SD70Dude Overmod NDG Wreck Video. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/video-derailment-canadian-pacific-railway-field-1.5449758 CBC seems to think this is amaze-O new information. Not sure it adds anything much to the original (Globe and Mail-sourced; interestingly no longer available) footage mentioned in the original Newswire post and commented on early in this thread -- the anomalous UP DPU mentioned there, too. I hadn't previously seen that video, and I work for a railroad. Most of the general public will have forgotten about the crash by now, so it is not surprising that the news will present it as new information. The article has been updated with the information that the lead TSB investigator, Don Crawford, has been demoted in response to his comments to the media, calling for a RCMP investigation. Crawford started out his railroad career as a brakeman on CN's Alberta Coal Branch, a mountain railroad if there ever was one, and worked his way up to become a Engine Service Officer (CNese for Road Foreman of Engines). He knows what he is talking about. I have it on good authority that the TSB will soon be releasing their report into another runaway caused by air brake failure, which occurred about 2 years ago on the CN ACB. Crawford was also in charge of this investigation.
Overmod NDG Wreck Video. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/video-derailment-canadian-pacific-railway-field-1.5449758 CBC seems to think this is amaze-O new information. Not sure it adds anything much to the original (Globe and Mail-sourced; interestingly no longer available) footage mentioned in the original Newswire post and commented on early in this thread -- the anomalous UP DPU mentioned there, too.
NDG Wreck Video. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/video-derailment-canadian-pacific-railway-field-1.5449758
I hadn't previously seen that video, and I work for a railroad. Most of the general public will have forgotten about the crash by now, so it is not surprising that the news will present it as new information.
The article has been updated with the information that the lead TSB investigator, Don Crawford, has been demoted in response to his comments to the media, calling for a RCMP investigation.
Crawford started out his railroad career as a brakeman on CN's Alberta Coal Branch, a mountain railroad if there ever was one, and worked his way up to become a Engine Service Officer (CNese for Road Foreman of Engines). He knows what he is talking about.
I have it on good authority that the TSB will soon be releasing their report into another runaway caused by air brake failure, which occurred about 2 years ago on the CN ACB. Crawford was also in charge of this investigation.
The pile of mangled equipment, not to mention the deaths of the employees, is the prima facia evidence of there being negligence. The real question is who's negligence was it?
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
Being that I retired from CSX and their AC 'heavy' locomotives are shown as weighing in at 432K - that I why I stated 700 tons for the 3 locomotives.
BaltACD cx500 The grade in the area is roughly 2% downhill, and the train weight was something around 15,000 tons. Only three units, only one of which was in the lead position. I don't know but the emergency application may have superseded the independent setting. And the DPUs would have to be reset after the emergency application.
cx500 The grade in the area is roughly 2% downhill, and the train weight was something around 15,000 tons. Only three units, only one of which was in the lead position. I don't know but the emergency application may have superseded the independent setting. And the DPUs would have to be reset after the emergency application.
NDGWreck Video. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/video-derailment-canadian-pacific-railway-field-1.5449758
Thank You.
cx500The grade in the area is roughly 2% downhill, and the train weight was something around 15,000 tons. Only three units, only one of which was in the lead position. I don't know but the emergency application may have superseded the independent setting. And the DPUs would have to be reset after the emergency application.
Pesuming that all 3 units had their brakes fully applied - no matter where they were located in the train - 15K tons of train will drag 700 tons of locomotives down a 2% grade with ease - as the derailment showed.
The grade in the area is roughly 2% downhill, and the train weight was something around 15,000 tons. Only three units, only one of which was in the lead position. I don't know but the emergency application may have superseded the independent setting. And the DPUs would have to be reset after the emergency application.
Paul_D_North_JrWas the grade in this CP incident so steep that all of the locomotives - lead and DPUs - would not have been able to hold it with the independent brakes in full application?
We've asked this specific question before, and I don't remember the answer ever being an unqualified 'yes' (although the unanswered companion question, how you hold the train while releasing and recharging the service brakes to continue, is an interesting one).
The principal issue for me is that even a slight amount of acceleration before applying the independent brake will likely result in the independent not being able to hold the train, and the effect of heating on composition shoes will appear before the 23mph or so that is the advent of runaway brake fade on the whole consist on this magnitude of downgrade -- how much earlier being calculable, but not that useful.+
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/cp-derailment-investigation-coverup-alleged-1.5436018
BaltACD SD70Dude CN and CP are pushing back against the latest handbrake rules: http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2019/03/09-cp-cn-to-appeal-canadian-government-rule-on-use-of-handbrakes Keith 'Runaway' Creel
SD70Dude CN and CP are pushing back against the latest handbrake rules: http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2019/03/09-cp-cn-to-appeal-canadian-government-rule-on-use-of-handbrakes
http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2019/03/09-cp-cn-to-appeal-canadian-government-rule-on-use-of-handbrakes
Keith 'Runaway' Creel
In the story, an overbearing official ordered the train to go down the hill even though there was some doubt about the brakes. The conductor said to him something like "If we get to the bottom, one of us is going to be out of a job. But I think we'll be switching cars in Hell instead." The runaway was slowed enough to get back under control when a light engine running ahead slowed enough to couple up and supply its air.
I first saw it in the old Railroad magazine, edited by Freeman H. Hubbard, Vol 101, No.4, Feb, 1977, pg. 34 (see http://www.philsp.com/homeville/GFI/t730.htm ). It was originally published in The Saturday Evening Post, Jan. 13, 1934.
I also have it in a copy of of an anthology titled "Open Throttle":
Open Throttle: Stories of Railroads and Railroad Men (1966), Phyllis R. Fenner, Editor - a great collection of 10 fiction stories, including one of the best by the dean of railroad fiction writers, Harry C. Bedwell - "Smart Boomer", featuring his legendary character, telegrapher/ station operator Eddie Sand. My personal favorite is the one about a runaway on a mountain railroad - "Imperial Pass" by Bedwell, which does not include Eddie Sand - see:
https://openlibrary.org/works/OL9338299W/Open_Throttle
http://www.abebooks.com/Open-Throttle-Stories-Railroads-Railroad-Men/5425906490/bd
- PDN.
Was the grade in this CP incident so steep that all of the locomotives - lead and DPUs - would not have been able to hold it with the independent brakes in full application?
Is there anything that would have prevented that action?
Paul_D_North_JrFrom my post on page 3 about a month ago (thurs., Feb. 7 at 7:38 PM): Interestingly, Appendix B (page 15 of the report, 16/ 16 of the PDF version*) is a table of how many handbrakes need to be applied for various torques on the handbrake wheel, and various grades, per 100 cars. For example, for a 1.3% grade and 80 ft.-lbs. (the value used in the report, pgs. 4 - 5 = 5 - 6 in the PDF), and a 112 car train (coincidentally the same number as in this incident), the number of handbrakes to be applied is 57. Do the math from the table for a 2.2% grade (if that's what it was where this train was stopped), and the number of handbrakes is about 86 per 100 cars, or 96 brakes for 112 cars - only 16 wouldn't be applied! * http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2011/r11q0056/r11q0056.pdf Comparing this to the table that SD70Dude posted above - for a 2.2% grade and 16,000+ tons, that table would require 112 hand brakes to be applied - which would be the entire train! Wonder how long it would take 1 guy - the conductor - to do that in a couple feet of snow in sub-zero weather - and then do it all over again to release them? A wild guess at 1 minute per car (optimistic, for sure - YMMV) would yield it taking about 2 hours each way - and then walking back . . . Makes the case for equipping at least unit trains with ECP brakes a little more compelling. Let's see how an autonomous train would cope with this scenario. - PDN.
Interestingly, Appendix B (page 15 of the report, 16/ 16 of the PDF version*) is a table of how many handbrakes need to be applied for various torques on the handbrake wheel, and various grades, per 100 cars. For example, for a 1.3% grade and 80 ft.-lbs. (the value used in the report, pgs. 4 - 5 = 5 - 6 in the PDF), and a 112 car train (coincidentally the same number as in this incident), the number of handbrakes to be applied is 57. Do the math from the table for a 2.2% grade (if that's what it was where this train was stopped), and the number of handbrakes is about 86 per 100 cars, or 96 brakes for 112 cars - only 16 wouldn't be applied!
* http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2011/r11q0056/r11q0056.pdf
Comparing this to the table that SD70Dude posted above - for a 2.2% grade and 16,000+ tons, that table would require 112 hand brakes to be applied - which would be the entire train!
Wonder how long it would take 1 guy - the conductor - to do that in a couple feet of snow in sub-zero weather - and then do it all over again to release them? A wild guess at 1 minute per car (optimistic, for sure - YMMV) would yield it taking about 2 hours each way - and then walking back . . . Makes the case for equipping at least unit trains with ECP brakes a little more compelling.
Let's see how an autonomous train would cope with this scenario.
With the rules and TTSI that were in effect on the CSX Mountain Sub. during my employment - when it was communicated that a train had gone into emergency on one of the subs grades - no matter the cause - the first thing the Chief Dispatcher did was to order a recrew for the train - it was a foregone conclusion, that in securing the train and finding the problem if any and then releasing hand brakes that the original crew would not complete their run without exceeding HOS.
From my post on page 3 about a month ago (thurs., Feb. 7 at 7:38 PM):
eVEN THOUGH ALL OF THE CLASS 1 RAILROADS WANT TO RUN LONGER HEAVIER TRAINS, THE ONLY SOLUTION THAT i SEE TO PREVENT ACCIDENTS IN THE KICKING HORSE PASS IS FOR CP TO BREAK A LONG TRAIN JUST EAST AND WEST OF THE PASS AND RUN TRAINS WITH LESS TRAILING TONNAGE AND AT REDUCED SPEEDS . THI SWILL PREVENT RUN AWAYS AND DEATHS ON THE PAS.
cALDREAMER
jeffhergert Thunderhawk I recall someone brought up dynamic holding and dynos dropping out in an emergency application. CP units were originally set up to drop out the dynos when the train went in emergency. This was changed to dynamic holding meaning they would still work for a time even after the PCS tripped due to losing the air. However, as I recall, this did not hold forever. Meaning a stopped train with the PCS tripped would not have dynamics. Or if the engineer put the throttle in idle then went back to dyno he would not have them. One would have to release the brakes to recover the PCS giving you dynos again. I've been told that when in emergency it's possible to recover the PCS and regain dynamic braking without releasing the emergency application. After being in emergency two minutes, place the automatic handle in "handle off" position. This won't release the emergency application but will allow the PCS to reset. I can't say whether or not that will work, just what I was told. Jeff
Thunderhawk I recall someone brought up dynamic holding and dynos dropping out in an emergency application. CP units were originally set up to drop out the dynos when the train went in emergency. This was changed to dynamic holding meaning they would still work for a time even after the PCS tripped due to losing the air. However, as I recall, this did not hold forever. Meaning a stopped train with the PCS tripped would not have dynamics. Or if the engineer put the throttle in idle then went back to dyno he would not have them. One would have to release the brakes to recover the PCS giving you dynos again.
I recall someone brought up dynamic holding and dynos dropping out in an emergency application. CP units were originally set up to drop out the dynos when the train went in emergency. This was changed to dynamic holding meaning they would still work for a time even after the PCS tripped due to losing the air. However, as I recall, this did not hold forever. Meaning a stopped train with the PCS tripped would not have dynamics. Or if the engineer put the throttle in idle then went back to dyno he would not have them. One would have to release the brakes to recover the PCS giving you dynos again.
I've been told that when in emergency it's possible to recover the PCS and regain dynamic braking without releasing the emergency application. After being in emergency two minutes, place the automatic handle in "handle off" position. This won't release the emergency application but will allow the PCS to reset. I can't say whether or not that will work, just what I was told.
Jeff
SD70dude For a conventional train (all units on the head end) Jeff's answer will work. DP complicates things, recovering from an emergency application takes longer and has more steps. First, make sure to hit the "brake valve out" and "set out" buttons in that order for all remotes. Then set them to "normal" just before releasing the automatic. If you do not do this the remote will go into emergency again when it senses the brake pipe pressure rise. In my experience the remote PC icon only goes away once it senses the rise in brake pipe pressure. At Partridge, if the engineer had moved the automatic handle from "emergency" to "handle off" he probably would have had working dynamics on the lead unit, but not on the two remotes.
For a conventional train (all units on the head end) Jeff's answer will work.
DP complicates things, recovering from an emergency application takes longer and has more steps.
First, make sure to hit the "brake valve out" and "set out" buttons in that order for all remotes. Then set them to "normal" just before releasing the automatic. If you do not do this the remote will go into emergency again when it senses the brake pipe pressure rise.
In my experience the remote PC icon only goes away once it senses the rise in brake pipe pressure.
At Partridge, if the engineer had moved the automatic handle from "emergency" to "handle off" he probably would have had working dynamics on the lead unit, but not on the two remotes.
I did a couple tests on different types of units at work, and discovered that I was not entirely correct when I wrote the above post.
On units with mechanical air brake stands (26L and 30CDW, found on our SD75, Dash-9 and older units) the PC goes away as soon as the automatic handle is moved from "emergency" to "handle off". At that point the locomotive will operate normally, even though the brake pipe pressure is still at 0 PSI.
In the same scenario newer units with electronic air brake controls will not recover the PC until the automatic handle is moved to "release" and the equalizing reservoir pressures rises to around 50-55 PSI.
I also neglected to list the procedure for recovering the PC on DP remotes without releasing the train air brakes: Over-Reduction. CN's procedure is as follows:
1. Press "brake valve out" and "set out" for all remotes.
2. Have the Conductor close the angle cock behind the lead locomotive consist (or lead portion of the train, if he is back changing a knuckle or air hose).
3. Recover emergency on lead locomotive, then immediately reduce equalizing reservoir (and brake pipe) pressure to 50 PSI.
4. Set all remotes to "normal".
5. Tell the Conductor to cut the air in to the train. Verify that the PC icon goes away for all remotes and the tail end pressure rises (if you have an EOT). At this point the Conductor can return to the head end.
The principle behind this is that cars that have gone into emergency braking from a fully or close to fully charged train should have over 70 PSI in the brake cylinder and both reservoirs. To trigger a release the brake pipe pressure must rise above the brake cylinder pressure at the car.
Some of our grades have specific instructions on how to secure, recover and recharge a train that had stopped in emergency. The mountain-grade lines I formerly worked on did not. It was up to the crew to decide how many handbrakes or retainers to apply, if any.
Since the Field wreck both CP and CN have issued bulletins requiring that trains stopped on steep grades due to poor braking must immediately be secured with handbrakes, whether or not the train is in emergency. This also applies if the train went into emergency for any other reason. The minimum number of handbrakes to be applied is outlined in the chart found in Rule 112. This copy of the chart is from last year, I can't remember if it has been revised since:
Euclid BaltACD TTSI for CSX Mountain Sub (Between Cumberland and Grafton) from 2015 Timetable. 2. All Trains – If speed cannot be maintained at or below the authorized speed for the train descending the grades listed above: A. The train must be stopped immediately by making an emergency brake application of the air brakes including the operation of the two-way EOT emergency toggle switch. B. The train dispatcher must be contacted. C. After stopping a minimum of 50% of train hand brakes must be applied before the recharging procedure is initiated. Does CN and CP have rules essentially identical to the CSX rules? We are told that the CP train was unable to control its speed, so they made an emergency application and stopped. We are told that they then did something like inspect/repair the brake system. Next thing we hear is that the relieving crew is on the train and the emergency application suddenly, unexpectedly releases, and the train begins to roll. Was the setting of handbrakes required after that emergency application was made to stop the train, which was out of control? If so, was the setting of handbrakes carried out at that point?
BaltACD TTSI for CSX Mountain Sub (Between Cumberland and Grafton) from 2015 Timetable. 2. All Trains – If speed cannot be maintained at or below the authorized speed for the train descending the grades listed above: A. The train must be stopped immediately by making an emergency brake application of the air brakes including the operation of the two-way EOT emergency toggle switch. B. The train dispatcher must be contacted. C. After stopping a minimum of 50% of train hand brakes must be applied before the recharging procedure is initiated.
TTSI for CSX Mountain Sub (Between Cumberland and Grafton) from 2015 Timetable.
2. All Trains – If speed cannot be maintained at or below the authorized speed for the train descending the grades listed above: A. The train must be stopped immediately by making an emergency brake application of the air brakes including the operation of the two-way EOT emergency toggle switch. B. The train dispatcher must be contacted. C. After stopping a minimum of 50% of train hand brakes must be applied before the recharging procedure is initiated.
2. All Trains – If speed cannot be maintained at or below the authorized speed for the train descending the grades listed above:
A. The train must be stopped immediately by making an emergency brake application of the air brakes including the operation of the two-way EOT emergency toggle switch.
B. The train dispatcher must be contacted.
C. After stopping a minimum of 50% of train hand brakes must be applied before the recharging procedure is initiated.
Does CN and CP have rules essentially identical to the CSX rules? We are told that the CP train was unable to control its speed, so they made an emergency application and stopped. We are told that they then did something like inspect/repair the brake system. Next thing we hear is that the relieving crew is on the train and the emergency application suddenly, unexpectedly releases, and the train begins to roll.
Was the setting of handbrakes required after that emergency application was made to stop the train, which was out of control? If so, was the setting of handbrakes carried out at that point?
I have no idea of the CN and CP current rules. From the push back from Keith Creel and CN about the Transport Canada emergency order - I don't think their rules are similar.
5559 STEEP GRADE (1% OR MORE) TRAIN HANDLING 1. Unit Trains: For head-end movement only, the allowable speed is 15 MPH while descending the following grades:BA 207.8 and BA 223.0 - Seventeen Mile GradeBA 242.3 and BA 252.3 - Cranberry GradeBA 255.1 and BA 259.3 - Cheat River GradeBA 262.0 and BA 267.4 - Newburg Grade 2. All Trains – If speed cannot be maintained at or below the authorized speed for the train descending the grades listed above: A. The train must be stopped immediately by making an emergency brake application of the air brakes including the operation of the two-way EOT emergency toggle switch. B. The train dispatcher must be contacted. C. After stopping a minimum of 50% of train hand brakes must be applied before the recharging procedure is initiated. D. The brake pipe must be recharged for a minimum of 20 minutes. The rear car air pressure must be within 5 PSI of the pressure shown on the HTD when the head end of the train began the descent. E. After recharging the air brake system to the required rear car air pressure, a 6 to 8 pounds brake pipe reduction must be made. After the brake pipe exhaust ceases, each car will be visually inspected to determine the brakes are applied, piston travel is within standards and brake shoes are against each wheel. F. The train may proceed only after being authorized by the Road Foreman of Engines or the Trainmaster. If needed, hand brakes may be left on the train to supplement train air brakes descending the remainder of the grade. To prevent sliding of wheels, avoid leaving hand brakes on any empty cars. Note: Should the train separate, hand brakes must be applied to each portion of the train to hold each section on the grade. G. Stopped on Grades – When recharging the train air brake system on descending grades of 1% or more, recharge the brake system for a minimum of 20 minutes. Note: During temperatures less than 32 degrees or inclement weather, additional charging time may be required. Trains must not proceed until the brake pipe is properly charged.
1. Unit Trains:
For head-end movement only, the allowable speed is 15 MPH while descending the following grades:BA 207.8 and BA 223.0 - Seventeen Mile GradeBA 242.3 and BA 252.3 - Cranberry GradeBA 255.1 and BA 259.3 - Cheat River GradeBA 262.0 and BA 267.4 - Newburg Grade
D. The brake pipe must be recharged for a minimum of 20 minutes. The rear car air pressure must be within 5 PSI of the pressure shown on the HTD when the head end of the train began the descent.
E. After recharging the air brake system to the required rear car air pressure, a 6 to 8 pounds brake pipe reduction must be made. After the brake pipe exhaust ceases, each car will be visually inspected to determine the brakes are applied, piston travel is within standards and brake shoes are against each wheel.
F. The train may proceed only after being authorized by the Road Foreman of Engines or the Trainmaster. If needed, hand brakes may be left on the train to supplement train air brakes descending the remainder of the grade. To prevent sliding of wheels, avoid leaving hand brakes on any empty cars.
Note: Should the train separate, hand brakes must be applied to each portion of the train to hold each section on the grade.
G. Stopped on Grades – When recharging the train air brake system on descending grades of 1% or more, recharge the brake system for a minimum of 20 minutes.
Note: During temperatures less than 32 degrees or inclement weather, additional charging time may be required.
Trains must not proceed until the brake pipe is properly charged.
It seems like we need a few details to fill out this story:
What rules pertained to the operation leading up to this runaway?
What would the new rules have required leading up this runaway?
Had the emergency application not released on its own, what did the relieving crew plan to do in starting the train?
Why did the relieving crew not get off the train when its emergency application suddenly released?
What did the relieving crew plan to do when their train began to move on its own?
Did the relieving crew pump any air into the train before it began to move?
What type of inspection or work was done on the braking system after the first crew made the emergency application because the train was suddenly out of control?
What was the relieving crew told to do when they reported that the emergency application holding the train stopped had suddenly and unexpectedly released?
What are the unintended consequences that CP refers to as being a result of the new handbrake rules?
What are the alternative measures that CP says are available?
ROBIN LUETHEHand brakes for modern RRing are surely an anachronism. If we are going to use hand brakes then those two mile train sets need a crew of four or five.
The actions of train crews are not just 'get on and ride' and never will be. Be prepared to work, and do hard physical labor, when the conditions require it - securing a train with HAND BRAKES is one of those labor intensive happenings when trains have an Emergency Brake Application in territory with grades - especially grades that are sustained for a number of miles.
The design of the air brake system permits the brakes to be released from an Emergency Application in a shorter amount of time than is required to restore full air pressue to the entire braking system thus allowing for another effective brake application - either service or emergency.
We can cry all we want about how it sould not be that way - but that is the way it is and it has to be worked with. Applying hand brakes is the only way to secure the train while the braking system is being recharged.
BaltACDKeith 'Runaway' Creel
Keith better watch out for the Iron Bracelet briagade going we need to have a meeting with you and your lovely team of lawyers to discuss why you picking profit over safety.
SD70DudeCN and CP are pushing back against the latest handbrake rules: http://trn.trains.com/news/news-wire/2019/03/09-cp-cn-to-appeal-canadian-government-rule-on-use-of-handbrakes
CN and CP are pushing back against the latest handbrake rules:
SD70DudeDP complicates things, recovering from an emergency application takes longer and has more steps.
Thanks, Dude, for that information. A more complicated process is the last thing needed when faced with a sudden crisis, as the train unexpectedly starts to move high up on a steep grade. Hopefully the event recorder in the lead unit survived, and the eventual TSB report can give the details.
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