TIA seems to be a condition beyond what I am wondering may have happened.
I had a friend that, when backing out of his garage, put the car in drive, reached around behind the back of the front seat to look out the back window, pressed the accelerator and drove through the front wall of the garage, directly into his living room.
I have done nearly the same thing. I have pressed the button on the remote to close the garage door BEFORE I put the car in gear to drive out.
My doctor wrote out a prescription while telling me I didn't need any medication... (he quietly wadded up the paper when he realized what he had done).
None of these actions fit the description of a TIA... rather what some refer to as a 'brain fart' or 'senile moment' or just a 'stupid mistake'. "Why did I do THAT?!"
The latter two of my examples were not something to consider as dangerous, as they resolved themselves immediately, but that first one COULD HAVE been much worse... there was several hundred dollars in damages to the car and thousands of dollars damage to the house and furnishings... and could have been deadly if someone had been sitting on the davenport that was utterly demolished in the "accident".
I would bet that all of us have done one of these "stupid mistakes" in our own past. Granted, 99.99% of the time, the mistake is not catastrophic, but they do occur. People flip the wrong switch at the wrong time for the wrong reason in the wrong situation and most of the time, nobody notices, but sometimes a pilot forgets to drop the landing gear or the switch operator resets the switch right in front of a moving train or an engineer moves the wrong lever and everybody looks for a "major medical cause".
I seriously wonder of there IS a "medical cause" (major or otherwise) for "Stupid mistakes", unless being human is a major medical situation that can be prevented or cured or controlled.
I think the best we can do is try to find a way to catch these mistakes before they hurt somebody.
AH! Have you ever clicked 'Delete' when you meant to click "Copy"? Windows has a feature wherein it asks you if you are sure...
Ever clicked 'Yes' when you meant to click 'No'?
Windows has the Recycle Bin to help you undo those TWO accidents... ever click "Empty Recycle Bin" when you meant to open it to recover from your twice blunder?
Ever click 'Yes' on the "Are you sure?" prompt about emptying the Recycle Bin?
Just how many times should Windows ask you "Are you sure?"???
Does it need a secondary Recycle Bin built-in?
Did you know there are utility programs that can sometimes recover from that last "Are you sure?"!
Semper Vaporo
Pkgs.
TIA's lead to loss of awareness. They don't have to become unconscienous they just loose touch. And unfortunately, there is no way to tell if the engineer had a TIA as they clear up when the clot moves and cannot be traced after the fact. Perhaps a speed alarm would have helped but I am not sure.
Euclid petitnj The engineer had a transient medical condition just before the crash. How do you know that? What was the exact effect of the TIA?
petitnj The engineer had a transient medical condition just before the crash.
How do you know that? What was the exact effect of the TIA?
The first that it was stated that the engineer had a TIA was in the above quoted post where the statement was made by petitnj. His full quote was as follows:
"The engineer had a transient medical condition just before the crash. TIA's are very common but often don't affect us -- we don't realize we had them."
I asked him how he knows that the engineer had a TIA. In the second part of my question, I was not asking what effects could be produced by a TIA.
Assuming that he somehow knew that the engineer had a TIA, I was asking petitnj to descibe the effects of TIA that the engineer had.
tree68 Euclid What was the exact effect of the TIA? Could have been any of a variety of symptoms: TIA Confusion is one symptom. Notable here is that moving either the throttle or the brake in a forward direction (toward the front of the locomotive) has the same effect - slowing the locomotive (or cab car, in this case). Of course, simply reducing the throttle isn't going to slow a train in and of itself. But unless there's a downgrade, the train shouldn't accelerate.
Euclid What was the exact effect of the TIA?
Could have been any of a variety of symptoms:
TIA
Confusion is one symptom.
Notable here is that moving either the throttle or the brake in a forward direction (toward the front of the locomotive) has the same effect - slowing the locomotive (or cab car, in this case). Of course, simply reducing the throttle isn't going to slow a train in and of itself. But unless there's a downgrade, the train shouldn't accelerate.
1. Where is the reported evidence that the engineer had a TIA?
2. Confusion, though possible, is NOT a common symptom.
[from the link you cited]:
Symptoms can vary widely across people, and across brain regions. The most frequent symptoms include temporary loss of vision (typically amaurosis fugax); difficulty speaking (aphasia); weakness on one side of the body (hemiparesis); and numbness or tingling (paresthesia), usually on one side of the body. Impairment of consciousness is very uncommon. There have been cases of temporary and partial paralysis affecting the face and tongue of the afflicted. The symptoms of a TIA are short-lived and usually last a few seconds to a few minutes and most symptoms disappear within 60 minutes. Some individuals may have a lingering feeling that something odd happened to the body. Dizziness, lack of coordination or poor balance are also symptoms related to TIA. Symptoms vary in severity.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
My most recent understanding is that it is not known why the locomotive control effects changed. Official statements have stated that. Their statement leaves open the possibility that the changes occurred due to some type of equipment malfunction, as opposed to control manipulation by the engineer. All that is known is that control effects were changed as is shown on the event recorder.
So considering that nothing is known about the engineer's actions or intent, I don't see how we can know that he suffered a TIA. He could have acted intentionally, acted when distracted, or fallen asleep.
EuclidWhat was the exact effect of the TIA?
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
petitnjThe engineer had a transient medical condition just before the crash.
Excerpt from NY Times, Oct. 6
On Wednesday, New Jersey Transit issued new rules requiring a second crew member to join the train engineer in the operating cab when entering stations in Hoboken and Atlantic City. The measure was aimed at providing a second set of eyes and ears during the final segment of trips into those stations.
Train service at Hoboken Terminal has been suspended since the crash. New Jersey Transit has not said when trains will start traveling there again.
James E. Hall, a former chairman of the safety board, said the event recorder information showed the engineer had accelerated the train before the crash, but it did not explain why.
“What it doesn’t answer is: If there were those movements by the operator of the throttle, were they accidental or intentional?” he said.
Mr. Hall praised the railroad’s decision to place a conductor next to the train’s engineer to serve as a backup. But he also urged the railroad to install an automatic braking system to prevent future accidents.
“It’s unimportant whether it was human error or accidental,” Mr. Hall said. “There are technologies to prevent the train from accelerating.”
http://www.hallassoc.net/Staff/managing%20partner.htm
schlimmThis crash and others show a clear need for automatic controls that could largely prevent human (likely) errors like these.
This is well understood, and has been since at least the time of Gold's ATS system in 1880.
The problem is that the "automatic controls" are not easy things to implement in the real world, as the repeated discussions of the implementation of train control on the Lindenwold line (and many others, right up to the recent accidents in Europe involving 'positive' train control systems) in numerous threads here will indicate.
I was of the opinion in the late 1980s that some form of artificial consciousness was necessary in any deterministic train-control system that used physical one-pipe brakes in an environment subject to climate and to potentially deferred or even malicious maintenance problems. It seems obvious to me that a similar concern will be needed to arrange safe stops 'in minimum time' at stub platforms with passenger trains.
Yes, you are right about the automatic controls. But they will by no means be simple and 'automatic' to implement, and I suspect there will still be circumstances where accidents or incidents occur outside the 'design envelope' of whatever control system is built. (Just as they still do when the 'control system' used involves a trained and diligent human consciousness...)
The engineer had a transient medical condition just before the crash. TIA's are very common but often don't affect us -- we don't realize we had them.
Clearly a case for automatic control system. However, listening to the local RR scanner, the train crews on multiple units spend significant time recycling the controls to get new locomotives to run. Will be interesting to see how reliable railroad controls will be.
This crash and others show a clear need for automatic controls that could largely prevent human (likely) errors like these.
It is amazing how similar this is to the Amtrak 188 derailment. In both cases, the engineer accelerated when he should have been slowing. And in both cases, the engineer said he could not remember doing so.
Although that last point is not clear in this Hoboken crash. The only thing that we have been told is that the engineer does not remember is the crash itself. The event recorder shows that the locomotive switched from idle throttle to notch #4, shortly before the end of track, and then that an “Emergency” brake application was made one second before impact.
It is not clear whether the engineer remembers making either one of those control changes. It is not clear whether the NTSB asked him if he remembered doing so.
The latest news is that the train suddenly accelerated from 10 mph to 20 mph 38 seconds before the crash with the emergency brake applied about a second before the crash. Doesn't look good for the engineer.
Euclid ...So if the engineer’s claim of 10 mph is true, his train had to accelerate by at least 10 mph as he approached the end of track. It raises the question of whether an intentional acceleration was made to prevent inadvertently stopping too short;...
...So if the engineer’s claim of 10 mph is true, his train had to accelerate by at least 10 mph as he approached the end of track. It raises the question of whether an intentional acceleration was made to prevent inadvertently stopping too short;...
It is now reported that the event recorder shows the train accelerating from 8 mph to 21 mph just before the collision.
About 1 second prior to impact, the engineer made an "Emergency" application of the brakes, and hit the bumper post at 21 mph.
The engineer says he does not remember the crash, but he does describe remembering events up to a very short interval prior to the crash. I am not sure how long that interval is, but I assume it was less than 1000 feet long. Maybe others can offer an accurate estimate based on the engineer’s terminology in his description of where he was when he looked at the speedometer and saw it reading 10 mph.
Since that claim of 10mph somewhere in the approach to the end of track, professional estimates have the train hitting the bumper at 20-30 mph. So if the engineer’s claim of 10 mph is true, his train had to accelerate by at least 10 mph as he approached the end of track. It raises the question of whether an intentional acceleration was made to prevent inadvertently stopping too short; and if so, did the engineer then fail to reduce power from that acceleration in time to get stopped for the bumper.
Perhaps there are other explanations for accelerating from 10 mph to 20-30 mph in the short distance approaching the end of track. But if not, the only apparent explanation is that the engineer’s claim of approaching at 10 mph is false.
The full explanation should be provided by the event recorder if it actually recorded these events, and if the data it recorded has not since been corrupted. Here is the latest update on that subject from this article:
http://www.amny.com/transit/hoboken-train-crash-ntsb-analyzing-event-and-video-recorders-officials-say-1.12404795
Quotes from the link:
“An agency spokesman said the information that will be made public will deal with what was found in the recorders, but will not give a cause for the crash.”
“The event recorder is expected to provide speed, throttle and breaking information as well as “about 100 other parameters” regarding the train’s movements, Southworth said.”
“Southworth said the cellphone as well as the event and video recorders were sent to be analyzed at the NTSB’s laboratory in Washington, D.C.”
“Southworth said he did not know whether the event recorder was functioning.”
There is one more thing to consider here. There is PTC and then there is Amtrak PTC (ACSES). I believe NJT is going with ACSES. ACSES uses track transponders for civil speed location identification.
The "ancient" ATC system on PATCO used similar to identify distance to the platform for each station so the train would stop at the right spot on the platform, automatically.
This wasn't part of the safety system - there were times the train slid by the end of the platform in bad weather - but it did work. The one place it wasn't used was at the stub end station at 15/16th and Locust in Phila. There, the operator had to turn of the ATC and manually position the train at the platform.
Theoretically, you could use the track transponders in ACSES to enforce stops before track end bumpers. The engineer would just have to stay below the somewhat conservative braking curve. It would mean a bit more time to get each train fully at each platform and would reduce terminal capacity a bit.
It might not be such a bad thing implement such a system. I would hope NJT is looking at this.
-Don (Random stuff, mostly about trains - what else? http://blerfblog.blogspot.com/)
FWIW.Hoboken. PATH 2011http://media.nj.com/star-ledger/photo/2011/05/9560086-large.jpghttp://i55.tinypic.com/2pzeknl.jpgDetroit. MC.http://www.shorpy.com/node/7837?size=_original#caption
I am familiar with the runaway in Washington where the GG1 went into the station and fell through the floor and into the basement. I also recall seeing that photo of the ATSF train overhanging the street below. Apparently there was at least one other similar accident at the Hoboken station, although I am not fully aware of the total history there.
I know that small non-terminal stations have been damaged or destroyed by passing freight trains either derailing or from shifting loads fouling the building. But I can also see the unique vulnerability of larger stations where the tracks end with the building beyond. With these conditions, I am sure that a lot of attention was focused on safety measures that would prevent trains from overrunning the terminal tracks. There must have been many patents and proposals offered to fulfill the need.
I found three wrecks in my early Railroad Gazette listings that involve trains busting into and out of stations for various reasons. They are as follows:
April 1884
On the night of the 21st a freight train on the Indianapolis Belt Railroad broke in two near Indianapolis, Ind., and the detached cars started back down grade following the Belt road and the Union tracks into the Panhandle station, running completely through that station, smashing the doors and butting posts at the end of it and piling themselves in a bad wreck in the street beyond. The wreck was scattered all over the street and against the walls of the buildings opposite the freight house.
May 1890
12th, at Terre Haute, Ind., butting collision between an incoming Vandalia freight and Evansville & Terre Haute yard engine pushing half dozen coal cars. Both locomotives were deserted before the collision. The engine of the former, the throttle lever of which had been opened by the shock, broke away from the tender and pushed the switching freight, half a mile, into the Union depot, there colliding with a Terre Haute & Peoria standing passenger train. Two engines and several cars were damaged and a portion of the station building demolished. Engineer hurt.
September 1890
9th, on Southern Pacific, at Oakland, Cal., a locomotive standing in the station ready to take a special passenger train was started backwards by self-opening of the throttle so suddenly as to overthrow the fireman, who was in charge; the engine ran at great speed into and over the stop blocks, and damaged the building considerably. A number of the occupants of the ferry house had narrow escapes, and the throttle was finally closed by Superintendent Wilder while the engine was still plowing its way toward the end of the track at the ferry slip.
DS4-4-1000 Euclid I also wonder how many instances there have been with passenger trains overrunning the end of the track and damaging the station. Probably the most famous is the wreck of the Federal in 1953 where GG1 4876 ended up in the basement of Union Station in Washington. That accident was attributed to a design flaw where the angle cock on a New Haven coach was closed by the motion of the car itself.
Euclid I also wonder how many instances there have been with passenger trains overrunning the end of the track and damaging the station.
Probably the most famous is the wreck of the Federal in 1953 where GG1 4876 ended up in the basement of Union Station in Washington. That accident was attributed to a design flaw where the angle cock on a New Haven coach was closed by the motion of the car itself.
Or by rock kicked up from the ballast.
EuclidI also wonder how many instances there have been with passenger trains overrunning the end of the track and damaging the station.
To complicate the clean up more the possibility of Matthew going right over NYC may make the clean up be pushed or a new disaster especially with the asbesdos.
One question that comes to my mind is this: In all of the track arrangements in history where trains have pulled into stub tracks and stopped short of a bumper post; has there ever been an installation of equipment that would automatically stop the train short of the bumper post if it senses that the engineer will not accomplish that stop?
I also wonder how many instances there have been with passenger trains overrunning the end of the track and damaging the station. On one hand, it seems like it would be rare and perhaps unlikely with typical long, slow approaches to large depots. But on the other hand, the consequence of such an overrun would be likely to be serious, considering that a lot of people would be positioned in the direct path of such a runaway.
Euclid...he also makes the following prediction...
Wonder if he buys lottery tickets. He must be a rich man if he does...
Euclid Jeff, I understand your point that PTC may only enforce the top speed allowed under “Restricted Speed” while not enforcing contingencies encountered that require stopping while under Restricted Speed. David Schanoes writes about this issue in his blog piece called, “While We’re Waiting; A Look Ahead.” http://www.ten90solutions.com/while_were_waiting_a_look_ahead He makes interesting points about the discrepancy between the law and the regulation which accepts running through a switch as long as the speed is less than 20 mph. In this piece, he also makes the following prediction about the forthcoming finding of cause by the NTSB, which is the failure of RJRT to install PTC: “The NTSB agrees with the assertion of its vice-chairperson that the primary cause for this overspeed derailment is the failure of NJT Rail Operations to install PTC in Hoboken Terminal. The NTSB finds that contributing causes to this derailment are: (a) FRA's approval of Main Line Track Exemptions for passenger terminals where speeds are restricted to no more than 20 mph and interlocking rules are in effect (b) failure of the locomotive engineer to properly control the speed of the train due to unknown reasons that may include, but are not limited to, obstructive sleep apnea, fatigue, pre-existing medical conditions, transient ischemic attack, distraction, distraction due to background radio communications between other trains and the control center, etc. etc.”
Jeff,
I understand your point that PTC may only enforce the top speed allowed under “Restricted Speed” while not enforcing contingencies encountered that require stopping while under Restricted Speed.
David Schanoes writes about this issue in his blog piece called, “While We’re Waiting; A Look Ahead.”
http://www.ten90solutions.com/while_were_waiting_a_look_ahead
He makes interesting points about the discrepancy between the law and the regulation which accepts running through a switch as long as the speed is less than 20 mph.
In this piece, he also makes the following prediction about the forthcoming finding of cause by the NTSB, which is the failure of RJRT to install PTC:
“The NTSB agrees with the assertion of its vice-chairperson that the primary cause for this overspeed derailment is the failure of NJT Rail Operations to install PTC in Hoboken Terminal.
The NTSB finds that contributing causes to this derailment are: (a) FRA's approval of Main Line Track Exemptions for passenger terminals where speeds are restricted to no more than 20 mph and interlocking rules are in effect
Mom and Dad are fighting!
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
The NTSB finds that contributing causes to this derailment are: (a) FRA's approval of Main Line Track Exemptions for passenger terminals where speeds are restricted to no more than 20 mph and interlocking rules are in effect (b) failure of the locomotive engineer to properly control the speed of the train due to unknown reasons that may include, but are not limited to, obstructive sleep apnea, fatigue, pre-existing medical conditions, transient ischemic attack, distraction, distraction due to background radio communications between other trains and the control center, etc. etc.”
Deggesty Neutralize asbestos? The only way I can imagine is by enclosing it in something that can be hermetically sealed--making sure that no fibers get away.
Neutralize asbestos? The only way I can imagine is by enclosing it in something that can be hermetically sealed--making sure that no fibers get away.
That is what is commonly done when older buildings are rehabbed and the asbestos doesn't need to be disturbed or removed. I think some kind of sealant is sprayed over it that seals the asbestos (and any loose fibers) in. Asbestos that has to be disturbed or removed is a hazardous material, and must be handled and disposed of in accordance with the HM rules, which are DEFINITELY no laughing matter (been there, watched it being done, and signed the payments for the work).
Euclid As I understand this, the only means available with PTC for controlling trains pulling up to the bumper post, as this one was doing; would be to enforce the concept of “restricted speed.” Why would this not result in stopping the train before it hit the bumper post? Doesn’t “restricted speed” require stopping short of an obstruction?
As I understand this, the only means available with PTC for controlling trains pulling up to the bumper post, as this one was doing; would be to enforce the concept of “restricted speed.” Why would this not result in stopping the train before it hit the bumper post? Doesn’t “restricted speed” require stopping short of an obstruction?
I think that when PTC enforces restricted speed, it is enforcing the top speed allowed by rule, 20 or 15 mph. A train comes up to a red number plated signal. (For me that's a Restricted Proceed, no stop required. For others it may still be a Stop and Proceed.) The train is allowed to pass the signal, proceeding at Restricted Speed, not exceeding 20 mph. PTC, from inputs from the signal system and the location of a preceeding trains engine, knows there is a train ahead, but may not know exactly where the rear end is. PTC allows the following train in and as long as it doesn't exceed 20 mph, and probably a margin of error slightly over 20 mph, PTC let's it keep going.
Our ATC is like this when you are running at restricted speed. It enforces the restricting cab signal, but won't cause a penalty brake application until your speed exceeds 22 mph.
Jeff
Johnny
The event recorder problems seem to be puzzling. Transport type aircraft have gone thru about 4 iterations of improvements. Most changes have been made retroactive when the airplanes go thru a "D" check or phased "D" check. Originally 11 parameters on analog metal tape, then to digital channels and now are at over 200+ parameters.
As well there are several indications that show on both the flight recorder and voice recorders that indicate they are working. Part of preflight check. In addition believe every 30 - 90 days an avionics tech must take a download of the units to verify they are working. The download also goes to the IT department to verify that the readings are reasonable and none are missing. IE -- airspeed of 2000 knots would indicate problems and order to replace recorder at next maintenance station sent.
Would think that the 92 day inspections would accomplish the same thing.
Another question. Since NJT operates this line under contract to MNRR why was the train short of regular number of cars ? Were the cars & loco owned by NJT or MNRR ?
Evidently the "SANDY" repairs did not include asbesdos removal ?
Any idea how the asbesdos will be neutralized ?
Since ACSES and the Amrak ATC systems are part of NJT as well why not have the systems with timer circuits to stop trains short of bumpers ? Of course these systems would not stop all trains but would stop most potential over runs.
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