rdamon Powered hand-brakes would require a electricial trainline. Sounds like ECP can give you an option for both.
Powered hand-brakes would require a electricial trainline. Sounds like ECP can give you an option for both.
Specifially, the pneumatic locking cylinder would use air to hold it in the released position, against a spring loading. To apply it, you would vent the air from it, and the spring would apply the lock lever.
This system could be installed on equipment that does not have ECP brakes. It does not use pneumatic force to hold brakes set as a kind of backup brake like a motorized handbrake would. Instead, my system would use the automatic brake to apply full braking force, and then a small, additional pneumatic cylinder apply or release the locking lever. Once, locked, the automatic brake application could be fully released, left applied, or it could leak off. It would not be needed to hold the train secured in the parked condition.
This system would require a second train line to charge and release the locking cylinders.
BaltACDProperly applied hand brakes are not subject to leakage!
Of course the are not subject to leakage. My point was in comparing the parking brake to ECP brakes, not comparing the parking brake to handbrakes. With bad cylinder seals, they will gladly leak off no matter whether the brake system is conventional air brakes or ECP brakes. Hand brakes do not address that problem.
The pertinent point in comparing the parking brake to handbrakes (if I were to make that comparison) is the parking brake's ease of use. With it, you push a button and it is on throughout the train. Push another button and it is realeased.
With hand brakes, you spend a couple hours climbing around in the mountains to set the handbrakes, then you climb around again to release them. This makes people not want to secure a train with them unless they absolutely have to.
Euclid oltmannd Five grand or so gets you ECP. A "parking brake" for existing airbrake is throwing good money after bad. ECP brakes would not have prevented this wreck if it was caused by brake cylinder leakage due to cold weather affecting older or damaged cylinder packing cups. Whereas a parking brake would have prevented this wreck.
oltmannd Five grand or so gets you ECP. A "parking brake" for existing airbrake is throwing good money after bad.
ECP brakes would not have prevented this wreck if it was caused by brake cylinder leakage due to cold weather affecting older or damaged cylinder packing cups.
Whereas a parking brake would have prevented this wreck.
Properly applied hand brakes are not subject to leakage!
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
oltmanndFive grand or so gets you ECP. A "parking brake" for existing airbrake is throwing good money after bad.
BaltACD Shadow the Cats owner blue streak 1 Murphy Siding The thread above about this area of track being challenging says "the train was parked with the emergency brakes applied at Partridge siding". If the train was in the siding, wouldn't the switch be set against the train and have to be lined before a train could go through it? We know the locos could have run thru the switch breaking the control rod and all the rest of the train could run thru it easily. Now if the RR had been required to put a split rail derails on the down hill side of any siding over a certain slope the train would have piled up into a berm at a very slow speed! The same as Lac-Megantic! Would it cost? Yes of course especially in snow country. But what is the alternative? More accidents including another haz mat cargo? Much less costly than installing your brake system on all north American cars! I've been talking to a few mechanical engineers. They say if we used the brake chamber already on there and 1 extra valve that takes its signals from the exhaust and the aux res only the cost would be 2 grand per car to redo the entire fleet for materials. No extra brake systems required 1 valve one new brake cylinder that will be designed to allow switching without requiring air to be on the car and that's all folks. Only two grand a car - for half a million or more rail cars - we'll sign your boss up to finance the miracle changes and you can save the rail industry. Don't forget you design changes also have to work seamlessly with cars that have yet to be converted to your miracle changes. Once the AAR agrees and sets your standard it should only take 5 to 8 years to get the entire fleet equipped.
Shadow the Cats owner blue streak 1 Murphy Siding The thread above about this area of track being challenging says "the train was parked with the emergency brakes applied at Partridge siding". If the train was in the siding, wouldn't the switch be set against the train and have to be lined before a train could go through it? We know the locos could have run thru the switch breaking the control rod and all the rest of the train could run thru it easily. Now if the RR had been required to put a split rail derails on the down hill side of any siding over a certain slope the train would have piled up into a berm at a very slow speed! The same as Lac-Megantic! Would it cost? Yes of course especially in snow country. But what is the alternative? More accidents including another haz mat cargo? Much less costly than installing your brake system on all north American cars! I've been talking to a few mechanical engineers. They say if we used the brake chamber already on there and 1 extra valve that takes its signals from the exhaust and the aux res only the cost would be 2 grand per car to redo the entire fleet for materials. No extra brake systems required 1 valve one new brake cylinder that will be designed to allow switching without requiring air to be on the car and that's all folks.
blue streak 1 Murphy Siding The thread above about this area of track being challenging says "the train was parked with the emergency brakes applied at Partridge siding". If the train was in the siding, wouldn't the switch be set against the train and have to be lined before a train could go through it? We know the locos could have run thru the switch breaking the control rod and all the rest of the train could run thru it easily. Now if the RR had been required to put a split rail derails on the down hill side of any siding over a certain slope the train would have piled up into a berm at a very slow speed! The same as Lac-Megantic! Would it cost? Yes of course especially in snow country. But what is the alternative? More accidents including another haz mat cargo? Much less costly than installing your brake system on all north American cars!
Murphy Siding The thread above about this area of track being challenging says "the train was parked with the emergency brakes applied at Partridge siding". If the train was in the siding, wouldn't the switch be set against the train and have to be lined before a train could go through it?
The thread above about this area of track being challenging says "the train was parked with the emergency brakes applied at Partridge siding". If the train was in the siding, wouldn't the switch be set against the train and have to be lined before a train could go through it?
We know the locos could have run thru the switch breaking the control rod and all the rest of the train could run thru it easily. Now if the RR had been required to put a split rail derails on the down hill side of any siding over a certain slope the train would have piled up into a berm at a very slow speed! The same as Lac-Megantic!
Would it cost? Yes of course especially in snow country. But what is the alternative? More accidents including another haz mat cargo?
Much less costly than installing your brake system on all north American cars!
I've been talking to a few mechanical engineers. They say if we used the brake chamber already on there and 1 extra valve that takes its signals from the exhaust and the aux res only the cost would be 2 grand per car to redo the entire fleet for materials. No extra brake systems required 1 valve one new brake cylinder that will be designed to allow switching without requiring air to be on the car and that's all folks.
Only two grand a car - for half a million or more rail cars - we'll sign your boss up to finance the miracle changes and you can save the rail industry.
Don't forget you design changes also have to work seamlessly with cars that have yet to be converted to your miracle changes.
Once the AAR agrees and sets your standard it should only take 5 to 8 years to get the entire fleet equipped.
Five grand or so gets you ECP. A "parking brake" for existing airbrake is throwing good money after bad.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
tree68 Electroliner 1935 Can a locomotive pull more load up a grade than it can hold back. It would seem that tractive effort and/or braking force (wheel/rail interface) should be equivalent. If you're talking tractive effort and dynamic braking retarding, you're probably spot on. The coefficient of friction between the wheels and the rails should be similar. I've slipped on dynamics before (one locomotive, sizable train, slick rail). Throw in the train brakes and the story changes.
Electroliner 1935 Can a locomotive pull more load up a grade than it can hold back. It would seem that tractive effort and/or braking force (wheel/rail interface) should be equivalent.
Can a locomotive pull more load up a grade than it can hold back. It would seem that tractive effort and/or braking force (wheel/rail interface) should be equivalent.
If you're talking tractive effort and dynamic braking retarding, you're probably spot on. The coefficient of friction between the wheels and the rails should be similar. I've slipped on dynamics before (one locomotive, sizable train, slick rail).
Throw in the train brakes and the story changes.
Throw out effective Dynamic Brakes on the locomotive and the story really changes when speed gets above X MPH depending on the grade. The steeper the grade, the slower the speed at which air brakes alone can control the speed.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
I saw an interview with someone from TSB of Canada who spoke of the effect of cold temperature making it hard to get the brake pipe charged because the cold causes leakage of the glad hand gaskets. He said that difficulty in raising brake pipe pressure can lead to accidents.
He did not mention the effect of the cold temperature making the car brake cylinders leak and not hold their set. That problem could explain the failure of a limited brake application to hold the speed in check going down grade. Leaking glad hand gaskets would not have had the effect of reducing brake force, which apparently was the cause of this disaster.
I highly suspect that the abovementioned cylinder leakage caused the emergency application to release. I would inspect these brake cylinder packing cups for defects such as cracking or aging, and then test their performance at sub-zero temperatures:
https://www.wabtec.com/products/1269/brake-cylinder-packing-cups
Euclid SD70Dude If the train is already in emergency jump off, there is nothing more you can do at that point. But every situation is unique, and we will have to wait for the final report to find out exactly what happened. Yes, we don't know exactly what happened. I see some conflict in the news on some key points. One report says the emergency application was a UDE. But in the scenario where you are on the train and it is in emergency with no recharging underway; and the train suddenly and unexpectedly loses its emergency application and beings to roll: I would get off and let it go. But I am just wondering if that is the action that the company would recommend under that circumstance.
SD70Dude If the train is already in emergency jump off, there is nothing more you can do at that point. But every situation is unique, and we will have to wait for the final report to find out exactly what happened.
Yes, we don't know exactly what happened. I see some conflict in the news on some key points. One report says the emergency application was a UDE.
But in the scenario where you are on the train and it is in emergency with no recharging underway; and the train suddenly and unexpectedly loses its emergency application and beings to roll: I would get off and let it go.
But I am just wondering if that is the action that the company would recommend under that circumstance.
In my experience most of the company would have denied that such a thing was possible, until now.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
SD70Dude,
Thanks for your thorough, complete, and clear responses to my questions regarding emergency braking.
SD70DudeIf the train is already in emergency jump off, there is nothing more you can do at that point. But every situation is unique, and we will have to wait for the final report to find out exactly what happened.
But I am just wondering if that is the action that the company would recommend under that circumstance. It seems that they would have to agree.
JPS1 SD70Dude If the train is already in emergency jump off, there is nothing more you can do at that point. What does it mean to put a freight train in emergency?
SD70Dude If the train is already in emergency jump off, there is nothing more you can do at that point.
What does it mean to put a freight train in emergency?
To open the "big hole", that is drop the train's brake pipe pressure to 0 PSI very quickly. This has the effect of directing all the air from both the auxiliary and emergency reservoirs (only the auxiliary reservoir's supply is used for normal braking) on each car to that car's brake cylinder, once the emergency application has taken hold the pressures in both reservoirs and the cylinder will be the same, that is the maximum braking effort possible at that time has been applied.
JPS1 Is an emergency condition for a freight train different than for a passenger train?
Is an emergency condition for a freight train different than for a passenger train?
Passenger air brakes are a bit different but work basically the same way. The rules require a full inspection of a passenger train after an emergency application, which is not always the case for freight trains.
Due to the light weight of passenger cars an emergency application is more likely to lock up brakes and skid wheels, compared to loaded freight cars (empties skid too). Some passenger cars may have an anti-lock braking system.
JPS1 What are the risks associated with putting the train in emergency?
What are the risks associated with putting the train in emergency?
Every car brakes a bit differently due to wear, tear and leaks on its braking system. Long trains also have lots of slack, and run-ins or run-outs can be very violent. Loaded and empty cars also brake differently (empties tend to dig in hard, loads not so much). The effect on a long, moving train is that different parts of the train brake harder than others, and slack action can result in broken knuckles or drawbars, and in some cases even cause a derailment (a big cut of loads runs into some empties marshalled ahead of them and pops one off).
JPS1 What steps are required to recover assuming the train stopped satisfactorily without an accident?
What steps are required to recover assuming the train stopped satisfactorily without an accident?
If you are on a section of track where the locomotive brakes alone can hold the train stopped (most areas, except of course for steep grades) wait 60 seconds, place the automatic brake valve to release, ensure the PC light/indicator goes out, and see if air pressure comes up on the tail end gauge. If it doesn't then send the conductor out for a walk.
If you are on a grade where the locomotive brakes alone will not hold the train send the conductor out to apply a sufficient number of handbrakes and/or retainers, the rulebook and local instructions will specify the minimum number (and if they didn't before they sure will now), more may end up being needed. Once the handbrakes/retainers are set follow the instructions in my first paragraph. If the train starts to move put it in emergency again and apply more handbrakes.
Proceed once the train is recharged. In some cases it may be better to leave the handbrakes and/or retainers applied until you reach flatter territory. DO NOT move the train with handbrakes set on empty cars, they will skid the wheels.
Some situations require the conductor to get off and inspect the train even if the air comes back up and you do not need handbrakes/retainers. In many cases all you have to do is wait for the brake pipe pressure to rise enough to release all the brakes, and then proceed.
Paul_D_North Jr Euclid I have this question: If a new crew takes over a train standing on a steep, long grade; and unexpectedly, the train begins to roll with brakes released, what should the crew do according to the rules? It is truly a life threatening situation, and there is the option of not taking the risk by simply getting off the train before its speed rises. Cleary, the train is out of control. The cars in this incident were were stored for more than a year, and then bought used from Public Service Co. of Oklahoma. Post-incident investigation concluded that they were not properly inspected and tested before being placed back into service, and that both the brake cylinders and hand brakes were defective on almost half of the fleet. As such, this scenario should not be typical, though evidently it did happen a couple times on the recent runaways with stored cars in British Columbia that are linked earlier in this thread. Further, the temperatures were in the -20 to - 22 deg. C range, which was a contributing factor. Interestingly, Appendix B (page 15 of the report, 16/ 16 of the PDF version) is a table of how many handbrakes need to be applied for various torques on the handbrake wheel, and various grades, per 100 cars. For example, for a 1.3% grade and 80 ft.-lbs. (the value used in the report, pgs. 4 - 5 = 5 - 6 in the PDF), and a 112 car train (coincidentally the same number as in this incident), the number of handbrakes to be applied is 57. Do the math from the table for a 2.2% grade (if that's what it was where this train was stopped), and the number of handbrakes is about 86 per 100 cars, or 96 brakes for 112 cars - only 16 wouldn't be applied! - PDN.
Euclid I have this question: If a new crew takes over a train standing on a steep, long grade; and unexpectedly, the train begins to roll with brakes released, what should the crew do according to the rules? It is truly a life threatening situation, and there is the option of not taking the risk by simply getting off the train before its speed rises. Cleary, the train is out of control.
I have this question:
If a new crew takes over a train standing on a steep, long grade; and unexpectedly, the train begins to roll with brakes released, what should the crew do according to the rules?
It is truly a life threatening situation, and there is the option of not taking the risk by simply getting off the train before its speed rises. Cleary, the train is out of control.
The cars in this incident were were stored for more than a year, and then bought used from Public Service Co. of Oklahoma. Post-incident investigation concluded that they were not properly inspected and tested before being placed back into service, and that both the brake cylinders and hand brakes were defective on almost half of the fleet. As such, this scenario should not be typical, though evidently it did happen a couple times on the recent runaways with stored cars in British Columbia that are linked earlier in this thread. Further, the temperatures were in the -20 to - 22 deg. C range, which was a contributing factor.
Also note what the TSB had to say about the type of air brake design used on the ex-Oklahoma ore cars:
"LIM cars are equipped with truck-mounted brakes that consist of 4 brake cylinders. The truck side frames conceal these cylinders, which cannot be examined unless the inspector bends down to look under the car body and through the side frames. It is therefore difficult for an inspector to observe the cylinder-piston position to verify if the brakes are applied. In comparison, QNS&L cars are equipped with body-mounted brakes, which have a single cylinder clearly visible in the centre of the car."
The cylindrical Canadian government grain hoppers also feature truck-mounted air brakes, and have been known for years to brake poorly compared to other cars. It is indeed a pain to do air tests on a train of truck-mounted air brakes.
Another factor which may have contributed to the 2011 QNSL runaway is the handbrake design, on many cars with truck-mounted air brakes the handbrake only works on one truck. This should not have contributed to this most recent Field Hill runaway, the handbrakes on government grain hoppers work on both trucks.
SD70DudeIf the train is already in emergency jump off, there is nothing more you can do at that point.
If the train is not yet in emergency take more air and try to stop it, which may require putting it in emergency. Then secure the train appropriately before attempting to recover and recharge.
If the train is already in emergency jump off, there is nothing more you can do at that point.
But every situation is unique, and we will have to wait for the final report to find out exactly what happened.
It sounds like hand brakes were never applied and retainers were not set. But it also sounds like the train was having a braking problem before it was stopped by the crew making an emergency application.
The symptoms described of not being able to hold the train at the prescribed speed, and the engineer’s response to that circumstance by making an emergency application are exactly what happened in the runaway on the Quebec North Shore & Labrador RR some years back. And then in that runaway, as in the case of this CP runaway, the train began to roll away some time after the emergency application had been made. Except in the case of the QNS&L runaway, the engineer had set many handbrakes prior to the train starting to roll away. The problem there was that many of the handbrakes were bad order and did not apply enough retardation.
However, the actual primary cause of the QNS&L incident was not a failure of handbrakes, but rather a failure of the brake cylinders to hold pressure due to leaking seals. This is what caused the initial problem of not being able to control the train speed coming down the grade. Making an emergency application was able to overwhelm the cylinder leakage, but only for a limited time; and then the train lost its emergency application due to the cylinder leakage.
In the case of this CP runaway, the same details have been stated. Service brake application was not holding and the engineer made an emergency application and stopped the train. Then two hours later, the emergency application leaked off and the train rolled away.
If that is what happened, setting enough handbrakes within the 2 hour time window would have held the train—if the handbrakes were in good order. But the question that I am left with is this:
What was the plan for the new crew once they took over? That is assuming that the train had remained stopped until that point in time. The previous crew had experienced a braking failure when running down the grade. It seems to me that the braking failure while running would have been a major red flag, and that the train would not be allowed to proceed until the braking failure problem was resolved. Temporarily securing the train with handbrakes, while necessary, would have been secondary to the issue of why normal braking was unable to hold the speed down as required.
The Canadian Transportation Agency(regulator) has issued an order since this accident requiring at least 25 handbrakes be applied in addition to setting the Retainers to the High Pressure position on 75% of the cars, it applies to both CP and CN, if they have to make an Emergency Brake application to control and stop the train on a Mountain grade. According to a recent report the relieved crew applied the Emergency brakes when the train exceeded the 15mph allowed speed. The same report said that train speed reached 20mph before the Emergency Brake application began to slow and then stopped the train.
Paul, the CP TT I have in front of me is from 2012. No guarantees that what I'm about to say hasn't changed since then. It shows that from MP 126 (just east of the east switch at Partridge) down to Field, westbounds with 100 tons or more per operative brake must not exceed 15mph. All other westbounds 20mph.
I wonder what the Tons Per Operable Brake (car) rule is for that CP territory. Since the wrecked train was 16,000+ tons for 112 cars, I surmise they were 286K/ 143 ton cars for the most part.
About 10 years back (I haven't looked since then) Norfolk Southern (and ConRail before that) prohibited any train with an average of over 140 TPOB - essentially any train with a large number of 286K cars - on Track 1 eastward from the New Portage Tunnel on the East Slope from Gallitzin summit (above Horseshoe Curve). There was about 1.1 miles of 2.36% grade as I recall, known as "The Slide". Any such train had to use 1 of the other 2 tracks, where the max grade was 1.86% (again as I recall). All trains were limited to 12 MPH, and those over 100 TPOB were restricted to 8 MPH. On any of the tracks, a certain number of retainers were required if the necessary number of dynamic brakes were not operating, the locomotives lacked the pressure maintaining air brake feature, or in other special circumstances.
I know CP is not NS, and 8 or 12 MPH is not practical - and perhaps not necessary - on the CP line. But I wonder how the high TPOB is taken into account - maybe by the DB requirements?
- PDN.
Sorry, Bruce - didn't know it was you!
Paul_D_North_Jrby a Bruce Matthews
Ask for the Bruce Matthews!
Accept no substitute.
Bruce
So shovel the coal, let this rattler roll.
"A Train is a Place Going Somewhere" CP Rail Public Timetable
"O. S. Irricana"
. . . __ . ______
Bruce KellyThe employee timetable goes into tremendous detail about the required speed and braking procedures at various locations for westbounds descending that hill. According to what I'm reading, that train, having been in emergency application at Partridge, in temperatures hovering near zero degrees F, should have had hand brakes set on "at least 75 percent of the cars" and retainers set "to the HP position on at least 75 percent of the loaded cars." That should have secured the train while the crew could release and recharge the air. According to the TSB report on Feb 5, "There were no hand brakes applied on the train." If what the TSB said is true, those three employees climbed aboard a runaway train in the making, just in time for its emergency air to bleed off, nothing else holding it down, all because a critical safety procedure that should have been performed earlier got ignored or overlooked.
My understanding of the US HOS law is that actions that are required to protect 'Public Safety' (such as, but not limited to, tying on hand brakes to secure trains) are allowable functions for employees to exceed the HOS. I have no understanding of how the Canadian HOS regulations are stated or applied.
If the original crew placed the train in Emergency, without applying hand brakes, they are the party responsible for the runaway. The issue then becomes, was the relief crew notified of the circumstance under which the train had been stopped? Was the Dispatcher notified of the condition of the train? Did the original crew place any notes concerning the condition of the train on the control stand for the relief crew to read. The train, as it was left was a trap waiting to be sprung by putting air back on the train.
CP has issued a bulletin containing new instructions on how to recover from an emergency brake application on a mountain grade:
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1eF2COQ7YrMFtPi5StH812xniBhaLwSMy/view
Note that the engineer must recover and begin recharging the train immediately after the handbrakes and retainers have been applied.
The employee timetable goes into tremendous detail about the required speed and braking procedures at various locations for westbounds descending that hill. According to what I'm reading, that train, having been in emergency application at Partridge, in temperatures hovering near zero degrees F, should have had hand brakes set on "at least 75 percent of the cars" and retainers set "to the HP position on at least 75 percent of the loaded cars." That should have secured the train while the crew could release and recharge the air. According to the TSB report on Feb 5, "There were no hand brakes applied on the train." If what the TSB said is true, those three employees climbed aboard a runaway train in the making, just in time for its emergency air to bleed off, nothing else holding it down, all because a critical safety procedure that should have been performed earlier got ignored or overlooked.
I haven't seen anyone point out that Positive Train Control wouldn't have prevented this tragedy.
PTC might have at least warned and stopped an oncoming (or slow-moving preceding train), though. Fortunately, that wasn't the case here.
Brian SchmidtCP CEO on fatal wreck: 'This is a tragedy' FIELD, British Columbia — Canadian Pacific president and CEO Keith Creel called this week’s fatal derailment in British Columbia a “tragedy” and has vowed to figure out what caused a train to derail while descending Kicking Ho... http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2019/02/05-cp-ceo-on-fatal-wreck-this-is-a-tragedy
FIELD, British Columbia — Canadian Pacific president and CEO Keith Creel called this week’s fatal derailment in British Columbia a “tragedy” and has vowed to figure out what caused a train to derail while descending Kicking Ho...
http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2019/02/05-cp-ceo-on-fatal-wreck-this-is-a-tragedy
EuclidHere is a runaway caused by brake cylinder leakage on the QNS&L. The engineer found that service applications were not holding on a descending grade, so he made an emergency application and stopped. He got off to set hand brakes and after an hour or so, the emergency application released due to leakage past the piston seals in many of the brake cylinders. The train began to roll because many of the hand brakes also failed to hold it due to hand brake mechanisms being poorly maintained. The engineer was able to get back on the engines as they went past him, and he was able to control the runaway until it eventually stopped below the grade. So there were two different braking defects; one that defeated the initial emergency application, and another that defeated the handbrake securement backup. http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2011/r11q0056/r11q0056.pdf
So there were two different braking defects; one that defeated the initial emergency application, and another that defeated the handbrake securement backup.
http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2011/r11q0056/r11q0056.pdf
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