CSX didn't have any high security locks in my area. We had Conrail/ NS high security keys but none for CSX.
mvlandsw When I worked on CSX the key could be removed from the switch lock without locking it. I doubt that this has changed , but don't know for sure.
When I worked on CSX the key could be removed from the switch lock without locking it. I doubt that this has changed , but don't know for sure.
That is true for regular switch locks. It is the high-security locks that do not allow the key to be removed when unlocked, and the two locks take different keys.
When switching I always leave the lock unlocked (with my keys in it if it's a high-security one), with the lock hanging in the hole on the switch handle to act as a keeper.
On CN we have to carry four different keys: regular switch key, high-security switch key, locomotive padlock key, and coach (skeleton) key.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
CSX rules required that the switch be locked when used in either position. This interpretation of the rule began around 2013. Before that we only locked them when leaving them in the normal position.
The only reason other than the conductor failing to reline the switch would be vandalism i.e. a disgruntled employee etc.
Jackflash The Conductors and Brakemen that I worked with would leave their keys in the unlocked switch lock (the key can not be removed with the lock in the unlocked position) while that switch was being used, you had to go back to the switch to get your keys.
The Conductors and Brakemen that I worked with would leave their keys in the unlocked switch lock (the key can not be removed with the lock in the unlocked position) while that switch was being used, you had to go back to the switch to get your keys.
I am suggesting that the conductor may have left his key in the unlocked switch to let the locomotive pass into the siding. Then he just locked the switch and removed his key while forgetting to re-line the switch for the main.
VOLKER LANDWEHR If it was a yard crew bringing additional (light) power for the autoracks why didn't they stop directly after the switch, re-align it and then back the power to the train? It would have been a short walk for the conductor. Regards, Volker
If it was a yard crew bringing additional (light) power for the autoracks why didn't they stop directly after the switch, re-align it and then back the power to the train? It would have been a short walk for the conductor.
Regards, Volker
Maybe after letting the engines into the siding, they did stop to let the conductor re-line the switch for the main line. That would be normal if they were not actully shoving all those autoracks into the siding as has been widely assumed.
So under this scenario, the switch would be lined into the siding for only a minute or so. After unlocking the switch to line it into the siding, do the rules require that the switch be re-locked as the engines pass over it?
Or would it be normal and accpetable to just leave the switch unlocked as the engines pass over it? If so, the swtich would be re-locked only only once, and that would be after it had been re-lined for the main line after letting the engines into the siding.
Leaving the switch unlocked as the engines passed over it and into the siding raises the possiblility that when the conductor intended to restore the switch for the main line, he just locked the switch while forgetting to throw it.
Under the original scenario, the crew leaves the switch open and they move far away from it; leaving it open for a considerable length of time. Under that scenario, restoring the switch would be a much more deliberate, unique, and focused task which would be easily remembered by both the engineer and the conductor. It seems unlikely that the conductor would have mistakenly recalled restoring the switch if it would have required a long walk to do so.
Under this new scenario, the task of restoring the switch would have been less unique and more routine. It would have been fast and easy, thus making it harder to distinquish in memory from all the thousands of other switch throwing events preceding it. Under this scenario, it would have been easy for the conductor to mistakenly fail to restore the switch while locking it, and the engineer suspecting that he noticed that action. Then, later, the conductor tells the engineer with certainty, that he restored the switch, and the engineer has doubt.
I don't know about CSX rules, but once you've reported clear of your limits you can't cancel the release. If you realize that you aren't clear (or the switch hasn't been restored as reported) all you can tell the dispatcher is that there has been a (terrible) mistake. The dispatcher is going to immediately call (in this case) 91 and tell them to bring their train to an immediate stop. He's not going to go through formalities to find out where 91 is or to change their authority limits. The first order of business is to avoid the incident, to keep it from happening.
In track warrant control, a dispatcher can't pull the track (authority) out from under you. They can however, give a new warrant that voids the current warrant and changes the limits. In effect, they can take away your authorization to proceed, but not in a way that leaves a train on a main track unauthorized for at least the track their train is sitting on. I would expect other procedures similar to TWC have the same ability. Sometimes circumstances change and there would have to be a way to change existing limits.
Jeff
Overmod Euclid So how could the freight engineer have called the dispatcher and canceled their previous release of their block back to the dispatcher? Wouldn’t this have required taking the block away from 91? The important aspect is that the dispatcher, upon receiving a 'cancel release' or whatever, will order 91 to stop as immediately as possible. That is the important thing here. Just how quickly the order will call for may depend on perceived severity; I do not know what the rules actually call for in this specific circumstance. If the CSX crew anticipates they will need more access to the main (not the case here with the train tied down) they can REQUEST authority from the dispatcher, who would then request it formally from 91. I suspect if CSX is only checking the switch, the dispatcher will not go through the 'full' TWC procedure, as safety has been achieved with 91 stopped. When CSX has checked and confirmed, 91 would be told to move with the authority they were granted. It does occur to me that the best thing in this instance -- perhaps in any instance a crew reports a mistaken or premature release of authority -- would be to order the 'next train' to proceed at restricted speed watching what the crew was concerned about. There is no real difference between that and the NTSB recommendation from 2012 that is now being revived as an emergency order.
Euclid So how could the freight engineer have called the dispatcher and canceled their previous release of their block back to the dispatcher? Wouldn’t this have required taking the block away from 91?
The important aspect is that the dispatcher, upon receiving a 'cancel release' or whatever, will order 91 to stop as immediately as possible. That is the important thing here. Just how quickly the order will call for may depend on perceived severity; I do not know what the rules actually call for in this specific circumstance.
If the CSX crew anticipates they will need more access to the main (not the case here with the train tied down) they can REQUEST authority from the dispatcher, who would then request it formally from 91.
I suspect if CSX is only checking the switch, the dispatcher will not go through the 'full' TWC procedure, as safety has been achieved with 91 stopped. When CSX has checked and confirmed, 91 would be told to move with the authority they were granted.
It does occur to me that the best thing in this instance -- perhaps in any instance a crew reports a mistaken or premature release of authority -- would be to order the 'next train' to proceed at restricted speed watching what the crew was concerned about. There is no real difference between that and the NTSB recommendation from 2012 that is now being revived as an emergency order.
That is what I would expect. There would be no provision requiring 91 to release their track authority in order for it to be cancelled. Their track authority would be taken away from them.
From the described scenario, the engineer apparently decided to not contact the dispatcher about his (the engineer's) doubt about the switch position, but rather go check for himself. Perhaps he did not want to take a chance on stopping 91 if the switch was properly lined. But he did not have enough time to get to the switch to check it.
This action raises the vision of the engineer getting to the switch just before 91, seeing it was wrong, and throwing it for the mainline just in the nick of time; or getting half thrown just as 91 hit the points.
As I understand it, the engineer was not responsible for the switch being lined wrong as it was. He had only certified that he had been told by the conductor that the switch was lined properly.
I suspect that there are very significant details unreleased regarding the thoughts and actions of the conductor that explain why he certified that the switch had been restored. I doubt it was due to simple switch handling routine where one loses track of the postion because the routine includes so much familarity with past switch throwing. In this case the switch handling was tied into a larger surrounding pattern that would have made the switch handling unique and easy to remember.
EuclidSo how could the freight engineer have called the dispatcher and canceled their previous release of their block back to the dispatcher? Wouldn’t this have required taking the block away from 91?
Euclid 243129 BaltACD Information I have received through back channels - Engineer inquired of the Conductor 3 (Count them THREE) times after the Conductor 'signed off' on his SPAF the switch had been lined for the Main and the EC-1 for the block released back to the Dispatcher - Three times the Conductor reported he had lined the switch for the Main Track. Engineer was in the process of walking to the switch to check it for himself when 91 entered the picture. It is my understanding that when the freight job released their block back to the dispatcher, it was immediately given to 91. So how could the freight engineer have called the dispatcher and canceled their previous release of their block back to the dispatcher? Wouldn’t this have required taking the block away from 91?
243129 BaltACD Information I have received through back channels - Engineer inquired of the Conductor 3 (Count them THREE) times after the Conductor 'signed off' on his SPAF the switch had been lined for the Main and the EC-1 for the block released back to the Dispatcher - Three times the Conductor reported he had lined the switch for the Main Track. Engineer was in the process of walking to the switch to check it for himself when 91 entered the picture.
BaltACD Information I have received through back channels - Engineer inquired of the Conductor 3 (Count them THREE) times after the Conductor 'signed off' on his SPAF the switch had been lined for the Main and the EC-1 for the block released back to the Dispatcher - Three times the Conductor reported he had lined the switch for the Main Track. Engineer was in the process of walking to the switch to check it for himself when 91 entered the picture.
Information I have received through back channels - Engineer inquired of the Conductor 3 (Count them THREE) times after the Conductor 'signed off' on his SPAF the switch had been lined for the Main and the EC-1 for the block released back to the Dispatcher - Three times the Conductor reported he had lined the switch for the Main Track. Engineer was in the process of walking to the switch to check it for himself when 91 entered the picture.
It is my understanding that when the freight job released their block back to the dispatcher, it was immediately given to 91. So how could the freight engineer have called the dispatcher and canceled their previous release of their block back to the dispatcher? Wouldn’t this have required taking the block away from 91?
Had he not trusted the conductor,yes it would and it would have prevented a tragedy.
Here is the answer I was looking for. When the engineer "confirms," he is not confirming that the switch has been properly lined. He is only confirming that he has been told by someone on the ground that the switch has been properly lined.
“BLET asked that FRA clarify that entry of the engineer's initials is an affirmation that the communication (representation) has been received and not that the engineer can personally vouch for the actions taken on the ground. FRA affirms that the engineer's responsibility is to acknowledge the information provided by the conductor or brakeman, not to act as a guarantor with respect to the actual position in which the switch was left.”
In my earlier comment, I suggested that the word, confirm needs to be changed to acknowledged. And that is exactly what the FRA has done in their language above.
This is from EO 24 found here:
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2005/11/25/05-23303/fra-emergency-order-no-24-notice-no-2-emergency-order-no-24-hand-operated-main-track-switches
Euclid Murphy Siding Euclid Okay, so the conductor confirms on behalf of himself and the engineer. I would not conclude that the conductor telling the engineer which way the switch is lined confirms anything for the engineer. All the engineer can confirm is that the conductor told him the switch was properly lined. Why should the engineer assume any responsiblity for the switch when he does not directly know which way it is lined? Who said he did? If you are asking how I know the engineer confirmed, I don’t know that. I am only saying what would be the manner in which the engineer could confirm if he did confirm. I am asking what the rule means by posing examples of how it would apply to the Cayce wreck scenario. The engineer could not possbily confirm how the switch was lined without seeing it. He could repeat what the conductor said about the switch being properly lined, if that is what is meant by "verbally confirm." If that is what the rule means, I would say that "confirm" should be changed to "acknowledge." In any case, I have heard comments that the engineer would be blamed along with anyone else on the crew if a switch was left improperly lined. I also assume that would be the idea of having all crew members witness and certify, as appears to be the intent of the SPAF process. Also, Balt said this earlier: “With knowledge I have of CSX Discipline - They BOTH have been fired, if the local discipline 'investigation' has been held."
Murphy Siding Euclid Okay, so the conductor confirms on behalf of himself and the engineer. I would not conclude that the conductor telling the engineer which way the switch is lined confirms anything for the engineer. All the engineer can confirm is that the conductor told him the switch was properly lined. Why should the engineer assume any responsiblity for the switch when he does not directly know which way it is lined? Who said he did?
Euclid Okay, so the conductor confirms on behalf of himself and the engineer. I would not conclude that the conductor telling the engineer which way the switch is lined confirms anything for the engineer. All the engineer can confirm is that the conductor told him the switch was properly lined. Why should the engineer assume any responsiblity for the switch when he does not directly know which way it is lined?
Okay, so the conductor confirms on behalf of himself and the engineer. I would not conclude that the conductor telling the engineer which way the switch is lined confirms anything for the engineer. All the engineer can confirm is that the conductor told him the switch was properly lined. Why should the engineer assume any responsiblity for the switch when he does not directly know which way it is lined?
Who said he did?
If you are asking how I know the engineer confirmed, I don’t know that. I am only saying what would be the manner in which the engineer could confirm if he did confirm. I am asking what the rule means by posing examples of how it would apply to the Cayce wreck scenario.
The engineer could not possbily confirm how the switch was lined without seeing it. He could repeat what the conductor said about the switch being properly lined, if that is what is meant by "verbally confirm." If that is what the rule means, I would say that "confirm" should be changed to "acknowledge."
In any case, I have heard comments that the engineer would be blamed along with anyone else on the crew if a switch was left improperly lined. I also assume that would be the idea of having all crew members witness and certify, as appears to be the intent of the SPAF process.
Also, Balt said this earlier:
“With knowledge I have of CSX Discipline - They BOTH have been fired, if the local discipline 'investigation' has been held."
Deggesty jeffhergert zugmann Sorry, I misread your post. I thought you said 'visually'. Not qulaiifed on Chessie rules, but I'll assume: Conductor is supposed to tell the engineer, or engineer ask the conductor. Probably a rule about double-chekcing in there somewhere. After this last incident I've been doing my best to be pretty specific about asking my conductor that the "(industry) switch is lined and locked normal". Reading our instructions, the engineer by initialing the SPAF (we use entries on the Conductor's Log instead of a specific form) is verifying that a job briefing has been held, either in person or via radio that the switch has been restored normal. The job briefing is required once the switch has been restored normal. There is no way the engineer, in most cases, could visually determine and confirm that the conductor, or whomever was in charge of the switch, actually lined the switch back normal. When releasing a track warrant in dark territory, it must be stated that all switches used have been restored and locked normal, a job briefing between crewmembers has been held and the conductor's form has been properly initialed. I think the assumption is that by holding the job briefing, the one handling the switch has indeed lined them all back normal. Of if he hadn't, it makes him realize he hasn't and then he goes and does line the switch. Maybe even the realization that he forgot one if using multiple hand throws. If you start holding engineers responsible for accepting the trainman's word that switches are lined correctly when they're not, then you're going to have to start holding the dispatchers responsible because they also took the trainman's word that the switch was lined correctly. Jeff Jeff, what you are saying is that it is a matter of TRUST?
jeffhergert zugmann Sorry, I misread your post. I thought you said 'visually'. Not qulaiifed on Chessie rules, but I'll assume: Conductor is supposed to tell the engineer, or engineer ask the conductor. Probably a rule about double-chekcing in there somewhere. After this last incident I've been doing my best to be pretty specific about asking my conductor that the "(industry) switch is lined and locked normal". Reading our instructions, the engineer by initialing the SPAF (we use entries on the Conductor's Log instead of a specific form) is verifying that a job briefing has been held, either in person or via radio that the switch has been restored normal. The job briefing is required once the switch has been restored normal. There is no way the engineer, in most cases, could visually determine and confirm that the conductor, or whomever was in charge of the switch, actually lined the switch back normal. When releasing a track warrant in dark territory, it must be stated that all switches used have been restored and locked normal, a job briefing between crewmembers has been held and the conductor's form has been properly initialed. I think the assumption is that by holding the job briefing, the one handling the switch has indeed lined them all back normal. Of if he hadn't, it makes him realize he hasn't and then he goes and does line the switch. Maybe even the realization that he forgot one if using multiple hand throws. If you start holding engineers responsible for accepting the trainman's word that switches are lined correctly when they're not, then you're going to have to start holding the dispatchers responsible because they also took the trainman's word that the switch was lined correctly. Jeff
zugmann Sorry, I misread your post. I thought you said 'visually'. Not qulaiifed on Chessie rules, but I'll assume: Conductor is supposed to tell the engineer, or engineer ask the conductor. Probably a rule about double-chekcing in there somewhere. After this last incident I've been doing my best to be pretty specific about asking my conductor that the "(industry) switch is lined and locked normal".
Sorry, I misread your post. I thought you said 'visually'.
Not qulaiifed on Chessie rules, but I'll assume:
Conductor is supposed to tell the engineer, or engineer ask the conductor. Probably a rule about double-chekcing in there somewhere. After this last incident I've been doing my best to be pretty specific about asking my conductor that the "(industry) switch is lined and locked normal".
Reading our instructions, the engineer by initialing the SPAF (we use entries on the Conductor's Log instead of a specific form) is verifying that a job briefing has been held, either in person or via radio that the switch has been restored normal. The job briefing is required once the switch has been restored normal. There is no way the engineer, in most cases, could visually determine and confirm that the conductor, or whomever was in charge of the switch, actually lined the switch back normal.
When releasing a track warrant in dark territory, it must be stated that all switches used have been restored and locked normal, a job briefing between crewmembers has been held and the conductor's form has been properly initialed.
I think the assumption is that by holding the job briefing, the one handling the switch has indeed lined them all back normal. Of if he hadn't, it makes him realize he hasn't and then he goes and does line the switch. Maybe even the realization that he forgot one if using multiple hand throws.
If you start holding engineers responsible for accepting the trainman's word that switches are lined correctly when they're not, then you're going to have to start holding the dispatchers responsible because they also took the trainman's word that the switch was lined correctly.
Jeff, what you are saying is that it is a matter of TRUST?
23 17 46 11
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
jeffhergertWhen you get down to it, no matter how many rules you pile on, no matter how much techonolgy you have, it really does come down to trusting people to do what they are supposed to do. On or off the job. I suppose, with the general breakdown of trusting others or institutions, maybe that seems old-fashioned and out of date. Jeff
We drive though green lights trusting others are going to stop for the red. We trust people aren't going to enter the freeway the wrong way. Isn't 100%, but few things in life are.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Euclid Well Rule 401.14 spells out the responsibility of the engineer and it sounds equal to the responsibility of the conductor. I assume that the words of the rule are very carefully chosen to say what they mean. In the Cayce collision we are discussing, assuming that the conductor restored the switch for the main line, and engineer was too far away to actually see the switch alignment, how does the engineer “verbally confirm,” according to Rule 401.14?
In the Cayce collision we are discussing, assuming that the conductor restored the switch for the main line, and engineer was too far away to actually see the switch alignment, how does the engineer “verbally confirm,” according to Rule 401.14?
He has a job briefing with the conductor, either in person when he's back in the cab or via the radio.
Deggesty Jeff, what you are saying is that it is a matter of TRUST?
When you get down to it, no matter how many rules you pile on, no matter how much techonolgy you have, it really does come down to trusting people to do what they are supposed to do. On or off the job. I suppose, with the general breakdown of trusting others or institutions, maybe that seems old-fashioned and out of date.
Johnny
edblysard Euclid zugmann Euclid Does each crew member have to verbally confirm that the position of the switch and that it has been locked to each of the other crew members, or just to himself/herself? Hard to do if the engineer is 150 cars away on the head end. Yes, I understand that. So then how is Rule 404.14 supposed to be complied with by a crew member that is too far away from the switch to observe which way it is lined? In what way is each member supposed to “confirm the position of the switch and confirm that it has been locked” ? 401.14 Before departing a location where main track switches have been operated by hand, each crew member must verbally confirm the position of the switches and that they have been locked. “Before departing” and “verbally” ought to be your clues.
Euclid zugmann Euclid Does each crew member have to verbally confirm that the position of the switch and that it has been locked to each of the other crew members, or just to himself/herself? Hard to do if the engineer is 150 cars away on the head end. Yes, I understand that. So then how is Rule 404.14 supposed to be complied with by a crew member that is too far away from the switch to observe which way it is lined? In what way is each member supposed to “confirm the position of the switch and confirm that it has been locked” ? 401.14 Before departing a location where main track switches have been operated by hand, each crew member must verbally confirm the position of the switches and that they have been locked.
zugmann Euclid Does each crew member have to verbally confirm that the position of the switch and that it has been locked to each of the other crew members, or just to himself/herself? Hard to do if the engineer is 150 cars away on the head end.
Euclid Does each crew member have to verbally confirm that the position of the switch and that it has been locked to each of the other crew members, or just to himself/herself?
Hard to do if the engineer is 150 cars away on the head end.
Clues for the clueless?
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
EuclidDoes each crew member have to verbally confirm that the position of the switch and that it has been locked to each of the other crew members, or just to himself/herself?
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