243129 I fail to see the point in filling out a paper form on site unless you have the means to fax it to the dispatcher. That form can be filled out at anytime. Again someone had to report clear of the main line. The question of the day is who reported clear and why was the switch not lined? The CSX crew has many questions to answer.
I fail to see the point in filling out a paper form on site unless you have the means to fax it to the dispatcher. That form can be filled out at anytime. Again someone had to report clear of the main line. The question of the day is who reported clear and why was the switch not lined? The CSX crew has many questions to answer.
Filling out the form is a 'memory jogger' - did I really do what the form I am filling out idicates that I did.
The Lawyers current mode for Operating Rules is to pile as many steps as possible for any given action so that when somethng happens the employee can be found guilty of breaking some element of the 36 bullet points of the rule.
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
I run under NORAC, not the CSX rules. However, as I regularly monitor CSX radio traffic here, in dark territory, I've got a pretty good handle on the procedures.
1. A crew is issued an EC-1 by the dispatcher. In true dark territory, the available track will be visible on the dispatcher's model board (computer screen). If any switches are to be handled in main track territory, a "Line 11" is a part of the EC-1, specifically authorizing the crew to handle the necessary switches. The usual readbacks, etc, occur.
2. The crew is done and is ready to give the track back to the dispatcher. If switches were involved, the first question out of the mouth of the dispatcher will/should be "all switches lined and locked normal and SPAF signed by both crew members?"
The crewmember then reads the pertinent information about the EC-1 to the dispatcher, who repeats it. The crewmember confirms the read, and the conductor gives a time and his/her initials.
The dispatcher then owns that portion of the track.
One possibility that comes to mind regarding the Cayce incident is that the crew may have been planning to restore the switch after they gave the track back, rather than before as they should have done. This would be living dangerously in any case.
Pure conjecture on my part - that may be why the CSX engineer was off the unit.
Also conjecture, the CSX crew forgot completely, or thought they had much more time to get to the switch.
If the dispatcher properly handled the cancellation of the EC-1 that had authorized the CSX rack train on the main, then the blame will fall squarely on the crew, in no small part because they lied about the SPAF.
If, on the other hand, the dispatcher failed to ascertain the position of the switch as part of the cancellation of the EC-1, then he gets at least part of the blame for not following the procedure properly.
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
BaltACD Euclid All I am suspecting is that the freight crew never gave their input for authority to be taken away from them. To have been able to make ANY MOVE involving the Main Track - the Freight crew had to have been issued a EC-1 (TWC Authority) to occupy the Main Track in the particular TWC block. There is a procedure that must be followed in the issuance and release of EC-1's. To release the block back to the Dispatcher the crew would have to state (almost verbateum) "Y777-04 is releasing EC-1 ##### in the Cayce Block and all switches have been secured for Main Track movements". The Dispatcher will repeat that verbiage back to the crew, for the crew to challenge any difference to their understanding. Once the Dispatcher and the Freight Crew Agree, the block is released and it can be issued to another train by the Dispatcher. The procedures ARE NOT - 'Hey Fred I want to shove 30 cars in the siding - OK Sam shove the cars off and let me know when you are clear. Hey Fred we are clear.
Euclid All I am suspecting is that the freight crew never gave their input for authority to be taken away from them.
To have been able to make ANY MOVE involving the Main Track - the Freight crew had to have been issued a EC-1 (TWC Authority) to occupy the Main Track in the particular TWC block. There is a procedure that must be followed in the issuance and release of EC-1's.
To release the block back to the Dispatcher the crew would have to state (almost verbateum) "Y777-04 is releasing EC-1 ##### in the Cayce Block and all switches have been secured for Main Track movements". The Dispatcher will repeat that verbiage back to the crew, for the crew to challenge any difference to their understanding. Once the Dispatcher and the Freight Crew Agree, the block is released and it can be issued to another train by the Dispatcher.
The procedures ARE NOT - 'Hey Fred I want to shove 30 cars in the siding - OK Sam shove the cars off and let me know when you are clear. Hey Fred we are clear.
I understand that the procedure is technically perfect and not just informal talking communication. But how do we know that the technically perfect procedure was properly followed by fallible humans?
It seems to me that there are three pieces to this system of track authority, and it seems that one of those pieces failed even though the system itself is technically perfect. It also seems that no evidence clearly indicts any one of the three pieces for the failure.
For instance, I can see the possibility that the freight crew surrendered their authority without re-lining the switch. I can also see the possibility that the freight crew never surrendered their authority, and yet it was somehow accepted by the dispatcher as having been surrendered. Not assuming either one happened, but both are possible.
If you will go back and re-read the RAR 05-04, there is a section precisely covering ways to prevent mistakes in memory-related procedure. And some explicit concern that the EO 24 procedure developed since the Graniteville incident did not involve important additional means of 'reminding' the crew; the NTSB suggested the use of strobe lights or radio beacons (perhaps similar to ELTs?) as devices to spur remembrance of mislined switches -- something I suspect we'll be reminded of in the upcoming report(s). It is interesting to consider whether the new FRA EO revision fully resolves the need for physical 'memory joggers' attached to each main-track switch when it is lined away from the main and only deactivated when the switch is fully lined and locked for the main.
PennsyBoomer Once again it is another level of checking based upon events that have precipitated most all of the Rules. There were not Form B's protecting maintenance of way work until, I believe, the late 70s when a UP train got into an Ohio Crane fouling their right of way. The advent of the Form B has no doubt been of benefit but, prior to, it was flag and whistle. So this rule, appropriately, for a first train was inevitable in the event.
Once again it is another level of checking based upon events that have precipitated most all of the Rules. There were not Form B's protecting maintenance of way work until, I believe, the late 70s when a UP train got into an Ohio Crane fouling their right of way. The advent of the Form B has no doubt been of benefit but, prior to, it was flag and whistle. So this rule, appropriately, for a first train was inevitable in the event.
Consolidated Code of Operating Rules 1967 and Uniform Code of Operating Rules 1968 both had train orders (CCOR Form Y and UCOR Form U) to protect men and machines. UCOR also had a provision under Form X orders for protecting men and machines. There may be others, those xamples just come to mind.
Jeff
I would not conclude that the Cayce incident was caused by a failure to remember which way the switch had been left.
EuclidI would not conclude that the Cayce incident was caused by a failure to remember which way the switch had been left.
But it is highly likely that it was caused by a failure to remember to line the switch for the main. If the CSX crew actually did anything at all to relinquish track authority -- whether following formal procedure or otherwise.
The good news is that we don't have to discuss or ponder any more hypotheticals before getting the 'he said she said' accounts from the principals themselves. Only then will we have enough to be able to say, or at least speculate some more, about who actually said what, or thought they understood what, to start getting to where we can 'conclude' anything much more than the circumstantial or the insulting.
tree68 If the dispatcher properly handled the cancellation of the EC-1 that had authorized the CSX rack train on the main, then the blame will fall squarely on the crew, in no small part because they lied about the SPAF.
I've been thinking about that. The engineer was 800 hundred feet away from the switch in this case but could just as easily been several thousand away and around a curve, etc. In those circumstances the engineer can not have any personal knowledge that the switch is properly aligned to the main track. His only recourse is to ask the other crewmember if it was done and accept their word the realignment did in fact take place.
Should the other crew member reply "sure" to that question but in fact be thinking instead of the dozens of other times he reset that switch you have the single point of failure that the form is designed to prevent. To me, the form appears to represent a point of gotcha the feds, assisted by management, is playing with the engineer.
Am I missing something?
Here is an interesting piece of information:
https://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/news/2018/02/06/incorrect-information-from-csx-employee-led-to.html
“Shortly before the 2:35 a.m. crash, Amtrak 91 stopped five miles before the site of the collision and waited for a go-ahead from a CSX dispatcher, per CSX protocol when a signaling system is being worked on, CSX documents show.”
Last trip, conditions permitting, I used the locomotive's counter to determine sight distance to facing point switch points. I was able to measure during daylight (early morning and sun down light levels) and night time conditions. Some switches were dual control type at control points (no targets) and some were hand throws. This is by no means is meant to be the definite word on the subject.
My experiences were that during light conditions, about 500 feet was the farthest one could definitely see the points. During dark conditions, using the locomotive headlight, about 200 feet was the distance. Admittedly, there could be variations due to conditions. Such as dirty head light/ditch lights might shorten the sight distance, but I don't believe that much. Or how dirty the area between the point and stock rail is. The idea that they are more visible at night with the headlight, well, no. I didn't find that to be true.
I did find that on switches with switch heaters and the snow shield covers between the points at night, you couldn't tell until you were almost right on top of the switch to clearly see the points.
The hardest part in doing this was thinking: "Am I really seeing the points or is my brain, because of clear signal indications, causing me to see the points before they can clearly be seen?" As conditions permit, I may do this some more on future trips.
Don Oltmannd posted this on the other thread:
“I heard that the CSX dispatcher got the 'switch is normal and locked" from someone in the yard office, not the conductor. The person quoted a news article in the Jax paper. I haven't been able to find that. Not good if true...”
I looked at some of that paper, but could not find that specific point that Don mentions. It should not be all that hard to find.
Euclid Don Oltmannd posted this on the other thread: “I heard that the CSX dispatcher got the 'switch is normal and locked" from someone in the yard office, not the conductor. The person quoted a news article in the Jax paper. I haven't been able to find that. Not good if true...” I looked at some of that paper, but could not find that specific point that Don mentions. It should not be all that hard to find.
I was hoping someone could find it. It could be it doesn't exist....
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
EuclidHere is an interesting piece of information: https://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/news/2018/02/06/incorrect-information-from-csx-employee-led-to.html “Shortly before the 2:35 a.m. crash, Amtrak 91 stopped five miles before the site of the collision and waited for a go-ahead from a CSX dispatcher, per CSX protocol when a signaling system is being worked on, CSX documents show.”
That isn't new information.
This jibes with the experimenting the NTSB did after Graniteville, described in RAR 05-04. You need to do a little translation of the description in your head, but resolving the switchpoints themselves is right in line with what Jeff said (and what I get from videos).
Targets, reflective targets, are more interesting. Apparently trained observers who knew in advance exactly where to look could make out a target for a mislined switch over 1100' away. When not expecting, the 'unambiguous' resolution of reflective spot was over 500'. They mentioned without full reference the 'previous' mislining accident caused by the local conductor (in 1999) where the engineer was surprised to see the misline ... and stopped 5 carlengths from the switch. That raised more interesting possibilities than it solved.
Perhaps never since the Sixties was 'Danger, Will Robinson!' more appropriate to hear. If the 'heard it in the yard office' story was his, it may have come from the same eagerness to write before checking and somewhat blissful ignorance of Railroading that had him hypothesizing (on the 4th) that CSX signal maintainers had a hand in this ... misunderstanding that it was a systemic suppression, not negligent tinkering, that had the signal system inactive. I think he got the 'conductor misreported the switch position' the same way he had all the other facts in that story ... plucked from Sumwalt's briefing, but not necessarily quite as Sumwalt said.
I think it would be extremely wise to wait for the recorded radio traffic, interview transcripts, and documentation before swallowing a Jacksonville Business Journal 'scoop' based on unstated original sources of independent verifiability.
It seems like the SPAF is not nearly as much about being a memory-jogger as it is about creating a paper trail in case $#!t happens and someone will need to be blamed.
Still in training.
oltmannd Euclid Don Oltmannd posted this on the other thread: “I heard that the CSX dispatcher got the 'switch is normal and locked" from someone in the yard office, not the conductor. The person quoted a news article in the Jax paper. I haven't been able to find that. Not good if true...” I looked at some of that paper, but could not find that specific point that Don mentions. It should not be all that hard to find. I was hoping someone could find it. It could be it doesn't exist....
23 17 46 11
LithoniaOperator It seems like the SPAF is not nearly as much about being a memory-jogger as it is about creating a paper trail in case $#!t happens and someone will need to be blamed.
The NTSB went to some length in noting that the severe monetary penalties associated with EO 24 could be highly counterproductive if ... as in one case they cited ... the risk of penalty led employees who had 'forgotten' to try to get back to line the switch "like it never even happened" instead of fessing up ASAP and having all the statutory crap fall on you ... with a train wrecking and perhaps people dying if they didn't get the CYA finished up in time.
And yes, I do suspect there may be some of that here somewhere...
Review and clarification please. Is this the correct interpretation?:| One of the crew members fills out and signs the form that says the switch was moved to the correct position. The 2nd crew member signs the form agreeing with the first crew member that the switch was moved to the correct position. A crew member then calls the dispatcher and says the switch has been moved to the correct position and both crew members have signed the form agreeing that it has been done. The dispatcher reads the information back. The crew member confirms what was read back is correct and the dispatcher OK's the next train to go through, knowing that the switch should be in the correct position. Which crew member typically fills out the form? Which one calls it in to the dispatcher?
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
As Ed notes, the conductor does the ground work. The engineer generally stays in the cab. It might be possible, if they were done tying the train down, that the engineer might volunteer to get the switch, particularly if the crew has a good working relationship and the conductor has other work to do before they can quit.
In my experience, the SPAF gets signed, but is not read back to the dispatcher. It's only noted on the air that the switches were restored and that the SPAF was signed by both members of the crew. It's the EC-1 (TW) that gets read, or in this case, the cancellation information of same.
As long as the train is not in motion, the engineer can handle the EC-1, otherwise it would be the conductor.
BaltACD Euclid Here is an interesting piece of information: https://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/news/2018/02/06/incorrect-information-from-csx-employee-led-to.html “Shortly before the 2:35 a.m. crash, Amtrak 91 stopped five miles before the site of the collision and waited for a go-ahead from a CSX dispatcher, per CSX protocol when a signaling system is being worked on, CSX documents show.” That isn't new information.
Euclid Here is an interesting piece of information: https://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/news/2018/02/06/incorrect-information-from-csx-employee-led-to.html “Shortly before the 2:35 a.m. crash, Amtrak 91 stopped five miles before the site of the collision and waited for a go-ahead from a CSX dispatcher, per CSX protocol when a signaling system is being worked on, CSX documents show.”
I thought it was interesting because I would not have expected that #91 was stopped short of the collision site and waiting for a go-ahead. What was the reason for holding #91? Why would they not have had given #91 authority to pass through the area without stopping?
If the reason is not known, is there a typical reason for holding #91 under these circumstances? The article says it was done per protocol. What is that protocol?
edblysard oltmannd Euclid Don Oltmannd posted this on the other thread: “I heard that the CSX dispatcher got the 'switch is normal and locked" from someone in the yard office, not the conductor. The person quoted a news article in the Jax paper. I haven't been able to find that. Not good if true...” I looked at some of that paper, but could not find that specific point that Don mentions. It should not be all that hard to find. I was hoping someone could find it. It could be it doesn't exist.... For the dispatcher to take anyone’s word other that that of the conductor or engineer of the train would be very very odd. I honestly can’t imagine a dispatcher accepting someone else’s word. Kinda like removing a blue flag….you just don’t, ever.
I totally agree.
EuclidI thought it was interesting because I would not have expected that #91 was stopped short of the collision site and waiting for a go-ahead. What was the reason for holding #91? Why would they not have had given #91 authority to pass through the area without stopping? If the reason is not known, is there a typical reason for holding #91 under these circumstances? The article says it was done per protocol. What is that protocol?
It is possible that 91 was held where it was for two reasons. First, the CSX crew may not have given up their track yet. Second, 91 may have been held at an established "block station," oftimes simply a sign beside the track. Further, the CSX train's authority may have extended all the way to that point. We don't know where that train came from in the first place.
I would suspect that the "protocol" was simply the operating rules for the railroad.
tree68 Euclid I thought it was interesting because I would not have expected that #91 was stopped short of the collision site and waiting for a go-ahead. What was the reason for holding #91? Why would they not have had given #91 authority to pass through the area without stopping? If the reason is not known, is there a typical reason for holding #91 under these circumstances? The article says it was done per protocol. What is that protocol? It is possible that 91 was held where it was for two reasons. First, the CSX crew may not have given up their track yet. Second, 91 may have been held at an established "block station," oftimes simply a sign beside the track.
Euclid I thought it was interesting because I would not have expected that #91 was stopped short of the collision site and waiting for a go-ahead. What was the reason for holding #91? Why would they not have had given #91 authority to pass through the area without stopping? If the reason is not known, is there a typical reason for holding #91 under these circumstances? The article says it was done per protocol. What is that protocol?
It is possible that 91 was held where it was for two reasons. First, the CSX crew may not have given up their track yet. Second, 91 may have been held at an established "block station," oftimes simply a sign beside the track.
If 91 were held at that location because it was an established “block station,” why would the fact that it was an established block station require holding the train there?
Just to clarify; I am not asking for the basis for choosing the location to hold the train. I am asking for the reason to hold the train.
Euclid tree68 Euclid I thought it was interesting because I would not have expected that #91 was stopped short of the collision site and waiting for a go-ahead. What was the reason for holding #91? Why would they not have had given #91 authority to pass through the area without stopping? If the reason is not known, is there a typical reason for holding #91 under these circumstances? The article says it was done per protocol. What is that protocol? It is possible that 91 was held where it was for two reasons. First, the CSX crew may not have given up their track yet. Second, 91 may have been held at an established "block station," oftimes simply a sign beside the track. If 91 were held at that location because it was an established “block station,” why would the fact that it was an established block station require holding the train there? Just to clarify; I am not asking for the basis for choosing the location to hold the train. I am asking for the reason to hold the train.
91 would be held at the North Limit of the Signal Suspension. The CSX crew having the block in the Signal Suspension. When the CSX crew released the block it was given to 91.
While TWC rules permit blocking milepost to milepost, it is was not CSX policy to do that when I was working. For Signal Suspension, you either get the entire limit of the block or you don't get the block.
BaltACD Euclid tree68 Euclid I thought it was interesting because I would not have expected that #91 was stopped short of the collision site and waiting for a go-ahead. What was the reason for holding #91? Why would they not have had given #91 authority to pass through the area without stopping? If the reason is not known, is there a typical reason for holding #91 under these circumstances? The article says it was done per protocol. What is that protocol? It is possible that 91 was held where it was for two reasons. First, the CSX crew may not have given up their track yet. Second, 91 may have been held at an established "block station," oftimes simply a sign beside the track. If 91 were held at that location because it was an established “block station,” why would the fact that it was an established block station require holding the train there? Just to clarify; I am not asking for the basis for choosing the location to hold the train. I am asking for the reason to hold the train. 91 would be held at the North Limit of the Signal Suspension. The CSX crew having the block in the Signal Suspension. When the CSX crew released the block it was given to 91. While TWC rules permit blocking milepost to milepost, it is was not CSX policy to do that when I was working. For Signal Suspension, you either get the entire limit of the block or you don't get the block.
Okay, but why hold a passenger train for that freight switching work? Why not have the freight job release their block authority and give authority to 91 before it arrives? Then after 91 passes without being delayed, give block authority back the the freight job so they can finish their work?
EuclidOkay, but why hold a passenger train for that freight switching work? Why not have the freight job release their block authority and give authority to 91 before it arrives? Then after 91 passes without being delayed, give block authority back the the freight job so they can finish their work?
In your perfect world that would happen. This is the real world of railroading - there are only 24 hours of track time to get everything done. Sometimes a move has to wait for track time to be able to continue their run.
When the Dispatcher gave the CSX crew the block to perform what they had to do, he was probably told that the crew could do what they needed to do in 'XX' minutes, which would have had them clear for 91 without delay - the crew didn't get their move accomplished in 'XX' minutes and 91 was held until the Dispatcher got the block back.
BaltACD Euclid Okay, but why hold a passenger train for that freight switching work? Why not have the freight job release their block authority and give authority to 91 before it arrives? Then after 91 passes without being delayed, give block authority back the the freight job so they can finish their work? In your perfect world that would happen. This is the real world of railroading - there are only 24 hours of track time to get everything done. Sometimes a move has to wait for track time to be able to continue their run. When the Dispatcher gave the CSX crew the block to perform what they had to do, he was probably told that the crew could do what they needed to do in 'XX' minutes, which would have had them clear for 91 without delay - the crew didn't get their move accomplished in 'XX' minutes and 91 was held until the Dispatcher got the block back.
Euclid Okay, but why hold a passenger train for that freight switching work? Why not have the freight job release their block authority and give authority to 91 before it arrives? Then after 91 passes without being delayed, give block authority back the the freight job so they can finish their work?
Okay, I see. If they took the block away from the freight, gave it to 91, and then had to give it back to the freight, it might have taken up more of the 24 hour track time than just holding 91 to let the freight finish. Then maybe somewhere in that urgent process, perhaps a mistake was made.
Is it determined yet whether the CSX crew was tying the train down where it was parked or was intending to cut off the power and run somewhere?
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