243129 BaltACD Information I have received through back channels - Engineer inquired of the Conductor 3 (Count them THREE) times after the Conductor 'signed off' on his SPAF the switch had been lined for the Main and the EC-1 for the block released back to the Dispatcher - Three times the Conductor reported he had lined the switch for the Main Track. Engineer was in the process of walking to the switch to check it for himself when 91 entered the picture. I was told it was a Cayce Yard crew that had the job of adding power to the 31 auto racks that were already in the siding thus building outbound train Q210 that would later be called to go to Greenwood, SC - Atlanta and then North. None of this is NTSB testimony so it is subject to CYA. . Three times??? Sounds like he is either covering his a$$ or he did not trust his conductor.The latter being the case why did he not contact the dispatcher via radio, cancel the clear call, then walk up and check the switch after the first query? Something is not right with that scenario.
BaltACD Information I have received through back channels - Engineer inquired of the Conductor 3 (Count them THREE) times after the Conductor 'signed off' on his SPAF the switch had been lined for the Main and the EC-1 for the block released back to the Dispatcher - Three times the Conductor reported he had lined the switch for the Main Track. Engineer was in the process of walking to the switch to check it for himself when 91 entered the picture. I was told it was a Cayce Yard crew that had the job of adding power to the 31 auto racks that were already in the siding thus building outbound train Q210 that would later be called to go to Greenwood, SC - Atlanta and then North. None of this is NTSB testimony so it is subject to CYA.
Information I have received through back channels - Engineer inquired of the Conductor 3 (Count them THREE) times after the Conductor 'signed off' on his SPAF the switch had been lined for the Main and the EC-1 for the block released back to the Dispatcher - Three times the Conductor reported he had lined the switch for the Main Track. Engineer was in the process of walking to the switch to check it for himself when 91 entered the picture.
I was told it was a Cayce Yard crew that had the job of adding power to the 31 auto racks that were already in the siding thus building outbound train Q210 that would later be called to go to Greenwood, SC - Atlanta and then North.
None of this is NTSB testimony so it is subject to CYA.
. Three times??? Sounds like he is either covering his a$$ or he did not trust his conductor.The latter being the case why did he not contact the dispatcher via radio, cancel the clear call, then walk up and check the switch after the first query? Something is not right with that scenario.
Agree....and so we wait on the NTSB.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
BaltACD CSX Rule 401.14 Before departing a location where main track switches have been operated by hand, each crew member must verbally confirm the position of the switches and that they have been locked.
CSX Rule
401.14 Before departing a location where main track switches have been operated by hand, each crew member must verbally confirm the position of the switches and that they have been locked.
When each crew member verbally confirms the position of the switches, and that they have been locked; does this require that each crew member has observed the switch status, or can crew members confirm this simply by confirming that they have been told this by a crew member who has observed it?
Does each crew member have to verbally confirm that the position of the switch and that it has been locked to each of the other crew members, or just to himself/herself?
23 17 46 11
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
jeffhergert blue streak 1 Want to read the transcripts between conductor and engineer. Maybe the engineer wondered if the conductor was referring to the switch going to the auto yard and not the switch to the siding ? I've been wondering that too. Just a little example of how even the best people can sometimes have a momentary lapse. Last week, I was pulled off my regular pool assignment to work the daylight yard engine. (Extra board depleted) The foreman and switchmen were both experienced and ones I would completely trust. Much of the time on the yard engine we sat in the clear while trains came in and out of the yard. We were going down the lead light power to go pull a cut off a track and switch it out, when the dispatcher came on the radio and said he had a short timer lined into the yard. The foreman decided to pull back in the clear and wait. The local manager came on the radio and said to go ahead and grab that cut. So the foreman said let's go back. I pulled up to a trailing point switch lined for us and stopped so he could get off. Instead of waiting for me to pull over the switch, I saw him go to the switch stand, take the hook out of the hasp and throw the switch. Then he gave me a "come ahead" sign. I asked him over the radio, "Are you sure about that?" He immediately realized what he had done and threw the switch back. So maybe the conductor, handling multiple switches in a short time, may have convinced himself that he had lined the switch normal when he hadn't. Jeff
blue streak 1 Want to read the transcripts between conductor and engineer. Maybe the engineer wondered if the conductor was referring to the switch going to the auto yard and not the switch to the siding ?
Want to read the transcripts between conductor and engineer. Maybe the engineer wondered if the conductor was referring to the switch going to the auto yard and not the switch to the siding ?
I've been wondering that too.
Just a little example of how even the best people can sometimes have a momentary lapse. Last week, I was pulled off my regular pool assignment to work the daylight yard engine. (Extra board depleted) The foreman and switchmen were both experienced and ones I would completely trust. Much of the time on the yard engine we sat in the clear while trains came in and out of the yard. We were going down the lead light power to go pull a cut off a track and switch it out, when the dispatcher came on the radio and said he had a short timer lined into the yard. The foreman decided to pull back in the clear and wait. The local manager came on the radio and said to go ahead and grab that cut. So the foreman said let's go back. I pulled up to a trailing point switch lined for us and stopped so he could get off. Instead of waiting for me to pull over the switch, I saw him go to the switch stand, take the hook out of the hasp and throw the switch. Then he gave me a "come ahead" sign. I asked him over the radio, "Are you sure about that?" He immediately realized what he had done and threw the switch back.
So maybe the conductor, handling multiple switches in a short time, may have convinced himself that he had lined the switch normal when he hadn't.
Jeff
jeffhergertSo maybe the conductor, handling multiple switches in a short time, may have convinced himself that he had lined the switch normal when he hadn't.
Been there. Even worse if you're trying to think several moves ahead. Never had anything untoward happen, though.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
This is a classic switch confusion wreck that is quite well known with several references available, including an article about it in Trains magazine. The fireman went ahead to the switch to let his passenger train out of a siding after a meet that was to occur.
The fireman walked up to the switch and unlocked it before the opposing train arrived. From the details that have been published, I believe that the unlocking being witnessed by the engineer, caused the engineer to wonder if the fireman had actually thrown the switch for the siding onto the mainline. So the engineer tooted the horn as if to ask the fireman if he was sure what he was doing.
The fireman took this as a sign of doubt, and then he began to doubt the correctness of the switch. Perhaps to ask the fireman again, the engineer turned his headlight on and off. Time was running out as the opposing passenger train approached, and at the last second, the fireman decided that the switch must be wrong. So he rushed to it with the intent to throw it to the correct position, but it was correct, and he threw it to the wrong position, thus letting the passenger train into the siding to collide head-on with his train standing in the siding for the meet.
https://www.gendisasters.com/new-mexico/2141/springer,-nm-flier-mail-trains-collide,-sep-1956
At some point in the future, if the Nevada Amtrak/Dirt Hauler collision investigation is any indication, the NTSB is likely to release a large document package that will include interview transcripts and other information, this release being in advance of public hearings on the incident. In the Nevada investigation, there were a number of interesting facts within the larger package.
BigJim Yet again, there is so much that we don't know!
Yet again, there is so much that we don't know!
Probably the most insightful comment in this thread. My mental model of what happened in this accident has undergone several revisions since first hearing about it and suspect that more revisions will be made to that model as more of the details come out.
- Erik
VOLKER LANDWEHRIf it was a yard crew bringing additional (light) power for the autoracks why didn't they stop directly after the switch, re-align it and then back the power to the train? It would have been a short walk for the conductor. Regards, Volker
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VOLKER LANDWEHR If it was a yard crew bringing additional (light) power for the autoracks why didn't they stop directly after the switch, re-align it and then back the power to the train? It would have been a short walk for the conductor.Regards, Volker
If it was a yard crew bringing additional (light) power for the autoracks why didn't they stop directly after the switch, re-align it and then back the power to the train? It would have been a short walk for the conductor.Regards, Volker
I would opine it was because they "owned" the track at the time. An unknown is whether the dispatcher was after them to clear up ASAP. I'm sure that will come out eventually.
If there was no sense of urgency on the part of the crew, then why hurry?
There are a number of pieces missing from this puzzle from our perspective.
LithoniaOperator7j43k, that is very believable scenario. Speculation, obviously, but I would not be surprised if you turn out to be right. Of course, I suppose it’s possible that NTSB, CSX, AMTK (and we) will never really know. If stories don’t jive, then I guess CSX will probably just fire them both. And injured parties will sue everyone they can semi-credibly add to the complaint.
Of course, I suppose it’s possible that NTSB, CSX, AMTK (and we) will never really know. If stories don’t jive, then I guess CSX will probably just fire them both. And injured parties will sue everyone they can semi-credibly add to the complaint.
With knowledge I have of CSX Discipline - They BOTH have been fired, if the local discipline 'investigation' has been held.
I may be mistaken as I don't know the specifics of either contract, but normally contracts require that the party's be charged within 5 or 7 days of the incident and unless posponed by mutual company-union agreement the investigation is to be held within 10 to 15 days of the notification. Postponement of investigations is a normal occurence.
The NTSB marches to its own drummer in investigation the happening.
7j43k, that is very believable scenario. Speculation, obviously, but I would not be surprised if you turn out to be right.
Still in training.
edblysard, never mind if you’d rather not say. I think I get it now anyway.
Just because you know a guy is a screwup does not mean you would know he was such a BIG and GHASTLY screwup who would lie. 3 times.
The engineer may well have asked 3 times. And then figured NOBODY would lie about something like that 3 times over.
And then signed and called it in.
And then had a few more minutes to think about it. And decided it wouldn't hurt a bit, while he was just sitting around, to go over and confirm.
This all does make the engineer look about as good as he can, under the circumstances. So grains of salt may be sprinkled around, as necessary.
Ed
LithoniaOperator Euclid If the engineer had to ask, he must not have known whether the switch had been re-lined. How could the conductor have re-lined the switch for the main line without the engineer realizing it? He did NOT re-line the switch for the mainline. That's why we are here discussing this. As for his seeing/not-seeing the conductor doing/not-doing his job, there are many possible scenarios. Probably he was doing engineer work, and did not see what the conductor was doing. The fact that the engineer (if this is true) asked three times what the status of the switch was, suggests to me that the conductor was perhaps a recent hire, or a person known to be unreliable. Just speculating, of course. But the fact that the engineer told the dispatcher (if he did) that the SPAF had been signed by him, or if he had actually signed it when, in fact, he was not certain of the switch status, is very troubling. Sounds like the conductor is in deep trouble, and the engineer may be also. He would have not been walking up to check if he was certain of the switch position. It's a tragedy for these two individuals, also. But a procedure existed to deal with the conditions, and one or more people did not follow the rules. And one or more may be lying in the aftermath. Very sad all the way around.
Euclid If the engineer had to ask, he must not have known whether the switch had been re-lined. How could the conductor have re-lined the switch for the main line without the engineer realizing it?
If the engineer had to ask, he must not have known whether the switch had been re-lined. How could the conductor have re-lined the switch for the main line without the engineer realizing it?
Yes, I realize the conductor did not re-line the switch. And, as you say, there could be many possible scenarios in which the conductor was able to re-line the switch without the engineer being aware of it. But it also seems like there is a high probability in this case that none of those scenarios materialized.
I suspect that the engineer came to the same conclusion. He never saw the conductor re-line the switch; and that there was no time period during the work which would have allowed the conductor to be out of the engineer's sight or awareness long enough to go to the switch, re-line it, and return.
Under those circumstances, without actually knowing the switch position, the natural conclusion would be that the switch could not possibly have been restored for the mainline.
edblysard, what does 23 17 46 11 stand for? If I may ask.
LithoniaOperator Notification: LithoniaOperator Rule WF-S: If I use a winking face, it's to denote sarcasm, irony, humor or absurdity. * * * Please sign and fax an approved acknowledgement form. Radio messages will not be recognized as proper acknowledgement. (Winky-face applies only to paragraph above it.) Have I covered my a$$?
Notification:
LithoniaOperator Rule WF-S:
If I use a winking face, it's to denote sarcasm, irony, humor or absurdity.
* * *
Please sign and fax an approved acknowledgement form. Radio messages will not be recognized as proper acknowledgement.
(Winky-face applies only to paragraph above it.)
Have I covered my a$$?
Balt -- when was the conductor 'past' the engineer long enough, anywhere in the timeframe starting with commencement of the shove, to have lined and locked that switch?
I have to wonder how the EC-1 got released with a 'signed SPAF' if the engineer were so unconvinced ... to the point of leaving the power of a train still being made up to verify the switch status after the three (3) requests of the conductor. After how many of the requests did the engineer sign off? I presume the conductor released the authority.
BaltACDEngineer inquired of the Conductor 3 (Count them THREE) times after the Conductor 'signed off' on his SPAF the switch had been lined for the Main
Asking him three times then double checking... Things that make you go "hmmmm." Not all employees are created equally....
im not familiar with "r.r." terminology or the "terms & conditions" ("T&C") used therein, but i do remember a tragic situation that occurred 10-15 years ago in SW s.c.. it is remarkably similar to the "cayce incident".. unfortunately, i cannot recall the details, but is very similar to this latest tragedy.. near a small company town in SW s.c., a freight train pulled off to a siding that served one customer, the main employer of this hamlet.. the crew left no cars on the mainline, but took the entire manifest onto the siding.. for whatever reason, the switch was LOCKED OPEN.. i dont recall how long the train worked along the siding, but the worst possible happened: a passenger train came along and diverted to the siding.. BOTTOM LINE: the passenger train was able to continue on the siding into the town where the freight train was working.. the passenger train slammed into the freight train, killing many crewmen and passengers.. i dont recall which members of the freight crew were injured, but the damage to both trains was devastating; worse, the accident actually killed the town.. the "mill", or whatever it was called, was also significantly damaged and not rebuilt.. because the "mill" was the primary employer, the town literally disappeared; it's gone now.. i believe some (or all) of the crew were charged with criminal negligence and were convicted but dont recall their sentences.. i never did read their justification for LOCKING THE SWITCH OPEN.. can anyone fill in the details on this event?
i have read several stories about accidents where a "controlling authority" was planning to implement stronger safety systems on a stretch where an accident occurred, but somehow "didnt get around to it".. it seems to be a "cover story" thats handed out whenever this happens.. i wonder how many r.r. executives would allow their family to travel a stretch of track where "state-of-the-art" controls were promised but never installed? makes me wonder..
but, i could be wrong!
COTTON BELT RUNS A
Blue Streak
jeffhergert PennsyBoomer Once again it is another level of checking based upon events that have precipitated most all of the Rules. There were not Form B's protecting maintenance of way work until, I believe, the late 70s when a UP train got into an Ohio Crane fouling their right of way. The advent of the Form B has no doubt been of benefit but, prior to, it was flag and whistle. So this rule, appropriately, for a first train was inevitable in the event. Consolidated Code of Operating Rules 1967 and Uniform Code of Operating Rules 1968 both had train orders (CCOR Form Y and UCOR Form U) to protect men and machines. UCOR also had a provision under Form X orders for protecting men and machines. There may be others, those xamples just come to mind. Jeff
PennsyBoomer Once again it is another level of checking based upon events that have precipitated most all of the Rules. There were not Form B's protecting maintenance of way work until, I believe, the late 70s when a UP train got into an Ohio Crane fouling their right of way. The advent of the Form B has no doubt been of benefit but, prior to, it was flag and whistle. So this rule, appropriately, for a first train was inevitable in the event.
Once again it is another level of checking based upon events that have precipitated most all of the Rules. There were not Form B's protecting maintenance of way work until, I believe, the late 70s when a UP train got into an Ohio Crane fouling their right of way. The advent of the Form B has no doubt been of benefit but, prior to, it was flag and whistle. So this rule, appropriately, for a first train was inevitable in the event.
Consolidated Code of Operating Rules 1967 and Uniform Code of Operating Rules 1968 both had train orders (CCOR Form Y and UCOR Form U) to protect men and machines. UCOR also had a provision under Form X orders for protecting men and machines. There may be others, those xamples just come to mind.
I find no reference to these forms of train orders in PRR (1960 rev.) or PC (1968) rule book. In situations where work was to be performed fouling an in service main track a "free form" order was used designating hours in effect, limits and requiring authority to proceed - a precursor to the Form Y or Form B - but this was not a common event. Undercutting bridge clearances that normally fouled adjacent track(s) would be an example.
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