Stepson has it. A former boss had it. He could easily fall asleep in his office chair.
Couple times I passed his house on way home from work and would see his car front up against the garage door and his brake lights on. Still in the car asleep. He mentioned to us it surprised him.
News on Google USA. Hate posting news articles anymore. Too much garbage.
Rich
If you ever fall over in public, pick yourself up and say “sorry it’s been a while since I inhabited a body.” And just walk away.
Preliminary report, no news in it.
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/DCA16MR011_Preliminary_Report.pdf
BaltACD Euclid What I find peculiar about the news of the interview with the engineer in this Hoboken crash is lack of any elaboration about the engineer’s forgetfulness. All they said is they he does not remember the collision. That raises this obvious question: Aside from the point of impact, what other events before and after that moment does the engineer also not remember? Did the NTSB not ask about those details, or are they not releasing the answers? For instance I would like to know whether the engineer remembers these details: Opening the throttle from idle to notch #4. Closing throttle from notch #4 to idle. Making the “Emergency” air brake application. Anything from the moment he described observing the speed indicator, to the point of impact. Anything from the point of impact to the time he recovered his memory. I would also like to know the answer to these questions: At what point did he recover his memory? Was the entire loss of memory continuous or intermittent? Considering that the NTSB has yet to complete their entire investigation and come up with a final report - I would expect anything they present to the public to be at best a representation of known provable facts. In depth 'understanding' of the engineer's reported failure to remember is far from a proveable fact, and thus not elaborated upon.
Euclid What I find peculiar about the news of the interview with the engineer in this Hoboken crash is lack of any elaboration about the engineer’s forgetfulness. All they said is they he does not remember the collision. That raises this obvious question: Aside from the point of impact, what other events before and after that moment does the engineer also not remember? Did the NTSB not ask about those details, or are they not releasing the answers? For instance I would like to know whether the engineer remembers these details: Opening the throttle from idle to notch #4. Closing throttle from notch #4 to idle. Making the “Emergency” air brake application. Anything from the moment he described observing the speed indicator, to the point of impact. Anything from the point of impact to the time he recovered his memory. I would also like to know the answer to these questions: At what point did he recover his memory? Was the entire loss of memory continuous or intermittent?
That raises this obvious question: Aside from the point of impact, what other events before and after that moment does the engineer also not remember? Did the NTSB not ask about those details, or are they not releasing the answers?
For instance I would like to know whether the engineer remembers these details:
Opening the throttle from idle to notch #4.
Closing throttle from notch #4 to idle.
Making the “Emergency” air brake application.
Anything from the moment he described observing the speed indicator, to the point of impact.
Anything from the point of impact to the time he recovered his memory.
I would also like to know the answer to these questions:
At what point did he recover his memory?
Was the entire loss of memory continuous or intermittent?
Considering that the NTSB has yet to complete their entire investigation and come up with a final report - I would expect anything they present to the public to be at best a representation of known provable facts. In depth 'understanding' of the engineer's reported failure to remember is far from a proveable fact, and thus not elaborated upon.
I am not asking for provable facts. I am only curious about his response in the interview. I recall that a full transcript of the interview with the engineer of Amtrak #188 was made public shortly after the wreck. In that case, there were details about where the memory ended, and the period in which it remained inactive.
EuclidWhat I find peculiar about the news of the interview with the engineer in this Hoboken crash is lack of any elaboration about the engineer’s forgetfulness. All they said is they he does not remember the collision. That raises this obvious question: Aside from the point of impact, what other events before and after that moment does the engineer also not remember? Did the NTSB not ask about those details, or are they not releasing the answers? For instance I would like to know whether the engineer remembers these details: Opening the throttle from idle to notch #4. Closing throttle from notch #4 to idle. Making the “Emergency” air brake application. Anything from the moment he described observing the speed indicator, to the point of impact. Anything from the point of impact to the time he recovered his memory. I would also like to know the answer to these questions: At what point did he recover his memory? Was the entire loss of memory continuous or intermittent?
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Ed and Jeff: Thank you. I have trouble taking a Tylenol w/o going to sleep shortly thereafter. And over the years, I have trained my brain/body to go to sleep when the head hits the pillow. But I suppose if it were my job, I would have trained myself to stay awake while working.
There is so much medication out there for everything real or imagined, I can't believe the railroads wouldn't have a really short list of what you can take. And medicine side effects are super scary.
As far as engineers not remembering after an accident - isn't this more common than not - that short term memory is often affected?
She who has no signature! cinscocom-tmw
A few months back, the railroad came out with a list of completely restricted, no use even with prescription, and a restricted use, 12 hours after taking dose before being able to work, medications. While the list is longer and broken down into individual catagories by drug type, I've listed a few because they are widely advertised on TV or otherwise known. No use medications include Xanax, Chantix, Lunesta, and Ambien CR. One of the 12 hour restrictions is Tylenol with Codeine.
I don't know if the updated list is just our own company's medical department view or if it came down from the FRA. An individual company can always be more restrictive than what the Government requires.
Jeff
What I find peculiar about the news of the interview with the engineer in this Hoboken crash is lack of any elaboration about the engineer’s forgetfulness. All they said is they he does not remember the collision.
Pretty much all OTC drugs are allowed, but if you have adverse side effects it is up to you to stop using them.
If any incident occurs and you have abused OTC drugs, you will be held accountable.
Prescription drugs are allowed for certain medical conditions, such as those to control blood pressure, heart meds, insulin...as long as you are under a doctors care and the drugs are prescription, your good to go.
You are required to inform the carrier of such use and the carrier can require your doctor to provide them with proof of need and use, but as long as it is to control a medical condition that does not affect operations it is allowed.
Any schedule 2 stuff is forbidden, as is any alcohol in any measurable amount.
There is no legal limit out here.
23 17 46 11
Would You Believe K.P. Lives in Roswell, NM?
BaltACD K. P. Harrier A common thread is perceived in three similar accidents. In 1956 in Los Angeles, a flipped train incident’s crew said they were going through orange groves but none were present. Another incident very recently and this one blanked out engineers’ acceleration took place. I’m inclined to believe some gas bombing took place or a planted gas bomb of some sort was triggered somehow that made the crew do the opposite to what they were supposed to do. In both recent cases the engines blanked out, or at least afterward they did. It may be worthwhile for investigators to take a long, hard look at some kind of mind altering gas that may have been used. If that was in fact what happened in all three incidents mentioned herein, unless that is looked at seriously, investigators may (“may”) never really find the actual cause of all these tragedies, and it likely will happen again! Is Roswell home? Or only home on this planet? I would have expected something like this from a number of posters, not you.
K. P. Harrier A common thread is perceived in three similar accidents. In 1956 in Los Angeles, a flipped train incident’s crew said they were going through orange groves but none were present. Another incident very recently and this one blanked out engineers’ acceleration took place. I’m inclined to believe some gas bombing took place or a planted gas bomb of some sort was triggered somehow that made the crew do the opposite to what they were supposed to do. In both recent cases the engines blanked out, or at least afterward they did. It may be worthwhile for investigators to take a long, hard look at some kind of mind altering gas that may have been used. If that was in fact what happened in all three incidents mentioned herein, unless that is looked at seriously, investigators may (“may”) never really find the actual cause of all these tragedies, and it likely will happen again!
Is Roswell home? Or only home on this planet?
I would have expected something like this from a number of posters, not you.
Yes, I live in Roswell, and Scotty transports me to Cajon Pass and the Sunset Route regularly for reports to the forum. Scotty is what those mysterious flying saucer sightings are all about in Roswell! Yah, right!
Seriously, I’ve read the government report on that 1956 Los Angeles RDC incident, and likewise about the 2008 Metrolink Chatsworth head-on. The latter incident was attributed to the Metrolink engineer running a red signal. Simple enough, BUT YET, in the report it says railfans that actually saw the signal testified that it was green, which would be consistent with the engineer not stopping. The NTSB, however, questioned the credibility of those that say they saw the signal. Presumably, those that say they saw the signal didn’t know the engineer.
Interestingly, the NTSF uses the terminology “probable cause” in its reports (which they usually do). Since none at the NTSB actually saw the incidents they report on, they can’t say for an absolute certainty what actually happened, but a most likely cause as they perceive it.
In that light I see the strange incidents as we have been discussing as possibly having an unknown factor, with that unknown being an element of sabotage using an untraceable gas of some sort. Such would explain why top notch, super trustworthy railroad engineers do a whoppingly stupid thing that causes numerous fatalities, and they can’t remember doing that stupid thing.
Maybe someone on their deathbed with just an hour to live will confess to some train wrecking that will solve some NTSF accident mysteries. At this point, however, I don’t think it is wise to attribute weird train accidents’ possible causes to foolish Roswell factors and chalk them off. Can you imagine how you would feel if you saw a train pass a green signal and then head-on struck another train, but the NTSF questioned that because they could not duplicate it? I don’t think the wickedness of people is fully understood by accident investigators. My earlier post may or may not be applicable to the incident of this thread. But, it is best to keep an open mind, especially with the recent mysterious crashes.
Take care all,
K.P.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- K.P.’s absolute “theorem” from early, early childhood that he has seen over and over and over again: Those that CAUSE a problem in the first place will act the most violently if questioned or exposed.
Norm48327What Jeff said, and pilots have about the same rules.
One "red flag" on OTC meds is "may cause drowsiness...."
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
Mookie This is a serious ? - do the railroads, big & small, allow any kind of medication (thru a doctor & by prescription) for any of their crew positions? Or if you have to take meds for some affiction, you are a desk jockey?
This is a serious ? - do the railroads, big & small, allow any kind of medication (thru a doctor & by prescription) for any of their crew positions? Or if you have to take meds for some affiction, you are a desk jockey?
What Jeff said, and pilots have about the same rules. Some medications will ground them till they have been off them for a time and others are grounds for the FAA to deny them a pilot's certificate. There's also random drug and alcohol testing.
Norm
Randy Stahl Murphy Siding Randy Stahl A busted MU jumper could have caused it. How so? If you short the right wires in the 27 pin bundle the engine (s) get a mind of thier own. It is very easy with a couple of alligator clips and wire to control an engine. It is a rule to inspect and test MU jumpers and discard damaged ones for this reason. A jumper that has been crushed or damaged is a menace.
Murphy Siding Randy Stahl A busted MU jumper could have caused it. How so?
Randy Stahl A busted MU jumper could have caused it.
A busted MU jumper could have caused it.
How so?
If you short the right wires in the 27 pin bundle the engine (s) get a mind of thier own. It is very easy with a couple of alligator clips and wire to control an engine. It is a rule to inspect and test MU jumpers and discard damaged ones for this reason. A jumper that has been crushed or damaged is a menace.
No kidding, not too long ago in my area an Engineer had a locomotive run wild on her because the MU cable had been crushed (probably had been hanging too low and got squashed when the locomotive was coupled to another piece of equipment) and some of those wires that shouldn't have touched each other did. The result was that the engine revved up and started applying full load to the traction motors despite the throttle not being in notch 8. She immediately moved the throttle to idle but this had no effect, so she set the automatic brake to stop the train and applied the independant brake to try and settle the locomotive down (it was jumping and slipping like crazy and applying the independant will smooth that out, but unfortunately not reduce the electrical load to the motors). Next she put the automatic brake into emergency, which should also have forced the engine back to idle but it still kept loading. I think she wound up having to shut the engine down with the emergency fuel cutoff button as none of the controls or breakers had an effect on it.
Shortly after this incident a bulletin came out advising us that MU cables must be hung securely well above the drawbar and unneeded ones must be secured only in the dummy ports, never plugged into the active one.
Greetings from Alberta
-an Articulate Malcontent
Yes, medications are allowed but not all. There are some medications that aren't allowed, even by prescription.
GoodtimingWhoa, that gas is everywhere!
This is a serious ? - do the railroads, big & small, allow any kind of medication (thru a doctor & by prescription) for any of their crew positions? Or if you have to take meds for some affliction, you are a desk jockey?
BaltACD K. P. Harrier Is Roswell home? Or only home on this planet? I would have expected something like this from a number of posters, not you.
K. P. Harrier
A common thread is perceived in three similar accidents. In 1956 in Los Angeles, a flipped train incident’s crew said they were going through orange groves but none were present. Another incident very recently and this one blanked out engineers’ acceleration took place. I’m inclined to believe some gas bombing took place or a planted gas bomb of some sort was triggered somehow that made the crew do the opposite to what they were supposed to do. In both recent cases the engines blanked out, or at least afterward they did. It may be worthwhile for investigators to take a long, hard look at some kind of mind altering gas that may have been used. If that was in fact what happened in all three incidents mentioned herein, unless that is looked at seriously, investigators may (“may”) never really find the actual cause of all these tragedies, and it likely will happen again!
Add me to the list of "Did He REALLY say That?"
I checked my calendar, Nope, it's NOT April 1st.
Doug
May your flanges always stay BETWEEN the rails
K. P. HarrierA common thread is perceived in three similar accidents. In 1956 in Los Angeles, a flipped train incident’s crew said they were going through orange groves but none were present. Another incident very recently and this one blanked out engineers’ acceleration took place. I’m inclined to believe some gas bombing took place or a planted gas bomb of some sort was triggered somehow that made the crew do the opposite to what they were supposed to do. In both recent cases the engines blanked out, or at least afterward they did. It may be worthwhile for investigators to take a long, hard look at some kind of mind altering gas that may have been used. If that was in fact what happened in all three incidents mentioned herein, unless that is looked at seriously, investigators may (“may”) never really find the actual cause of all these tragedies, and it likely will happen again!
Are you just joking?
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
You know, I've had times that I moved the throttle in the wrong direction - notch down when I wanted more, notch up when I wanted to slow down. Of course, I immediately caught the mistake and dealt with it, but if someone is somehow confused, distracted, incapacitated, or otherwise not on top of what they are doing, it can happen.
A factor with us is that we regularly (every trip) spend half our time running "backwards," which reverses the logic I mentioned before.
Randy
Thanks to Chris / CopCarSS for my avatar.
wanswheel The NTSB agrees with the assertion of its vice chairperson that the primary cause for this overspeed derailment is the failure of NJT Rail Operations to install PTC in Hoboken Terminal.
The NTSB agrees with the assertion of its vice chairperson that the primary cause for this overspeed derailment is the failure of NJT Rail Operations to install PTC in Hoboken Terminal.
I'd suggest to the NTSB that there is a significant difference between "cause" and "failed to prevent". Language counts!
TIA the rumor might’ve got started by David Schanoes’ imagination. Excerpt from Railway Age
http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/blogs/david-schanoes/while-were-waiting-administrator-feinberg.html?channel=00
It’s November 2017, and the NTSB is conducting an open hearing, live-streamed on the web, to consider the findings of its investigation into the overspeed derailment of NJT train no. 1614 on Sept. 29, 2016…
The NTSB finds that contributing causes to this derailment are: (a) FRA’s approval of Main Line Track Exclusion Addendums (MTEAs) for passenger terminals where speeds are restricted to no more than 20 mph and interlocking rules are in effect; (b) failure of the locomotive engineer to properly control the speed of the train due to unknown reasons that may include, but are not limited to, obstructive sleep apnea, fatigue, pre-existing medical conditions, transient ischemic attack, distraction, distraction due to background radio communications between other trains and the control center, etc., etc.
petitnj TIA's lead to loss of awareness. They don't have to become unconscienous they just loose touch. And unfortunately, there is no way to tell if the engineer had a TIA as they clear up when the clot moves and cannot be traced after the fact. Perhaps a speed alarm would have helped but I am not sure.
TIA's lead to loss of awareness. They don't have to become unconscienous they just loose touch. And unfortunately, there is no way to tell if the engineer had a TIA as they clear up when the clot moves and cannot be traced after the fact. Perhaps a speed alarm would have helped but I am not sure.
Loss of awareness is another of many aspects of impaired consciousness. Impaired consciousness includes but is not limited to becoming unconscious.
Even though a TIA is short-lived, it can still be diagnosed afterwards. Methods include a physical to look for risk factors, carotid ultrasonography, CT scans of brain, CT angiography, MRIs, and echocardigraphy.
What is your source for stating so unequivocally that the engineer had a TIA? TIAs have an incidence rate of 83 per 100,000 population, and highest in black males.
Personally, I believe a partial seizure disorder is more consistent with his actions.
TIA seems to be a condition beyond what I am wondering may have happened.
I had a friend that, when backing out of his garage, put the car in drive, reached around behind the back of the front seat to look out the back window, pressed the accelerator and drove through the front wall of the garage, directly into his living room.
I have done nearly the same thing. I have pressed the button on the remote to close the garage door BEFORE I put the car in gear to drive out.
My doctor wrote out a prescription while telling me I didn't need any medication... (he quietly wadded up the paper when he realized what he had done).
None of these actions fit the description of a TIA... rather what some refer to as a 'brain fart' or 'senile moment' or just a 'stupid mistake'. "Why did I do THAT?!"
The latter two of my examples were not something to consider as dangerous, as they resolved themselves immediately, but that first one COULD HAVE been much worse... there was several hundred dollars in damages to the car and thousands of dollars damage to the house and furnishings... and could have been deadly if someone had been sitting on the davenport that was utterly demolished in the "accident".
I would bet that all of us have done one of these "stupid mistakes" in our own past. Granted, 99.99% of the time, the mistake is not catastrophic, but they do occur. People flip the wrong switch at the wrong time for the wrong reason in the wrong situation and most of the time, nobody notices, but sometimes a pilot forgets to drop the landing gear or the switch operator resets the switch right in front of a moving train or an engineer moves the wrong lever and everybody looks for a "major medical cause".
I seriously wonder of there IS a "medical cause" (major or otherwise) for "Stupid mistakes", unless being human is a major medical situation that can be prevented or cured or controlled.
I think the best we can do is try to find a way to catch these mistakes before they hurt somebody.
AH! Have you ever clicked 'Delete' when you meant to click "Copy"? Windows has a feature wherein it asks you if you are sure...
Ever clicked 'Yes' when you meant to click 'No'?
Windows has the Recycle Bin to help you undo those TWO accidents... ever click "Empty Recycle Bin" when you meant to open it to recover from your twice blunder?
Ever click 'Yes' on the "Are you sure?" prompt about emptying the Recycle Bin?
Just how many times should Windows ask you "Are you sure?"???
Does it need a secondary Recycle Bin built-in?
Did you know there are utility programs that can sometimes recover from that last "Are you sure?"!
Semper Vaporo
Pkgs.
Euclid petitnj The engineer had a transient medical condition just before the crash. How do you know that? What was the exact effect of the TIA?
petitnj The engineer had a transient medical condition just before the crash.
How do you know that? What was the exact effect of the TIA?
The first that it was stated that the engineer had a TIA was in the above quoted post where the statement was made by petitnj. His full quote was as follows:
"The engineer had a transient medical condition just before the crash. TIA's are very common but often don't affect us -- we don't realize we had them."
I asked him how he knows that the engineer had a TIA. In the second part of my question, I was not asking what effects could be produced by a TIA.
Assuming that he somehow knew that the engineer had a TIA, I was asking petitnj to descibe the effects of TIA that the engineer had.
tree68 Euclid What was the exact effect of the TIA? Could have been any of a variety of symptoms: TIA Confusion is one symptom. Notable here is that moving either the throttle or the brake in a forward direction (toward the front of the locomotive) has the same effect - slowing the locomotive (or cab car, in this case). Of course, simply reducing the throttle isn't going to slow a train in and of itself. But unless there's a downgrade, the train shouldn't accelerate.
Euclid What was the exact effect of the TIA?
Could have been any of a variety of symptoms:
TIA
Confusion is one symptom.
Notable here is that moving either the throttle or the brake in a forward direction (toward the front of the locomotive) has the same effect - slowing the locomotive (or cab car, in this case). Of course, simply reducing the throttle isn't going to slow a train in and of itself. But unless there's a downgrade, the train shouldn't accelerate.
1. Where is the reported evidence that the engineer had a TIA?
2. Confusion, though possible, is NOT a common symptom.
[from the link you cited]:
Symptoms can vary widely across people, and across brain regions. The most frequent symptoms include temporary loss of vision (typically amaurosis fugax); difficulty speaking (aphasia); weakness on one side of the body (hemiparesis); and numbness or tingling (paresthesia), usually on one side of the body. Impairment of consciousness is very uncommon. There have been cases of temporary and partial paralysis affecting the face and tongue of the afflicted. The symptoms of a TIA are short-lived and usually last a few seconds to a few minutes and most symptoms disappear within 60 minutes. Some individuals may have a lingering feeling that something odd happened to the body. Dizziness, lack of coordination or poor balance are also symptoms related to TIA. Symptoms vary in severity.
My most recent understanding is that it is not known why the locomotive control effects changed. Official statements have stated that. Their statement leaves open the possibility that the changes occurred due to some type of equipment malfunction, as opposed to control manipulation by the engineer. All that is known is that control effects were changed as is shown on the event recorder.
So considering that nothing is known about the engineer's actions or intent, I don't see how we can know that he suffered a TIA. He could have acted intentionally, acted when distracted, or fallen asleep.
EuclidWhat was the exact effect of the TIA?
petitnjThe engineer had a transient medical condition just before the crash.
Excerpt from NY Times, Oct. 6
On Wednesday, New Jersey Transit issued new rules requiring a second crew member to join the train engineer in the operating cab when entering stations in Hoboken and Atlantic City. The measure was aimed at providing a second set of eyes and ears during the final segment of trips into those stations.
Train service at Hoboken Terminal has been suspended since the crash. New Jersey Transit has not said when trains will start traveling there again.
James E. Hall, a former chairman of the safety board, said the event recorder information showed the engineer had accelerated the train before the crash, but it did not explain why.
“What it doesn’t answer is: If there were those movements by the operator of the throttle, were they accidental or intentional?” he said.
Mr. Hall praised the railroad’s decision to place a conductor next to the train’s engineer to serve as a backup. But he also urged the railroad to install an automatic braking system to prevent future accidents.
“It’s unimportant whether it was human error or accidental,” Mr. Hall said. “There are technologies to prevent the train from accelerating.”
http://www.hallassoc.net/Staff/managing%20partner.htm
schlimmThis crash and others show a clear need for automatic controls that could largely prevent human (likely) errors like these.
This is well understood, and has been since at least the time of Gold's ATS system in 1880.
The problem is that the "automatic controls" are not easy things to implement in the real world, as the repeated discussions of the implementation of train control on the Lindenwold line (and many others, right up to the recent accidents in Europe involving 'positive' train control systems) in numerous threads here will indicate.
I was of the opinion in the late 1980s that some form of artificial consciousness was necessary in any deterministic train-control system that used physical one-pipe brakes in an environment subject to climate and to potentially deferred or even malicious maintenance problems. It seems obvious to me that a similar concern will be needed to arrange safe stops 'in minimum time' at stub platforms with passenger trains.
Yes, you are right about the automatic controls. But they will by no means be simple and 'automatic' to implement, and I suspect there will still be circumstances where accidents or incidents occur outside the 'design envelope' of whatever control system is built. (Just as they still do when the 'control system' used involves a trained and diligent human consciousness...)
The engineer had a transient medical condition just before the crash. TIA's are very common but often don't affect us -- we don't realize we had them.
Clearly a case for automatic control system. However, listening to the local RR scanner, the train crews on multiple units spend significant time recycling the controls to get new locomotives to run. Will be interesting to see how reliable railroad controls will be.
This crash and others show a clear need for automatic controls that could largely prevent human (likely) errors like these.
It is amazing how similar this is to the Amtrak 188 derailment. In both cases, the engineer accelerated when he should have been slowing. And in both cases, the engineer said he could not remember doing so.
Although that last point is not clear in this Hoboken crash. The only thing that we have been told is that the engineer does not remember is the crash itself. The event recorder shows that the locomotive switched from idle throttle to notch #4, shortly before the end of track, and then that an “Emergency” brake application was made one second before impact.
It is not clear whether the engineer remembers making either one of those control changes. It is not clear whether the NTSB asked him if he remembered doing so.
The latest news is that the train suddenly accelerated from 10 mph to 20 mph 38 seconds before the crash with the emergency brake applied about a second before the crash. Doesn't look good for the engineer.
Euclid ...So if the engineer’s claim of 10 mph is true, his train had to accelerate by at least 10 mph as he approached the end of track. It raises the question of whether an intentional acceleration was made to prevent inadvertently stopping too short;...
...So if the engineer’s claim of 10 mph is true, his train had to accelerate by at least 10 mph as he approached the end of track. It raises the question of whether an intentional acceleration was made to prevent inadvertently stopping too short;...
It is now reported that the event recorder shows the train accelerating from 8 mph to 21 mph just before the collision.
About 1 second prior to impact, the engineer made an "Emergency" application of the brakes, and hit the bumper post at 21 mph.
The engineer says he does not remember the crash, but he does describe remembering events up to a very short interval prior to the crash. I am not sure how long that interval is, but I assume it was less than 1000 feet long. Maybe others can offer an accurate estimate based on the engineer’s terminology in his description of where he was when he looked at the speedometer and saw it reading 10 mph.
Since that claim of 10mph somewhere in the approach to the end of track, professional estimates have the train hitting the bumper at 20-30 mph. So if the engineer’s claim of 10 mph is true, his train had to accelerate by at least 10 mph as he approached the end of track. It raises the question of whether an intentional acceleration was made to prevent inadvertently stopping too short; and if so, did the engineer then fail to reduce power from that acceleration in time to get stopped for the bumper.
Perhaps there are other explanations for accelerating from 10 mph to 20-30 mph in the short distance approaching the end of track. But if not, the only apparent explanation is that the engineer’s claim of approaching at 10 mph is false.
The full explanation should be provided by the event recorder if it actually recorded these events, and if the data it recorded has not since been corrupted. Here is the latest update on that subject from this article:
http://www.amny.com/transit/hoboken-train-crash-ntsb-analyzing-event-and-video-recorders-officials-say-1.12404795
Quotes from the link:
“An agency spokesman said the information that will be made public will deal with what was found in the recorders, but will not give a cause for the crash.”
“The event recorder is expected to provide speed, throttle and breaking information as well as “about 100 other parameters” regarding the train’s movements, Southworth said.”
“Southworth said the cellphone as well as the event and video recorders were sent to be analyzed at the NTSB’s laboratory in Washington, D.C.”
“Southworth said he did not know whether the event recorder was functioning.”
There is one more thing to consider here. There is PTC and then there is Amtrak PTC (ACSES). I believe NJT is going with ACSES. ACSES uses track transponders for civil speed location identification.
The "ancient" ATC system on PATCO used similar to identify distance to the platform for each station so the train would stop at the right spot on the platform, automatically.
This wasn't part of the safety system - there were times the train slid by the end of the platform in bad weather - but it did work. The one place it wasn't used was at the stub end station at 15/16th and Locust in Phila. There, the operator had to turn of the ATC and manually position the train at the platform.
Theoretically, you could use the track transponders in ACSES to enforce stops before track end bumpers. The engineer would just have to stay below the somewhat conservative braking curve. It would mean a bit more time to get each train fully at each platform and would reduce terminal capacity a bit.
It might not be such a bad thing implement such a system. I would hope NJT is looking at this.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
FWIW.Hoboken. PATH 2011http://media.nj.com/star-ledger/photo/2011/05/9560086-large.jpghttp://i55.tinypic.com/2pzeknl.jpgDetroit. MC.http://www.shorpy.com/node/7837?size=_original#caption
I am familiar with the runaway in Washington where the GG1 went into the station and fell through the floor and into the basement. I also recall seeing that photo of the ATSF train overhanging the street below. Apparently there was at least one other similar accident at the Hoboken station, although I am not fully aware of the total history there.
I know that small non-terminal stations have been damaged or destroyed by passing freight trains either derailing or from shifting loads fouling the building. But I can also see the unique vulnerability of larger stations where the tracks end with the building beyond. With these conditions, I am sure that a lot of attention was focused on safety measures that would prevent trains from overrunning the terminal tracks. There must have been many patents and proposals offered to fulfill the need.
I found three wrecks in my early Railroad Gazette listings that involve trains busting into and out of stations for various reasons. They are as follows:
April 1884
On the night of the 21st a freight train on the Indianapolis Belt Railroad broke in two near Indianapolis, Ind., and the detached cars started back down grade following the Belt road and the Union tracks into the Panhandle station, running completely through that station, smashing the doors and butting posts at the end of it and piling themselves in a bad wreck in the street beyond. The wreck was scattered all over the street and against the walls of the buildings opposite the freight house.
May 1890
12th, at Terre Haute, Ind., butting collision between an incoming Vandalia freight and Evansville & Terre Haute yard engine pushing half dozen coal cars. Both locomotives were deserted before the collision. The engine of the former, the throttle lever of which had been opened by the shock, broke away from the tender and pushed the switching freight, half a mile, into the Union depot, there colliding with a Terre Haute & Peoria standing passenger train. Two engines and several cars were damaged and a portion of the station building demolished. Engineer hurt.
September 1890
9th, on Southern Pacific, at Oakland, Cal., a locomotive standing in the station ready to take a special passenger train was started backwards by self-opening of the throttle so suddenly as to overthrow the fireman, who was in charge; the engine ran at great speed into and over the stop blocks, and damaged the building considerably. A number of the occupants of the ferry house had narrow escapes, and the throttle was finally closed by Superintendent Wilder while the engine was still plowing its way toward the end of the track at the ferry slip.
DS4-4-1000 Euclid I also wonder how many instances there have been with passenger trains overrunning the end of the track and damaging the station. Probably the most famous is the wreck of the Federal in 1953 where GG1 4876 ended up in the basement of Union Station in Washington. That accident was attributed to a design flaw where the angle cock on a New Haven coach was closed by the motion of the car itself.
Euclid I also wonder how many instances there have been with passenger trains overrunning the end of the track and damaging the station.
Probably the most famous is the wreck of the Federal in 1953 where GG1 4876 ended up in the basement of Union Station in Washington. That accident was attributed to a design flaw where the angle cock on a New Haven coach was closed by the motion of the car itself.
Or by rock kicked up from the ballast.
EuclidI also wonder how many instances there have been with passenger trains overrunning the end of the track and damaging the station.
To complicate the clean up more the possibility of Matthew going right over NYC may make the clean up be pushed or a new disaster especially with the asbesdos.
One question that comes to my mind is this: In all of the track arrangements in history where trains have pulled into stub tracks and stopped short of a bumper post; has there ever been an installation of equipment that would automatically stop the train short of the bumper post if it senses that the engineer will not accomplish that stop?
I also wonder how many instances there have been with passenger trains overrunning the end of the track and damaging the station. On one hand, it seems like it would be rare and perhaps unlikely with typical long, slow approaches to large depots. But on the other hand, the consequence of such an overrun would be likely to be serious, considering that a lot of people would be positioned in the direct path of such a runaway.
Euclid...he also makes the following prediction...
Wonder if he buys lottery tickets. He must be a rich man if he does...
Euclid Jeff, I understand your point that PTC may only enforce the top speed allowed under “Restricted Speed” while not enforcing contingencies encountered that require stopping while under Restricted Speed. David Schanoes writes about this issue in his blog piece called, “While We’re Waiting; A Look Ahead.” http://www.ten90solutions.com/while_were_waiting_a_look_ahead He makes interesting points about the discrepancy between the law and the regulation which accepts running through a switch as long as the speed is less than 20 mph. In this piece, he also makes the following prediction about the forthcoming finding of cause by the NTSB, which is the failure of RJRT to install PTC: “The NTSB agrees with the assertion of its vice-chairperson that the primary cause for this overspeed derailment is the failure of NJT Rail Operations to install PTC in Hoboken Terminal. The NTSB finds that contributing causes to this derailment are: (a) FRA's approval of Main Line Track Exemptions for passenger terminals where speeds are restricted to no more than 20 mph and interlocking rules are in effect (b) failure of the locomotive engineer to properly control the speed of the train due to unknown reasons that may include, but are not limited to, obstructive sleep apnea, fatigue, pre-existing medical conditions, transient ischemic attack, distraction, distraction due to background radio communications between other trains and the control center, etc. etc.”
Jeff,
I understand your point that PTC may only enforce the top speed allowed under “Restricted Speed” while not enforcing contingencies encountered that require stopping while under Restricted Speed.
David Schanoes writes about this issue in his blog piece called, “While We’re Waiting; A Look Ahead.”
http://www.ten90solutions.com/while_were_waiting_a_look_ahead
He makes interesting points about the discrepancy between the law and the regulation which accepts running through a switch as long as the speed is less than 20 mph.
In this piece, he also makes the following prediction about the forthcoming finding of cause by the NTSB, which is the failure of RJRT to install PTC:
“The NTSB agrees with the assertion of its vice-chairperson that the primary cause for this overspeed derailment is the failure of NJT Rail Operations to install PTC in Hoboken Terminal.
The NTSB finds that contributing causes to this derailment are: (a) FRA's approval of Main Line Track Exemptions for passenger terminals where speeds are restricted to no more than 20 mph and interlocking rules are in effect
Mom and Dad are fighting!
The NTSB finds that contributing causes to this derailment are: (a) FRA's approval of Main Line Track Exemptions for passenger terminals where speeds are restricted to no more than 20 mph and interlocking rules are in effect (b) failure of the locomotive engineer to properly control the speed of the train due to unknown reasons that may include, but are not limited to, obstructive sleep apnea, fatigue, pre-existing medical conditions, transient ischemic attack, distraction, distraction due to background radio communications between other trains and the control center, etc. etc.”
Deggesty Neutralize asbestos? The only way I can imagine is by enclosing it in something that can be hermetically sealed--making sure that no fibers get away.
Neutralize asbestos? The only way I can imagine is by enclosing it in something that can be hermetically sealed--making sure that no fibers get away.
That is what is commonly done when older buildings are rehabbed and the asbestos doesn't need to be disturbed or removed. I think some kind of sealant is sprayed over it that seals the asbestos (and any loose fibers) in. Asbestos that has to be disturbed or removed is a hazardous material, and must be handled and disposed of in accordance with the HM rules, which are DEFINITELY no laughing matter (been there, watched it being done, and signed the payments for the work).
Euclid As I understand this, the only means available with PTC for controlling trains pulling up to the bumper post, as this one was doing; would be to enforce the concept of “restricted speed.” Why would this not result in stopping the train before it hit the bumper post? Doesn’t “restricted speed” require stopping short of an obstruction?
As I understand this, the only means available with PTC for controlling trains pulling up to the bumper post, as this one was doing; would be to enforce the concept of “restricted speed.” Why would this not result in stopping the train before it hit the bumper post? Doesn’t “restricted speed” require stopping short of an obstruction?
I think that when PTC enforces restricted speed, it is enforcing the top speed allowed by rule, 20 or 15 mph. A train comes up to a red number plated signal. (For me that's a Restricted Proceed, no stop required. For others it may still be a Stop and Proceed.) The train is allowed to pass the signal, proceeding at Restricted Speed, not exceeding 20 mph. PTC, from inputs from the signal system and the location of a preceeding trains engine, knows there is a train ahead, but may not know exactly where the rear end is. PTC allows the following train in and as long as it doesn't exceed 20 mph, and probably a margin of error slightly over 20 mph, PTC let's it keep going.
Our ATC is like this when you are running at restricted speed. It enforces the restricting cab signal, but won't cause a penalty brake application until your speed exceeds 22 mph.
Johnny
The event recorder problems seem to be puzzling. Transport type aircraft have gone thru about 4 iterations of improvements. Most changes have been made retroactive when the airplanes go thru a "D" check or phased "D" check. Originally 11 parameters on analog metal tape, then to digital channels and now are at over 200+ parameters.
As well there are several indications that show on both the flight recorder and voice recorders that indicate they are working. Part of preflight check. In addition believe every 30 - 90 days an avionics tech must take a download of the units to verify they are working. The download also goes to the IT department to verify that the readings are reasonable and none are missing. IE -- airspeed of 2000 knots would indicate problems and order to replace recorder at next maintenance station sent.
Would think that the 92 day inspections would accomplish the same thing.
Another question. Since NJT operates this line under contract to MNRR why was the train short of regular number of cars ? Were the cars & loco owned by NJT or MNRR ?
Evidently the "SANDY" repairs did not include asbesdos removal ?
Any idea how the asbesdos will be neutralized ?
Since ACSES and the Amrak ATC systems are part of NJT as well why not have the systems with timer circuits to stop trains short of bumpers ? Of course these systems would not stop all trains but would stop most potential over runs.
BANG! DING! OW!
schlimm Maybe more (passenger & commuter) trains need an auto-pilot as well as PTC?
Maybe more (passenger & commuter) trains need an auto-pilot as well as PTC?
Maybe it goes further than that , we still gotta share the road with this guy.
Dec. 30, 1939
tree68 Euclid Doesn’t “restricted speed” require stopping short of an obstruction?
Euclid Doesn’t “restricted speed” require stopping short of an obstruction?
zugmann Euclid n012944, Here is what I am wondering about. If that rear event recorder had been not working for say a week or more, is it likely that it was leading a train at some point during that time? For this train that crashed, would it be likely that they moved the working event recorder to the leading end of the train every time they changed directions? Not how event recorders work. It's not like there's an "event recorder working" gauge in a locomotive. I've had engines where the roadforemen tried to get a download and they couldn't. Files get corrupted, CF cards don't work, etc.
Euclid n012944, Here is what I am wondering about. If that rear event recorder had been not working for say a week or more, is it likely that it was leading a train at some point during that time? For this train that crashed, would it be likely that they moved the working event recorder to the leading end of the train every time they changed directions?
Not how event recorders work. It's not like there's an "event recorder working" gauge in a locomotive. I've had engines where the roadforemen tried to get a download and they couldn't. Files get corrupted, CF cards don't work, etc.
I would think that it would be considered very important for an event recorder to be working, considering its role to capture critical information that is only availble during an event. While it may not be necessary to have an "event recorder operating" indicator, having such an indicator does not seem like overkill.
Short of that, however, would be a requirement to check the event recorder for operation at the start of a work shift. I understand the point that they can fail any time for several different reasons, and that this one that failed was not legally required for the operation underway during the crash.
But it raises a few questions when they first tell us that they will get information from the two event recorders, and then tell us that one of them was not operating with the apparent explanation that it was too old. The question that this raises was asked at a NTSB news conference, and it seemed clear to me that they dodged the question because it was a hot potato.
Within half the distance to the obstruction. Using that parameter, a train could never actually reach the bumper.
In this particular situation, we also have to question the resolution of whatever is being used to determine the position of the train. If it's GPS, the resolution can sometimes be to tens of feet, not to mention this incident occurred inside the train shed (from what I've seen), which is going to affect the GPS signal.
News articles seem to report nothing not said by Ms. D-Z at the briefings, which of course are on NTSB youtube channel. Most recent video is generally first in the second row, ‘uploads.’
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCe5dWbxxvQqDAHmyMrEF7Kw
schlimmExperts have disputed that. The programming can enforce stops, not just speed limits.
Would that entail having everything signalled right up to the bumping block? I think that's the problem - some of these stations are so full of swithces and tracks it would be a hell of a job to signal everything. Or can you have a sea of restricting with a stop signal at the end?
I honestly don't know.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Euclidn012944, Here is what I am wondering about. If that rear event recorder had been not working for say a week or more, is it likely that it was leading a train at some point during that time? For this train that crashed, would it be likely that they moved the working event recorder to the leading end of the train every time they changed directions?
BaltACD schlimm CMStPnP Euclid So, the engineer says that he entered the station at 10 mph, but he does not remember the crash. The one black box recovered was not working during the trip because it was old. They can’t get to the other black box because it is too hard with all the wreckage, and there might be asbestos. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/n-j-train-crash-one-data-recorder-wasn-t-working-n658256 Sounds like Sleep Apnea and he passed out. Just like the Amtrak crash earlier. Maybe they should start testing Locomotive Engineers for Sleep Apnea. Better still, equip all commuter train lines with PTC. Metro-North did. NJT could have. They still can once they get rid of Christie. PTC enforces response to Signal Indications. The Signal Indication into a dead end station track would be 'Restricting' - proceed at restricted speed (with all the other requirements restricted speed entails). IF train was proceeding at 10 MPH as the engineer asserts, it was moving in accordance within the limits that PTC would allow. The fact that the train did not stop short of the track blockage (bumping block) indicates man failure that PTC would not prevent.
schlimm CMStPnP Euclid So, the engineer says that he entered the station at 10 mph, but he does not remember the crash. The one black box recovered was not working during the trip because it was old. They can’t get to the other black box because it is too hard with all the wreckage, and there might be asbestos. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/n-j-train-crash-one-data-recorder-wasn-t-working-n658256 Sounds like Sleep Apnea and he passed out. Just like the Amtrak crash earlier. Maybe they should start testing Locomotive Engineers for Sleep Apnea. Better still, equip all commuter train lines with PTC. Metro-North did. NJT could have. They still can once they get rid of Christie.
CMStPnP Euclid So, the engineer says that he entered the station at 10 mph, but he does not remember the crash. The one black box recovered was not working during the trip because it was old. They can’t get to the other black box because it is too hard with all the wreckage, and there might be asbestos. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/n-j-train-crash-one-data-recorder-wasn-t-working-n658256 Sounds like Sleep Apnea and he passed out. Just like the Amtrak crash earlier. Maybe they should start testing Locomotive Engineers for Sleep Apnea.
Euclid So, the engineer says that he entered the station at 10 mph, but he does not remember the crash. The one black box recovered was not working during the trip because it was old. They can’t get to the other black box because it is too hard with all the wreckage, and there might be asbestos. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/n-j-train-crash-one-data-recorder-wasn-t-working-n658256
So, the engineer says that he entered the station at 10 mph, but he does not remember the crash. The one black box recovered was not working during the trip because it was old. They can’t get to the other black box because it is too hard with all the wreckage, and there might be asbestos.
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/n-j-train-crash-one-data-recorder-wasn-t-working-n658256
Sounds like Sleep Apnea and he passed out. Just like the Amtrak crash earlier. Maybe they should start testing Locomotive Engineers for Sleep Apnea.
Better still, equip all commuter train lines with PTC. Metro-North did. NJT could have. They still can once they get rid of Christie.
PTC enforces response to Signal Indications. The Signal Indication into a dead end station track would be 'Restricting' - proceed at restricted speed (with all the other requirements restricted speed entails). IF train was proceeding at 10 MPH as the engineer asserts, it was moving in accordance within the limits that PTC would allow. The fact that the train did not stop short of the track blockage (bumping block) indicates man failure that PTC would not prevent.
Experts have disputed that. The programming can enforce stops, not just speed limits.
n012944,
Here is what I am wondering about. If that rear event recorder had been not working for say a week or more, is it likely that it was leading a train at some point during that time? For this train that crashed, would it be likely that they moved the working event recorder to the leading end of the train every time they changed directions?
I think that was the basic point of a question asked at the NTSB press conference. It was whether a failed event recorder on a train suggested a violation, assuming that it had been bad order for some significant period of time.
Euclid And if that is so, doesn’t that mean that a failed event recorder on the trailing locomotive going into the station was a violation?
And if that is so, doesn’t that mean that a failed event recorder on the trailing locomotive going into the station was a violation?
It wouldn't be a violation until the outbound actually left.
An "expensive model collector"
tree68 Niles - who cares about some stabbings?
Niles - who cares about some stabbings?
I think he was talking about the 2012 derailment, not the stabbings.
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAB1306.pdf
They have clarified the rule on event recorders saying that the leading end of the train must have one that is working. This was in response to a question as to whether the one that was not working on the trailing end was required to have been working. The answer was left at “no” because only the lead end requires one to be working.
I am not familiar with this operation, but doesn’t either end of the train lead at various times? And if that is so, doesn’t that mean that a failed event recorder on the trailing locomotive going into the station was a violation?
Somehow, I get the feeling that when they finally get the debris cleared away and recover the second event recorder, that will not be working either.
7j43k...Chester, PA. <snip> Niles, MI...
Probably because they didn't get quite the major press coverage. A fair amount was heard about Chester in the trade press, but it still didn't get the general coverage that the incidents involving large numbers of people did. Niles - who cares about some stabbings? Everyday news... (I know, people do care about the stabbings, especially the victims, but in the 24 hour news cycle, it's pfft... Chester was "just" an industrial accident.)
We care about these incidents because we are interested in railroads. The general public, not so much. How much coverage have you seen about Chief Fahey?
Hoboken Terminal reopening is very much undecided.
http://www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf/2016/09/when_will_hoboken_terminal_reopen_experts_say_that.html#incart_river_indexp
Euclid So, the NTSB responsibly addresses the public desire to know what happened while an accident is fresh in the peoples’ minds. They don’t withhold every detail until the last stone has been turned over. However, with this Hoboken crash, I sense a reversal of that NTSB policy about generously informing the public. I see indications that they have adopted precisely the attitude that they should not be expected to tell us anything until their work is finished.
So, the NTSB responsibly addresses the public desire to know what happened while an accident is fresh in the peoples’ minds. They don’t withhold every detail until the last stone has been turned over.
However, with this Hoboken crash, I sense a reversal of that NTSB policy about generously informing the public. I see indications that they have adopted precisely the attitude that they should not be expected to tell us anything until their work is finished.
NTSB has been incredibly unsharing about the crash at Chester, PA. In my opinion. There was information they had early on that they COULD have shared, but didn't.
Niles, MI was another one. They knew stuff within a few days, and didn't tell until the final report. In my opinion.
The one in Midland, Texas (veterans, parade, flatbed) was a bit different. There was, what, 4 daily news conferences before they left. THAT was pretty sharing. In my opinion.
Now, perhaps there were regrets because of the "over" sharing at Midland. Because the locals dearly wanted to blame the UP, and the more the NTSB talked, the worse it looked for the city and the police. And perhaps those two groups cause political unhappiness outwards.
In my opinion.
Ed
I have sometimes wondered why the NTSB tells us anything until they finish their investigation and release the final report. I would tend to expect that as a natural consequence of the gravity of their official process taking precedence.
But, traditionally, that has not been the way they have handled it. Instead, they move fast and tell us what they find as they go. I think the reason is that they realize that the public has an interest in the safety in the public sector, and they are naturally anxious for explanations of a big accident. If an investigative agency came off as defensive, lawyerly, and tight lipped, it would antagonize the public; and a public agency needs public support.
RME the system we use and have used is at Zero pressure the valve closes in less than 1/2 of a second and that is the industry standard on the emergency shutoff valves. They are a pump up to open and the total system volume of fluid in the trailer is less than 2 cups of fluid. The PSI required to open the valve is less than 200 PSI and if the pressure is removed it drops the valve to closed. This system is used by all Haz Mat OTR tanker trailers and has been for 40 years. The emergency releases are a breakable bolt looking device on every corner of the trailer and if there is an issue anywhere all you have to do is grab twist and snap. That releases the pressure and closes the valve. We have hauled acid for 30+ years and never had an issue like this until this week. In fact the only other issue we have ever had was where the valve refused to open on the trailer when pumped up for opening 20+ years ago. That we traced to a cracked emergancy release bolt.
I've been following this on www.NorthJersey.com and www.NJ.com. The event recorder's been recovered from the locomotive, but not the event recorder from the cab car, it's still too dangerous to go in there.
The engineer's 48 years old. He might have had a health issue but we don't know yet. From the other NJT stories I'm suspecting there may have been a mechanical failure of some kind but that's just speculation on my part.
For a good photo tour and history of the NJT Lackawanna Terminal in Hoboken go to www.subwaynut.com and follow the New Jersey Transit Rail headings. It's pretty interesting.
Excerpt from Hoboken Terminal's 100th anniversary newsletter, February 2007
http://www.njtransit.com/pdf/nn_EnRouteSpclEdtn.pdf
In a small, corner office above the concourse of Hoboken Terminal, NJ TRANSIT staff works behind the darkened glass to coordinate the movement of customers and trains in and out of Hoboken Terminal.
Overlooking Tracks 1-17, the only hint that they are there comes from the glow of the computer monitors that link them to the core of their mission, which is to make sure our customers move through the terminal safely and on time. Customers exiting a train or pursuing their next destination might glance upward and wonder what actually goes on in the small, bustling workspace affectionately called the “dugout.”
“We closely monitor every train that comes and goes, using the Train Management and Control (TMAC) system,” said Chief Trainmaster, Hoboken Rita Whitley. “We can see the whole railroad just as a train dispatcher does.” NJ TRANSIT uses TMAC to track and control all of the railmovements on its system.
The dugout houses the chief trainmaster, senior trainmaster and others who coordinate all train and crew movements into and out of Hoboken Terminal. The room is open about 20 hours a day, coordinated with the rail schedules of the Hoboken Division. The Hoboken Division includes all trains on the Morris & Essex, Main/Bergen County, Pascack Valley, Montclair-Boonton and Port Jervis lines, and some trains on the North Jersey Coast and Raritan Valley lines.
“We are in charge if there is any kind of problem with the trains, be it mechanical, crew or passenger,” Rita said. “We have to get that train moving and make sure all the customers get on their way.”
The room originally was positioned above the newspaper stand, overlooking the tracks. After the recent renovation of the terminal’s waiting area, the dugout can now be found in the corner of the main building, across from the entrance to NY Waterway...
seppburgh2I have worked over 35 years in IT, from key-coder to now Project Manager. The rule used to determine risk and mitigation plans is simple, "if an error is possible, someone will find the trigger."
And it only took 107 years to find it.
BaltACD MidlandMike TV news reports showed a number of people saying they would not be riding the trains in the foreseeable future. The future will end Monday when the alternative takes twice as long, gives multiple life threatening thrills each way and if they want to park a vehicle in New York, can the find a Mortgage to finance the parking spot.
MidlandMike TV news reports showed a number of people saying they would not be riding the trains in the foreseeable future.
TV news reports showed a number of people saying they would not be riding the trains in the foreseeable future.
The future will end Monday when the alternative takes twice as long, gives multiple life threatening thrills each way and if they want to park a vehicle in New York, can the find a Mortgage to finance the parking spot.
It's been a while since I lived in the NY area, but there are other alternatives such as carpool, rideshare, buses, and shuttle vans. NJT rail would be ill advised to think that people did not have options.
I have worked over 35 years in IT, from key-coder to now Project Manager. The rule used to determine risk and mitigation plans is simple, "if an error is possible, someone will find the trigger."
MidlandMike Goodtiming TV news reports showed a number of people saying they would not be riding the trains in the foreseeable future.
Goodtiming
GoodtimingI doubt if NJT will lose passengers. This was an accident; a one time thing. When was the last bad one in Hoboken?
Norm48327 I believe a series of short blasts is a danger signal.
I believe a series of short blasts is a danger signal.
This is not even speculation but if a train is a runaway how can the engineer warn persons on the ground ? Reason asked is that we seem to recall engineer of the PRR Federal runaway was blowing his horn a certain way and a tower operator called and warned the terminal of the runaway ?
BuslistThis is not an adment to the law but an practical rule surrounding it. It was decided by the PTC RSAC ( Rail Safety Advisory Council). To be fair I should state that I was a member of that group.
Just for clarification, would/could terminals such as Hoboken and the approach tracks potentially be covered by PTC?
MidlandMike n012944 schlimm NJT hasn't installed PTC because they did not apply for a long-term, low-interest loan under the PRIIA. By contrast, in NY, Metro North did. Seems irrelevent, as it appears PTC will not be in use at the Hoboken Terminal. http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/blogs/david-schanoes/preventing-not-chasing-the-ambulance.html?channel=63 "Would PTC have prevented this accident? Yes and no. In theory, yes. In reality, no. Why? Because FRA, in its wisdom, allows railroads to apply for a Main Line Track Exclusion Addendum (MTEA). Meaning? Meaning that in its PTC Implementation Plan (PTCIP), a railroad can designate a passenger terminal exception from PTC requirements for trackage used exclusively as yard or terminal tracks by or in support of regularly scheduled intercity or commuter passenger service where the application for the MTEA relief: • Describes in detail the physical boundaries of the trackage in question, its use and characteristics (including track and signal charts). • The maximum authorized speed for all train movements is not greater than 20 mph. • That 20 mph is enforced by PTC equipment active and installed on the trains within the yard or terminal (i.e. the onboard equipment “reads” non-PTC territory as a speed restriction not exceeding 20 mph). • Interlocking rules are in effect prohibiting reverse movements without signal indication or verbal permission. • No freight operations are permitted, or if permitted, no passengers will be aboard passenger trains within the defined limits. NJT received approval for its PTCIP. The PTCIP included the application of the MTEA for Hoboken Terminal." This seems to say that you can apply for a PTC exemption in a yard: That 20 mph is enforced by PTC equipment active and installed on the trains within the yard or terminal (i.e. the onboard equipment “reads” non-PTC territory as a speed restriction not exceeding 20 mph). I suppose there is more to the story, however, the PTC law can be amended to allow for new circumstances that present themselves.
n012944 schlimm NJT hasn't installed PTC because they did not apply for a long-term, low-interest loan under the PRIIA. By contrast, in NY, Metro North did. Seems irrelevent, as it appears PTC will not be in use at the Hoboken Terminal. http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/blogs/david-schanoes/preventing-not-chasing-the-ambulance.html?channel=63 "Would PTC have prevented this accident? Yes and no. In theory, yes. In reality, no. Why? Because FRA, in its wisdom, allows railroads to apply for a Main Line Track Exclusion Addendum (MTEA). Meaning? Meaning that in its PTC Implementation Plan (PTCIP), a railroad can designate a passenger terminal exception from PTC requirements for trackage used exclusively as yard or terminal tracks by or in support of regularly scheduled intercity or commuter passenger service where the application for the MTEA relief: • Describes in detail the physical boundaries of the trackage in question, its use and characteristics (including track and signal charts). • The maximum authorized speed for all train movements is not greater than 20 mph. • That 20 mph is enforced by PTC equipment active and installed on the trains within the yard or terminal (i.e. the onboard equipment “reads” non-PTC territory as a speed restriction not exceeding 20 mph). • Interlocking rules are in effect prohibiting reverse movements without signal indication or verbal permission. • No freight operations are permitted, or if permitted, no passengers will be aboard passenger trains within the defined limits. NJT received approval for its PTCIP. The PTCIP included the application of the MTEA for Hoboken Terminal."
schlimm NJT hasn't installed PTC because they did not apply for a long-term, low-interest loan under the PRIIA. By contrast, in NY, Metro North did.
NJT hasn't installed PTC because they did not apply for a long-term, low-interest loan under the PRIIA. By contrast, in NY, Metro North did.
Seems irrelevent, as it appears PTC will not be in use at the Hoboken Terminal.
http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/blogs/david-schanoes/preventing-not-chasing-the-ambulance.html?channel=63
"Would PTC have prevented this accident? Yes and no. In theory, yes. In reality, no. Why? Because FRA, in its wisdom, allows railroads to apply for a Main Line Track Exclusion Addendum (MTEA). Meaning? Meaning that in its PTC Implementation Plan (PTCIP), a railroad can designate a passenger terminal exception from PTC requirements for trackage used exclusively as yard or terminal tracks by or in support of regularly scheduled intercity or commuter passenger service where the application for the MTEA relief:
• Describes in detail the physical boundaries of the trackage in question, its use and characteristics (including track and signal charts).
• The maximum authorized speed for all train movements is not greater than 20 mph.
• That 20 mph is enforced by PTC equipment active and installed on the trains within the yard or terminal (i.e. the onboard equipment “reads” non-PTC territory as a speed restriction not exceeding 20 mph).
• Interlocking rules are in effect prohibiting reverse movements without signal indication or verbal permission.
• No freight operations are permitted, or if permitted, no passengers will be aboard passenger trains within the defined limits.
NJT received approval for its PTCIP. The PTCIP included the application of the MTEA for Hoboken Terminal."
This seems to say that you can apply for a PTC exemption in a yard:
That 20 mph is enforced by PTC equipment active and installed on the trains within the yard or terminal (i.e. the onboard equipment “reads” non-PTC territory as a speed restriction not exceeding 20 mph).
I suppose there is more to the story, however, the PTC law can be amended to allow for new circumstances that present themselves.
This is not an adment to the law but an practical rule surrounding it. It was decided by the PTC RSAC ( Rail Safety Advisory Council). To be fair I should state that I was a member of that group.
Until effective PTC is installed, is it possible that the conductor could go forward in the terminal zone, and either join the engineer in a large enough cab, or look out the front door window with access to an emergency brake to stop the train if the engineer is incapacitated? If that is not practical, how about another engineer or supervisor getting on the train at Secaucus to add a second pair of eyes into the terminal? They will need to do something to answer safety demands, and bring back passengers.
Murphy is a railroader. If it can fail, it will. If it can't fail, it will fail.
zugmann jeffhergert Now, can you go too slow at Restricted Speed? Nope. I've already done 1mph while running restricted. I've heard of tiems wehre the engineer sent the conductor to walk ahead to make sure the route is clear on a particular nasty stretch of railroad when restricted speed was required (severe downhill grade, blind curves, short visibilty for signals, etc).
jeffhergert Now, can you go too slow at Restricted Speed?
Nope.
I've already done 1mph while running restricted. I've heard of tiems wehre the engineer sent the conductor to walk ahead to make sure the route is clear on a particular nasty stretch of railroad when restricted speed was required (severe downhill grade, blind curves, short visibilty for signals, etc).
While I agree with you, I've heard of an engineer being disciplined for going too slow at restricted speed. I don't know all the details, but the manager thought the engineer could be going faster for the conditions. It was upheld in arbitration.
One of my co-workers was threatened with "Malicious Rules Compliance" for going slow at Restricted Speed in an area where they like to test. In that area, if I'm at Restricted Speed, 5 mph is about the highest I'll go because of the twists and turns the tracks make through town.
Shadow the Cats ownerRegardless of how well you engineer something how well the rules are written how well you test sometimes the smallest little item will cause a multi million dollar failure.
One of my best college friends lost his father due to the failure of a 39-cent light bulb on a military 707. It would have told him (IIRC) the flaps had not locked properly extended on takeoff; he concluded when the aircraft would not rotate properly on takeoff that he needed emergency power, and one of the engine spools disintegrated when he throttled up quickly.
Note that redundant indication, and perhaps even a simple mechanical arming lock on the acid valve, would have precluded the inadvertent release; something as simple as a spring-powered stop valve or linkage (analogous to truck brakes) would have allowed closing it within no more than a few seconds. I am personally of the opinion that any critical hazmat system needs to have some BITE-like functionality so that it continually diagnoses and reports any fault, or at the very least does a self-check and confirmation before going through any operating cycle. But in a world where fixes to inadequate technology involve more layers of themselves-failure-prone deterministic layers, I'm not as sanguine as I probably should pretend to be.
Nothing and I mean Nothing can be designed 100% failsafe. I just got thru yesterday having to read a report from one of my companies drivers that the system that valve that is supposed to stop the flow of acid when the hydraulic fluid is removed from it will drop closed in an emergency failed. We use a pressure system that you have to pressurize the system to even open a butterfly valve to get the acid to flow. Well yesterday one of our drivers had a pipe failure on the consignee side and needed to stop unloading he went to break the emergency valve release off and the unloading valve stayed wide open. 1500 gallons of acid was spilled into the containment basin. He had the valve replaced and I got the report. Now this is a closed system guess what was the cause in a sealed system a speck of lint had somehow gotten into the hydraulic clyinder and plugged the line. We are retrofitting filters on all our acid tanks as a precaution on our own.
Regardless of how well you engineer something how well the rules are written how well you test sometimes the smallest little item will cause a multi million dollar failure.
EuclidMy only point was that some type of automatic system could be installed that would override the control of the engineer in case his train was approaching the bumper too fast to stop short of it. Is this possible or not?
In a word, yes. And I agree that this ought to be implemented anywhere passenger trains approach terminal bumpers. I don't know if anyone has yet brought up the Chicago Transit horror, where the woman ran the train up the escalator ... that, too, might have been prevented with an automatic system, and in fact I believe there was an automatic system that required slow approach ... to a point halfway down the platform. As with Amtrak 188, quite a bit of mischief can occur in just a few seconds' worth of acceleration at the wrong point.
I tend to agree (in theory) that a transponder-based approach, with proper redundancy in the design, is the 'right' starting point. No matter what the approach, the train is set to 10 to 15mph going into the platform, is held to reasonable restricted-speed (brakes kept set to where a stop in 'half the remaining distance' can be made from the cab when needed), and is brought to a controlled smooth stop at a point clear of the bumper even if there may be slick rail for some reason. It's not a trivial design exercise, but it is certainly neither rocket-science engineering nor a particularly difficult set of conditions to include.
However, one initial concern is that such a system shouldn't be included in a 'global' PTC mandate, any more than PAR should be required for all airports at all times. If it were applied to any "public" system used for the transportation of passengers into passenger facilities, it would make far better sense, but that would literally require a proper 'act of Congress' separate from the 2008 et seq. PTC business.
RME Buslist Euclid I agree that PTC could have prevented this crash by simply controlling the speed. That would have nothing to do with what is called Restricted Speed. but it does. Read the PTC requirements, they are available on the net. This was a point of contention at the PTC RSAC group. Ron, listen to him. You need to know more about the history of the PTC mandate and the industry response to understand what the system does and does not do.
Buslist Euclid I agree that PTC could have prevented this crash by simply controlling the speed. That would have nothing to do with what is called Restricted Speed. but it does. Read the PTC requirements, they are available on the net. This was a point of contention at the PTC RSAC group.
Euclid I agree that PTC could have prevented this crash by simply controlling the speed. That would have nothing to do with what is called Restricted Speed.
I agree that PTC could have prevented this crash by simply controlling the speed. That would have nothing to do with what is called Restricted Speed.
but it does. Read the PTC requirements, they are available on the net. This was a point of contention at the PTC RSAC group.
Ron, listen to him. You need to know more about the history of the PTC mandate and the industry response to understand what the system does and does not do.
This began by a general point earlier that seemed to suggest that PTC would have prevented this crash. Then there seemed to be a counterpoint that PTC could not have prevented the crash because it cannot override mistakes in judgement while running at restricted speed, and restricted speed is the rule that governs the terminal operation where the crash occurred.
My only point was that some type of automatic system could be installed that would override the control of the engineer in case his train was approaching the bumper too fast to stop short of it. Is this possible or not?
CMStPnP I remember back when the trains at Chicago Union Station used to have to stop 100 feet before the bumping post then proceed closer to it. They don't seem to do that anymore though that I have noticed. Wonder why?
I remember back when the trains at Chicago Union Station used to have to stop 100 feet before the bumping post then proceed closer to it. They don't seem to do that anymore though that I have noticed. Wonder why?
jeffhergertNow, can you go too slow at Restricted Speed?
EuclidI agree that PTC could have prevented this crash by simply controlling the speed. That would have nothing to do with what is called Restricted Speed.
Don't even need PTC for that. Could just install a form of pullback protection similar to what remote engines use at some places.
Semper Vaporo zugmann Semper Vaporo Seems to me that any place that is a restricted speed would be the intended place where PTC would be of most value. Problem is that restrcited speed isn't a speed - it's a method of operation. How do you enforce it through PTC? It's the most basic of operations - pretty much "don't hit stuff". A lot of that stuff can be things that aren't connected to the signal system, but you still can't hit. 80. MOVEMENT AT RESTRICTED SPEED Movements made at Restricted Speed must apply the following three requirements as the method of operation: 1. Control the movement to permit stopping within one half the range of vision short of: a. Other trains or railroad equipment occupying or fouling the track, b. Obstructions, c. Switches not properly lined for movement, d. Derails set in the derailing position, e. Any signal requiring a stop, AND 2. Look out for broken rail and misaligned track. AND 3. Do not exceed 20 MPH outside interlocking limits and 15 MPH within interlocking limits. This restriction applies to the entire movement, unless otherwise specified in the rule or instruction that requires Restricted Speed. Thank you for the explanation. Helps to have a good definition of the terms. Still, point 3. above seems to be something that PTC could be used to limit the speed to one of those as a maximum. Something that in the present event was above those values.
zugmann Semper Vaporo Seems to me that any place that is a restricted speed would be the intended place where PTC would be of most value. Problem is that restrcited speed isn't a speed - it's a method of operation. How do you enforce it through PTC? It's the most basic of operations - pretty much "don't hit stuff". A lot of that stuff can be things that aren't connected to the signal system, but you still can't hit. 80. MOVEMENT AT RESTRICTED SPEED Movements made at Restricted Speed must apply the following three requirements as the method of operation: 1. Control the movement to permit stopping within one half the range of vision short of: a. Other trains or railroad equipment occupying or fouling the track, b. Obstructions, c. Switches not properly lined for movement, d. Derails set in the derailing position, e. Any signal requiring a stop, AND 2. Look out for broken rail and misaligned track. AND 3. Do not exceed 20 MPH outside interlocking limits and 15 MPH within interlocking limits. This restriction applies to the entire movement, unless otherwise specified in the rule or instruction that requires Restricted Speed.
Semper Vaporo Seems to me that any place that is a restricted speed would be the intended place where PTC would be of most value.
Problem is that restrcited speed isn't a speed - it's a method of operation. How do you enforce it through PTC? It's the most basic of operations - pretty much "don't hit stuff". A lot of that stuff can be things that aren't connected to the signal system, but you still can't hit.
80. MOVEMENT AT RESTRICTED SPEED Movements made at Restricted Speed must apply the following three requirements as the method of operation: 1. Control the movement to permit stopping within one half the range of vision short of: a. Other trains or railroad equipment occupying or fouling the track, b. Obstructions, c. Switches not properly lined for movement, d. Derails set in the derailing position, e. Any signal requiring a stop, AND 2. Look out for broken rail and misaligned track. AND 3. Do not exceed 20 MPH outside interlocking limits and 15 MPH within interlocking limits. This restriction applies to the entire movement, unless otherwise specified in the rule or instruction that requires Restricted Speed.
Thank you for the explanation. Helps to have a good definition of the terms.
Still, point 3. above seems to be something that PTC could be used to limit the speed to one of those as a maximum. Something that in the present event was above those values.
I believe that PTC will limit trains to 20 mph (or slightly over) when restricted speed is allowed, such as at an intermediate red signal. I'm not sure, maybe even at an absolute. There has to be a way to allow trains to be "flagged" by an absolute. Still, 20 mph is sometimes too fast for conditions. (We don't have the 15 mph for interlocking limits.) A few fatal collisions have happened within the parameters of Restricted Speed. I'm waiting for when one happens after PTC is implemented and the public finds out that it can't prevent everything. (We won't mention the 2012 Niles MI Amtrak derailment where on a PTC equipped line a train went through an open switch. It wasn't a failure of the PTC itself, but a human caused failure in the signal system. Still new PTC systems have to interface and work with existing systems. A failure in one subsystem can mean a failure in the entire system. Something I don't think the public realizes.)
Now, can you go too slow at Restricted Speed?
IIRC the speed restrictions start on the west side of the Bergen Hill tunnel. When a train emerges from the Bergen Hill Tunnel it should be down to 10mph. Pre NJTransit it may have been faster.
Normal train speeds are quit slow within the terminal 10mph. I think there is a slight downgrade from the tunnel into the terminal.
BaltACD Euclid BaltACD Semper Vaporo Everything I have read states PTC is not applicable to this situation, and that the terminal is exempt from it. Not sure on the truth to this, but if the terminal is a restricted speed area, it sounds legit. ?? That confuses me... are you saying that because a terminal is a restricted speed it should be exempt from PTC? Seems to me that any place that is a restricted speed would be the intended place where PTC would be of most value. PTC would have value in APPROACHING a zone of restricted speed; however, in the Restricted Speed zone PTC has NO VALUE. See Zug's explanation of Restricted Speed. Restricted Speed is visual railroading. I understand the point that restricted speed is based on visually identifying various obstacles, and the PTC cannot control that. But why would there need to be a restriced speed zone approaching the bumper? It is the same obstacle in the same place every day, so why not just set a speed limit, and have PTC just monitor the actual speed as the train approaches that obstacle? Just set the speed limit approaching the bumper, and PTC will stop the train if it exceeds the speed limit. So what speed do you want PTC to hit the bumper at?
Euclid BaltACD Semper Vaporo Everything I have read states PTC is not applicable to this situation, and that the terminal is exempt from it. Not sure on the truth to this, but if the terminal is a restricted speed area, it sounds legit. ?? That confuses me... are you saying that because a terminal is a restricted speed it should be exempt from PTC? Seems to me that any place that is a restricted speed would be the intended place where PTC would be of most value. PTC would have value in APPROACHING a zone of restricted speed; however, in the Restricted Speed zone PTC has NO VALUE. See Zug's explanation of Restricted Speed. Restricted Speed is visual railroading. I understand the point that restricted speed is based on visually identifying various obstacles, and the PTC cannot control that. But why would there need to be a restriced speed zone approaching the bumper? It is the same obstacle in the same place every day, so why not just set a speed limit, and have PTC just monitor the actual speed as the train approaches that obstacle? Just set the speed limit approaching the bumper, and PTC will stop the train if it exceeds the speed limit.
BaltACD Semper Vaporo Everything I have read states PTC is not applicable to this situation, and that the terminal is exempt from it. Not sure on the truth to this, but if the terminal is a restricted speed area, it sounds legit. ?? That confuses me... are you saying that because a terminal is a restricted speed it should be exempt from PTC? Seems to me that any place that is a restricted speed would be the intended place where PTC would be of most value. PTC would have value in APPROACHING a zone of restricted speed; however, in the Restricted Speed zone PTC has NO VALUE. See Zug's explanation of Restricted Speed. Restricted Speed is visual railroading.
Semper Vaporo Everything I have read states PTC is not applicable to this situation, and that the terminal is exempt from it. Not sure on the truth to this, but if the terminal is a restricted speed area, it sounds legit. ?? That confuses me... are you saying that because a terminal is a restricted speed it should be exempt from PTC? Seems to me that any place that is a restricted speed would be the intended place where PTC would be of most value.
?? That confuses me... are you saying that because a terminal is a restricted speed it should be exempt from PTC?
Seems to me that any place that is a restricted speed would be the intended place where PTC would be of most value.
PTC would have value in APPROACHING a zone of restricted speed; however, in the Restricted Speed zone PTC has NO VALUE. See Zug's explanation of Restricted Speed. Restricted Speed is visual railroading.
I understand the point that restricted speed is based on visually identifying various obstacles, and the PTC cannot control that. But why would there need to be a restriced speed zone approaching the bumper? It is the same obstacle in the same place every day, so why not just set a speed limit, and have PTC just monitor the actual speed as the train approaches that obstacle?
Just set the speed limit approaching the bumper, and PTC will stop the train if it exceeds the speed limit.
So what speed do you want PTC to hit the bumper at?
I would want it to stop the train before it hits the bumper.
Goodtiming Yes, Hoboken is a termination point. From there riders cross the Hudson either by ferry or PATH train which is totally different system with no physical connection to NJ Transit. Here's my question, I am sure that the engineer rides in the forward facing control car with the engine in the back pushing. How in the good Lord's name did he survive Going thru the bumping post and the concrete walkways?
Yes, Hoboken is a termination point. From there riders cross the Hudson either by ferry or PATH train which is totally different system with no physical connection to NJ Transit. Here's my question, I am sure that the engineer rides in the forward facing control car with the engine in the back pushing. How in the good Lord's name did he survive Going thru the bumping post and the concrete walkways?
There are collision posts in the cab end of the car. Not as good as in a locomotive but enough in this case to protect the engineer from fatal injuries, after hitting a wall. This is FRA standards hard at work.
blue streak 1Why not have a time out circuit that prevents trains from approaching speed restrictions too fast ?.
I think that's part of the overall plan of PTC. I could be wrong.
This particular incident appears to have occurred inside the trainshed. I would question the accuracy of GPS in that situation. Other means, like transponders on the track, might be a better choice there.
Without seeing the ETT, we can't know what the speed restrictions are there. I would opine that the train came into the station well over what most would consider reasonable and prudent, whether the area was supposed to be restricted speed or not.
Have no idea of PTC architecture but;
Why not have a time out circuit that prevents trains from approaching speed restrictions too fast ?. Know of at least one such such location on a BNSF ( AT&SF ) ATS division that has a time out circuit mainly for passenger trains. The NY city subways have time out circuits that will stop a subway train if it exceeds whatever speed limit for any segment ? It would seem that a simple PTC command to stop a train if it excees a pre determined speed into a terminal would be is easily accomplished ?
An example ( not necessarily the actual numbers ) would be at 200 ft from bumper post 10 MPH and 100 ft from bumper 5 MPH. Otherwise a stop command to train is issued. There aare many other stations that could use this feature BON, BOS, WASH, MIA, CHI, LAX to name a few..
This solution would certainly have been easier if ATC, ATS has been the PTC choice
When traveling at restricted speed, you must be able to stop within one-half the distance of your line of sight--and your line of sight will vary as you move; therefore your maximum allowable speed will vary as you move. You cannot have a set speed limit of so many mph under such a circumstance.
When the CZ backs into Denver, the conductor, who is standing at the rear, continually tells the engineer, who cannot see what the conductor sees, what his line of sight is (in so many cars), and as the train backs around the curves, the conductor's line of sight varies. The same applies in Salt Lake City when a detour across Wyoming is necessary, except that the eastbound Zephyr backs out of the station, whereas the westbound Zephyr backs into the station (and it is usually dark when #5 arrives).
Thank you for confirming "push-pull" operation. I suspected as much when I saw one report saying that the engineer and conductor survived when they "were in the back of the train."I've gone out on limbs before (and haven't always been right), but I suspect that the engineer somehow became incapacitated, in spite of his clean health record. It happens...happened to me, sort of. Sad.
Carl
Railroader Emeritus (practiced railroading for 46 years--and in 2010 I finally got it right!)
CAACSCOCOM--I don't want to behave improperly, so I just won't behave at all. (SM)
We call it Hoboken Terminal, but it's Lackawanna Terminal, Hoboken.
BLS53Sounds like a heck of an ordeal to get to and from work everyday.
That's the price you pay if you want a high paying "downtown" job but choose to live in the "out in the country" low-rent district...
As for the engineer - one report has it that the cab car rode up over the bumper and continued into the building. Had the cab car encountered a larger immovable object, the result would have been vastly different, both for the engineer and the passengers.
Let's say that the New York City area is a bit different, with the Hudson River as a great barrier to surface transportation entering Manhattan from New Jersey.
At the beginning of service to Manhattan from New Jersey, the only way to cross the river was by ferry (there was quite a bit of river traffic at that time). Even the mighty Pennsylvania required transfer to/from ferries until the current tunnels were built. The then Hudson and Manhattan opened its first tunnels (from Hoboken into downtown Manhattan) in 1909, and the H&M (now PATH) was a popular link for people arrivng/departing on the Lackawanna.. Later, tunnels were built into what became the World Trade Center, and extended from Newark into Manhattan.
There were also ferries connecting Manhattan with the terminii of the other roads that ended on the west bank of the Hudson. However, by 1960 there were no more ferries (I think I am right on this); when I arrived in Hoboken by train in 1969, I rode PATH into downtown Manhattan.
Since that year, ferries have again been instituted between Manhattan and Hoboken, reviving the use of the ferry slips in that beautiful building which is shown in an earlier post on this thread.
Thank you. For those of us unfamiliar with the area, one generally visualizes these stops as a run through with a small station and platform. Because that's how it usually is with commuter rail. This one is obviously different.
I suppose there's limits to the amount of rail traffic that can go through what bridges and tunnels are available. I thought ferry transfers were relegated to the 19th century. Sounds like a heck of an ordeal to get to and from work everyday.
Semper VaporoEverything I have read states PTC is not applicable to this situation, and that the terminal is exempt from it. Not sure on the truth to this, but if the terminal is a restricted speed area, it sounds legit. ?? That confuses me... are you saying that because a terminal is a restricted speed it should be exempt from PTC? Seems to me that any place that is a restricted speed would be the intended place where PTC would be of most value.
Bob Schuknecht BLS53 I'm trying to understand the track layout there. So the trains come in head first to the station? Do they then back out and rejoin the main to cross the river into NYC? I assume Hoboyken isn't a termination point. What am I missing here? The trains are push-pull. The train was running with the cab control car at the head end and the engine pushing from the rear.
BLS53 I'm trying to understand the track layout there. So the trains come in head first to the station? Do they then back out and rejoin the main to cross the river into NYC? I assume Hoboyken isn't a termination point. What am I missing here?
I'm trying to understand the track layout there. So the trains come in head first to the station? Do they then back out and rejoin the main to cross the river into NYC? I assume Hoboyken isn't a termination point. What am I missing here?
The trains are push-pull. The train was running with the cab control car at the head end and the engine pushing from the rear.
That they're push-pull, doesn't answer my question.
Semper VaporoSeems to me that any place that is a restricted speed would be the intended place where PTC would be of most value.
The local news stations here in NY/NJ all had an interview with a man who identified himself as an NJT mechanic, who witnessed the crash. He stated that the cab car climbed over the bumper and traveled several feet in the air before crashing down. This suggests that the engineer's cab went over the bumper rather than slam into it. About 6 PM, the local stations were reporting that the engineer had been released from the hospital.
n012944 schlimm Buslist schlimm No PTC. Surprised? No. But I'll bet victims and their families are angry about the delays in implementation, especially on commuter and passenger lines.
Buslist schlimm No PTC. Surprised? No. But I'll bet victims and their families are angry about the delays in implementation, especially on commuter and passenger lines.
Buslist
schlimm No PTC. Surprised?
schlimm
No PTC.
Surprised?
No. But I'll bet victims and their families are angry about the delays in implementation, especially on commuter and passenger lines.
schlimm Buslist schlimm No PTC. Surprised? No. But I'll bet victims and their families are angry about the delays in implementation, especially on commuter and passenger lines.
Buslist schlimm No PTC. Surprised?
schlimm No PTC.
Everything I have read states PTC is not applicable to this situation, and that the terminal is exempt from it. Not sure on the truth to this, but if the terminal is a restricted speed area, it sounds legit.
BaltACD Look through the NJT expenditures I posted - NJT contracted in 2011 for $151M for development and installation of PTC. http://www.njtransit.com/tm/tm_servlet.srv?hdnPageAction=AwardsTo Google Maps of the Hoboken Terminal. https://www.google.com/maps/@40.73527,-74.02926,664m/data=!3m1!1e3
Look through the NJT expenditures I posted - NJT contracted in 2011 for $151M for development and installation of PTC.
http://www.njtransit.com/tm/tm_servlet.srv?hdnPageAction=AwardsTo
Google Maps of the Hoboken Terminal.
https://www.google.com/maps/@40.73527,-74.02926,664m/data=!3m1!1e3
I don't understand your point.
BaltACD Euclid BaltACD Euclid It is up to Congress to shut down operations not having PTC or to let them run without it. They are in the driver’s seat. http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2016/09/29/hoboken-crash-pelosi-rips-congress-for-delaying-ptc-deadline.html It isn't 12/31/2018 - YET! I understand that. I am just saying that if there are any complaints about the delay of PTC, blame Congress. NO! Blame the speed of invention. When PTC was mandated it DID NOT EXIST as a product available for purchase. The product had to invented, developed and tested. It is still in the development and testing stage. Samsung has had such great success in unleashing Galaxy 7 on the world, do you want PTC to be the same kind of product - offering something and having ot catch on fire when it comes time to be used.
Euclid BaltACD Euclid It is up to Congress to shut down operations not having PTC or to let them run without it. They are in the driver’s seat. http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2016/09/29/hoboken-crash-pelosi-rips-congress-for-delaying-ptc-deadline.html It isn't 12/31/2018 - YET! I understand that. I am just saying that if there are any complaints about the delay of PTC, blame Congress.
BaltACD Euclid It is up to Congress to shut down operations not having PTC or to let them run without it. They are in the driver’s seat. http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2016/09/29/hoboken-crash-pelosi-rips-congress-for-delaying-ptc-deadline.html It isn't 12/31/2018 - YET!
Euclid It is up to Congress to shut down operations not having PTC or to let them run without it. They are in the driver’s seat. http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2016/09/29/hoboken-crash-pelosi-rips-congress-for-delaying-ptc-deadline.html
http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2016/09/29/hoboken-crash-pelosi-rips-congress-for-delaying-ptc-deadline.html
It isn't 12/31/2018 - YET!
I understand that. I am just saying that if there are any complaints about the delay of PTC, blame Congress.
NO! Blame the speed of invention. When PTC was mandated it DID NOT EXIST as a product available for purchase. The product had to invented, developed and tested. It is still in the development and testing stage. Samsung has had such great success in unleashing Galaxy 7 on the world, do you want PTC to be the same kind of product - offering something and having ot catch on fire when it comes time to be used.
Well if the implementation is to be determined by the speed of the invention, it will never happen because nobody can say how long the invention should take. With all the money to be made in the development of the invention, it will go on forever.
Congress wants it to happen, so they set a time limit. The industry failed to meet the time limit, so Congress extended it. That cycle will probably repeat. Congress has the choice to once again extend the limit or let the law force the shut down of non-PTC complying trains.
In the meantime, every time there is a big crash, the public will demand to know why PTC did not prevent it.
NJT Expenditures for the past 12 years
EuclidIt is up to Congress to shut down operations not having PTC or to let them run without it. They are in the driver’s seat. http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2016/09/29/hoboken-crash-pelosi-rips-congress-for-delaying-ptc-deadline.html
It is up to Congress to shut down operations not having PTC or to let them run without it. They are in the driver’s seat.
PTC - you don't go down to the signal supply store today and buy a PTC system and install it tomorrow on all the field signals and operating equipment and get all the required employees trained in it's operation.
I have no idea how far along NJT is in their PTC efforts, however, I suspect they have not been totally sitting on their thumbs. I suspect the same politicians that are now criticizing them for not having PTC installed and operational are the same politicians that have defeated funding bills that would have advanced the installation and operation of PTC on NJT.
narig01 http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Major-Train-Accident-in-Hoboken-Injuries-Reported-395249051.html WNBC New York is reporting 3 deaths. WNBC New York corrected their story, they are now saying 1 death. Train was #1614 originating at Spring Valley. I will speculate that the train may have gone into the ticket office.
http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Major-Train-Accident-in-Hoboken-Injuries-Reported-395249051.html
WNBC New York is reporting 3 deaths.
WNBC New York corrected their story, they are now saying 1 death.
Train was #1614 originating at Spring Valley.
I will speculate that the train may have gone into the ticket office.
If only they had the $! Cut trains or spend the $ on PTC? Which would the public prefer?
Commuter operations are generally short of cash. Look at the current news in your own backyard. Only now is METRA considering PTC for the ex MLW lines. Almost 2 years after the deadline. As we used to try to teach young engineers, in spite of the "no question should go unasked" think it through before asking it.
Which would you prefer?
lionelsoni The engineer is said to have survived.
The engineer is said to have survived.
In critical condition.
08/09/2011
Andrew Cuomo: “It could be personal to the conductor.”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qa61Q8j6Cxk&t=20m47s
Bob Nelson
Any news on the crew?
narig01 http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Major-Train-Accident-in-Hoboken-Injuries-Reported-395249051.html WNBC New York is reporting 3 deaths. Train was #1614 originating at Spring Valley. I will speculate that the train may have gone into the ticket office.
Bella Dinh-Zarr
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cPHVnlsRkts&t=3m38s
Prayer and thoughts with those injured in the Hoboken crash. Also the person who died and their family.
Was watching Fox News at my local bodega. The Fox News bimbo was talking to a rail safety "expert" and nither one had any idea how a train works. "Like why did not the conducter stop the train?". "Who drives the train?". I wanted to throw my breakfast sandwich at the TV.
Now i later learn that FOX is broadcast outta New York City so YOU WOULD THINK that some of the anchors take the commuter train once in a while.
" Most programs are broadcast from Fox News headquarters in New York City (at 1211 Avenue of the Americas), in its streetside studio on Sixth Avenue in the west wing of Rockefeller Center, sharing its headquarters with sister channel Fox Business Network. Fox News Channel has seven studios at its New York City headquarters that are used for its and Fox Business' programming:"
Not a good day for NJT
http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2016/09/person_struck_and_killed_by_train_at_newark_penn_s.html
NEWARK — A person was struck and killed by an Amtrak train at Newark Penn Station Thursday morning, according to an official.
Northeast Regional train 190 hit the "trespasser" around 6:20 a.m. on track 2, an Amtrak spokesman said.
No one aboard the Amtrak train was hurt. The passengers were transferred to a New York-bound NJ Transit train.
The spokesman didn't know the age or gender of the person killed.
WNBC New York also interviewed a William Blaine, a locomotive engineer with Norfolk Southern who was at the scene of the wreck.(Mr Blaine' s description may indicate the Engineer may have been incapacitated going into this)
WNBC also has on air Bill Vantuono of Railway Age.
Three confirmed dead, so far. No PTC. Track #5 in Hoboken Station.
One person has died.
NPR is reporting on it right now. Witnesses say there are 100 injuries or more. The train was going at track speed, it did not slow down, as you would expect a train to do coming into a station.
One of the reports I saw said this was a Pascack Valley train.
NJ.com has already updated with some video. From the look of it the train ran off the end of the track. Also part of the train shed collapsed. I also saw what I think is building marble in the pictures.
Didn't take long to cross the Atlantic
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-37503920
https://www.rt.com/usa/361068-hoboken-new-jersey-train-crash/
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/train-crashes-new-jersey-transit-hoboken-station-article-1.2811435
http://www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf/2016/09/several_hurt_in_train_crash_at_hoboken_station.html
Not a lot of detail yet.
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