet, the CSX train was occupying the empty track they had been walking on.
So what to do? Their decision does not seem that irresponsible to me. They were not required to have protection to foul the Amtrak track. Their engineer said he did not how to acquire protection if they desired. They were not prohibited from walking on the Amtrak track by rule or trespassing law. I am sure they looked for trains while on the Amtrak track.
But one little thing blindsided them. It was something they never considered. It rarely happens. That was the approach not of a train expected, but of two trains simultaneously converging on them. Then the non-lethal train took all of their attention, leaving no chance for a sudden recognition of their peril. It was only that, which was the perfect storm in the perfect sense of the term.
243129 tree68 Even slamming the brake handle to emergency immediately would have had almost no effect on the forward speed of her train It could have afforded milleseconds to the victims. Her reaction, or lack of, afforded none.
I think we have already seen that a few milliseconds would not have changed the outcome: death. The only benefit might be in reducing guilt feelings in the engineer. Maybe, maybe not. I' have treated two engineers for PTSD after they hit pedestrian, one a child with a bike, the other a young man. In both cases they did apply emergency brakes. They still felt guilty.
EuclidIf I were to cross over a train, I would prefer using a covered hopper, from stirrup, to grabiron, over the cross running board, over the couplers, and down the other side....
NS has a specific codicil in one of their rules that proscribes 'riding a shove' if you're over the gauge: if you're up under the slope sheet of a hopper. That might be an option for crossing over, too.
But as I understand it, the two conductors rode the cars from the first inspection stop to the second stop at the accident site. So when they got off at that second stop, I assume they just both got off on that Amtrak side.
As I recall it, they walked back down the cut on opposite sides until they reached the car ... presumably at the end of the cut, as it was to be set out and left there ... finding one more partially-engaged handbrake on the way. Part of the likely 'attention problem' was that just about as they arrived all the way back there, they were told 'never mind' ... probably because someone realized the detector had gone off from friction of the handbrake, and when the wheels cooled there would be little to no operative reason to leave the car set out ... and would for some reason have to walk all the way back to the head end (instead of riding the cut back up to make the presumable joint with the 'rest' of the consist one track over). That may be mistaken, but it should be easy to find (or disprove) in the report or in interviews.
But I think there is good evidence in the CSX engineer interview that there was steep ballast leading down to a water-filled ditch on the non-Amtrak side. Walking there would require walking on a steep slope of loose ballast, and fighting the gravitational pull to slide down the slope and into water. Anyone with common sense would choose not to walk on that side.
I'm reasonably sure that could have been a factor.
So what to do? Their decision does not seem that irresponsible to me. They were not required to have protection to foul the Amtrak track. Their engineer said he did not how to acquire protection if they desired. They were not prohibited from walking on the Amtrak track by rule or trespassing law...
Except that ES23 required them to 'ensure protection' if more than 4' from a rail ... and that's any rail. It also requires them to KEEP looking in the direction a train could be expected to come from, and I don't think either train was running 'wrong main' at the point of impact. The general equivalent to NS rule 21(a) (which is like the old Southern Rule M) and 21(c)(6) which calls for vigilant lookout at ALL times, is in GS10 (the language includes 'be alert for and keep clear of', which they manifestly did not, did not, did not do, and no 'confusion' excused them from doing so)
What I hope to come out of this accident, apart from the new lesson written in blood that you take rules like GS10 seriously all the time, even when tired or PO'd, is more defined protocol for when protection needs to be granted, and a more formalized and easily-invoked procedure to get it, confirm it, and know how long to wait for it (or what to watch out for and when until you get it!). Combined with that, adoption of a rule for defined whistle signals involving specific 'off time' and clear patterns that are 'handed' by railroad direction, so one can be distinguished in direction by 'code' and not just reflected intensity in a noisy and multipath-ridden environment.
I don't think any rule that attempts to enforce vigilance will be much more successful than the old Army Air edict during the runup to WWI -- informed that hard landings were causing severe damage to the available aircraft, the commandant issued an order that there were to be no more hard landings thenceforth. The correct ways to instill things like vigilance have to come from more trusted, and non-adversarial sources, and not be fraught with punishments as the chief means of either reinforcement or enforcement.
charlie hebdoI think we have already seen that a few milliseconds would not have changed the outcome: death. The only benefit might be in reducing guilt feelings in the engineer. Maybe, maybe not. I' have treated two engineers for PTSD after they hit pedestrian, one a child with a bike, the other a young man. In both cases they did apply emergency brakes. They still felt guilty.
Where did you see and how do you know "we have already seen that a few milliseconds would not have changed the outcome: death."?
There should be no guilt if you have done all the 'right things' i.e. sounding the horn, placing the train in emergency. You cannot take the train off the tracks to hit them, they should not have been there.
243129 charlie hebdo I think we have already seen that a few milliseconds would not have changed the outcome: death. The only benefit might be in reducing guilt feelings in the engineer. Maybe, maybe not. I' have treated two engineers for PTSD after they hit pedestrian, one a child with a bike, the other a young man. In both cases they did apply emergency brakes. They still felt guilty. Where did you see and how do you know "we have already seen that a few milliseconds would not have changed the outcome: death."? There should be no guilt if you have done all the 'right things' i.e. sounding the horn, placing the train in emergency. You cannot take the train off the tracks to hit them, they should not have been there.
charlie hebdo I think we have already seen that a few milliseconds would not have changed the outcome: death. The only benefit might be in reducing guilt feelings in the engineer. Maybe, maybe not. I' have treated two engineers for PTSD after they hit pedestrian, one a child with a bike, the other a young man. In both cases they did apply emergency brakes. They still felt guilty.
Of course they shouldn't have been there. As to the milliseconds, it was discussed. The likelihood it would have altered the outcome was very slim.
As to #175's guilt, it's not a rational, legal thing. It has to do with how humans react, especially with their emotional states in tragic situations. It is very complex. You may not understand any of this, but I am a clinical psychologist. It's what I deal with and have done so for 35 years. I had first-hand experience with treating two engineers involved in these incidents as well as many others suffering from PTSD. Doing all you can but to no avail may logically suggest "there should be no guilt" but our psyches do not necessarily work logically, consistently and rationally. Every person and situation are different.
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