EuclidThat is the beauty of speculation. It gets the job done.
And helps you keep your post count up.
Norm
That article was written about a different rail securement system than is common in the US. Please tell us in your "experience" you've seen it used in North America. I don't think that system is relevant to this discussion. Yes, I'm aware lag screws are used in some cases.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rail_fastening_system
tree68 schlimm So now we have the UP spokesperson (who must be getting this from UP experts) saying what some of us non-experts have been saying? If you throw enough theories against the wall, one of them is bound to stick...
schlimm So now we have the UP spokesperson (who must be getting this from UP experts) saying what some of us non-experts have been saying?
If you throw enough theories against the wall, one of them is bound to stick...
That is the beauty of speculation. It gets the job done.
I can’t link to an individual image, but here in the first image top-right, is the lag screw system that may be in use on the U.P. line through Mosier. I believe it is also the one that failed catastrophically in the CN derailment on 1/29/2012.
Note the lag screw that only holds down the tie plate and is not connected directly to the rail base. In looking at several images of these lag screws, I can see improvements that have been made to reduce the stress concentration at the thread/shank interface.
When these lag screws break inside of the tie, the top part becomes merely a loose pin resisting the shear force of the tie plate being pushed sideways. With the screw broken, it no longer provides any hold-down pressure that creates friction between the bottom of the plate and the top of the tie.
So with the broken top part acting only as a loose shear pin, the rail side force can easily exert shear force on the pin that causes it to wallow out the hole and allow the gage to widen.
So gage-widening can be seen as an indication that several lag screws have failed in an area of higher track stress such as a curve.
Track west of Mosier is due for new ties.
Excerpt from UP news release, Jun. 1
http://www.up.com/media/releases/160601-oregon-investment.htm
Union Pacific plans to invest $34.6 million in 2016 to improve Oregon's transportation infrastructure…[including]…$3.6 million investment in the rail line between Bridal Veil and Hood River to replace 28,342 railroad ties.
schlimmSo now we have the UP spokesperson (who must be getting this from UP experts) saying what some of us non-experts have been saying?
Larry Resident Microferroequinologist (at least at my house) Everyone goes home; Safety begins with you My Opinion. Standard Disclaimers Apply. No Expiration Date Come ride the rails with me! There's one thing about humility - the moment you think you've got it, you've lost it...
With that CN wreck I posted on the previous page, I find it amazing that the fasteners became a lethal booby trap waiting to spring without any warning. They would break where the unthreaded shank joins the threaded portion. But the break was hidden inside of the tie and went undiscovered.
When they inspected the track, they occasionally found that the head of a screw spike could be seen standing too high, thus indicating that screw had unscrewed a few turns. So they turned those back down and made them tight.
They did not try to tighten the screw spikes that had their heads appearing to be fully down. If they had tried to tighten those a little, they would have found that many of them turned completely freely because they were broken above the threads inside of the tie. The top portion would be loose, and it could be lifted right out the hole. Then they would have realized that those needed to be replaced because they were broken.
So one by one, lag screws broke without detection. Then when enough had broken, a point was reached where the remaining fasteners were insufficient to withstand the total loading in the broader area. So all of the unbroken fasteners then broke simultaneously under the passing of a train, just like what apparently happened at Mosier.
I wonder how extensive this sort of problem is or has been. I wonder if the problem has been solved. What would be needed is a way to quickly detect whether a spike lag screw is broken by pulling up on them to see if they withdrew from their holes. That would be a challenge to perfect a testing machine for working on a rolling pass over the track while tugging upward on every track screw.
EuclidYes, us non-experts can cover a lot of ground quickly with our freedom to speculate.
John Deere manure spreaders cover a lot of ground, too.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Just to clarify, I said this:
The one thing that is misleading these experts [the ones quoted in the article about experts doubting the fastener theory] is that they are assuming that the reference to a failed fastener is referring to ONE fastener. They say a derailment is unlikely to be caused by the failure of one fastener. However, the U.P. did not say that the failure was with just ONE fastener. They said that indications are “the failure of a fastener that connects the rail to the railroad tie”. It is sloppy writing that obviously intends to mean the failure of a type of fastener that connects the rail to the tie.
U.P. is now confirming that the failure was with multiple fasteners as I speculated above.
I would like to know what type of rail/tie fasteners are in use on this stretch of the U.P. line through Mosier. Does anybody here know? If it is the Lag Screw Spikes like the ones that failed in the CN wreck in 2012 that I linked above, I wonder how U.P. could have been blindsided by the same problem.
schlimm wanswheel Euclid a failed fastener is referring to ONE fastener. Excerpt from KATU Portland, Jun. 11 http://katu.com/news/local/officials-multiple-broken-fasteners-led-to-mosier-oil-train-derailment-explosion Union Pacific officials told KATU News Friday night they believe multiple loose fasteners on the track led to the crash. So now we have the UP spokesperson (who must be getting this from UP experts) saying what some of us non-experts have been saying?
wanswheel Euclid a failed fastener is referring to ONE fastener. Excerpt from KATU Portland, Jun. 11 http://katu.com/news/local/officials-multiple-broken-fasteners-led-to-mosier-oil-train-derailment-explosion Union Pacific officials told KATU News Friday night they believe multiple loose fasteners on the track led to the crash.
Euclid a failed fastener is referring to ONE fastener.
a failed fastener is referring to ONE fastener.
Excerpt from KATU Portland, Jun. 11
http://katu.com/news/local/officials-multiple-broken-fasteners-led-to-mosier-oil-train-derailment-explosion
Union Pacific officials told KATU News Friday night they believe multiple loose fasteners on the track led to the crash.
So now we have the UP spokesperson (who must be getting this from UP experts) saying what some of us non-experts have been saying?
Yes, us non-experts can cover a lot of ground quickly with our freedom to speculate.
dehusman Euclid Okay thanks for that explanation. So in the case of this derailment, they would find the UDE in the event recorder, and the present cumulative distance reading of the event recorder. Then they read the distance traveled between the occasion of the reading and the occasion of the UDE. Then they measure that distance back from the event recorder where it was read, and that would find the geographical location of the UDE.
Euclid Okay thanks for that explanation. So in the case of this derailment, they would find the UDE in the event recorder, and the present cumulative distance reading of the event recorder. Then they read the distance traveled between the occasion of the reading and the occasion of the UDE. Then they measure that distance back from the event recorder where it was read, and that would find the geographical location of the UDE.
C&NW, CA&E, MILW, CGW and IC fan
Thanks wanswheel. That is what I expected. Although, just to clarify, the quote you show from me is NOT what I expected.
EuclidOkay thanks for that explanation. So in the case of this derailment, they would find the UDE in the event recorder, and the present cumulative distance reading of the event recorder. Then they read the distance traveled between the occasion of the reading and the occasion of the UDE. Then they measure that distance back from the event recorder where it was read, and that would find the geographical location of the UDE.
This is the danger of inexperienced people trying to figure stuff out. The event recorder tell you where the ENGINE was. Not where the derailment or the UDE happened. The time it records is when the UDE reached the engine, not when the UDE happened.
Derailment investigators will look at all the evidence. They know where the derailment happened because there are marks on the track followed by a pile of cars. If there is physical evidence of a defect that couldn't be caused by a UDE, they don't spend a lot of time trying to figure out where the UDE was. The oil train that derailed on the broken rail for example. Once you find the broken rail, the the UDE isn't a suspect any more. The first thing you go for is the physical evidence. Once you can't find any physical evidence that points to something else, then you start looking at the edge cases (and a UDE derailing a loaded unit train moving at speed with the slack stretched and no brakes applied (based on the media reports so far) is really, really, really an edge case.)
EuclidSo if that indicates that the UDE occurred say 100 feet ahead of the point of derailment, it would leave open the possibility that the UDE caused the derailment. It would also rule out the possibility that the derailment caused the UDE.
I rather doubt that you will get that level of precision. You are grossly over simplifying things.
Dave H. Painted side goes up. My website : wnbranch.com
Euclid obviously intends to mean the failure of a type of fastener
obviously intends to mean the failure of a type of fastener
Brilliant, and thanks for crediting your reader for an ability to recognize the obvious.
Excerpt from The Oregonian op-ed column by Jim Hall, Jun. 9
http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2016/06/phase_out_rail_shipments_of_cr.html#incart_river_home
In my seven years as chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), I saw firsthand the results of warnings unheeded. Carrying crude oil by rail is just not a good idea.
After reading the TSB report of the CN derailment that I posted above, I have to wonder about this comment in the article on “railroad industry experts” doubting the suggestion that rail fasteners failed:
“Multiple railroad industry experts have said they find it unlikely a fastener failure could cause a derailment of that size.”
Why is it unlikely? It derailed 31 cars in the CN wreck that I posted above when multiple fasteners failed simultaneously under a passing train. When you read about the details, there is nothing unlikely about it whatsoever.
The one thing that is misleading these experts is that they are assuming that the reference to a failed fastener is referring to ONE fastener. They say a derailment is unlikely to be caused by the failure of one fastener. However, the U.P. did not say that the failure was with just ONE fastener. They said that indications are “the failure of a fastener that connects the rail to the railroad tie”. It is sloppy writing that obviously intends to mean the failure of a type of fastener that connects the rail to the tie.
Demonstrating just how this would happen is the CN derailment in which 74 of these screw spike fasteners failed over a long period of time. They broke inside of the tie where the break could not be seen or detected. Many inspections failed to find the problem, with the last inspection made just a couple days prior to the derailment.
By that time, so many screw spikes had broken in the tie that the remaining unbroken ones could not handle the side force on the rail in the curve. When that point was reached, all of the remaining, unbroken fasteners broke simultaneously under a passing train, and the rail tipped over.
That is how the failure of a fastener derails a train. The failure consists of a series of fasteners failing individually in a long progression over time; just as a rail flaw grows worse over time with the passing of each train.
I speculate that this is what happened with the Mosier derailment. It fits perfectly with the meager evidence indicated by U.P., and I can’t think of any other explanation that would fit that stated evidence.
Paul of Covington schlimm Speculation by anyone is fruitless. That's never stopped us before.
schlimm Speculation by anyone is fruitless.
That's never stopped us before.
It won't stop speculation, no, but that speculation is certainly not bearing any fruit, other than sour grapes, perhaps.
schlimmSpeculation by anyone is fruitless.
_____________
"A stranger's just a friend you ain't met yet." --- Dave Gardner
http://www.opb.org/news/article/industry-experts-question-railroads-explanation-for-derailment-cause/
There is nothing in that inspection report that pertains to this oil train derailment in Mosier. In connection with the statement about a track problem causing the Mosier derailment, U.P. has said nothing pertaining to the loose frog bolts, loose guard rail bolts, loose rail joint bolts or any other defect listed in the inspection report.
What they said about the Mosier derailment is this:
“Union Pacific said the preliminary indications from its investigation are “the failure of a fastener that connects the rail to the railroad tie,” according Justin Jacobs, a railroad spokesman.”
I assume they are referring to Lag Screw Fasteners as an alternative to cut spikes to secure rails to the ties. Perhaps they are suggesting that the Mosier derailment resulted from the same basic cause as this CN derailment that occurred on 1/21/12.
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2012/r12e0008/r12e0008.asp
From the report:
“In this occurrence, a number of lag screws in the vicinity of the POD broke off in the tie. The breaks, which occurred over a considerable period of time, were due to fatigue at the transition point between the shank and the threads, where the cross-sectional area is reduced. Even with broken lag screws, there was little indication that the curve was under stress, as track gauge was maintained by the lag screws that did not break. The remaining intact lag screws experienced much higher lateral curving forces. The derailment occurred when the remaining screw fasteners were insufficient to resist the lateral curving forces; the high rail then rolled under the train, resulting in wheels falling into gauge at the east end of Fabyan Bridge.”
Only one thing seems clear. We will all need to wait for an authoritative explanation, hopefully from and investigation conducted by an impartial body. Speculation by anyone is fruitless.
Schlimm: Ah yes, I had forgotten about that FRA inspection report, mostly because it is irrelevant. Part of it deals with turnout components, and I have seen no suggestion that the derailment occurred at a switch. The remainder mentions vegetation close to the track.
The official UP spokesperson, like any big corporation, is concerned with putting the best possible face on what happened to the general public. That typically means the bare minimum of facts, and anything that might be considered to be embarassing will get glossed over if possible. If there was a switch involved, then that may be the key piece of data intentionally left out. The media and the public do not have the understanding to see what is missing. Nor do railfans who watch trains from lineside have that deeper understanding that comes from being involved in the dirtier side of day-to-day
schlimm cx500 But are they the source, or is it the media reporting how they interpreted what may have been said? Unfortunately railroad media personnel often have rather more expertise in the media than with the realities down trackside. And could you please indicate where you find reference to an FRA report. 1. An official UP spokesperson. 2. Overmod posted this link to an FRA track inspection: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2852027/Cortex-Inspection-4-27-16.pdf
cx500 But are they the source, or is it the media reporting how they interpreted what may have been said? Unfortunately railroad media personnel often have rather more expertise in the media than with the realities down trackside. And could you please indicate where you find reference to an FRA report.
1. An official UP spokesperson.
2. Overmod posted this link to an FRA track inspection:
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2852027/Cortex-Inspection-4-27-16.pdf
railroading.
mudchickenRegarding the insulated joint comment in CWR territory, 95% chance on UP in CWR main track territory, that insullated bonded joint is Huck Bolted together 6-8 times, cannot be adjusted and the chance of a blind insulated joint in CWR territory is incredibly small.
I stand reeducated. Not familiar with UP's joints. Now I know.
I don’t find anything in that inspection report that pertains to failed track fastening screws.
I heard nothing in the Spokesperson’s comments that indicated she was referring to track joint bolts.
If it is a matter of track screws, what would be a possible form of failure with them? Would it be that they break? If so, what has been a typical cause for breaking of the screws? How else could they fail?
As Dave Husman said earlier the U.P. Spokesperson’s reference to a failure of a track screw may be referring to a class of track screws and not just to a single track screw. If so, the obvious inability of a failure of a single track screw to cause a derailment would be irrelevant. But still, there needs to be an explanation of how say 100 track screw could be okay when one train goes by, but fail by the time the next train arrives.
I have not seen any reference responses to this failed track screw theory that did not doubt it. And I have heard no plausible explanation for the theory.
And also, the Spokesperson did say that the theory may not pan out. So the whole story seems weird. What was the point of telling us about it?
"In a sense, the track report I provided (the .pdf link is here) may itself be a bit of a red herring, in that it shows the existence of known or tolerated defects but not necessarily of the kind that would contribute to this particular kind of derailment."
- Somebody is not living in the real world with statements like that. (Defective logic?) After reading the track inspection report and the above comment, I'm sure of it.
Regarding the insulated joint comment in CWR territory, 95% chance on UP in CWR main track territory, that insullated bonded joint is Huck Bolted together 6-8 times, cannot be adjusted and the chance of a blind insulated joint in CWR territory is incredibly small. (The endposts would wear our way ahead of huckbolt failure)....Nearest exception was some six tenth (0.6) miles from the location of the derailment. Random loose bolts and fit of a switch point to a stock rail in CWR turnouts in a common turnout are a mechanical fact of life. Might as well try controlling the weather.
Everybody chill.
Norm48327 cx500 schlimm cx500 The experienced railroaders on this forum have recognized that the report of "a failed track bolt" makes little sense but in the absence of real data don't go off on wild speculation. The UPRR does not employ "experienced railroaders" then, since they and the FRA report are the source for the failed track bolt theory? But are they the source, or is it the media reporting how they interpreted what may have been said? Unfortunately railroad media personnel often have rather more expertise in the media than with the realities down trackside. And could you please indicate where you find reference to an FRA report. I also note one of the postings quotes another source indicating experienced railroaders (not just the ones on this forum) found the theory implausible. If it is a joint bar most of the bolts, not just one, must have failed for the joint to open up enough to start derailing. But instead it is described as a track bolt connecting the rail to a tie. Again, the rail will still be held in gauge by all the adjacent ties. It will require multiple consecutive tie/bolt failures before the rail will have freedom to move laterally or turn over. Perhaps that is the case, but that is not what has been reported. Rail seat abrasion sometimes had the same effect but I believe that problem, once identified, came under control. I suppose one failed track bolt might (by a considerable stretch of imagination) cause a derailment if somehow it managed to jump out of its position at the base of the rail and land on the railhead. Anyway, we have no reliable information, and the little bits we have heard are second hand at best. And that description of a (singular) track bolt causing the derailment seems highly improbable. You may be onto something. It's difficult to see on Google Earth, but about 400 ft west of the road bridge appears to be a signal mast and control box. If that is true there would likely be an insulated joint there. As far as the young lady spokeswoman, would you expect her to know the difference between a joint bar bolt and a rail fastener? I guess we'll just have to wait for more information.
cx500 schlimm cx500 The experienced railroaders on this forum have recognized that the report of "a failed track bolt" makes little sense but in the absence of real data don't go off on wild speculation. The UPRR does not employ "experienced railroaders" then, since they and the FRA report are the source for the failed track bolt theory? But are they the source, or is it the media reporting how they interpreted what may have been said? Unfortunately railroad media personnel often have rather more expertise in the media than with the realities down trackside. And could you please indicate where you find reference to an FRA report. I also note one of the postings quotes another source indicating experienced railroaders (not just the ones on this forum) found the theory implausible. If it is a joint bar most of the bolts, not just one, must have failed for the joint to open up enough to start derailing. But instead it is described as a track bolt connecting the rail to a tie. Again, the rail will still be held in gauge by all the adjacent ties. It will require multiple consecutive tie/bolt failures before the rail will have freedom to move laterally or turn over. Perhaps that is the case, but that is not what has been reported. Rail seat abrasion sometimes had the same effect but I believe that problem, once identified, came under control. I suppose one failed track bolt might (by a considerable stretch of imagination) cause a derailment if somehow it managed to jump out of its position at the base of the rail and land on the railhead. Anyway, we have no reliable information, and the little bits we have heard are second hand at best. And that description of a (singular) track bolt causing the derailment seems highly improbable.
schlimm cx500 The experienced railroaders on this forum have recognized that the report of "a failed track bolt" makes little sense but in the absence of real data don't go off on wild speculation. The UPRR does not employ "experienced railroaders" then, since they and the FRA report are the source for the failed track bolt theory?
cx500 The experienced railroaders on this forum have recognized that the report of "a failed track bolt" makes little sense but in the absence of real data don't go off on wild speculation.
The UPRR does not employ "experienced railroaders" then, since they and the FRA report are the source for the failed track bolt theory?
But are they the source, or is it the media reporting how they interpreted what may have been said? Unfortunately railroad media personnel often have rather more expertise in the media than with the realities down trackside. And could you please indicate where you find reference to an FRA report. I also note one of the postings quotes another source indicating experienced railroaders (not just the ones on this forum) found the theory implausible.
If it is a joint bar most of the bolts, not just one, must have failed for the joint to open up enough to start derailing. But instead it is described as a track bolt connecting the rail to a tie. Again, the rail will still be held in gauge by all the adjacent ties. It will require multiple consecutive tie/bolt failures before the rail will have freedom to move laterally or turn over. Perhaps that is the case, but that is not what has been reported. Rail seat abrasion sometimes had the same effect but I believe that problem, once identified, came under control.
I suppose one failed track bolt might (by a considerable stretch of imagination) cause a derailment if somehow it managed to jump out of its position at the base of the rail and land on the railhead.
Anyway, we have no reliable information, and the little bits we have heard are second hand at best. And that description of a (singular) track bolt causing the derailment seems highly improbable.
You may be onto something. It's difficult to see on Google Earth, but about 400 ft west of the road bridge appears to be a signal mast and control box. If that is true there would likely be an insulated joint there.
As far as the young lady spokeswoman, would you expect her to know the difference between a joint bar bolt and a rail fastener?
I guess we'll just have to wait for more information.
Why not? She works for the UP so they should provide her the info. That's how it works.
cx500But are they the source, or is it the media reporting how they interpreted what may have been said? Unfortunately railroad media personnel often have rather more expertise in the media than with the realities down trackside. And could you please indicate where you find reference to an FRA report.
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