News Wire: Three dead in CP derailment in British Columbia

[BaltACD]

SD70Dude

Overmod

NDG

Wreck Video.

 https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/video-derailment-canadian-pacific-railway-field-1.5449758

 

CBC seems to think this is amaze-O new information.  Not sure it adds anything much to the original (Globe and Mail-sourced; interestingly no longer available) footage mentioned in the original Newswire post and commented on early in this thread -- the anomalous UP DPU mentioned there, too. 

I hadn't previously seen that video, and I work for a railroad.  Most of the general public will have forgotten about the crash by now, so it is not surprising that the news will present it as new information. 

The article has been updated with the information that the lead TSB investigator, Don Crawford, has been demoted in response to his comments to the media, calling for a RCMP investigation. 

Crawford started out his railroad career as a brakeman on CN's Alberta Coal Branch, a mountain railroad if there ever was one, and worked his way up to become a Engine Service Officer (CNese for Road Foreman of Engines).  He knows what he is talking about. 

I have it on good authority that the TSB will soon be releasing their report into another runaway caused by air brake failure, which occurred about 2 years ago on the CN ACB.  Crawford was also in charge of this investigation. 

The pile of mangled equipment, not to mention the deaths of the employees, is the prima facia evidence of there being negligence.  The real question is who's negligence was it?

[SD70Dude]

Overmod

NDG

Wreck Video.

 https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/video-derailment-canadian-pacific-railway-field-1.5449758

 

CBC seems to think this is amaze-O new information.  Not sure it adds anything much to the original (Globe and Mail-sourced; interestingly no longer available) footage mentioned in the original Newswire post and commented on early in this thread -- the anomalous UP DPU mentioned there, too.

I hadn't previously seen that video, and I work for a railroad.  Most of the general public will have forgotten about the crash by now, so it is not surprising that the news will present it as new information. 

The article has been updated with the information that the lead TSB investigator, Don Crawford, has been demoted in response to his comments to the media, calling for a RCMP investigation. 

Crawford started out his railroad career as a brakeman on CN's Alberta Coal Branch, a mountain railroad if there ever was one, and worked his way up to become a Engine Service Officer (CNese for Road Foreman of Engines).  He knows what he is talking about. 

I have it on good authority that the TSB will soon be releasing their report into another runaway caused by air brake failure, which occurred about 2 years ago on the CN ACB.  Crawford was also in charge of this investigation. 

[BaltACD]

Being that I retired from CSX and their AC 'heavy' locomotives are shown as weighing in at 432K - that I why I stated 700 tons for the 3 locomotives.

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

BaltACD

 

cx500

The grade in the area is roughly 2% downhill, and the train weight was something around 15,000 tons.  Only three units, only one of which was in the lead position.  I don't know but the emergency application may have superseded the independent setting.  And the DPUs would have to be reset after the emergency application.

Pesuming that all 3 units had their brakes fully applied - no matter where they were located in the train - 15K tons of train will drag 700 tons of locomotives down a 2% grade with ease - as the derailment showed.

Do the math: 

[Overmod]

NDG

Wreck Video.

 https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/video-derailment-canadian-pacific-railway-field-1.5449758

 

CBC seems to think this is amaze-O new information.  Not sure it adds anything much to the original (Globe and Mail-sourced; interestingly no longer available) footage mentioned in the original Newswire post and commented on early in this thread -- the anomalous UP DPU mentioned there, too.

[NDG]

 

Wreck Video.

 

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/video-derailment-canadian-pacific-railway-field-1.5449758

 

Thank You.

[BaltACD]

cx500

The grade in the area is roughly 2% downhill, and the train weight was something around 15,000 tons.  Only three units, only one of which was in the lead position.  I don't know but the emergency application may have superseded the independent setting.  And the DPUs would have to be reset after the emergency application.

Pesuming that all 3 units had their brakes fully applied - no matter where they were located in the train - 15K tons of train will drag 700 tons of locomotives down a 2% grade with ease - as the derailment showed.

[NDG]

CP/CBC.

 

https://www.cpr.ca/en/media/cp-corrects-inaccuracies-in-cbc-reporting-of-field-b-c-derailment

 

Thank You.

[NDG]

FYI.

 

Received on Internet.

 

Update 1977 Incident.

 

March 2019.

 

http://www.okthepk.ca/dataCprSiding/articles/201206/month00.htm

 

Thank You.

[cx500]

The grade in the area is roughly 2% downhill, and the train weight was something around 15,000 tons.  Only three units, only one of which was in the lead position.  I don't know but the emergency application may have superseded the independent setting.  And the DPUs would have to be reset after the emergency application.

[Overmod]

Paul_D_North_Jr

Was the grade in this CP incident so steep that all of the locomotives - lead and DPUs - would not have been able to hold it with the independent brakes in full application? 

We've asked this specific question before, and I don't remember the answer ever being an unqualified 'yes' (although the unanswered companion question, how you hold the train while releasing and recharging the service brakes to continue, is an interesting one).

The principal issue for me is that even a slight amount of acceleration before applying the independent brake will likely result in the independent not being able to hold the train, and the effect of heating on composition shoes will appear before the 23mph or so that is the advent of runaway brake fade on the whole consist on this magnitude of downgrade -- how much earlier being calculable, but not that useful.+

[SD70Dude]

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/cp-derailment-investigation-coverup-alleged-1.5436018

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

BaltACD

SD70Dude

CN and CP are pushing back against the latest handbrake rules:

http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2019/03/09-cp-cn-to-appeal-canadian-government-rule-on-use-of-handbrakes

Keith 'Runaway' Creel 

A really good fiction short story about a somewhat similar situation - a train only partially equipped with early airbrakes running away on a steep grade after all the air was gone (several causes, including weak air pumps).  It was called "Imperial Pass" by Harry Bedwell,  I've always through it was written around the CP crossing of the Rockies without specifically mentioning it. 

In the story, an overbearing official ordered the train to go down the hill even though there was some doubt about the brakes.  The conductor said to him something like "If we get to the bottom, one of us is going to be out of a job.  But I think we'll be switching cars in Hell instead."  The runaway was slowed enough to get back under control when a light engine running ahead slowed enough to couple up and supply its air.

I first saw it in the old Railroad magazine, edited by Freeman H. Hubbard, Vol 101, No.4, Feb, 1977, pg. 34 (see http://www.philsp.com/homeville/GFI/t730.htm ).  It was originally published in The Saturday Evening Post, Jan. 13, 1934. 

I also have it in a copy of of an anthology titled "Open Throttle": 

Open Throttle: Stories of Railroads and Railroad Men (1966), Phyllis R. Fenner, Editor - a great collection of 10 fiction stories, including one of the best by the dean of railroad fiction writers, Harry C. Bedwell - "Smart Boomer", featuring his legendary character, telegrapher/ station operator Eddie Sand.  My personal favorite is the one about a runaway on a mountain railroad - "Imperial Pass" by Bedwell, which does not include Eddie Sand - see:

https://openlibrary.org/works/OL9338299W/Open_Throttle 

 http://www.abebooks.com/Open-Throttle-Stories-Railroads-Railroad-Men/5425906490/bd  

- PDN. 

 

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

Was the grade in this CP incident so steep that all of the locomotives - lead and DPUs - would not have been able to hold it with the independent brakes in full application? 

Is there anything that would have prevented that action?

- PDN.

[BaltACD]

Paul_D_North_Jr

From my post on page 3 about a month ago (thurs., Feb. 7 at 7:38 PM):

Interestingly, Appendix B (page 15 of the report, 16/ 16 of the PDF version*) is a table of how many handbrakes need to be applied for various torques on the handbrake wheel, and various grades, per 100 cars.  For example, for a 1.3% grade and 80 ft.-lbs. (the value used in the report, pgs. 4 - 5 = 5 - 6 in the PDF), and a 112 car train (coincidentally the same number as in this incident), the number of handbrakes to be applied is 57.  Do the math from the table for a 2.2% grade (if that's what it was where this train was stopped), and the number of handbrakes is about 86 per 100 cars, or 96 brakes for 112 cars - only 16 wouldn't be applied!  

* http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2011/r11q0056/r11q0056.pdf  

Comparing this to the table that SD70Dude posted above - for a 2.2% grade and 16,000+ tons, that table would require 112 hand brakes to be applied - which would be the entire train!

Wonder how long it would take 1 guy - the conductor - to do that in a couple feet of snow in sub-zero weather - and then do it all over again to release them?  A wild guess at 1 minute per car (optimistic, for sure - YMMV) would yield it taking about 2 hours each way - and then walking back . . .  Makes the case for equipping at least unit trains with ECP brakes a little more compelling. 

Let's see how an autonomous train would cope with this scenario. 

- PDN. 

With the rules and TTSI that were in effect on the CSX Mountain Sub. during my employment - when it was communicated that a train had gone into emergency on one of the subs grades - no matter the cause - the first thing the Chief Dispatcher did was to order a recrew for the train - it was a foregone conclusion, that in securing the train and finding the problem if any and then releasing hand brakes that the original crew would not complete their run without exceeding HOS.

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

From my post on page 3 about a month ago (thurs., Feb. 7 at 7:38 PM):

Interestingly, Appendix B (page 15 of the report, 16/ 16 of the PDF version*) is a table of how many handbrakes need to be applied for various torques on the handbrake wheel, and various grades, per 100 cars.  For example, for a 1.3% grade and 80 ft.-lbs. (the value used in the report, pgs. 4 - 5 = 5 - 6 in the PDF), and a 112 car train (coincidentally the same number as in this incident), the number of handbrakes to be applied is 57.  Do the math from the table for a 2.2% grade (if that's what it was where this train was stopped), and the number of handbrakes is about 86 per 100 cars, or 96 brakes for 112 cars - only 16 wouldn't be applied!  

* http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2011/r11q0056/r11q0056.pdf  

Comparing this to the table that SD70Dude posted above - for a 2.2% grade and 16,000+ tons, that table would require 112 hand brakes to be applied - which would be the entire train!

Wonder how long it would take 1 guy - the conductor - to do that in a couple feet of snow in sub-zero weather - and then do it all over again to release them?  A wild guess at 1 minute per car (optimistic, for sure - YMMV) would yield it taking about 2 hours each way - and then walking back . . .  Makes the case for equipping at least unit trains with ECP brakes a little more compelling. 

Let's see how an autonomous train would cope with this scenario. 

- PDN. 

[caldreamer]

eVEN THOUGH ALL OF THE CLASS 1 RAILROADS WANT TO RUN LONGER HEAVIER TRAINS, THE ONLY SOLUTION THAT i SEE TO PREVENT ACCIDENTS IN THE KICKING HORSE PASS IS FOR CP TO BREAK A LONG TRAIN JUST EAST AND WEST OF THE PASS AND RUN TRAINS WITH LESS TRAILING TONNAGE AND AT REDUCED SPEEDS .  THI SWILL PREVENT RUN AWAYS AND DEATHS ON THE PAS.

    cALDREAMER

[SD70Dude]

jeffhergert

Thunderhawk

I recall someone brought up dynamic holding and dynos dropping out in an emergency application. CP units were originally set up to drop out the dynos when the train went in emergency. This was changed to dynamic holding meaning they would still work for a time even after the PCS tripped due to losing the air. However, as I recall, this did not hold forever. Meaning a stopped train with the PCS tripped would not have dynamics. Or if the engineer put the throttle in idle then went back to dyno he would not have them. One would have to release the brakes to recover the PCS giving you dynos again.

I've been told that when in emergency it's possible to recover the PCS and regain dynamic braking without releasing the emergency application.  After being in emergency two minutes, place the automatic handle in "handle off" position.  This won't release the emergency application but will allow the PCS to reset.  I can't say whether or not that will work, just what I was told.

Jeff  

 

SD70dude

For a conventional train (all units on the head end) Jeff's answer will work.  

DP complicates things, recovering from an emergency application takes longer and has more steps.  

First, make sure to hit the "brake valve out" and "set out" buttons in that order for all remotes.  Then set them to "normal" just before releasing the automatic.  If you do not do this the remote will go into emergency again when it senses the brake pipe pressure rise.  

In my experience the remote PC icon only goes away once it senses the rise in brake pipe pressure.

At Partridge, if the engineer had moved the automatic handle from "emergency" to "handle off" he probably would have had working dynamics on the lead unit, but not on the two remotes.

 

I did a couple tests on different types of units at work, and discovered that I was not entirely correct when I wrote the above post. 

On units with mechanical air brake stands (26L and 30CDW, found on our SD75, Dash-9 and older units) the PC goes away as soon as the automatic handle is moved from "emergency" to "handle off".  At that point the locomotive will operate normally, even though the brake pipe pressure is still at 0 PSI.

In the same scenario newer units with electronic air brake controls will not recover the PC until the automatic handle is moved to "release" and the equalizing reservoir pressures rises to around 50-55 PSI. 

I also neglected to list the procedure for recovering the PC on DP remotes without releasing the train air brakes:  Over-Reduction.  CN's procedure is as follows:

1.  Press "brake valve out" and "set out" for all remotes. 

2.  Have the Conductor close the angle cock behind the lead locomotive consist (or lead portion of the train, if he is back changing a knuckle or air hose). 

3.  Recover emergency on lead locomotive, then immediately reduce equalizing reservoir (and brake pipe) pressure to 50 PSI. 

4.  Set all remotes to "normal".

5.  Tell the Conductor to cut the air in to the train.  Verify that the PC icon goes away for all remotes and the tail end pressure rises (if you have an EOT).  At this point the Conductor can return to the head end. 

The principle behind this is that cars that have gone into emergency braking from a fully or close to fully charged train should have over 70 PSI in the brake cylinder and both reservoirs.  To trigger a release the brake pipe pressure must rise above the brake cylinder pressure at the car. 

Some of our grades have specific instructions on how to secure, recover and recharge a train that had stopped in emergency.  The mountain-grade lines I formerly worked on did not.  It was up to the crew to decide how many handbrakes or retainers to apply, if any. 

Since the Field wreck both CP and CN have issued bulletins requiring that trains stopped on steep grades due to poor braking must immediately be secured with handbrakes, whether or not the train is in emergency.  This also applies if the train went into emergency for any other reason.  The minimum number of handbrakes to be applied is outlined in the chart found in Rule 112.  This copy of the chart is from last year, I can't remember if it has been revised since:

[BaltACD]

Euclid

 

BaltACD

TTSI for CSX Mountain Sub (Between Cumberland and Grafton) from 2015 Timetable. 

2. All Trains – If speed cannot be maintained at or below the authorized speed for the train descending the grades listed above:

A. The train must be stopped immediately by making an emergency brake application of the air brakes including the operation of the two-way EOT emergency toggle switch.

B. The train dispatcher must be contacted.

C. After stopping a minimum of 50% of train hand brakes must be applied before the recharging procedure is initiated. 

Does CN and CP have rules essentially identical to the CSX rules?  We are told that the CP train was unable to control its speed, so they made an emergency application and stopped.  We are told that they then did something like inspect/repair the brake system.  Next thing we hear is that the relieving crew is on the train and the emergency application suddenly, unexpectedly releases, and the train begins to roll. 

Was the setting of handbrakes required after that emergency application was made to stop the train, which was out of control?  If so, was the setting of handbrakes carried out at that point?

I have no idea of the CN and CP current rules.  From the push back from Keith Creel and CN about the Transport Canada emergency order - I don't think their rules are similar.

[Euclid]

BaltACD

TTSI for CSX Mountain Sub (Between Cumberland and Grafton) from 2015 Timetable.

 

 

2. All Trains – If speed cannot be maintained at or below the authorized speed for the train descending the grades listed above:

A. The train must be stopped immediately by making an emergency brake application of the air brakes including the operation of the two-way EOT emergency toggle switch.

B. The train dispatcher must be contacted.

C. After stopping a minimum of 50% of train hand brakes must be applied before the recharging procedure is initiated.

 

 

 

 

Does CN and CP have rules essentially identical to the CSX rules?  We are told that the CP train was unable to control its speed, so they made an emergency application and stopped.  We are told that they then did something like inspect/repair the brake system.  Next thing we hear is that the relieving crew is on the train and the emergency application suddenly, unexpectedly releases, and the train begins to roll. 

Was the setting of handbrakes required after that emergency application was made to stop the train, which was out of control?  If so, was the setting of handbrakes carried out at that point?

[BaltACD]

TTSI for CSX Mountain Sub (Between Cumberland and Grafton) from 2015 Timetable.

5559 STEEP GRADE (1% OR MORE) TRAIN HANDLING

1. Unit Trains:

For head-end movement only, the allowable speed is 15 MPH while descending the following grades:
BA 207.8 and BA 223.0 - Seventeen Mile Grade
BA 242.3 and BA 252.3 - Cranberry Grade
BA 255.1 and BA 259.3 - Cheat River Grade
BA 262.0 and BA 267.4 - Newburg Grade

2. All Trains – If speed cannot be maintained at or below the authorized speed for the train descending the grades listed above:

A. The train must be stopped immediately by making an emergency brake application of the air brakes including the operation of the two-way EOT emergency toggle switch.

B. The train dispatcher must be contacted.

C. After stopping a minimum of 50% of train hand brakes must be applied before the recharging procedure is initiated.

D. The brake pipe must be recharged for a minimum of 20 minutes. The rear car air pressure must be within 5 PSI of the pressure shown on the HTD when the head end of the train began the descent.

E. After recharging the air brake system to the required rear car air pressure, a 6 to 8 pounds brake pipe reduction must be made. After the brake pipe exhaust ceases, each car will be visually inspected to determine the brakes are applied, piston travel is within standards and brake shoes are against each wheel.

F. The train may proceed only after being authorized by the Road Foreman of Engines or the Trainmaster. If needed, hand brakes may be left on the train to supplement train air brakes descending the remainder of the grade. To prevent sliding of wheels, avoid leaving hand brakes on any empty cars.

Note: Should the train separate, hand brakes must be applied to each portion of the train to hold each section on the grade.

G. Stopped on Grades – When recharging the train air brake system on descending grades of 1% or more, recharge the brake system for a minimum of 20 minutes.

Note: During temperatures less than 32 degrees or inclement weather, additional charging time may be required.

Trains must not proceed until the brake pipe is properly charged.

 

[Euclid]

 

It seems like we need a few details to fill out this story:

 

1. What rules pertained to the operation leading up to this runaway?

    

2. What would the new rules have required leading up this runaway?

    

3. Had the emergency application not released on its own, what did the relieving crew plan to do in starting the train?

    

4. Why did the relieving crew not get off the train when its emergency application suddenly released?

    

5. What did the relieving crew plan to do when their train began to move on its own?

    

6. Did the relieving crew pump any air into the train before it began to move?

    

7. What type of inspection or work was done on the braking system after the first crew made the emergency application because the train was suddenly out of control?

    

8. What was the relieving crew told to do when they reported that the emergency application holding the train stopped had suddenly and unexpectedly released?

    

9. What are the unintended consequences that CP refers to as being a result of the new handbrake rules?

    

10. What are the alternative measures that CP says are available?

 

[BaltACD]

ROBIN LUETHE

Hand brakes for modern RRing are surely an anachronism. If we are going to use hand brakes then those two mile train sets need a crew of four or five.

The actions of train crews are not just 'get on and ride' and never will be.  Be prepared to work, and do hard physical labor, when the conditions require it - securing a train with HAND BRAKES is one of those labor intensive happenings when trains have an Emergency Brake Application in territory with grades - especially grades that are sustained for a number of miles.

The design of the air brake system permits the brakes to be released from an Emergency Application in a shorter amount of time than is required to restore full air pressue to the entire braking system thus allowing for another effective brake application - either service or emergency.

We can cry all we want about how it sould not be that way - but that is the way it is and it has to be worked with.  Applying hand brakes is the only way to secure the train while the braking system is being recharged.

[ROBIN LUETHE]

Hand brakes for modern RRing are surely an anachronism. If we are going to use hand brakes then those two mile train sets need a crew of four or five.

[zardoz]

BaltACD

Keith 'Runaway' Creel

From the Newswire page: “the application of handbrakes in accordance with the Ministeral Order introduces additional risks and will have unintended consequences." Read: this is going to put my bonus at risk, and consequentially will cut into our bottom line.

[Shadow the Cats owner]

Keith better watch out for the Iron Bracelet briagade going we need to have a meeting with you and your lovely team of lawyers to discuss why you picking profit over safety.  

[BaltACD]

SD70Dude

CN and CP are pushing back against the latest handbrake rules:

http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2019/03/09-cp-cn-to-appeal-canadian-government-rule-on-use-of-handbrakes

Keith 'Runaway' Creel

[SD70Dude]

CN and CP are pushing back against the latest handbrake rules:

http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2019/03/09-cp-cn-to-appeal-canadian-government-rule-on-use-of-handbrakes

[cx500]

SD70Dude

DP complicates things, recovering from an emergency application takes longer and has more steps.

Thanks, Dude, for that information.   A more complicated process is the last thing needed when faced with a sudden crisis, as the train unexpectedly starts to move high up on a steep grade.  Hopefully the event recorder in the lead unit survived, and the eventual TSB report can give the details.

[Shadow the Cats owner]

They had an unsecured train with no airpressure reserves at all no Dynamic brakes to attempt to hold it if it started to move at all.  They were on wet rail from snow running with just enough power to get it over the freaking hill.  Sorry for me that is a trainload of Nitro waiting for a blasting cap and the emergency brakes failing to hold was the blasting cap on a 2.2 downgrade especially without retainers set.  I know enough about safety regulations that how this train was stopped and then the crew treated when they were basically forced to get on it that no law in either Canada or the USA is going to protect CP from the wrath the legal system is going to have upon the leadership of the company.  Yes I am talking about possible charges involving the CEO for changes made to the operations over the pass.  Notice how they changed them back right after this one.  They are in CYA mode and the TSB will be going well why wasn't this train run like that.  Let alone the lawyers for the familes they are going to make CP scream in the lawsuit.  If my boss had pulled such a dumb ass stunt as CP did here our Operational Creds would be pulled so freaking fast by the FMCSA that we would be out of business.   

[Thunderhawk]

SD70Dude

For a conventional train (all units on the head end) Jeff's answer will work.   DP complicates things, recovering from an emergency application takes longer and has more steps.  

 

That's where I was getting crossed up on the PCS issue. Ran plenty of DPU's but fortunately didn't lose the air often. heh

Will be interesting to see what the report says. I'm sure they already know exactly what happened but they have to go through all the steps.

[Thunderhawk]

Shadow the Cats owner

The way your talking Thunder about this train it was a trainload of Nitroglrcerian waiting on the rails and the loss of the brakes was the Fulmated Mercury needed to make the sucker explode and the crew was the one caught up in the explosion.

 

Quite the imagination you have. 

 

I said nothing of the sort.

[SD70Dude]

For a conventional train (all units on the head end) Jeff's answer will work.  

DP complicates things, recovering from an emergency application takes longer and has more steps.  

First, make sure to hit the "brake valve out" and "set out" buttons in that order for all remotes.  Then set them to "normal" just before releasing the automatic.  If you do not do this the remote will go into emergency again when it senses the brake pipe pressure rise.  

In my experience the remote PC icon only goes away once it senses the rise in brake pipe pressure.

At Partridge, if the engineer had moved the automatic handle from "emergency" to "handle off" he probably would have had working dynamics on the lead unit, but not on the two remotes.

[Thunderhawk]

jeffhergert

I've been told that when in emergency it's possible to recover the PCS and regain dynamic braking without releasing the emergency application.  After being in emergency two minutes, place the automatic handle in "handle off" position.  This won't release the emergency application but will allow the PCS to reset.  I can't say whether or not that will work, just what I was told. Jeff  

 

I've thought about that a couple times today and I believe you are correct Jeff. Memory is going already I guess. Never had to use that feature myself but it seems like a guy got himself in a bad spot on the hill in St. Paul due to not knowing about the ability to recover the PCS. Either way, in either situation hand brakes should have been applied.

 

CP's do have dynamic holding however, so they won't drop out when in emergency. Too much train for just the dynos but "Precision Railroading!" means no extra power for braking so there it is.

[jeffhergert]

Thunderhawk

I recall someone brought up dynamic holding and dynos dropping out in an emergency application. CP units were originally set up to drop out the dynos when the train went in emergency. This was changed to dynamic holding meaning they would still work for a time even after the PCS tripped due to losing the air. However, as I recall, this did not hold forever. Meaning a stopped train with the PCS tripped would not have dynamics. Or if the engineer put the throttle in idle then went back to dyno he would not have them. One would have to release the brakes to recover the PCS giving you dynos again.

I've been told that when in emergency it's possible to recover the PCS and regain dynamic braking without releasing the emergency application.  After being in emergency two minutes, place the automatic handle in "handle off" position.  This won't release the emergency application but will allow the PCS to reset.  I can't say whether or not that will work, just what I was told.

Jeff  

[Deggesty]

From what I have read, I have the impression that the cause of the runaway was similar to that of the fairly recent Sandpatch runaway: the unknowing taught the unlearned about mountain railroading. 

[BaltACD]

Don't know the CP's TTSI's in this area. 

The TTSI in one mountanious territory with X inches of snow I am familiar with instructs crews to make a automatic brake application at a spot prior to the worst part of the descent and where a train can be stopped with a normal brake application - the intent of this application is to 'condition' the air brake system putting heat into the brake shoes and/or finding the brakes have been iced - before the 'point of no return'.  If the brakes are found to be iced, crew was to take action to remove the ice.

Can't speak to CP's normal operations practices, on CSX when I retired, engineers were being taught to use Dynamic Brakes as their primary braking device and only resort to the automatic air brake if the Dynamics were not holding the train to the Engineer's satisfaction or to complete a stop.  Limited use of air brakes does extend brake shoe life, however in snow and ice conditions it does allow for a serious ice build up.

[Shadow the Cats owner]

The way your talking Thunder about this train it was a trainload of Nitroglrcerian waiting on the rails and the loss of the brakes was the Fulmated Mercury needed to make the sucker explode and the crew was the one caught up in the explosion.  If one of my drivers had any concerns about a trailer they were to pull we require the freaking thing to be repair NO QUESTIONS asked regardless of how minor the problem.  This crew was basically forced to climb on and told good luck and hope you live.  I hope CP has some very deep freaking pockets by the time their families are done with them.  

[Euclid]

Thunderhawk

Former CP (Soo) engineer here. These are my thoughts after having read the special instructions for handling trains over this grade. The entire train should have been tied down per CP rules. (This is not a new rule. Special instructions from 20 years ago state this.) This should have been done by the original crew regardless of hours of service. Canada may be different but I really doubt they are forbidden from working past 12 hours to tie down a train when conditions require it. 

 

There is talk of handbrakes and cars with truck mounted brakes. I see some of those cars in pictures of the wreck. The cars lettered CP Rail with SOO reporting marks have these. (Later cars with the CPR herald do not have these)For one, these do not brake as well in my experience and secondly the handbrakes (immaterial in this instance but they were brought up) only apply on the B end truck on these cars. Truck mounted brakes are part of the reason so many cars need to be tied down per special instructions here and anywhere else on the railroad as they do not want a judgement call to come into play. Much like locomotive hand brakes, which only apply the brake to one axle, hand brakes on truck mounts do not hold all that well.

 

I do not know if the crew being relieved was there when the dogcatch crew arrived. Have not seen this stated anywhere. If they were, there should have been a job briefing informing the relief crew there were no brakes on the train. And at that moment the conductor and student should have started spinning brakes. If there was no crew to get a briefing from there should have been a message on the control stand stating the condition of the train.

Either way, it has been reported the relief crew had reservations about taking this train so this tells me they knew the status of the train. In emergency with no hand brakes. And obviously they were all on the locomotive when it started rolling. In that situation I am getting off that train RIGHT NOW as the engineer had zero options to stop or even hold back that train. In those temps even with a 1+1+1 DPU setup there is no way he is getting enough air into that train fast enough to get it into emergency again. And even if he did the application would not be as strong as the first as the reservoirs would not be anywhere near fulling recharged.

 

Also, unless they have changed them in the last few years, CP AC units are set for max 100K dynamic to reduce in train buff forces. (Interesting side note, CP SD40-2's were set at only 45K max dyno for the same reason as they ran them in 5 unit sets quite often. After the first few orders of AC's they were turned up to the normal 60K as they were no longer used in big sets in the mountains.) Even if that UP unit was set higher there was not nearly enough dynamic to hold the train.

I recall someone brought up dynamic holding and dynos dropping out in an emergency application. CP units were originally set up to drop out the dynos when the train went in emergency. This was changed to dynamic holding meaning they would still work for a time even after the PCS tripped due to losing the air. However, as I recall, this did not hold forever. Meaning a stopped train with the PCS tripped would not have dynamics. Or if the engineer put the throttle in idle then went back to dyno he would not have them. One would have to release the brakes to recover the PCS giving you dynos again.

Poor braking prior to the emergency stop could possibly be a combination of snow/ice on the brake shoes and the number of truck mount brakes in the train. It's quite possible in looking at the profile of this line the engineer never used the train brakes after leaving Calgary. Or if he did it wasn't enough to really clean off the shoes. Trains don't stop worth a damn until one gets some heat into the brake shoes in the snow and going upgrade prior to cresting the grade the original crew would have had no real chance to clean them off with a minimum set. Not positive this is the case, but it does fit the poor braking reported.

 

Just speculating, but worst case scenario is the train sitting there for two hours in -30 temps, throttle in idle, pcs tripped and likely snow/ice on the brake shoes with no handbrakes set. When it started moving there was no way to stop it. The crew should have got off right then and there and watched it go.

 

Thunderhawk,

Welcome to the forum and thanks for your input.  I don't know if it has been reported what kind of reservations the new crew had about taking over the train.  But considering the train not being tied down except for the emergency application; and just before that, the train not adequately responding to braking; I would think this would definitely call for reservations about taking a safety risk.

[cx500]

Thunderhawk

Either way, it has been reported the relief crew had reservations about taking this train so this tells me they knew the status of the train.

I have wondered if this may have been a misunderstanding on the part of media reporting, since sometimes I have seen it phrased as "reluctance" rather than "reservations".  A crew at the away from home terminal is hoping for a train to get back home (preferably a hot shot), so will not be happy about getting called for a turn that keeps them away and will require a lot of time outside the warm cab in bitter cold.  I can easily imagine a bit of whining when called.

There are so many details that we don't know.  Some will be trivial; others could have a significant contribution to the tragedy.  The TSB report in a year or so can be expected to make them publicly available to the public.  The folks directly involved in the investigation likely already know the basic story and are just fleshing out the corroborating details and the "what-ifs".

John

[Thunderhawk]

Former CP (Soo) engineer here. These are my thoughts after having read the special instructions for handling trains over this grade. The entire train should have been tied down per CP rules. (This is not a new rule. Special instructions from 20 years ago state this.) This should have been done by the original crew regardless of hours of service. Canada may be different but I really doubt they are forbidden from working past 12 hours to tie down a train when conditions require it. 

 

There is talk of handbrakes and cars with truck mounted brakes. I see some of those cars in pictures of the wreck. The cars lettered CP Rail with SOO reporting marks have these. (Later cars with the CPR herald do not have these)For one, these do not brake as well in my experience and secondly the handbrakes (immaterial in this instance but they were brought up) only apply on the B end truck on these cars. Truck mounted brakes are part of the reason so many cars need to be tied down per special instructions here and anywhere else on the railroad as they do not want a judgement call to come into play. Much like locomotive hand brakes, which only apply the brake to one axle, hand brakes on truck mounts do not hold all that well.

 

I do not know if the crew being relieved was there when the dogcatch crew arrived. Have not seen this stated anywhere. If they were, there should have been a job briefing informing the relief crew there were no brakes on the train. And at that moment the conductor and student should have started spinning brakes. If there was no crew to get a briefing from there should have been a message on the control stand stating the condition of the train.

Either way, it has been reported the relief crew had reservations about taking this train so this tells me they knew the status of the train. In emergency with no hand brakes. And obviously they were all on the locomotive when it started rolling. In that situation I am getting off that train RIGHT NOW as the engineer had zero options to stop or even hold back that train. In those temps even with a 1+1+1 DPU setup there is no way he is getting enough air into that train fast enough to get it into emergency again. And even if he did the application would not be as strong as the first as the reservoirs would not be anywhere near fulling recharged.

 

Also, unless they have changed them in the last few years, CP AC units are set for max 100K dynamic to reduce in train buff forces. (Interesting side note, CP SD40-2's were set at only 45K max dyno for the same reason as they ran them in 5 unit sets quite often. After the first few orders of AC's they were turned up to the normal 60K as they were no longer used in big sets in the mountains.) Even if that UP unit was set higher there was not nearly enough dynamic to hold the train.

I recall someone brought up dynamic holding and dynos dropping out in an emergency application. CP units were originally set up to drop out the dynos when the train went in emergency. This was changed to dynamic holding meaning they would still work for a time even after the PCS tripped due to losing the air. However, as I recall, this did not hold forever. Meaning a stopped train with the PCS tripped would not have dynamics. Or if the engineer put the throttle in idle then went back to dyno he would not have them. One would have to release the brakes to recover the PCS giving you dynos again.

Poor braking prior to the emergency stop could possibly be a combination of snow/ice on the brake shoes and the number of truck mount brakes in the train. It's quite possible in looking at the profile of this line the engineer never used the train brakes after leaving Calgary. Or if he did it wasn't enough to really clean off the shoes. Trains don't stop worth a damn until one gets some heat into the brake shoes in the snow and going upgrade prior to cresting the grade the original crew would have had no real chance to clean them off with a minimum set. Not positive this is the case, but it does fit the poor braking reported.

 

Just speculating, but worst case scenario is the train sitting there for two hours in -30 temps, throttle in idle, pcs tripped and likely snow/ice on the brake shoes with no handbrakes set. When it started moving there was no way to stop it. The crew should have got off right then and there and watched it go.

[Euclid]

zardoz

 

Euclid

I would think that the air brake issue would have been one heck of a red flag.  I cannot imagine a train resuming movement down a steep grade after a crew has experienced some degree of brake failure.  Fortunately, an emergency application was able to stop the train and hold it for a while.  It seems to me that the crew should have been ordered to immediately start setting handbrakes as quickly as possible just in case the emergency application should fail to hold the train, which it ultimately did.  I cannot imagine deciding to let the train resume without first securing the stopped train and resolving the brake problem that preceded the stop.   

 

 

When one reads reports of various disasters and/or incidents, very frequently you will learn that there were many things that went wrong to lead up to the event, any of which, by themselves, would not be sufficient to cause the accident, but when added up they spell disaster.

 

I believe this accident is one of those scenarios.

The only question I have regarding the accident is why did the crew not bail when they realized they were on a runaway? I understand that it was around 1am and many degrees below 0 when they first boarded, but with the extensive experience of the Engineer, I would think he would have been the first to realize the level of disaster that was unfolding beneath him.

 

I too wonder why the crew did not get off and let the train go when it started to roll without any input from the crew.  I also wonder why they did not refuse to take over and operate the train after the previous crew reported problems holding back the train with the air brakes. 

Earlier here, someone reported that the new crew expressed reluctance to take over the train.  This scenario called for radical action to stand on the principle even if it made waves.  And it sounds like the new crew let that difficult responsibility slide until they were doomed. 

[zardoz]

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-how-train-301-switched-from-a-regular-run-to-a-deadly-derailment/

Made hot. Need subscription to view.

[zardoz]

Euclid

I would think that the air brake issue would have been one heck of a red flag.  I cannot imagine a train resuming movement down a steep grade after a crew has experienced some degree of brake failure.  Fortunately, an emergency application was able to stop the train and hold it for a while.  It seems to me that the crew should have been ordered to immediately start setting handbrakes as quickly as possible just in case the emergency application should fail to hold the train, which it ultimately did.  I cannot imagine deciding to let the train resume without first securing the stopped train and resolving the brake problem that preceded the stop.   

When one reads reports of various disasters and/or incidents, very frequently you will learn that there were many things that went wrong to lead up to the event, any of which, by themselves, would not be sufficient to cause the accident, but when added up they spell disaster.

I believe this accident is one of those scenarios.

The only question I have regarding the accident is why did the crew not bail when they realized they were on a runaway? I understand that it was around 1am and many degrees below 0 when they first boarded, but with the extensive experience of the Engineer, I would think he would have been the first to realize the level of disaster that was unfolding beneath him.

[Euclid]

In the news, I find conflicting information as to whether the emergency application was intentionally made, or was spontaneously made by some cause within the brake system (a UDE). 

I also find information indicating that the requirement to set handbrakes for this stop did not exist before this incident, but has now been initiated as a response to it.  They make it sound like a temporary order imposed until the cause of this disaster is found.  So were handbrakes required for that stop, or not?

It has also been reported that prior to stopping the train, the crew was experiencing problems with the air brakes.  Specifically, the service applications made while descending the grade were not sufficiently holding back the train.  Instead, the train was accelerating when subjected to brake applications that should have prevented any acceleration, and just held the train at a constant speed.

I would think that the air brake issue would have been one heck of a red flag.  I cannot imagine a train resuming movement down a steep grade after a crew has experienced some degree of brake failure.  Fortunately, an emergency application was able to stop the train and hold it for a while. 

It seems to me that the crew should have been ordered to immediately start setting handbrakes as quickly as possible just in case the emergency application should fail to hold the train, which it ultimately did. 

I cannot imagine deciding to let the train resume without first securing the stopped train and resolving the brake problem that preceded the stop.   

[dwill49965]

After re-reading the above linked article, there is really nothing new in it, just re-hashing what is basically already known.

[dwill49965]

https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-how-train-301-switched-from-a-regular-run-to-a-deadly-derailment/

[tdmidget]

Paul_D_North_Jr

Euclid and Overmod: I'm wondering how much elasticity there would be in the brake rigging between the locking cylinder and the brake shoe.  It seems to me that if the mechanism is rigid and then relaxes the least bit (contraction from temperature drop?), then the retained force on the brake shoe would quickly go to zero.  In contrast, if there's some kind of elastic pressure on the brake shoe - like a spring or air pressure - a relaxation would not greatly reduce the force on the brake shoe.  

- PDN.

 

Get real. Contraction due to cold would tighten the brake, not loosen. If a car had 40 feet of brake rigging then 1 degree F would be .00342 inches. Insignificant. Besides the brake rigging is at ambient temperature anyway.

[SD70Dude]

tree68

I've encountered brakes that were wound up tight, until I gave them "one more tug" at which time a link slipped and the brakes weren't tight any more. 

I've seen that too. Very frustrating.

tree68

It's not hard to imagine that a handbrake might be far enough out of adjustment that the wheel or lever comes up tight, but the shoes aren't tight on the wheels.

On more than one occasion I have seen the chain or another part of the handbrake rigging get jammed or caught on something, so that even when the chain is tight right at the handbrake assembly no force is being transferred to the brake shoes.

[SD70Dude]

Paul_D_North_Jr

This is pertinent because in the QNS&L runaway incident involving the LIM cars that we've discussed above, those cars had truck-mounted brakes.  So any attempt to comprehensively address this issue will have to consider that configuration as well.  (Those handbrakes must have been in really bad shape; from the diagram on page 18 there are not that many moving parts from the handbrake wheel to the brake beam to go wrong.)

On some cars with truck-mounted air brakes the handbrake only applies on the B-end truck. 

No idea if the LIM cars were configured this way, but it is something else to keep in mind when tying your train down. 

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

  The securement test for the QNS&L incident was that the train started moving on its own and ran away . . .   But your points are well taken.

- PDN. 

[tree68]

Paul_D_North_Jr

(Those handbrakes must have been in really bad shape; from the diagram on page 18 there are not that many moving parts from the handbrake wheel to the brake beam to go wrong.)

I've encountered brakes that were wound up tight, until I gave them "one more tug" at which time a link slipped and the brakes weren't tight any more.  

It's not hard to imagine that a handbrake might be far enough out of adjustment that the wheel or lever comes up tight, but the shoes aren't tight on the wheels.

That's one reason why we do a securement test in the post Lac Megantic world.

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

SD70Dude

There are some diagrams in this document:

https://model-railroad-hobbyist.com/sites/model-railroad-hobbyist.com/files/users/Gary%20Yurgilfiles/Trains%2060%20Freight%20Car%20Brake%20Rigging%20Arrangements.pdf

Truck mounted diagram:

 

Thanks for posting this, SD70Dude! 

Euclid - Check out the diagrams of a handbrake for body-mounted brakes on page 17 (18 of 43 in the PDF version) and for truck-mounted brakes on page 18 (19 of 43).  Note that in the former, the handbrake chain is shown as attaching directly to the body lever/ brake cylinder piston push rod, but in the latter it's shown as attaching to a lever that's mounted on the brake beam.  There's quite a difference between those 2 diagrams in the number of parts and the elasticity of the overall handbrake subsystem.   

This is pertinent because in the QNS&L runaway incident involving the LIM cars that we've discussed above, those cars had truck-mounted brakes.  So any attempt to comprehensively address this issue will have to consider that configuration as well.  (Those handbrakes must have been in really bad shape; from the diagram on page 18 there are not that many moving parts from the handbrake wheel to the brake beam to go wrong.)

- PDN.  

[BaltACD]

Euclid

 

SD70Dude

There are some diagrams in this document:

https://model-railroad-hobbyist.com/sites/model-railroad-hobbyist.com/files/users/Gary%20Yurgilfiles/Trains%2060%20Freight%20Car%20Brake%20Rigging%20Arrangements.pdf

Truck mounted diagram:

SD70Dude, 

Thanks for posting that link to air brake equipment.  Interestingly, I had not considered the truck mounted cylinders shown in that sample illustration.  They do indeed pose an issue similar to what Paul North asked about.  They would not provide that consequential stretch elasticity that is inherent when the cylinder operates though all of the foundation rigging.  I will have to ponder this matter.

When it comes to applying hand brakes - the linkage to the hand brake operating mechanism is basically the same no matter if there are truck mounted brake cylinders or a single car mounted brake cylinders.  The chain linkage between the brake beams and the operating mechanism will still streatch as additional force is applied to it.  The hand brake linkage operates on the brake beams, not on the brake cylinders.

[Euclid]

SD70Dude

There are some diagrams in this document:

https://model-railroad-hobbyist.com/sites/model-railroad-hobbyist.com/files/users/Gary%20Yurgilfiles/Trains%2060%20Freight%20Car%20Brake%20Rigging%20Arrangements.pdf

Truck mounted diagram:

 

SD70Dude,

Thanks for posting that link to air brake equipment.  Interestingly, I had not considered the truck mounted cylinders shown in that sample illustration.  They do indeed pose an issue similar to what Paul North asked about.  They would not provide that consequential stretch elasticity that is inherent when the cylinder operates though all of the foundation rigging.  I will have to ponder this matter.

[SD70Dude]

There are some diagrams in this document:

https://model-railroad-hobbyist.com/sites/model-railroad-hobbyist.com/files/users/Gary%20Yurgilfiles/Trains%2060%20Freight%20Car%20Brake%20Rigging%20Arrangements.pdf

Truck mounted diagram:

[Euclid]

Paul_D_North_Jr

I'm wondering how much elasticity there would be in the brake rigging between the locking cylinder and the brake shoe.  It seems to me that if the mechanism is rigid and then relaxes the least bit (contraction from temperature drop?), then the retained force on the brake shoe would quickly go to zero.  In contrast, if there's some kind of elastic pressure on the brake shoe - like a spring or air pressure - a relaxation would not greatly reduce the force on the brake shoe.  

- PDN.

 

[quote user="Paul_D_North_Jr"]

Paul,

I know exactly what you are referring to.  There has to be some type of spring elasticity between my locking lever engagement with the brake cylinder lever and the brake shoes against the wheels if the contact is made through purely mechanical levers and linkages.  Otherwise the brakes are either full-on or full-off, and the slightest relaxation of the full-on instantly changes it to full-off.

I worried about this problem, and yet I knew that there is plenty elasticity in tightening a handbrake.  It is like winding up the application against an ever-tightening spring.  There is no point at which the brake wheel just stops hard as you would expect if there was not elasticity in the application. 

I have seen brake winches torn apart in wrecks, but I could not recall whether I had seen a robust torsion spring in the winch mechanism. But even if there was a spring inside of the handbrake winch, its elasticity would not apply its benefit to my brake lock.  This is because my locking lever engages the brake cylinder lever between the handbrake winch and the locking lever. 

Also, the air brake linkage does not need any degree of tensile elasticity because it gets is variable pressure from the elasticity of the compressed air expanding into the brake cylinder.  The air is the spring.  With the hand brake being purely mechanical, it does need the tensile elasticity in order to give range between full-on and full-off. 

So I was worried that I might have to add a new spring somewhere downstream from my brake locking lever.  But then this spring would have to be right in the rigging so that the full air brake force was always transmitted through it.  This would get very complicated and technical to add the proper spring into that critical air brake linkage.    

I called New York Air Brake and asked a tech rep if there was any spring in the winch that loaded as the winch tightened the brake rigging.  He said no.  I asked him what causes the sensation of very long ramp-up of tension as you tighten the winch.  He said that was caused by the stretching of all the rods and other tensile components in the brake foundation rigging.

That is very good news.  There is a lot of elasticity and it is right where I need it; between the brake cylinder and the brake shoes and not in the handbrake winch.  

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

Euclid and Overmod: I'm wondering how much elasticity there would be in the brake rigging between the locking cylinder and the brake shoe.  It seems to me that if the mechanism is rigid and then relaxes the least bit (contraction from temperature drop?), then the retained force on the brake shoe would quickly go to zero.  In contrast, if there's some kind of elastic pressure on the brake shoe - like a spring or air pressure - a relaxation would not greatly reduce the force on the brake shoe.  

- PDN.

[CSSHEGEWISCH]

Sounds like this system is an additional braking system similar to truck brakes.  Keep in mind that if such a system is installed, it will also have to be maintained, and once again the issue of backward compatibility has not been addressed.

[Euclid]

rdamon

Powered hand-brakes would require a electricial trainline.  Sounds like ECP can give you an option for both.

 

ECP may offer some type of option to convey power to motorized handbrakes, but I am proposing a securement brake that uses pneumatic power to lock the air brake linkage after it has been full applied to set. 

Specifially, the pneumatic locking cylinder would use air to hold it in the released position, against a spring loading.  To apply it, you would vent the air from it, and the spring would apply the lock lever.

This system could be installed on equipment that does not have ECP brakes.  It does not use pneumatic force to hold brakes set as a kind of backup brake like a motorized handbrake would.  Instead, my system would use the automatic brake to apply full braking force, and then a small, additional pneumatic cylinder apply or release the locking lever.  Once, locked, the automatic brake application could be fully released, left applied, or it could leak off.  It would not be needed to hold the train secured in the parked condition. 

This system would require a second train line to charge and release the locking cylinders.

[rdamon]

Powered hand-brakes would require a electricial trainline.  Sounds like ECP can give you an option for both.

[Euclid]

BaltACD

Properly applied hand brakes are not subject to leakage!

Of course the are not subject to leakage.  My point was in comparing the parking brake to ECP brakes, not comparing the parking brake to handbrakes.  With bad cylinder seals, they will gladly leak off no matter whether the brake system is conventional air brakes or ECP brakes.  Hand brakes do not address that problem.

The pertinent point in comparing the parking brake to handbrakes (if I were to make that comparison) is the parking brake's ease of use.  With it, you push a button and it is on throughout the train.  Push another button and it is realeased. 

With hand brakes, you spend a couple hours climbing around in the mountains to set the handbrakes, then you climb around again to release them.  This makes people not want to secure a train with them unless they absolutely have to.  

[BaltACD]

Euclid

 

oltmannd

Five grand or so gets you ECP. A "parking brake" for existing airbrake is throwing good money after bad. 

ECP brakes would not have prevented this wreck if it was caused by brake cylinder leakage due to cold weather affecting older or damaged cylinder packing cups. 

Whereas a parking brake would have prevented this wreck.

Properly applied hand brakes are not subject to leakage!

[Euclid]

oltmannd

Five grand or so gets you ECP. A "parking brake" for existing airbrake is throwing good money after bad.

ECP brakes would not have prevented this wreck if it was caused by brake cylinder leakage due to cold weather affecting older or damaged cylinder packing cups. 

Whereas a parking brake would have prevented this wreck.

[oltmannd]

BaltACD

 

 

Shadow the Cats owner

 

blue streak 1

 

Murphy Siding

The thread above about this area of track being challenging says  "the train was parked with the emergency brakes applied at Partridge siding". If the train was in the siding, wouldn't the switch be set against the train and have to be lined before a train could go through it?  

We know the locos could have run thru the switch breaking the control rod and all the rest of the train could run thru it easily.  Now if the RR had been required to put a split rail derails on the down hill side of any siding over a certain slope the train would have piled up into a berm at a very slow speed!   The same as Lac-Megantic!

Would it cost?  Yes of course especially in snow country.  But what is the alternative?  More accidents including another haz mat cargo?

Much less costly than installing your brake system on all north American cars! 

I've been talking to a few mechanical engineers.  They say if we used the brake chamber already on there and 1 extra valve that takes its signals from the exhaust and the aux res only the cost would be 2 grand per car to redo the entire fleet for materials.  No extra brake systems required 1 valve one new brake cylinder that will be designed to allow switching without requiring air to be on the car and that's all folks.  

 

 

Only two grand a car - for half a million or more rail cars - we'll sign your boss up to finance the miracle changes and you can save the rail industry.

Don't forget you design changes also have to work seamlessly with cars that have yet to be converted to your miracle changes.

Once the AAR agrees and sets your standard it should only take 5 to 8 years to get the entire fleet equipped.

 

Five grand or so gets you ECP.  A "parking brake" for existing airbrake is throwing good money after bad.

[BaltACD]

tree68

Electroliner 1935

Can a locomotive pull more load up a grade than it can hold back. It would seem that tractive effort and/or braking force  (wheel/rail interface) should be equivalent. 

 

 

If you're talking tractive effort and dynamic braking retarding, you're probably spot on.   The coefficient of friction between the wheels and the rails should be similar.  I've slipped on dynamics before (one locomotive, sizable train, slick rail).

Throw in the train brakes and the story changes.

Throw out effective Dynamic Brakes on the locomotive and the story really changes when speed gets above X MPH depending on the grade.  The steeper the grade, the slower the speed at which air brakes alone can control the speed.

[tree68]

Electroliner 1935

Can a locomotive pull more load up a grade than it can hold back. It would seem that tractive effort and/or braking force  (wheel/rail interface) should be equivalent. 

If you're talking tractive effort and dynamic braking retarding, you're probably spot on.   The coefficient of friction between the wheels and the rails should be similar.  I've slipped on dynamics before (one locomotive, sizable train, slick rail).

Throw in the train brakes and the story changes.

[Electroliner 1935]

Can a locomotive pull more load up a grade than it can hold back. It would seem that tractive effort and/or braking force  (wheel/rail interface) should be equivalent. 

 

[Euclid]

I saw an interview with someone from TSB of Canada who spoke of the effect of cold temperature making it hard to get the brake pipe charged because the cold causes leakage of the glad hand gaskets.  He said that difficulty in raising brake pipe pressure can lead to accidents.  

He did not mention the effect of the cold temperature making the car brake cylinders leak and not hold their set.  That problem could explain the failure of a limited brake application to hold the speed in check going down grade.  Leaking glad hand gaskets would not have had the effect of reducing brake force, which apparently was the cause of this disaster. 

I highly suspect that the abovementioned cylinder leakage caused the emergency application to release.  I would inspect these brake cylinder packing cups for defects such as cracking or aging, and then test their performance at sub-zero temperatures:

https://www.wabtec.com/products/1269/brake-cylinder-packing-cups 

[SD70Dude]

Euclid

SD70Dude

If the train is already in emergency jump off, there is nothing more you can do at that point. But every situation is unique, and we will have to wait for the final report to find out exactly what happened.

Yes, we don't know exactly what happened.  I see some conflict in the news on some key points.  One report says the emergency application was a UDE.

But in the scenario where you are on the train and it is in emergency with no recharging underway; and the train suddenly and unexpectedly loses its emergency application and beings to roll:  I would get off and let it go. 

But I am just wondering if that is the action that the company would recommend under that circumstance. 

In my experience most of the company would have denied that such a thing was possible, until now.

[JPS1]

SD70Dude,

Thanks for your thorough, complete, and clear responses to my questions regarding emergency braking.  

[Euclid]

SD70Dude

If the train is already in emergency jump off, there is nothing more you can do at that point. But every situation is unique, and we will have to wait for the final report to find out exactly what happened.

Yes, we don't know exactly what happened.  I see some conflict in the news on some key points.  One report says the emergency application was a UDE.

But in the scenario where you are on the train and it is in emergency with no recharging underway; and the train suddenly and unexpectedly loses its emergency application and beings to roll:  I would get off and let it go. 

But I am just wondering if that is the action that the company would recommend under that circumstance.  It seems that they would have to agree.

[SD70Dude]

JPS1

SD70Dude

If the train is already in emergency jump off, there is nothing more you can do at that point. 

What does it mean to put a freight train in emergency?

To open the "big hole", that is drop the train's brake pipe pressure to 0 PSI very quickly.  This has the effect of directing all the air from both the auxiliary and emergency reservoirs (only the auxiliary reservoir's supply is used for normal braking) on each car to that car's brake cylinder, once the emergency application has taken hold the pressures in both reservoirs and the cylinder will be the same, that is the maximum braking effort possible at that time has been applied. 

JPS1

Is an emergency condition for a freight train different than for a passenger train?

Passenger air brakes are a bit different but work basically the same way.  The rules require a full inspection of a passenger train after an emergency application, which is not always the case for freight trains.

Due to the light weight of passenger cars an emergency application is more likely to lock up brakes and skid wheels, compared to loaded freight cars (empties skid too).  Some passenger cars may have an anti-lock braking system.

JPS1

What are the risks associated with putting the train in emergency?

Every car brakes a bit differently due to wear, tear and leaks on its braking system.  Long trains also have lots of slack, and run-ins or run-outs can be very violent.  Loaded and empty cars also brake differently (empties tend to dig in hard, loads not so much).  The effect on a long, moving train is that different parts of the train brake harder than others, and slack action can result in broken knuckles or drawbars, and in some cases even cause a derailment (a big cut of loads runs into some empties marshalled ahead of them and pops one off).

JPS1

What steps are required to recover assuming the train stopped satisfactorily without an accident?

If you are on a section of track where the locomotive brakes alone can hold the train stopped (most areas, except of course for steep grades) wait 60 seconds, place the automatic brake valve to release, ensure the PC light/indicator goes out, and see if air pressure comes up on the tail end gauge.  If it doesn't then send the conductor out for a walk.

If you are on a grade where the locomotive brakes alone will not hold the train send the conductor out to apply a sufficient number of handbrakes and/or retainers, the rulebook and local instructions will specify the minimum number (and if they didn't before they sure will now), more may end up being needed.  Once the handbrakes/retainers are set follow the instructions in my first paragraph.  If the train starts to move put it in emergency again and apply more handbrakes. 

Proceed once the train is recharged.  In some cases it may be better to leave the handbrakes and/or retainers applied until you reach flatter territory.  DO NOT move the train with handbrakes set on empty cars, they will skid the wheels. 

Some situations require the conductor to get off and inspect the train even if the air comes back up and you do not need handbrakes/retainers.  In many cases all you have to do is wait for the brake pipe pressure to rise enough to release all the brakes, and then proceed. 

[SD70Dude]

Paul_D_North Jr

Euclid

I have this question:

If a new crew takes over a train standing on a steep, long grade; and unexpectedly, the train begins to roll with brakes released, what should the crew do according to the rules?

It is truly a life threatening situation, and there is the option of not taking the risk by simply getting off the train before its speed rises.  Cleary, the train is out of control.

The cars in this incident were were stored for more than a year, and then bought used from Public Service Co. of Oklahoma.  Post-incident investigation concluded that they were not properly inspected and tested before being placed back into service, and that both the brake cylinders and hand brakes were defective on almost half of the fleet.  As such, this scenario should not be typical, though evidently it did happen a couple times on the recent runaways with stored cars in British Columbia that are linked earlier in this thread.  Further, the temperatures were in the -20 to - 22 deg. C range, which was a contributing factor.

 

Interestingly, Appendix B (page 15 of the report, 16/ 16 of the PDF version) is a table of how many handbrakes need to be applied for various torques on the handbrake wheel, and various grades, per 100 cars.  For example, for a 1.3% grade and 80 ft.-lbs. (the value used in the report, pgs. 4 - 5 = 5 - 6 in the PDF), and a 112 car train (coincidentally the same number as in this incident), the number of handbrakes to be applied is 57.  Do the math from the table for a 2.2% grade (if that's what it was where this train was stopped), and the number of handbrakes is about 86 per 100 cars, or 96 brakes for 112 cars - only 16 wouldn't be applied!  

 

 

- PDN.

Also note what the TSB had to say about the type of air brake design used on the ex-Oklahoma ore cars:

"LIM cars are equipped with truck-mounted brakes that consist of 4 brake cylinders. The truck side frames conceal these cylinders, which cannot be examined unless the inspector bends down to look under the car body and through the side frames. It is therefore difficult for an inspector to observe the cylinder-piston position to verify if the brakes are applied. In comparison, QNS&L cars are equipped with body-mounted brakes, which have a single cylinder clearly visible in the centre of the car."

The cylindrical Canadian government grain hoppers also feature truck-mounted air brakes, and have been known for years to brake poorly compared to other cars.  It is indeed a pain to do air tests on a train of truck-mounted air brakes.

Another factor which may have contributed to the 2011 QNSL runaway is the handbrake design, on many cars with truck-mounted air brakes the handbrake only works on one truck.  This should not have contributed to this most recent Field Hill runaway, the handbrakes on government grain hoppers work on both trucks. 

[JPS1]

SD70Dude

If the train is already in emergency jump off, there is nothing more you can do at that point. 

What does it mean to put a freight train in emergency?

Is an emergency condition for a freight train different than for a passenger train?

What are the risks associated with putting the train in emergency?

What steps are required to recover assuming the train stopped satisfactorily without an accident?

[SD70Dude]

Euclid

I have this question:

If a new crew takes over a train standing on a steep, long grade; and unexpectedly, the train begins to roll with brakes released, what should the crew do according to the rules?

It is truly a life threatening situation, and there is the option of not taking the risk by simply getting off the train before its speed rises.  Cleary, the train is out of control. 

If the train is not yet in emergency take more air and try to stop it, which may require putting it in emergency.  Then secure the train appropriately before attempting to recover and recharge.

If the train is already in emergency jump off, there is nothing more you can do at that point. 

But every situation is unique, and we will have to wait for the final report to find out exactly what happened.

[Euclid]

I have this question:

If a new crew takes over a train standing on a steep, long grade; and unexpectedly, the train begins to roll with brakes released, what should the crew do according to the rules?

It is truly a life threatening situation, and there is the option of not taking the risk by simply getting off the train before its speed rises.  Cleary, the train is out of control. 

[Euclid]

It sounds like hand brakes were never applied and retainers were not set.  But it also sounds like the train was having a braking problem before it was stopped by the crew making an emergency application.

The symptoms described of not being able to hold the train at the prescribed speed, and the engineer’s response to that circumstance by making an emergency application are exactly what happened in the runaway on the Quebec North Shore & Labrador RR some years back.  And then in that runaway, as in the case of this CP runaway, the train began to roll away some time after the emergency application had been made.  Except in the case of the QNS&L runaway, the engineer had set many handbrakes prior to the train starting to roll away.  The problem there was that many of the handbrakes were bad order and did not apply enough retardation.

However, the actual primary cause of the QNS&L incident was not a failure of handbrakes, but rather a failure of the brake cylinders to hold pressure due to leaking seals.  This is what caused the initial problem of not being able to control the train speed coming down the grade.  Making an emergency application was able to overwhelm the cylinder leakage, but only for a limited time; and then the train lost its emergency application due to the cylinder leakage.

In the case of this CP runaway, the same details have been stated.  Service brake application was not holding and the engineer made an emergency application and stopped the train.  Then two hours later, the emergency application leaked off and the train rolled away. 

If that is what happened, setting enough handbrakes within the 2 hour time window would have held the train—if the handbrakes were in good order.  But the question that I am left with is this:

What was the plan for the new crew once they took over?  That is assuming that the train had remained stopped until that point in time.  The previous crew had experienced a braking failure when running down the grade.  It seems to me that the braking failure while running would have been a major red flag, and that the train would not be allowed to proceed until the braking failure problem was resolved.  Temporarily securing the train with handbrakes, while necessary, would have been secondary to the issue of why normal braking was unable to hold the speed down as required. 

[beaulieu]

The Canadian Transportation Agency(regulator) has issued an order since this accident requiring at least 25 handbrakes be applied in addition to setting the Retainers to the High Pressure position on 75% of the cars, it applies to both CP and CN, if they have to make an Emergency Brake application to control and stop the train on a Mountain grade. According to a recent report the relieved crew applied the Emergency brakes when the train exceeded the 15mph allowed speed. The same report said that train speed reached 20mph before the Emergency Brake application began to slow and then stopped the train.

[Bruce Kelly]

Paul, the CP TT I have in front of me is from 2012. No guarantees that what I'm about to say hasn't changed since then. It shows that from MP 126 (just east of the east switch at Partridge) down to Field, westbounds with 100 tons or more per operative brake must not exceed 15mph. All other westbounds 20mph. 

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

I wonder what the Tons Per Operable Brake (car) rule is for that CP territory.  Since the wrecked train was 16,000+ tons for 112 cars, I surmise they were 286K/ 143 ton cars for the most part.  

About 10 years back (I haven't looked since then) Norfolk Southern (and ConRail before that) prohibited any train with an average of over 140 TPOB - essentially any train with a large number of 286K cars - on Track 1 eastward from the New Portage Tunnel on the East Slope from Gallitzin summit (above Horseshoe Curve).  There was about 1.1 miles of 2.36% grade as I recall, known as "The Slide".  Any such train had to use 1 of the other 2 tracks, where the max grade was 1.86% (again as I recall).   All trains were limited to 12 MPH, and those over 100 TPOB were restricted to 8 MPH.  On any of the tracks, a certain number of retainers were required if the necessary number of dynamic brakes were not operating, the locomotives lacked the pressure maintaining air brake feature, or in other special circumstances.

I know CP is not NS, and 8 or 12 MPH is not practical - and perhaps not necessary - on the CP line.  But I wonder how the high TPOB is taken into account - maybe by the DB requirements?

- PDN. 

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

Sorry, Bruce - didn't know it was you!

- PDN. 

[AgentKid]

Paul_D_North_Jr

by a Bruce Matthews

Ask for the Bruce Matthews!

Accept no substitute.

Bruce

 

[BaltACD]

Bruce Kelly

The employee timetable goes into tremendous detail about the required speed and braking procedures at various locations for westbounds descending that hill. According to what I'm reading, that train, having been in emergency application at Partridge, in temperatures hovering near zero degrees F, should have had hand brakes set on "at least 75 percent of the cars" and retainers set "to the HP position on at least 75 percent of the loaded cars." That should have secured the train while the crew could release and recharge the air. According to the TSB report on Feb 5, "There were no hand brakes applied on the train." If what the TSB said is true, those three employees climbed aboard a runaway train in the making, just in time for its emergency air to bleed off, nothing else holding it down, all because a critical safety procedure that should have been performed earlier got ignored or overlooked.

My understanding of the US HOS law is that actions that are required to protect 'Public Safety' (such as, but not limited to, tying on hand brakes to secure trains) are allowable functions for employees to exceed the HOS.  I have no understanding of how the Canadian HOS regulations are stated or applied.

If the original crew placed the train in Emergency, without applying hand brakes, they are the party responsible for the runaway.  The issue then becomes, was the relief crew notified of the circumstance under which the train had been stopped?  Was the Dispatcher notified of the condition of the train?  Did the original crew place any notes concerning the condition of the train on the control stand for the relief crew to read.  The train, as it was left was a trap waiting to be sprung by putting air back on the train.

[SD70Dude]

CP has issued a bulletin containing new instructions on how to recover from an emergency brake application on a mountain grade:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1eF2COQ7YrMFtPi5StH812xniBhaLwSMy/view

Note that the engineer must recover and begin recharging the train immediately after the handbrakes and retainers have been applied.

[Bruce Kelly]

The employee timetable goes into tremendous detail about the required speed and braking procedures at various locations for westbounds descending that hill. According to what I'm reading, that train, having been in emergency application at Partridge, in temperatures hovering near zero degrees F, should have had hand brakes set on "at least 75 percent of the cars" and retainers set "to the HP position on at least 75 percent of the loaded cars." That should have secured the train while the crew could release and recharge the air. According to the TSB report on Feb 5, "There were no hand brakes applied on the train." If what the TSB said is true, those three employees climbed aboard a runaway train in the making, just in time for its emergency air to bleed off, nothing else holding it down, all because a critical safety procedure that should have been performed earlier got ignored or overlooked.

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

I haven't seen anyone point out that Positive Train Control wouldn't have prevented this tragedy. 

PTC might have at least warned and stopped an oncoming (or slow-moving preceding train), though.  Fortunately, that wasn't the case here.

- PDN. 

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

Brian Schmidt

CP CEO on fatal wreck: 'This is a tragedy'

FIELD, British Columbia — Canadian Pacific president and CEO Keith Creel called this week’s fatal derailment in British Columbia a “tragedy” and has vowed to figure out what caused a train to derail while descending Kicking Ho...

http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2019/02/05-cp-ceo-on-fatal-wreck-this-is-a-tragedy 

From a comment by a Bruce Matthews under this item: 

Added 2 days ago

 

Bruce Matthews

One further point to mention about the press conference Mr. O'Neil referenced, the TSB says there are 99 cars and three locomotives on the ground, and not one inch of road access to get at them. This is going to be a big time old school cleanup.

- PDN. 

[Paul_D_North_Jr]

Euclid

Here is a runaway caused by brake cylinder leakage on the QNS&L.  The engineer found that service applications were not holding on a descending grade, so he made an emergency application and stopped.  He got off to set hand brakes and after an hour or so, the emergency application released due to leakage past the piston seals in many of the brake cylinders.  The train began to roll because many of the hand brakes also failed to hold it due to hand brake mechanisms being poorly maintained.  The engineer was able to get back on the engines as they went past him, and he was able to control the runaway until it eventually stopped below the grade.

So there were two different braking defects; one that defeated the initial emergency application, and another that defeated the handbrake securement backup.

http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2011/r11q0056/r11q0056.pdf 

The cars in this incident were were stored for more than a year, and then bought used from Public Service Co. of Oklahoma.  Post-incident investigation concluded that they were not properly inspected and tested before being placed back into service, and that both the brake cylinders and hand brakes were defective on almost half of the fleet.  As such, this scenario should not be typical, though evidently it did happen a couple times on the recent runaways with stored cars in British Columbia that are linked earlier in this thread.  Further, the temperatures were in the -20 to - 22 deg. C range, which was a contributing factor.

[Euclid]

It is well known that charging a brake pipe in cold weather is slowed by increased leakage of the glad hand rubber gaskets.  I don’t know the cause of this runaway, but there has to be a clear reason why an emergency application unintentionally releases in two hours.  

If this was caused by extremely cold temperatures, it would not be related to leaking glad hand gaskets.  It would likely be related to leaking piston seals in the brake cylinders of each railcar due to the cold.  On level track, this would probably not pose a problem because an emergency application would overwhelm the piston seal leakage and stop the train. 

What the low temperature leakage of the piston seals would do is allow the emergency application to leak off after stopping the train.  If the train were stopped on a grade by an emergency application during extreme cold, the loss of the application due to leakage would be disastrous.

It would be interesting to know the rules governing this situation of stopping and holding a train at this location.  Stopping and holding the train on the grade with just an emergency application and no handbrakes seems like a very high risk gamble.  I doubt that the rules would allow that gamble. 

[Euclid]

 

And that is the problem and reason why U.S. freight car technology is frozen except in areas where it can be improved without affecting interchangeability.  Any improvement that affects interchangeability must be made as an independent overlay, and then when all freight cars are converted, the obsolete equipment can be removed and the new equipment installed by overlay will become the new standard. 

This restriction to improvement primarily affects couplers and braking systems.  The strongest challenge to the limitation has been ECP braking.  Handbrakes could be improved without affecting interchangeability as long as they remain controlled at each freight car and do not require a power supply or use the power of the air brake compressed air.  Otherwise, the Nineteenth Century handbrake is probably the best candidate for being replaced by a modern solution.  Yet it will endure with its unreliability, danger, and enormous consumption of manual labor.

[CSSHEGEWISCH]

Balt hit the nail right on the head.  Most proposals for ECP and other braking system updates do not provide for backward compatibility with the existing system.  It is one thing to install a new system in cars that are in captive or non-interchange service and something quite different to install that system in cars in general service that would operate with non-equipped cars.

[BaltACD]

Shadow the Cats owner

 

blue streak 1

 

Murphy Siding

The thread above about this area of track being challenging says  "the train was parked with the emergency brakes applied at Partridge siding". If the train was in the siding, wouldn't the switch be set against the train and have to be lined before a train could go through it?  

We know the locos could have run thru the switch breaking the control rod and all the rest of the train could run thru it easily.  Now if the RR had been required to put a split rail derails on the down hill side of any siding over a certain slope the train would have piled up into a berm at a very slow speed!   The same as Lac-Megantic!

Would it cost?  Yes of course especially in snow country.  But what is the alternative?  More accidents including another haz mat cargo?

Much less costly than installing your brake system on all north American cars! 

I've been talking to a few mechanical engineers.  They say if we used the brake chamber already on there and 1 extra valve that takes its signals from the exhaust and the aux res only the cost would be 2 grand per car to redo the entire fleet for materials.  No extra brake systems required 1 valve one new brake cylinder that will be designed to allow switching without requiring air to be on the car and that's all folks.  

Only two grand a car - for half a million or more rail cars - we'll sign your boss up to finance the miracle changes and you can save the rail industry.

Don't forget you design changes also have to work seamlessly with cars that have yet to be converted to your miracle changes.

Once the AAR agrees and sets your standard it should only take 5 to 8 years to get the entire fleet equipped.

[BaltACD]

Deggesty

Thrown wrong--it is not lined for the movement you want to make.

Thrown right--it is lined for the movement you want to make.

There are two positions for a power switch - Normal or Reverse - in its simplest implementation  switches at the end of a Passing siding, when lined for the Main track in straight away movement - the switches are lined Normal.  When a switch is thrown to allow access to the siding the switch is lined Reverse.

Communications between Dispatchers and Signal Maintainers, MofW Employees and T&E Crews will refer to the position of the swtitch as Normal or Reverse.

[Deggesty]

Thrown wrong--it is not lined for the movement you want to make.

Thrown right--it is lined for the movement you want to make.

[Murphy Siding]

NDG

 

Line Reopen.

 

FYI.,

 

Line Reopen, first West down in Field.

 

Thank You.

 

 

Oh boy- that would be spooky to be the first train crew through after it reopened.

[Murphy Siding]

zugmann

 

 

Murphy Siding

The thread above about this area of track being challenging says "the train was parked with the emergency brakes applied at Partridge siding". If the train was in the siding, wouldn't the switch be set against the train and have to be lined before a train could go through it?

 

 

Unless there's a derail, a trailing point switch isn't stopping anything if it's thrown wrong.  Just breaks the switch.

 

I don't understand the difference between thrown wrong and thrown right(?) In this case, would it matter how the switch was thrown, or was the train leaving either way?

[Murphy Siding]

Shadow the Cats owner

Zugman no I'm getting tired of reading about people dying in an industry that makes billions of dollars each quarter yet refuses to consider anything that would save the lives of their employees and people along their right of way over the needs of their shareholders and vulture capitalists that all they care about is how much money they're squeezing out of the place. Sorry I care a whole lot more about my driver's making it home safe and sound than I care about getting a new phone or getting my nails done.  If it makes me a swallow person for putting a human life first instead of the almighty dollar than I am not going to apologize for that. I have seen way to many pictures of blood ama guts from idiots whose companies picked money over them.  So what if it's going to cost a couple billion dollars to do this.  There's a time to do things not because it's forced upon you but the right thing to do.  This is one of those things.  What's next they pile up a hazmat train off of Cajon or Donner for the same reason before people say enough is enough.  How many people have to be killed before they say enough.  

 

  Railroad accidents make the news because everything about a train is bigger. On the whole, I'd say the railroad industry has a lot better safety record with their employees than the trucking industry.

[jeffhergert]

Shadow the Cats owner

 

 

blue streak 1

 

 

Murphy Siding

The thread above about this area of track being challenging says  "the train was parked with the emergency brakes applied at Partridge siding". If the train was in the siding, wouldn't the switch be set against the train and have to be lined before a train could go through it? 

 

 

 

We know the locos could have run thru the switch breaking the control rod and all the rest of the train could run thru it easily.  Now if the RR had been required to put a split rail derails on the down hill side of any siding over a certain slope the train would have piled up into a berm at a very slow speed!   The same as Lac-Megantic!

Would it cost?  Yes of course especially in snow country.  But what is the alternative?  More accidents including another haz mat cargo?

Much less costly than installing your brake system on all north American cars!

 

 

 

 

 

I've been talking to a few mechanical engineers.  They say if we used the brake chamber already on there and 1 extra valve that takes its signals from the exhaust and the aux res only the cost would be 2 grand per car to redo the entire fleet for materials.  No extra brake systems required 1 valve one new brake cylinder that will be designed to allow switching without requiring air to be on the car and that's all folks.  

 

 

Would that be the same mechanical engineer qouted by an Iowa news outlet who said tank cars handling hazardous materials were only designed to be operated at 20/25 mph?  IRRC, it was a professor/teacher of ME at the U of I in Iowa City who said that in an article after one of the oil train derailments.

Jeff 

[NDG]

 

Line Reopen.

 

FYI.,

 

Line Reopen, first West down in Field.

 

Thank You.

 

[Euclid]

Overmod

 

Euclid

The ideal securement brake is a single control in the locomotive cab that can apply and release the securement brake simultaneously on all cars in the train. I worked out a design for this brake. It has its own air cylinder on each car ...

 

 

It occurs to me that there's a better approach to this, better in fact than implementing 'motorized' handbrake application (as someone pointed out does already exist for locomotives).

All that is needed is an arrangement that mechanically locks the existing air-brake piston, either 'on demand' or automatically, only after a full emergency application has been made (and full air pressure has been applied to the cylinder and associated foundation down to shoes). 

 

That is exactly what I described about my securment brake concept that I described a few posts above.  With my concept, you set the air brakes and then a locking lever is actuated to grab the brake cylinder lever in order to mechanically prevent the lever from moving into the brake release position.  You can leave air in the brake cylinder or leave it depressurised.  But the brakes will be locked in applied position as long as the mechancial lock lever remains engaged. 

This locking feature cannot accidentally engage while the train is moving with brakes released.  The train has to be stopped with air brakes applied in order to engage the brake lock lever.

This securement brake would need to be released for switching cars.  When released and no air on the car at all, the handbrake can be applied and released with no interference from the securement brake mechanism.

This is ready for manufactuing with all details modeled in Solidworks.  There are some issues that need to be investigated and maybe tweaked a bit.  For instance, when you go to the full force brake application, there needs to be some small clearance between the engaging features of the locking lever and the brake cylinder lever.  This is needed in order for the locking lever to get into locked position without any interference from the brake cylinder lever.

This small clearance would allow the locking lever to relax slightly into the release position once the brake cylinder leaked down.  You don't want that relaxing to be enough to compromise the securred brake application.  But I think it could be tweaked to get the mechanism to provide relable securrement braking even with some operating clearances. 

[Shadow the Cats owner]

blue streak 1

 

 

Murphy Siding

The thread above about this area of track being challenging says  "the train was parked with the emergency brakes applied at Partridge siding". If the train was in the siding, wouldn't the switch be set against the train and have to be lined before a train could go through it? 

 

 

 

We know the locos could have run thru the switch breaking the control rod and all the rest of the train could run thru it easily.  Now if the RR had been required to put a split rail derails on the down hill side of any siding over a certain slope the train would have piled up into a berm at a very slow speed!   The same as Lac-Megantic!

Would it cost?  Yes of course especially in snow country.  But what is the alternative?  More accidents including another haz mat cargo?

Much less costly than installing your brake system on all north American cars!

 

 

I've been talking to a few mechanical engineers.  They say if we used the brake chamber already on there and 1 extra valve that takes its signals from the exhaust and the aux res only the cost would be 2 grand per car to redo the entire fleet for materials.  No extra brake systems required 1 valve one new brake cylinder that will be designed to allow switching without requiring air to be on the car and that's all folks.  

 

[blue streak 1]

Murphy Siding

The thread above about this area of track being challenging says  "the train was parked with the emergency brakes applied at Partridge siding". If the train was in the siding, wouldn't the switch be set against the train and have to be lined before a train could go through it? 

We know the locos could have run thru the switch breaking the control rod and all the rest of the train could run thru it easily.  Now if the RR had been required to put a split rail derails on the down hill side of any siding over a certain slope the train would have piled up into a berm at a very slow speed!   The same as Lac-Megantic!

Would it cost?  Yes of course especially in snow country.  But what is the alternative?  More accidents including another haz mat cargo?

Much less costly than installing your brake system on all north American cars!  lets "KISS" it.

[diningcar]

Perhaps another simpler solution when "hours of service"apply in a dangerous location. Just move on to a safe place and then be relieved at that location. It should be a very short distance to a "much less dangerous location" and safer than working for another short period of time.

[zugmann]

Overmod

I would do this via proximity rather than 'command', so that the locks are only released on the 'return' from mandatorily walking the train after an emergency set.

Not all emergency applications require walking the train.

[Overmod]

Euclid

The ideal securement brake is a single control in the locomotive cab that can apply and release the securement brake simultaneously on all cars in the train. I worked out a design for this brake. It has its own air cylinder on each car ...

It occurs to me that there's a better approach to this, better in fact than implementing 'motorized' handbrake application (as someone pointed out does already exist for locomotives).

All that is needed is an arrangement that mechanically locks the existing air-brake piston, either 'on demand' or automatically, only after a full emergency application has been made (and full air pressure has been applied to the cylinder and associated foundation down to shoes).  This could be done with a small dedicated air reservoir on each car, with manual pulloff for release, but I'd personally think that electrical would be a better approach. (Note that this is entirely separate from a current ECP system, but adds positive mechanical brake engagement to it ... and unless I'm mistaken, definitively solves the issue with repeats of the S-4200 'bug' allowing train runaways with existing ECP programming design.)

A somewhat simpler approach would be to provide a spring-loaded pin with a pyro or cold-gas actuated latch which could be deployed with externally-visible 'locked' indication for positive engagement once an emergency (or penalty) stop had been completed.  Arrangements to gang-release the locks are not technically difficult and could be made for wireless actuation, but I would do this via proximity rather than 'command', so that the locks are only released on the 'return' from mandatorily walking the train after an emergency set.

[rdamon]

So back to this incident ..   Was setting of handbrakes required after the emergency stop?

Found this old thread about the proper number of brakes to set.

http://cs.trains.com/trn/f/111/p/219332/2421340.aspx?page=1

 

[zugmann]

Shadow the Cats owner

Zugman no I'm getting tired of reading about people dying in an industry that makes billions of dollars each quarter yet refuses to consider anything that would save the lives of their employees and people along their right of way over the needs of their shareholders and vulture capitalists that all they care about is how much money they're squeezing out of the place. Sorry I care a whole lot more about my driver's making it home safe and sound than I care about getting a new phone or getting my nails done. If it makes me a swallow person for putting a human life first instead of the almighty dollar than I am not going to apologize for that. I have seen way to many pictures of blood ama guts from idiots whose companies picked money over them. So what if it's going to cost a couple billion dollars to do this. There's a time to do things not because it's forced upon you but the right thing to do. This is one of those things. What's next they pile up a hazmat train off of Cajon or Donner for the same reason before people say enough is enough. How many people have to be killed before they say enough.

And what am I supposed to do about it?

[Euclid]

zugmann

 

Euclid

But other than that, the system only requires adding some basic parts to each railcar. All of the new parts are designed in the same mechanical engineering spirit as the brake rigging, cylinders, pins, and levers that are already in use under each railcar.

 

 

That's a big "only" there, bud.

 

Well sure, there is some cost to it, but it saves a lot of money needed to walk the train setting and releasing handbrakes.  And it also prevents a few multi-million dollar runaways and several injuries and fatalities along the way. 

[Shadow the Cats owner]

Zugman no I'm getting tired of reading about people dying in an industry that makes billions of dollars each quarter yet refuses to consider anything that would save the lives of their employees and people along their right of way over the needs of their shareholders and vulture capitalists that all they care about is how much money they're squeezing out of the place. Sorry I care a whole lot more about my driver's making it home safe and sound than I care about getting a new phone or getting my nails done.  If it makes me a swallow person for putting a human life first instead of the almighty dollar than I am not going to apologize for that. I have seen way to many pictures of blood ama guts from idiots whose companies picked money over them.  So what if it's going to cost a couple billion dollars to do this.  There's a time to do things not because it's forced upon you but the right thing to do.  This is one of those things.  What's next they pile up a hazmat train off of Cajon or Donner for the same reason before people say enough is enough.  How many people have to be killed before they say enough.  

[zugmann]

Murphy Siding

The thread above about this area of track being challenging says "the train was parked with the emergency brakes applied at Partridge siding". If the train was in the siding, wouldn't the switch be set against the train and have to be lined before a train could go through it?

Unless there's a derail, a trailing point switch isn't stopping anything if it's thrown wrong.  Just breaks the switch.

[zugmann]

Euclid

But other than that, the system only requires adding some basic parts to each railcar. All of the new parts are designed in the same mechanical engineering spirit as the brake rigging, cylinders, pins, and levers that are already in use under each railcar.

That's a big "only" there, bud.

[Euclid]

Shadow the Cats owner

Yes I understand how the switching system works for the railroads having had to help move the cars in our SIT yard more then freaking once around here. However I can not understand why your industry is so freaking callous about the loss of life in these accidents. These crews had families that are ripped apart by the loss of their loved ones and the words thats how it is in the railroad life rings hollow in their ears. When my boss asks for ways to make his drivers more comfortable out on the road he does NOT respond with that's how we always have done it. We see if we can implement it on a decent cost basis for us and what it will mean for our drivers and if so WE DO IT. But then at least here we treat our employees as they are humans not something that can be disposed of if they get killed like the railroads are doing anymore. Also like your treating them to. They died so move on instead of asking for a better system to prevent runaways in the mountains.

What is needed to prevent losing control of trains on steep grades is ECP brakes.

What is needed for freight train securement is a brake that prevents a train from rolling just like a parking brake keeps vehicles from rolling when left parked.  On trains, this function is performed by setting and releasing handbrakes.  The problem with that is the time and effort required to set as many as 50 or more hand brakes on mountain grades.  Another problem is that the handbrakes wear or their maintenance is neglected, so the actual brake wheel manual force needed does not reflect that actual amount of braking resistance applied.  And different people apply different amounts of force with no actual standard measure of force stipulated or measured. 

The ideal securement brake is a single control in the locomotive cab that can apply and release the securement brake simultaneously on all cars in the train.  I worked out a design for this brake.  It has its own air cylinder on each car, and the cylinder forces the piston out by air pressure, and allows it to retract by spring pressure.  This cylinder operates a locking lever that can block the brake cylinder lever from returning the train brakes to release position if the locking cylinder is vented and allows the spring to retract the piston. 

When the train is running with brakes released, all of the securement brake cylinders are pressurized to hold the locking lever in the released position.  To set the securement brake when the train stops, first the automatic air brake is applied in either a full service or emergency application.  Then the securement brake control is used to depressurize and vent the securement brake cylinders.  As those cylinders vent, the spring retracts the pistons, which pulls the securement locking lever into a position in which it holds the air brake cylinder lever.  This action then mechanically prevents the air brake cylinders from releasing the brake foundation rigging for the car brakes.

To release the securement brake, the train brakes must be applied maximum braking force.  Then the securement brake control is moved to the release position, which extends the securement brake cylinder pistons, which in turn, moves the securement locking lever out of interference with the brake cylinder lever.  Then, when the train brakes are released, their foundation rigging is mechanically free to move the brake shoes away from their wheel contact. 

The probable showstopper with this idea, however, is the need for a second air line running throughout the train to operate the securement brake.  But other than that, the system only requires adding some basic parts to each railcar.  All of the new parts are designed in the same mechanical engineering spirit as the brake rigging, cylinders, pins, and levers that are already in use under each railcar.    

[Murphy Siding]

The thread above about this area of track being challenging says  "the train was parked with the emergency brakes applied at Partridge siding". If the train was in the siding, wouldn't the switch be set against the train and have to be lined before a train could go through it?

[zugmann]

 

 We're getting off the point with your all-too familiar pseudo profanity-laden rants on here.  It's not just a simple design change (that we'd need to do to how many railcars??), but a fundamental design change in how the railroad operates, inlcuding how many private industries are able to move their cars around.

 Your comparing the actions of your one boss for one small company to the entire way an industry is operated.  Very small apples and very large oranges.

 

[Shadow the Cats owner]

Yes I understand how the switching system works for the railroads having had to help move the cars in our SIT yard more then freaking once around here.  However I can not understand why your industry is so freaking callous about the loss of life in these accidents.  These crews had families that are ripped apart by the loss of their loved ones and the words thats how it is in the railroad life rings hollow in their ears.  When my boss asks for ways to make his drivers more comfortable out on the road he does NOT respond with that's how we always have done it.  We see if we can implement it on a decent cost basis for us and what it will mean for our drivers and if so WE DO IT.  But then at least here we treat our employees as they are humans not something that can be disposed of if they get killed like the railroads are doing anymore.  Also like your treating them to.  They died so move on instead of asking for a better system to prevent runaways in the mountains.  

 

The system we use per Federal Regulations each axle equipped with spring brakes must be able to hold the entire weight of the vechile on a 20 percent grade on Wet smooth Concrete.  You know of any hand applied handbrake that coudl do that.  We can stop 40 tons with just 4 wheels in an emergency.  

 

How to do switching the rod used for bleeding could be used as a catch to prevent the parking aka emergency brake from being applied.  You could still flat and hump switch yet have the parking brake when done.  Yes the railroads have done things this way for over a century however it might be time for things to change a little okay.

[zugmann]

Shadow the Cats owner

What's the body count now 52 or more from a system that if there is no pressure in the system the train can roll away.

You do understnad how hump yards and switching without air work, don't you?

[Deggesty]

Apparently, you have those who know nothing about mountain railroading teaching the unlearned how to handle trains in mountains.

[BaltACD]

Shadow the Cats owner

The time has come and passed for the railroads to at least join the 20th century on a brake system that if it loses the air pressure it's still not going to let people die.  What's the body count now 52 or more from a system that if there is no pressure in the system the train can roll away.  

The task of braking a 112 car train on a 2.2% grade that weighs in the neighborhood of 16K tons is a major undertaking and requires a lot of braking power, a lot more power than can be developed in the trucking air over spring form of air brakes.

If the Relief Crew made a release of the trains Emergency Applicaion (no matter how that application was made) without securing the train with hand brakes first - they were their own worst enemy.  If the original crew stopped the train by using a Emergency Applicatio and did not apply hand brakes, they set a trap that the Relief Crew walked into.

Mountain railroading is exacting in what must be done for it to be done safely.  Miss a step and the result can be your life.

In our current society of push botton everything, hand brakes may be looked upon as an anachronism - they are not.  Keeping trains moving in the mountains is one thing.  The more difficult task is getting a stopped train in the mountains moving safely and under control.

[zardoz]

blue streak 1

What is the thinking about not allowing dynamic brakes if the train has an emergency brake application?

There is NO thinking involved.

At the very least, if some dolt in (mis)management feels the need for such stupidity, the union should insist that there be a procedure to disable the feature. It is as stupid as having a PC switch cut motive power during an emergency application.

I cannot even fathom any reason for having the DB cut out during an emergency application. The term "emergency" in of itself implies that retarding forces as strong as possible are needed. And if the "logic" is that it is to reduce buff forces, by the time the dynamics cycle from power to braking, the train's air brakes would have applied throughout the entire train, minimizing excessive buff.

[Euclid]

Here is a runaway caused by brake cylinder leakage on the QNS&L.  The engineer found that service applications were not holding on a descending grade, so he made an emergency application and stopped.  He got off to set hand brakes and after an hour or so, the emergency application released due to leakage past the piston seals in many of the brake cylinders.  The train began to roll because many of the hand brakes also failed to hold it due to hand brake mechanisms being poorly maintained.  The engineer was able to get back on the engines as they went past him, and he was able to control the runaway until it eventually stopped below the grade.

So there were two different braking defects; one that defeated the initial emergency application, and another that defeated the handbrake securement backup.

http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2011/r11q0056/r11q0056.pdf 

[blue streak 1]

There is a report that the train was parked by the previous crew by appling the emergency brakes.  evidently the train remained in emergency until the new crew boarded and the train then started to move because air had bled away.  There fore no air brakes. The new crew was unable to engage dynamics because of the train in emergency.  What is the thinking about not allowing dynamic brakes if the train has an emergency brake application?

[Shadow the Cats owner]

The time has come and passed for the railroads to at least join the 20th century on a brake system that if it loses the air pressure it's still not going to let people die.  What's the body count now 52 or more from a system that if there is no pressure in the system the train can roll away.  

[BaltACD]

cx500

I didn't see that the emergency application was undesired UDE).  My impression was that the original crew made that application to ensure the train was held firmly.

John

It was stated that the crew involved in the incident was a 'relief crew' that took over operation of the train after the original crew had had 'trouble' and expired on the Hours of Service.  Trouble, 99.9% of the time on line of road involves the train going into emergency for whatever the reason. 

Whenever a train STOPS on high grade territory it must be secured by hand brakes - if air brakes are released, it takes an amount of time for the brake resevoirs to be recharged so that the brakes can be applied again - during the period of time it takes to recharge the brake system the train can become a runaway if not secured by hand brakes.

[NDG]

FYI.

CP Laggan Sub and Spiral Tunnels.

 

CP Laggan Sub. 01.

 

http://www.okthepk.ca/foamerFiles/22laggan.htm

 

 

CP Laggan Sub. 02.

 

http://www.okthepk.ca/foamerFiles/mapSpirl.htm 

 

Thank You.

[NDG]

 

 

CPR had another Fatal runaway ex Warfield a few years back + 3%, and D/B nullified by Emergency Application  Engineer in Unit facing Train ( Uphill End ) as way done in days of Steam re Hand Signals and Curves @ Fertilizer Plant.

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gJG5a_4sANA.

 

Here are Four 4 Reports FYI.

 

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054.asp   Megantic July 6, 2013.

 

http://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2007/r07v0109/r07v0109.asp   Warfield  Hill April 23, 2007.

 

http://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2001/r01w0007/r01w0007.asp   Nipigon Sub January  8, 2001.

 

http://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/1997/r97c0147/r97c0147.asp   Field Hill December 2, 1997. 

 

 

FWIW.

 

The Road Foreman inserts his Saluda key to allow D/B after Emergency. @ 10:50.

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9IABM8UPplY

 

Thank You.

[cx500]

I didn't see that the emergency application was undesired UDE).  My impression was that the original crew made that application to ensure the train was held firmly.

I am more curious about whether the dynamic brakes were engaged (on all three units), and that will have to wait until the event recorders can be analysed.  I believe after the runaway around 20 years ago the differences between the SD40-2 and the AC4400 controls was highlighted.  The older units, when the controller was set to dynamic, would have operative dynamic brakes.  The newer units had different "logic", and after an emergency application some of the controls would have to be reset for a brief time before the microprocessors enabled the dynamics to engage.  Even with the train brakes released the dynamic brake might have been sufficient to control the rate of acceleration.  I will try later to find the link to the TSB report for that accident (no fatalities that time, fortunately).

I will now gladly pass the discussion back to those here who have actual knowledge and experience in running trains.  My railroad career was primarily from the rails down, not directly involved in what ran on top of the rails.

John

[BaltACD]

SD70Dude

 

Ulrich

I'm not sure I understand..the crew were already aboard and the train began to roll on its own? Would the engineer then notice this and apply the brakes.. or is it already too late at that point?  

From the reports so far it sounds like the train had been stopped with the air brakes in emergency for a couple hours, and then started to roll.  If that is true then there would be no more brake left for the engineer to apply. 

Question then becomes - did the crew that experienced the UDE begin applying hand brakes to the train as they began their inspection from the head end.

Have no idea of CP rules for the territory. in the mountain territories I worked crews were required to tie on 50% hand brakes starting from the head end - 120 car in train required 'at least' 60 hand brakes - more if it was detirmined as air was being released that on 50% was not securing the train.  To get the train moving, retainers would be set on the head part of the train as the air restored and a full service application was made to get the Conductor back on the head end.

[NDG]

SD70Dude

Full video of the TSB press conference this morning:

https://www.facebook.com/cbccalgary/videos/362320107953710/?hc_location=ufi

 

 

 

THANK YOU! for posting that.

 

In last 2 Minutes of video he mentions the Retainers! and explains how they work!

 

Merci, Mon Vieux!!

[SD70Dude]

Full video of the TSB press conference this morning:

https://www.facebook.com/cbccalgary/videos/362320107953710/?hc_location=ufi

[SD70Dude]

NDG

In the Live Broadcast when they went to the ' Phone In ' part of the programme, the gentleman said the train ' Had seventy-five 75 %  ( percent ) of it's Retainers set in the High Pressure Position.'

Thank You.

Near the end another reporter said he had heard "there were reports that the engineer or crew did not want to take this train".  It was not clear where, when or which crew (original or relief) may have said that.

Carmichael's response was that the TSB did not have that information yet, but he also stated in the press conference that they had not yet been able to interview the train's original crew.

[diningcar]

SD70Dude

 

 

Ulrich

I'm not sure I understand..the crew were already aboard and the train began to roll on its own? Would the engineer then notice this and apply the brakes.. or is it already too late at that point? 

 

 

 

From the reports so far it sounds like the train had been stopped with the air brakes in emergency for a couple hours, and then started to roll.  If that is true then there would be no more brake left for the engineer to apply. 

 Then perhaps the TOS rules should be modified to allow moving to a safe place to change crews.

[SD70Dude]

Ulrich

I'm not sure I understand..the crew were already aboard and the train began to roll on its own? Would the engineer then notice this and apply the brakes.. or is it already too late at that point? 

From the reports so far it sounds like the train had been stopped with the air brakes in emergency for a couple hours, and then started to roll.  If that is true then there would be no more brake left for the engineer to apply. 

[SD70Dude]

BaltACD

SD70Dude

FYI, preliminary report into another runaway incident in cold weather, from last winter:

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/sur-safe/letter/rail/2018/r18e0007/r18e0007-617-04-18.asp

Pictures of the derailed cars indicated that they appeared to be of CP ownership.  With that being the case, I doubt that they have been in storage for any period of time during the harvest and shipping season.

I agree.  My point was that extreme cold exposes problems that would not be apparent at warmer temperatures. 

[Ulrich]

I'm not sure I understand..the crew were already aboard and the train began to roll on its own? Would the engineer then notice this and apply the brakes.. or is it already too late at that point? 

[blue streak 1]

Started to roll on its own?  Boy this sounds similar to another run away at Lac-megantic (sp?).   We again say any location where trains are parked on a slope for what ever reason  needs to be protected by a split rail derail.  Our engineer friends can tell us how easy the possibility of air bleeding away especially in cold weather can happen.

What if this train instead had been one of the many petroleum trains that travels this line? 

[Brian Schmidt]

Investigators: CP grain train ‘started to move on its own’

CALGARY – Investigators with the Transportation Safety Board of Canada say the Canadian Pacific grain train that derailed in British Columbia on Monday, killing three railroaders, “started to move on its own” following a crew change...

http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2019/02/05-investigators-cp-grain-train-started-to-move-on-its-own

[NDG]

SD70Dude

I watched it as it was being broadcast live, with no issues.  Looks like CTV only gave the live broadcast, and has not permanently uploaded footage of the press conference.

The Global News link I posted is the first few minutes of the conference, the rest was Carmichael answering questions from reporters (some were indeed pretty dumb), most of his answers fell into the "we do not have that information yet" category, as I would expect at this early point in the investigation.

 

 

In the Live Broadcast when they went to the ' Phone In ' part of the programme, the gentleman said the train ' Had seventy-five 75 %  ( percent ) of it's Retainers set in the High Pressure Position.' 

 

Thank You.

[BaltACD]

SD70Dude

FYI, preliminary report into another runaway incident in cold weather, from last winter:

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/sur-safe/letter/rail/2018/r18e0007/r18e0007-617-04-18.asp

Pictures of the derailed cars indicated that they appeared to be of CP ownership.  With that being the case, I doubt that they have been in storage for any period of time during the harvest and shipping season.

[SD70Dude]

I watched it as it was being broadcast live, with no issues.  Looks like CTV only gave the live broadcast, and has not permanently uploaded footage of the press conference.

The Global News link I posted is the first few minutes of the conference, the rest was Carmichael answering questions from reporters (some were indeed pretty dumb), most of his answers fell into the "we do not have that information yet" category, as I would expect at this early point in the investigation.

[Overmod]

Still (1:25pm Central) nothing in the CTV clip 'window' for the conference that was to have been provided live at 11:00.  Some video from a TSB spokesman seems to be out in breaking news; I think this is the Eric Collard clip CTV previously ran, not something 'new' from the conference.  Perhaps one of you has better access to Canadian streaming video, or I'm missing something about how to access their link:

https://calgary.ctvnews.ca/video?clipId=373266#1603617

(you may have to unmute this via the control at the bottom of the frame once it has started)  At 2:00 Central this window went back to saying "there are no live events -- please check back later" so perhaps there was something running that I couldn't see.

  Apparently the train had been stopped for 2 hours when it 'started moving on its own' just as the crew had reboarded; they 'were not ready to take over' (or words to that effect). 

One newswoman tried to make something of the report that the train was exceeding the speed limit for the location where it derailed, which would be pathetic if it weren't so typical.

[SD70Dude]

FYI, preliminary report into another runaway incident in cold weather, from last winter:

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/sur-safe/letter/rail/2018/r18e0007/r18e0007-617-04-18.asp

[SD70Dude]

What the TSB knows so far:

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/rail/2019/r19c0015/r19c0015.asp?fbclid=IwAR3WNZGBxSBnCcSBjbY0rnF5mpTImFwX_203FC4ircSJauQ0FLBAGoXGQss

First part of the press conference, the TSB's statement:

https://globalnews.ca/news/4926096/field-train-derailment/

[caldreamer]

Lets waot to see what the black boxes tell investigators.  When they are recovered and analyzed they will provide a wealth of information.

     Caldreamer

[SD70Dude]

I thought the UP unit was a remote. 

CTV is now saying the conference will start at 1:00 PM ET (11:00 in Calgary).

Official Transport Canada blurb:

R19C0015
Date:
Occurrence Type:
Time:
ACCIDENT Accident/Incident Type: MAIN-TRACK TRAIN DERAILMENT
2019-02-04 01:00 Classification: BEING ASSESSED
Province: Nearest Town/City:
Subdivision Owner:
Subdivision Name:
BRITISH COLUMBIA YOHO
CP - CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY CO.
LAGGAN Subdivision Mileage: 130.60
Location:
Details:
DG Cars Involved:
Train Operator:
Yard Name:
0
CP - CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY CO.
DG Released: 0
Spur Name: Spur Mileage:
Injuries:
Fatal: 3 Serious: 0 Minor: 0
Occurrence Summary:
CP train traveling west on the Laggan Sub. with distributed power (1-1-1) and handling 112L, 14418T, 6677F, ran uncontrolled and
derailed 30-40 grain cars at Mile 130.6. Three employee fatalities reported by RCMP. One locomotive on its side in a creek. CP
hazmat team responding. Three TSB investigators deployed.

[Overmod]

SD70Dude

The lead locomotive is in the Kicking Horse River somewhere, I can't find it in any of the photos or footage.

The Calgary CTVnews site now has an aerial picture of the lead unit in the river; they note it fell 'over 60m' to get there.

There is a flag to WATCH LIVE AT 11: the TSB initial report will be presented.  As of 11:00 Central this morning the link is still 'black', leading me to suspect the presentation is only a couple of hours away if it hasn't already been done.

[BaltACD]

Brian Schmidt

CP CEO on fatal wreck: 'This is a tragedy'

FIELD, British Columbia — Canadian Pacific president and CEO Keith Creel called this week’s fatal derailment in British Columbia a “tragedy” and has vowed to figure out what caused a train to derail while descending Kicking Ho...

http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2019/02/05-cp-ceo-on-fatal-wreck-this-is-a-tragedy

From the video it appears that the train had a UP DPU locomotive in the middle of it.

[caldreamer]

When the train recorders are recoverd, it will tell the investigators what was goingon on the train.  You get a wealth ofinformation from tose black boxes.

     Caldreamer

 

[Brian Schmidt]

CP CEO on fatal wreck: 'This is a tragedy'

FIELD, British Columbia — Canadian Pacific president and CEO Keith Creel called this week’s fatal derailment in British Columbia a “tragedy” and has vowed to figure out what caused a train to derail while descending Kicking Ho...

http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2019/02/05-cp-ceo-on-fatal-wreck-this-is-a-tragedy

[blue streak 1]

2 pile ups in same area in three weeks?  Is this an indication that the trains are too long for this segment of RR travel?  The engineer is repored to have 20 + years experience so why?  One report I read said train was doing 60+ MPH but we will need to find out if that is true?

Frtunate the highway bridge was not damaged or taken out. 

[SD70Dude]

I too offer my thoughts, prayers, condolences, but none of those will bring back the dead.  RIP, and let us hope this never happens again. 

Some additional info:

https://calgary.ctvnews.ca/three-cp-rail-crew-members-killed-in-train-derailment-near-field-b-c-1.4281571

As in 1997 it looks like sections of the train derailed in several places, including underneath the Highway 1 overpass and directly in front of the Spiral Tunnels tourist lookout.  It is likely that there is wreckage piled up inside the tunnels too. 

From information posted on another forum it appears that this train had already run into issues, this crew had relieved the original crew online.  All this happened around 1:00 AM, with the temperature below -30°C.  The engineer and conductor were both killed on impact, the trainee lasted longer but died with the medics.  The lead locomotive is in the Kicking Horse River somewhere, I can't find it in any of the photos or footage.   

Their last report was that they were about to enter the Upper Spiral Tunnel at nearly 50 mph. 

[NDG]

 

FYI.

 

 

Means Diversion trains will run South from Calgary and West thru Crowsnest Pass (  Elev 4454 Feet )/Fort Steele/Kootenay Central/Golden and return as when train derailed in Spiral Tunnel a while back.

 

Cold.

Thank You.

[BaltACD]

Condolences to the families of those involved.  Virtually any 'hack' of a engineer can get his train to climb a mountain - eventually.  This incident high lights that the real skills of a engineer are demonstrated in getting trains down grades safely.

[AgentKid]

First off, I want to offer my condolences to the families of the crew members.

This is one tough place to run a railway. Unfortunately, the CPR has been paying the price to play in the big leagues for a 110 years now on The Big Hill.

Bruce