Montana Coal and the Milwaukee Road

[oakpalms]

QUOTE: Originally posted by jeaton

Gabe

Dave has this covered fairly well. I was trying to pull down some maps of the PRB that I could correlate with my MILW maps. It looks to me that the MILW swung over the northern end of the PRB and perhaps could have gone in there, but the timing was off.
PRB coal did not become attractive until the Clean Air Act, I think of the Mid '80s and by that time they were dust. Even if they had been able to hang on, they may have found themselves the third man in a two man game.

The trackage around Puget sound and to the west and south of Tacoma was a bit of a jumble of rights and joint trackage. For example Cedar Falls to Everett was MILW as was Cedar Falls to Maple Valley. Maple Vallely to Black River Jct was C&PS Ry (?&Puget Sound?) where it connected to the MILW owned to Seattle. The track south from Black River Jct to Tacoma Jct was joint owned with the OWRR& N Co. And so it goes. My charts show isolated trackage owned at Port Townsend, Eagle Harbor Port Blakeley and Bremerton, all appearantly served by car ferry.

The isolated Bellingham division consisted of 66.97 miles of main track and 24.13 other. Connections are shown and in addition to car ferry there could have been interchange with the GN at Bellingham and the CP and B.C. Electric Ry at the Canada Border. If they were getting a long haul off their lines up there or off the Canadian connections, I suspect that they would have had to move the traffic via car ferry. I would be surprised if GN would have allowed an open interchange for traffic from the MILW at Bellingham back to the MILW at Everett

I am sending you an Email on the source of this stuff.

Jay

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by futuremodal

QUOTE: Originally posted by arbfbe

Perhaps the abandonment of Deer Lodge Pass is closer than we expect. Apparently UP is interested in selling the line but has doubts anyone would buy the line account the legal climate in Montana regarding injuries to railroaders.

http://www.montanastandard.com/articles/2005/09/23/newsbutte_top/newsbutte_top.txt

Didn't MRL once make a bid for the Silver Bow line, but BN blocked it? Obviously, MRL would be the logical takeover entity, but if BNSF is set on keeping MRL and UP from having interchange, then I cannot think of any other buyer ('cept maybe BNSF itself, and that would mean an invader into UP's sole territory of Southern Idaho.) Maybe BNSF and UP have made one of those "smoke filled room" backdoor deals: BNSF stays outa UP's Southern Idaho and UP exits from BNSF's Montana.

Yes they did and with that Tennessee Pass as well.

[erikem]

I don't have a lot to contribute, but this thread was fun reading - my grandfather's first job was assisting with the construction of the PCE around Terry, MT - my dad was born and raised in Miles City and some of my earliest memories were riding the Olympian Hiawatha from Seatle to Miles City in 1957. A perhaps fitting note was that the Milw pulled out of Miles City a day after my grandmother died.

Some of the grading for the North-South Railroad was still vislble in the mid-1970's and remember one BN exec saying in 1976 that it was a topic of discussion.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by arbfbe

QUOTE: Originally posted by cornmaze

QUOTE: Originally posted by arbfbe
The MILW chose to compete by building steeper grades and using electrification to haul longer trains with reduced operating expenses over what the best steam could do.

So, you're saying the C.M.&St.P. already had electrification in mind when they surveyed the route? Interesting. I'd always assumed the electrification was an idea that came along after the surveys and construction were completed.

I guess that fact we may never know. The planning for the Milw expansion had to be underway in 1904 or 1905. The decision on electrification had to have been made about 1909 or 1910 or just after the line was completed. Certainly no railroad had built such an electrification for such a length in that time. The BA&P was nearby to provide the prototype for high voltage electrification.

Electrification was studied in 1906, and in that year Milwaukee incorporated a Montana subsidiary to develop electric power sources and, in 1907, the Milwaukee Road organized the Idaho Water and Electric Power Company for the stated purpose of building dams, appropriating public water for development purposes and to supply electric power to the railroad and other customers.

During that year, water rights were acquired on the St. Joe River in Idaho, and on the Missoula (Clark's Fork) River in Montana, and property purchased for reservoirs and dams. Negotiations had occurred with the Anaconda Company, a major landowner in Western Montana, for real property purchases for facilities, including flow rights on the Missoula (Clark’s Fork) River.

George Gibbs was hired away from Westinghouse to be the first Electrical Egnineer, March 6, 1908. Copper cable was purchased for the first section, St. Regis, Montana to North Fork, Idaho in July, 1908. Plans were so far along that the Anaconda Copper Mining Company's forest products manager sought electric power transmission rights over Milwaukee power lines on behalf of the Anaconda Company. [Letter, Big Blackfoot Milling Co. to H.R. Williams, “President, C.M.&St.P. Ry. Co., Seattle Washington.” 11/19/1908. Discussion of deed language regarding use of transmission lines, “we would like, however, to have free use of the pole line between your Power House and the Bitter Root Tunnel, providing we develop power above your dam on the Missoula River.” AFP Records, Series 57, 22:60, p. 360.]

Best regards, Michael Sol

[arbfbe]

QUOTE: Originally posted by cornmaze

QUOTE: Originally posted by arbfbe
The MILW chose to compete by building steeper grades and using electrification to haul longer trains with reduced operating expenses over what the best steam could do.

So, you're saying the C.M.&St.P. already had electrification in mind when they surveyed the route? Interesting. I'd always assumed the electrification was an idea that came along after the surveys and construction were completed.

I guess that fact we may never know. The planning for the Milw expansion had to be underway in 1904 or 1905. The decision on electrification had to have been made about 1909 or 1910 or just after the line was completed. Certainly no railroad had built such an electrification for such a length in that time. The BA&P was nearby to provide the prototype for high voltage electrification. By 1910 and 1911 the MILW had a good idea what operating costs for a steam railroad in the Rocky Mountains, the Belt Mountains and the Cascade Mountains were going to be. Electrification certainly offered a competitive advantage over steam and might bring the MILW's costs related to steeper grades and sharper curves more in line with what the GN might be paying for steam with their lower grades and fewer curves.

It sort of becomes a battle between fixed capital costs vs variable operating costs. All things changed when diesels became as common as steam engines. The electrical traction motors the MILW relied upon now became available to everyone without the added costs of electrification. Suddenly, the GN track profile would trump the MILW track profile in figuring the cost of operation. Then the question would be whether or not the investment in the substations and trolley wire could trump the investment in hundreds of prime movers and main generators. Given the life span of the MILW electrics vs the GN diesels it would seem the electrics were again more favorable in many ways. Newer diesels did bring in new technology with each generation, though.

[Anonymous]

Pesonally I feel from what I know that even if the MILW got into the PRB it would of been too little too late but they could of done it just fine because several shippers weren't happy with BN's rates.

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by arbfbe
The MILW chose to compete by building steeper grades and using electrification to haul longer trains with reduced operating expenses over what the best steam could do.

So, you're saying the C.M.&St.P. already had electrification in mind when they surveyed the route? Interesting. I'd always assumed the electrification was an idea that came along after the surveys and construction were completed.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding

nanaimo: Thanks again for the "book"
Miahael Sol: There is another reference to the cost *over-run*, if you will,of the Pacific Coast Extention. See nanaimo73 post above-13th line down, the page that ends in #102060. A publication put out by the Milwaukee Road in 1968 appears to say the original estimate was $45 (or $60) million. The actual total was $257 million.

Yup, it became a historical truism, even among some at the Milwaukee Road. That 1968 publication, ostensibly by Curtiss Crippen, contained several historical errors. President Crippen recognized that was one of them.

As people came to the Milwaukee Road with "conventional wisdoms" rather than actualized understanding, these things not only became accepted, but official.

I am very familiar with that particular publication.

Among other things, I was hired to fix it.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Murphy Siding]

nanaimo: Thanks again for the "book"

Miahael Sol: There is another reference to the cost *over-run*, if you will,of the Pacific Coast Extention. See nanaimo73 post above-13th line down, the page that ends in #102060. A publication put out by the Milwaukee Road in 1968 appears to say the original estimate was $45 (or $60) million. The actual total was $257 million.

[nanaimo73]

I found some burried treasure on the internet-
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102049
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102051
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102052
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102053
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102054
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102056
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102057
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102058
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102059
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102060
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102061
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102062
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102063
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102064
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102065
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102066
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102067
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102068
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102050
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=102048

[arbfbe]

The railroads building through Montana had three different goals in mind to enhance their bottom line performance. The NP built mostly to get the darned thing built. The lined up to get to all the economically important communities and hoped traffic would evolve on the rest. The MILW hoped to tap as much traffic as possible on the way to the Coast and with the exception of the area between Miles City and Three Forks hit most every community of importance that the NP was serving. There was always hope Harlowtown and Ringling would rival Bozeman but we know that never happened. The GN had different ideas. Jim Hill built the line for the lowest grades. That was his priority nearly above all else. He missed every developed city in the state with the mainline and only got to Great Falls, Helena and Butte with a branch line. I guess he figured the real money was in the long haul and with the power of the late 1800s the more cars you could get behind a single steam engine the fewer trains you needed to run. The fewer trains the lower costs per car. Any of Jim Hill's competitors could buy a locomotive as strong as the best he could buy or build. So the hardest competitive advantage for any other regional road to best would be his grades through the mountains. Line relocations were very expensive and not to be taken lightly. Hill made numerour relocations to his original alignment to better meet his goal of keepingt the grades down. The MILW chose to compete by building steeper grades and using electrification to haul longer trains with reduced operating expenses over what the best steam could do. No doubt the GN had the best long haul alignment by the time steam was gone and diesels had equalized some of the advantages electrification had to offer. i do not believe the reason the MILW track was abandoned was solely account they had 2% grades and sharper curves.

[icmr]

How about we talk about Pennsylvania coal on Norfolk Southern or on CSXT.



ICMR

Happy Railroading.[swg][swg]

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by nanaimo73

Would the signal beside the 4th car rule out the line down to Bovill ?

My second guess was that the countryside looks like a lot of the St. Joe River valley, and some tributaries. The WI&M came to mind. The signal didn't look right, but, that's also a lot of power on that train and my dim, very dim memories of that line don't account for trains that size coming out of Bovill or Palouse.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[nanaimo73]

Would the signal beside the 4th car rule out the line down to Bovill ?

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by nanaimo73

Michael or arbfbe, do you know where this was taken ?
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=83211

It has an Olympic Peninsula feel to it, but the train is pretty big for that stretch of line. Could be along the St. Joe, east of St. Maries.

Best, Michael Sol

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by VerMontanan

From the "what if" standpoint of crossings of the Continental Divide in Montana, overlooked is the best crossing - and it's still in use - Deer Lodge Pass along I-15 south of Butte.

Elk Park Pass had (has) the best westbound crossing of the Continental Divide, far better than either Deer Lodge or Marias.

QUOTE:
And that it survives today (and survival is always a prime factor in determining the viability of any route) is a testimony to its worth, while the routes over Pipestone, Homestake, and Elk Park no longer are.

This is such a peasant-minded conclusion. Deer Lodge survives (so far) only because it is UP's only line into Silver Bow and the BNSF connection. If UP had entered by Pipestone, then Pipestone would still be in existence as a rail route.

How about this statement:

*The fact that Mullan Pass survives today is a testimony to its superiority over Elk Park Pass*

In a real world analysis, the fact that Mullan Pass survives today is that it was NP's (and is MRL's) only viable mainline over the CD, while Elk Park Pass is gone because it was a one way in / one way out branchline into Butte for GN, and once the BN merger took place the ex-NP line from Garrison to Butte was sufficient for the amount of traffic generated for BN in Butte.

We could make all sorts of peasant minded conclusions about survivors vs goners:

*The fact that Stevens Pass survives today is a testimony to its superiority over Snoqualmie Pass* (Hmmm, 2.2% both ways plus 8 mile tunnel vs 1.7%/0.7% plus 2 mile tunnel)

*The fact that Stampede Pass survives today is a testimony to its superiority over Snoqualmie Pass (Again, 2.2% both ways vs 1.7%/0.7%)

*The fact that Bozeman Pass survives today is a testimony to its superiority over Sixteen Mile Canyon* (2.2 % both ways vs 1.0%/1.4%)

*The fact that the ex-NP line between Spokane and Pasco survives today is a testimony to its superiority over the ex-SP&S line*

We could go on and on as to why current lines survive while other lines are gone, but anyone who claims it is primarily due to alleged superior engineering of one over the other is being simple-minded. It is politics/managerial decisions/ and in some cases pure luck that some lines survive while others have perished.

[Anonymous]

Basalt does break down, as the talus slopes along the Columbia River near Beverly (a few miles from the Boylston tunnel) can attest.

I have been through the GN Mansfield branch tunnel as well, back in 1985. It collapsed 2 years ago.

as was the one on the GN Mansfield branch also in basalt, which I have both walked and rode through.

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by arbfbe

nanaimo73,

That photo came up on the internet another time and I believe the photo was pegged as somewhere in Idaho. The exact location has left my mind, though.

It looks like just outside of St. Maries ID.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by VerMontanan it’s a good bet that it too, like all other routes currently operated, would require more power, and therefore result in a greater cost, than Marias.

Reposting the same baloney 400 times, selectively choosing your data to favor one railroad, while enhancing the deficiencies of another, is your sport.

Kind of like always leaving out the 2.2% grades and 10 degree curves on the Bieber line, making THREE 2.2% grades on the GN mainline, plus a tunnel that is the functional equivalent of yet another 2.2% grade except that it costs much more to operate than a 2.2% grade.

In terms of cost, you have the equivalent of more than four 2.2% grades on the Great Northern mainline. In terms of cost of operation, this is far worse than Milwaukee or NP.

And you always leave out those SEVENTEEN distinct 1.0% grades in the 156 mile distance between Havre and the beginnings of Marias Pass as well. That's not even in the mountains and the total rise to run over that distance is only 0.2%. There is no railroad in the West with anything like that.

Mountain grades cost more to operate, no doubt. But GN managed to make it an expensive proposition to cross relatively flat prarie and gained nothing by it. At least MILW and NP crossed real mountain ranges for the privilege.

These are the many reasons why Milwaukee could always beat GN on regular schedules.

Namely, GN's four 2.2% grades, long, slow, expensive tunnel operations, and a rolling washboard railroad of nothing but 1% grades, followed by a downhill, followed by another 1%, then another downhill, for over 150 miles. And not all of curves on those grades were compensated. And that's before GN even gets off the Plains into the real mountains. GN only gains 1657feet in elevation in that 157 miles, but has gradient to reach 8290 feet. Efficient engineering?

And you talk about costs.

"More power and therefore greater cost" is ridiculous in the context. The Milwaukee electrification was far cheaper to operate than GN's choice of steam, then diesel, plus 24 hour high cost tunnel clearing stations. As a "total engineering solution" the Milwaukee's transit times were faster, the cost to operate far less.

That is an engineering solution far more efficient than the steep grade, long tunnel, rollercoaster solution offered by the GN mainline.

I am sure the GN thread is the appropriate place for GN discussions, instead of Milwaukee threads where you show up only to insist on discussing, always, GN.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[VerMontanan]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

Milwaukee could operate its 2% Pipestone crossing with Electrification more cheaply, faster, with heavier tonnage than GN could achieve on the 1.2%/1.8% Marias Pass crossing with steam. The "total engineering solution" of electrification combined with compensated curve track design was far superior to anything that could be achieved at that time with steam regardless of gradient. The engineering solution was economically and operationally superior to the 1% or less grade without the electrification.

GN's Ralph Budd kicked and screamed to get the Milwaukee's data on the first year of electrification and stormed off when Milwaukee's VP-Electrification avoided ever providing it to him.

Best regards, Michael Sol

While that Ralph Budd “kicked and screamed” makes a great story, this is another example of explaining why things turned out as they didn’t, and it’s important to interject a bit of reality here with regard to what we do know for sure. What we do know is that even the Milwaukee was the only of the Western “Transcontinentals” to use electrification to a great extent. It was also the only one to give it up, and the only one to be largely abandoned. And you can look at those facts in a number of ways.

First of all, if the “total engineering solution” could reduce the effect of a 2% grade on the Milwaukee Road, why was it not done elsewhere? Certainly grades such as the approach to Moffat Tunnel, Donner Pass, or the UP crossing of the Blue Mountains would certainly be good candidates. That others did not emulate the Milwaukee (to any great extent, the Great Northern did electrify Wenatchee to Skykomish when the “new” Cascade Tunnel was completed) certainly means something. And again, while everyone else could have been wrong and the Milwaukee Road the only one right, they were also the only one to give up this advantage and its route disappear altogether.

On the other hand, just because others didn’t do it doesn’t mean it was wrong for the Milwaukee either, for they had to do something. Between the eastern foothills of the Rocky Mountains in Montana and the Pacific Coast, the Milwaukee’s profile was vastly inferior to that of the Great Northern and even to that of the Northern Pacific. While Mr. Sol focuses on Pipestone Pass vs. Marias Pass example, again, the numerous other grades are overlooked. The first year of Milwaukee electrification was well before the line change at Loweth in 1956 where the grade was 2.05% westbound (reduced to 1.4% with the new line). So, Pipestone Pass was not the greatest of the Milwaukee’s worries. (Great Northern had no such corresponding hill to that of Loweth). Additionally eastbound, while GN trains after cresting Marias Pass encountered only short uphill segments (never exceeding .8 percent) enroute to Havre, eastward Milwaukee trains after cresting the Continental Divide faced nearly 50 miles of continuous one percent climb from Lombard to Loweth. Between the Continental Divide and the Spokane area, GN and NP had no comparable hills to the Milwaukee’s 1.7 percent crossing (each way) of the Bitterroots. In Washington, the Milwaukee had two major hills to cross (the Saddle Mountains and Cascades), while the GN and NP had just one: the Cascades. While it appears that indeed the Milwaukee did enjoy the superior crossing of at least one hill, the Cascades, compared to that of its competitors, it’s also true that unlike its competitors, the Milwaukee had no options how to route its traffic. Both GN and NP did utilize the gentle grades of subsidiary Spokane, Portland, and Seattle when an alternative was desired to their crossing of the Cascades. While the SP&S is generally considered the GN and NP route for traffic to and from Portland (the Milwaukee Road was also the only transcontinental railroad in the Northwest not to serve Portland, at least until trackage rights were granted with the BN merger), it was also used to relay traffic to GN and NP trains at Vancouver for movement northward. More miles, to be sure, but an alternate route, and one that’s water level much of the way and never more than .8 percent at that, is a tremendous asset. For example, while GN and NP could (and did) route cars from east of Spokane destined for Longview via SP&S to Vancouver (WA) and then north avoiding major grade, the Milwaukee had no choice but to pull this traffic over the 2.2 percent grade of the Saddle Mountains and the 3 percent grade of Tacoma Hill (which was not electrified). Again, that other railroads did not emulate the Milwaukee’s solution to conquering grades, or that the Milwaukee did not choose to keep this solution in operation makes one wonder as to whether it was, as Mr. Sol says, the “total engineering solution”, but with more hills to climb than the competitors, something had to be done. That the Great Northern did not seek that “total engineering solution” could also be a result of the fact that perhaps such a solution was not cost effective or necessary for them. In other words, such “solutions” are not necessary when your grades are minimal to begin with, and in the case of traversing Washington State, not as important when you have an alternate route.

Getting back to what we do know as certain, and that is that the Milwaukee’s “total engineering solution” wasn’t “total” in one respect: time. While Mr. Sol does use the phrase "at the time", time does not stand still. Even if (and that’s a big if, given that all other railroads did not follow suit) it did ameliorate the situation during steam operations, things changed: Dieselization, for sure, but by 1970, the difference between Pipestone Pass and Marias Pass was significant: While the Milwaukee crossing of the Continental Divide remained single track (as was all the Pacific Extension) without CTC, the GN crossing of Marias Pass featured long sections of double track (60 percent of the 150 miles between Shelby and Whitefish alone) with the remainder having long sidings and equipped with CTC. Therefore, while the Milwaukee’s “total engineering solution” wasn’t sufficiently total to save that route (after all, “total” is a very definitive word), the infrastructure that Great Northern created prior to the merger 35 years ago is capable of handling up to 50 daily trains today, and without significant changes over the years (signaling changes, upgrading double track to two main track CTC being the most notable). Due to the infrastructure in place, by 1972, Burlington Northern had eliminated the crew change at Cut Bank, and trains needed but one crew for the 255-mile run from Havre to Whitefish. Meanwhile, correspondingly, the 227 miles between Harlowton and Deer Lodge on the Milwaukee required two road crews (changing at Three Forks). When the Milwaukee discontinued electrification and the Butte helper in 1974, trailing tonnage was limited to about 5,500 tons westbound; meanwhile as more heavy cars entered service everywhere, BN was running westward trains over Marias Pass at 9,000 tons or more, without a helper.

Today, for obvious reasons, a comparison between the operations over Marias Pass and those over the numerous Milwaukee grades in Montana is not possible. But it is possible to get a glimpse of how Marias Pass is handling traffic. For example, this is a representative sample of westbound unit train traffic in a 30-hour stretch passing through Cut Bank, Montana beginning the afternoon of March 4, 2004:

G-MNSKAL9-29, by Cut Bank 1502-04, 14,898 tons (Marion, SD to Kalama, WA)
C-SCMCEC0-10 by Cut Bank 1925-04, 17,634 tons (Spring Creek, MT to Centralia,
WA)
G-PKRTAC9-28 by Cut Bank 0044-05, 14,552 tons (Parker, SD to Tacoma, WA)
G-SIOPAS1-26 by Cut Bank 0116-05, 13,965 tons (Sioux City, IA to Pasco, WA)
G-JSDKAL9-29 by Cut Bank 0743-05, 13,797 tons (Jefferson, SD to Kalama, WA)
G-SIOTAC9-02 by Cut Bank 1012-05, 15,007 tons (Sioux City, IA to Tacoma, WA)
G-GRFRGT1-29 by Cut Bank 1335-05, 12,881 tons (Great Falls, MT to Rivergate,
OR)
G-HVRKAL9-03 by Cut Bank 1825-05, 15,430 tons (Havre, MT to Kalama, WA)
G-HTIKAL9-02 by Cut Bank 1951-05, 14,051 tons (Hinton, IA to Kalama, WA)

As information, all the trains had 4 units each. Most of units were C44's, but there was one representative SD60, SD75, and SD40 in the bunch. All told, that's 132,215 tons of grain and coal moved in 30 hours with 36 total units averaging 1.1 horsepower per ton. All trains operated from origin to destination without helper crews (all operated with distributed power) and without additional helper power. Again, these represent only the westward unit trains by this one location in this 30 hour timeframe. All told, there were about 45 other trains operated during the same period, including three Amtrak trains, none of which was more than 20 minutes late.

There is no other route in the United States (CN, in Canada, could do it with less) where trains operate from east of the Rockies to a Pacific Coast State with less power today, and definitely no instance today where a 2 percent grade is operated with less power than this 1.2 percent grade. While a comparison with how such traffic would or could be handled over Milwaukee’s Pipestone Pass is a moot point due to its abandonment, it’s a good bet that it too, like all other routes currently operated, would require more power, and therefore result in a greater cost, than Marias. And that much of the infrastructure in use on Marias Pass today was in place back in 1970 gives a good insight as to why this is the primary east-west rail route across the Northern Tier today. Had the Milwaukee route survived to where today it could take advantage of changes in railroad technology, things certainly could have been different. Given the numerous steep grades on the Milwaukee route, distributed power would certainly be a natural, but it would require 75 to 150 percent (depending on destination) more power than what BNSF currently uses would certainly put it at a competitive disadvantage. That much of the capacity on Marias today was around 35 years ago suggests a similar operating advantage in that period, too… as well as a much better reason that things turned out as they did, instead of how they didn’t.

[arbfbe]

nanaimo73,

That photo came up on the internet another time and I believe the photo was pegged as somewhere in Idaho. The exact location has left my mind, though.

[VerMontanan]

QUOTE: Originally posted by bobwilcox

What the UP does with their line in S. Montana is pretty simple. If it does not make an adequate return on investment they will dump the line. It is easier to do if a shortline operator is interested. If an operator is not interested the line gets scrapped. Montana can scream about an abandoment all they want but the money talks. The line probably should have been dumped when Butte shut down many years ago.

Traffic on the UP line south from Silver Bow was strong through the mid-1990s. I recall BN operating 10,000-ton trains between Great Falls and Helena or Garrison (BN retained the line between Helena and Garrison for 5 years after creation of the MRL) on a regular basis. Most of the traffic was destined for interchange with the UP at Silver Bow. Since then, most traffic is interchanged between CP and UP at Kingsgate/Eastport on a route that usually is longer and with steeper grades. But with BN (later BNSF) as UP's prime competitor, the two railroads tend not to participate in interchange with one another to create a through route. One exception to this is that UP must still rely on BNSF to forward substantial traffic between the Vancouver, BC area and Portland because it has no line of its own between the Vancouver area and Seattle.

[nanaimo73]

Michael or arbfbe, do you know where this was taken ?
http://www.rrpicturearchives.net/showPicture.aspx?id=83211

[Anonymous]

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

The book was part of run-up of the need for securities regulation, and an impetus to the Securities and Exchange Act, establishing the SEC in 1933 upon the theory that, without oversight and regulation of the stock market and publicly-traded companies of the type of regulation that existed for railroads through the ICC, "the Investor Pays," because the average investor is incapable of protecting themselves from corporate shenanigans and insider control activity.

Sounds like Lowenthall was ahead of his time, circa 1990's (the decade of fraud).

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding

Thanks, that was interesting. Am I perceiving this right, that Lowenthal was aiming his dislike towards bankers, and not the Milwaukee Road?

At the time of the Milwaukee Receivership, 1925, Lowenthal was General Counsel of the Russian-American Import-Export Bank, a Soviet banking cover for various enterprises of the new Soviet government in Russia. By the time he wrote his book on the Milwaukee in 1933, he was firmly aligned with "Progressives" within the New Deal. He wasn't that particularly interested in the Milwaukee Road, per se, but rather the influence that he perceived on its receivership and ultimate control by First National City Bank of New York and in particular by Kuhn. Loeb & Company.

The book was part of a run-up to the political drive underscoring the need for securities regulation. This was an impetus to the passage Securities and Exchange Act, establishing the SEC in 1933 upon the theory that, without oversight and regulation of the stock market and publicly-traded companies of the type of regulation that existed for railroads through the ICC, "the Investor Pays," because the average investor is incapable of protecting themselves from corporate shenanigans and insider control activity.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Murphy Siding]

Thanks, that was interesting. Am I perceiving this right, that Lowenthal was aiming his dislike towards bankers, and not the Milwaukee Road?

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding

I'm still searching for the "triple the estimate " quote. What I did find is this: The Historical Guide to North American Railroads, By George H. Drury. "In 1901...estimate...was $45 million........The cost of the extension was $234 million.

This hghlights the problem of historical works that rely on secondary sources. Like the rumor that floats around high school, by the time its done, it barely resembles the original.

A 1901 survey was sent to determine the cost, using "modern technology" and mutliple railheads, and 1901 prices, of duplicating the Northern Pacific Railroad. The 1890s had been a period of deflation, and so 1901 prices looked pretty good by comparison with what came before, or came after. However, the 1901 estimate was only what it was: the prospective cost of duplicating the NP in that year. It was not the construction estimate used for the Pacific Extension Construction developed in 1905-1906 based on final route selection and the costs of construction of that later time period. The NP figure was never used as a basis for estimating the costs of the actual PCE construction, nor did Milwaukee Road contemplate building a line as poorly built and located as the NP. It was a hypothetical exercise. The $45 million is what the surveyor reported. There is no record of what D.J. Whittemore, Milwaukee's Chief Engineer, and one of the most experienced railroad engineers in the country, thought of the estimate since the estimate was not adopted by the Company for any purpose.

The $234 million figure was generated by a lawyer writing an expose about bankers and how they take over valuable properties. That was The Investor Pays by Max Lowenthal (Knopf, 1933).

Lowenthal took the figure from an engineering study done on the Milwaukee in 1925. In that study, a short reference was made to the running investment in Lines West, including costs of construction, costs of equipment, annual maintenance, additions and betterments, without any deductions for depreciation, scrap, retirements, etc. as of May 1, 1925. It was a different figure on May 1, 1924. and was a different figure at any given point in time as the bulk of it represented maintenance and equipment acquisition costs, and more so as time passed. By 1925, the PCE was a long ways from the construction era.

The engineers who prepared the study did not represent the $234 million as a cost of construction.

Nowhere do they even remotely suggest such a thing, and no Milwaukee Road record supports that assessment. It is simply wrong. Lowenthal not only took the number out of context in his book, he misrepresented its meaning entirely. Whether it was because he didn't understand it, not having anything resembling an engineering background, or purposely mis-stated it is an interesting question.

It would be as though you suggested that the Great Northern Railway cost $1.5 Billion to build and represented this far and wide as Jim Hill's hugely expensive blunder that could never be paid off. because you would lead everyone to believe that this was the cost of construction of the Great Northern mainline completed in 1893.

You would do that without disclosing that this was a 1970 "figure" and obtained only by adding in 80 years of maintenance, replacement, additions, betterments, all boxcars and equipment ever purchased, total cost of dieselization, and so forth, without any depreciation or other adjustments.

Did it really cost $1.5 Billion to build the Great Northern Railway? No, at least not in the context implied here. That method of assigning a "cost of construction" is as misleading as can possibly be because it represents everything under the sun besides the original cost of construction. "Total investment" is a constantly increasing figure with the passage of time and with the passage of time bears less and less relevance to the actual cost of construction. It is a peculiarly engineering concept that has no basis in accounting.

Lowenthal's use of a 1925 number was odd since the same engineering study that he relied on did, in fact, clearly show that the actual cost of construction through August 1, 1909 was $99 million. The last spikes were driven in April and May, 1909.

The $234 million figure is probably the single most repeated falsehood about the Milwaukee Road, because few, if any, writers go back to the primary source material to assess accuracy once these things appear in print.

Why use the 1925 figure, or a 1917 figure, or a 1952 figure, or a 1980 figure? None of them represent the "cost of construction" as commonly understood in the discussions of the cost of building the Milwaukee Road.

Lowenthal blundered on his interpretation of the figure and historians and politicians have relied on that blunder ever since. By now, you could cite to any of 100 or so publications all relying on that single source for that erroneous information.

Best regards, Michael Sol

[Murphy Siding]

I'm still searching for the "triple the estimate " quote. What I did find is this: The Historical Guide to North American Railroads, By George H. Drury. "In 1901...estimate...was $45 million........The cost of the extension was $234 million.

[MichaelSol]

QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding

QUOTE: Originally posted by MichaelSol

QUOTE: Originally posted by Murphy Siding

Can someone explain why the PCE cost something like 3 times times the "estimated" cost? .... How did they miss it by so far?

It didn't and they didn't.

It cost $99 million to complete the mainline and related construction, tunnels, bridges, yards, depots, etc., by the close of the construction era, August 1, 1909. This was about $14 million more than the engineering estimate. MILW's PCE cost less to construct than any other transcontinental, primarily because of technology and mutliple railheads. That final "cost" also included equipment, and if that is deducted, the construction "estimate" was very close to the final actual construction cost.

Best regards, Michael Sol

OK. I'm going to have go look that one up. I've read that phrase "triple the estimate" in several different sources. Things that make you go hmmmm.......

Thanks

Oh, the quotes are out there all right. They will all trace back to a single source. The problem is that the source was wrong.

Best regards, Michael Sol