*** To the Moderator or Administrator. This post and thread were just deleted from your website. It has been professionally written and vetted. It had about 1500 views and 50 replies in 4 days. And it just disappeared - the original post and all the responses. I think that it may have been deleted because I used an improper abbreviation in a response. I am not sure. This is an important topic that I am posting as a public service. Please put it back up again and I will be careful with everything I write. Loco ***
The Amtrak Train 188 derailment on May 12, 2015 at Frankford Junction Curve in Northeast Philadelphia was a terrible tragedy. Eight passengers died and scores were injured, many seriously. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted their usual detailed investigation and determined the accident’s probable cause. Train 188, operating northbound from Washington to New York City, entered the 50 mph curve at 106 mph, a very unsafe speed, because of what is called “situational awareness.” The train’s engineer Brandon Bostian apparently lost track of where he was on the route, and believed that he was beyond this unusually sharp curve when he was not.
The investigation established that Engineer Bostian had a clean disciplinary record, was not impaired by drugs or alcohol, and he was not using a cell phone or any other personal electronic device. Shortly before the accident, a SEPTA train on an adjacent track stopped because of a thrown rock shattering that train’s windshield. There was much radio chatter about the SEPTA incident as Train 188 approached the fateful curve, and this may have distracted Bostian. All the available evidence points to the conclusion that the locomotive engineer failed to properly control his train’s speed simply because of losing track of where he was in the nighttime darkness – human failure at the worst possible time. The NTSB’s assessment and commentary are “spot on” based on the known facts.
The NTSB reported that Positive Train Control (PTC), mandated by Congress in 2008, had not yet been implemented at the time of the accident on that portion of the Northeast Corridor. The NTSB also found that “the accident could have been avoided if positive train control or another control system had been in place to enforce the permanent speed restriction of 50 mph at the Franklin (sic) Junction Curve.”
As detailed as the NTSB’s accident report is, its findings are somewhat incomplete and even misleading. That is because a fully capable train control system was in place at the time of the accident. The necessary equipment has been on the Northeast Corridor passenger locomotives, including Train 188, for at least 50 years, and this train control system has also been part of the Northeast Corridor wayside signaling between New York City and Washington, including at Frankford Junction, for even longer than that.
As mentioned in the NTSB report, this long existing train control system is called Automatic Train Control (ATC), and consists of cab signaling with speed enforcement and limiting. Cab signaling on a locomotive inductively receives signal system information transmitted by the wayside signaling through the running rails, and provides a display in the locomotive cab of the safe speed (sometimes a signal aspect denoting speed requirements) based on the real time conditions ahead of the train. The ATC speed enforcement feature stops the train if the engineer does not comply with the cab signal speed. At Frankford Junction, this longstanding ATC equipment has provided protection that forces trains to slowdown when approaching preceding trains and stop signals. This existing safety system also forces trains to slowdown for lower speed turnouts when switching from track to track.
Prior to the accident and as reported by the NTSB, this existing ATC equipment even forced slowdowns for some Northeast Corridor curves, including this very Frankford Junction Curve in the southbound direction. However, Train 188 was operating northbound, and the ATC system was not used to display or enforce a reduced speed for the Frankford Junction Curve in the northbound direction. Yes, the necessary equipment had been in place on the locomotives and in the wayside signaling for over 50 years, something the NTSB did not fully explain. As Train 188 approached and entered the 50 mph curve, the cab signal displayed and permitted the locomotive’s maximum speed of 125 mph, even though lower cab signal speeds were available. To its credit, the NTSB did conclude that ATC cab signaling protection for the Frankford Junction Curve “would have prevented the accident.” But why wasn’t this existing ATC equipment used to force northbound trains down to a safe speed before reaching the curve?
Although no mention was found in the NTSB report about speed signs approaching the accident curve, Dennis Pierce, president of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, said to a congressional committee that “the simple use of speed signs in the approach to the curve, as a reminder, may have prevented this accident.” The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Emergency Order 31 issued after the accident directed Amtrak to “enhance speed restriction signage.” It is hard to fathom why a railroad line with speeds up to 150 mph wouldn’t have signs approaching low speed curves, and why the NTSB’s report didn’t address this issue.
Excessive speeds on railway curves have caused many tragic accidents over the years. One of the early and more serious accidents of this type occurred November 1, 1918 on the Brooklyn Rapid Transit’s Brighton Beach Line in New York City. Known as the Malbone Street Wreck, somewhere between 93 and 103 people died and many others were seriously injured.
Two notable train wrecks occurred in the United States during the 1950s because of excessive speed on curves – one on what is now the Northeast Corridor at Jenkins Curve in Bridgeport Connecticut, and the other at Redondo Junction in Southern California. For these two excessive speed accidents, a total of 31 died and 175 were injured. Such excessive speed accidents are not peculiar only to the United States, but have occurred around the world with some frequency. For one 50 mph curve in Morpeth, England, there have been three serious excessive speed derailments in modern times – in 1969, 1984 and 1994. For the three accidents at this one curve there were a total of 6 fatalities and 57 injured.
These types of excessive speed accidents virtually always involve human failure and associated factors such as loss of situational awareness, distraction, forgetfulness, drowsiness, falling asleep, and on occasion impairment.
The first accident that is particularly germane to the Frankford Junction accident occurred 8:23 AM December 12, 1990 on Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor at Back Bay in Boston. Amtrak Train 66 operating from Washington to Boston approached the 30 mph speed restriction and curve entering Back Bay Station at excessive speed. The resulting derailment and crash into a commuter train on an adjacent track injured 453 people, not counting 175 additional claims of injury that were made after the fact. One of many interesting factors about the Back Bay accident was that the engineer’s 4:30 AM report time in New Haven, Connecticut for the assignment made it likely that he had to arise somewhere around 3:00 AM or earlier – a difficult wakeup time for most human beings.
The NTSB reported that the Back Bay accident’s probable cause was human failure with several significant contributing factors, one of which was “Amtrak’s failure to have advanced warning devices for a speed reduction for the curve entering Back Bay Station.” This wording didn’t make clear that both the Back Bay locomotive and wayside signaling were already equipped with the ATC cab signaling and speed enforcement system, and that this preexisting safety system was not used to force trains to slowdown for the curve.
The Back Bay accident on the Northeast Corridor was a loud wakeup call. America’s most prestigious and highest speed rail line had modern ATC cab signaling with speed enforcement and limiting capability, but this safety system was rarely used to force trains to slowdown to safe speeds for curves. In the aftermath of the Back Bay accident, Amtrak after conferring with the FRA reconfigured the existing ATC system and equipment to force speed reductions approaching the Back Bay Curve. Amtrak also rearranged the existing ATC cab signal equipment at some other locations to limit train speeds approaching curves, including the Frankford Junction Curve in the southbound direction, but not in the northbound direction.
Several foreign curve excessive speed accidents occurred in recent years and were widely reported in the American news media. Two of the more pertinent accidents occurred in Japan and Spain. The Amagasaki rail crash in April 2005 took 107 lives and injured 562, and Spain’s Santiago de Compostela derailment and rollover in July 2013 was caught on dramatic video and resulted in 79 dead and 140 injured. These and other similar excessive speed accidents were caused by human failure and the lack of safety systems. As these accidents illustrate, the number of deaths and injuries resulting from excessive speed accidents can reach catastrophic levels.
Then on December 1, 2013, a southbound Metro North Railroad commuter train derailed after entering Spuyten Duyvil Curve in New York City at excessive speed. This accident resulted in 4 deaths and 61 injured. The engineer was believed to have fallen asleep while at the controls of the fast moving train, and he was later diagnosed to have severe obstructive sleep apnea. The NTSB found that a contributory factor to the accident “was the absence of a positive train control system.” However, the Metro North trains and wayside signaling have had ATC cab signaling with speed enforcement and limiting for several decades, which system was and is fully capable of preventing curve excessive speed accidents. It wasn’t absent; it just wasn’t used for that purpose.
In response to the Spuyten Duyvil accident, the FRA issued Emergency Order 29 requiring the Metro North Railroad to use its existing ATC train control system to provide for safety wherever the authorized speed dropped by more than 20 mph. For example, if the track approaching a 50 mph curve is authorized for 80 mph, the speed reduction at the curve would be 30 mph, and the existing ATC system had to be used to ensure safe speeds were enforced. Metro North modified the signaling approaching the Spuyten Duyvil Curve and approaching all other speed restrictions on its entire rail network that were covered by the FRA emergency directive. Thanks to the ATC system, the Spuyten Duyvil accident should never happen again on the Metro North Railroad.
The wreck of Amtrak Train 188 in Northeast Philadelphia occurred less than two years after the Metro North accident and the FRA’s issuance of Emergency Order 29. The permitted speed approaching Frankford Junction Curve for Train 188 was 80 mph and the curve was timetabled for 50 mph – a 30 mph speed drop. Two questions were never raised or answered by the NTSB. Why didn’t the FRA make Emergency Order 29 applicable to Amtrak and all rail lines already equipped with an ATC train control system? Was it because the FRA believed the Amtrak locomotive engineers are less fallible than those of Metro North, and those in Spain and Japan?
There was much commentary reported in the news media about Bostian’s 106 mph speed being reckless. Of course, that speed was wrong and unsafe at that location. However, 106 mph is not an unusual speed for Amtrak trains when operating on the Northeast Corridor. For Bostian’s Train 188 run from Washington to New York, major stretches had authorized speeds of 110 to 125 mph. In fact, as the NTSB reported, the authorized speed immediately beyond the Frankford Junction area was 110 mph. The speed of 106 mph was quite a normal speed for Train 188, but it was a wrong and dangerous speed before being past the Frankford Junction Curve. Sadly, as the NTSB has made clear, situational awareness has been a significant factor in many transportation fatal accidents. That is one important reason why there are safety systems to protect against human error.
The NTSB railroad accident reports have not looked at the bigger picture and possible systemic problems and failures, especially with respect to those responsible for railroad signal systems here in North America. For instance, neither the NTSB nor the FRA ever mentioned how passenger railroad safety systems in the United States compare with those on our own domestic rail transit systems, especially with respect to limiting train speeds when necessary for safety – such as approaching curves.
It just happens that many of our modern heavy rail transit systems in the United States have had their signal systems enforce all speed restrictions, including all curves, beginning more than 40 years ago. This level of safety has been provided on the PATCO Speedline between Philadelphia and New Jersey since 1969, on San Francisco Bay Area’s BART rail network since 1972, on WMATA in our nation’s capital since 1976, and on Atlanta’s MARTA since 1979. The maximum speeds on these transit systems are relatively low and range from 65 to 80 mph. Since Amtrak trains on the Northeast Corridor operate up to 125, 135 and 150 mph depending on location and train type, it seems very incongruous that the Northeast Corridor curve speeds weren’t all speed limited long ago.
While the NTSB report is correct in its technical detail and findings, it does not provide a top down and broad assessment about how such an unnecessary and tragic accident could occur on Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor in this 21st Century. The safety technology not only existed, but was in place at Frankford Junction for more than 50 years. No new equipment was required. The public deserves to know why, after the Metro North accident and many other speed related accidents here in the United States and around the world, FRA Emergency Order 29 was not made applicable to Amtrak. And the public should be told why the FRA allowed the Spuyten Duyvil curve to not be protected by the existing signal system equipment until after that unnecessary fatal accident.
Focusing on Engineer Brandon Bostian and his performance was a necessary part of the accident investigation. However, his human failing is dwarfed by the failure of the FRA and the railroads to enforce safe speeds before these accidents occurred, by using long existing equipment for very little cost. The complete story of the Amtrak Train 188 accident deserves to be told.
LocoEngineer2000 It has been professionally written and vetted.
Ok.. who wrote and vetted this? Jsut curious, since it was stated as so.
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
We need to know how long it would have taken for a signal maintainer to change the 4 tracks approach signals north bound to approach 60 ?. That would have taken care of the ATC limiting the speed of 188 ?
zugmann LocoEngineer2000 It has been professionally written and vetted.
zugmann:
I wrote that preface to the Administraor because they took down the entire thread that had 1500 or so views and many posts. I assume that it was because I used unacceptable slang in a response. Not sure. I was basically begging Trains to put the thread back up.
I wrote it and I had a team vet it.
If you want to know more, just send me an email at rrengr1776@aol.com
Loco
The PRR safety measures were deactivated to make PTC installation easier. That is a fact.
Very parallel to the deactivation of the historic ABS system and the CSX-Amtrak Virgina tragedy.
And if this d---ed bus bridge goes into effect for the Southwest Chief, and a bus tragedy occurs, who will take the blame?
zugmann LocoEngineer2000 It has been professionally written and vetted. Ok.. who wrote and vetted this? Jsut curious, since it was stated as so.
I wonder what the poster's real agenda is? Union lawyer?
LocoEngineer2000But why wasn’t this existing ATC equipment used to force northbound trains down to a safe speed before reaching the curve?
By the explanation given, it seems that the ATC equipment was not deemed to have been necessary. The safety issue was to prevent exceeding the overturn speed on the curve. Apparently, the speed limit alone was thought to be insufficient to prevent overspeed on the curve. And yet, the speed limit alone was deemed to be sufficient to control the speed leading up to the reduced speed limit of the curve if the the speed limit of the preceding section was lower than the overturn speed of the curve.
What seems oddly inconsistent in this thinking is this: If the speed limit alone is insufficient to guarantee safe speed for the curve, why is it sufficient to guarantee that trains approaching the curve speed limit will not be exceeding the speed limit during that approach?
This seems like incredibly compartmentalized reasoning on the part of the decision makers. To have applied ATC protection with such fuzzy reasoning tells me that they really believed that the speed limit alone was sufficient and were only installing the redundancy of ATC because they were being forced to by higher authority. Further evidence of that is the fact that they felt that fixed signs warning of the curve overturn hazard were not needed because there was a speed limit rule covering the hazard.
daveklepperThe PRR safety measures were deactivated to make PTC installation easier. That is a fact.
Dave:
Thanks for your comment.
The ATC cab signals were never used before the accident at this curve to force northbound trains down to safe speeds. We always received Clear signals and Clear cab.
charlie hebdo I wonder what the poster's real agenda is? Union lawyer?
Hello Charlie:
I understand your curiousity. But who I am shouldn't matter since I am only posting truths.
Euclid LocoEngineer2000 But why wasn’t this existing ATC equipment used to force northbound trains down to a safe speed before reaching the curve? What seems oddly inconsistent in this thinking is this: If the speed limit alone is insufficient to guarantee safe speed for the curve, why is it sufficient to guarantee that trains approaching the curve speed limit will not be exceeding the speed limit during that approach? This seems like incredibly compartmentalized reasoning on the part of the decision makers. To have applied ATC protection with such fuzzy reasoning tells me that they really believed that the speed limit alone was sufficient and were only installing the redundancy of ATC because they were being forced to by higher authority. Further evidence of that is the fact that they felt that fixed signs warning of the curve overturn hazard were not needed because there was a speed limit rule covering the hazard.
LocoEngineer2000 But why wasn’t this existing ATC equipment used to force northbound trains down to a safe speed before reaching the curve?
LocoEngineer2000I understand your curiousity. But who I am shouldn't matter since I am only posting truths.
Actually it does. If someone says the post was professionally written, then I think that person owes the audience some disclosure.
Not saying I disagree with you, but the use of "professionally written and vetted" is odd. Lawyer? Consulting group? Safety group? Union? Or simply a copy and paste job?
zugmann LocoEngineer2000 I understand your curiousity. But who I am shouldn't matter since I am only posting truths. Actually it does. If someone says the post was professionally written, then I think that person owes the audience some disclosure. Not saying I disagree with you, but the use of "professionally written and vetted" is odd. Lawyer? Consulting group? Safety group? Union? Or simply a copy and paste job?
LocoEngineer2000 I understand your curiousity. But who I am shouldn't matter since I am only posting truths.
Hello zugmann:
Thanks again for your continued interest.
The statement was written to the Board Administrator for reasons previously explained. I thought that they would strip it away before the post went up, and they did not. Regardless, the statement is true and it was not a cut and paste job.
You have read the post and my later comments. Do you think that it was a cut and paste job?
My only aim is to provbide accurate and complete information something that the news media has not done.
I ask everyone to dwell on the facts. If there is something I wrote that you do not believe, please say so. I should be able to back up everything I said.
The complete story is that about one hundred years ago the PRR acquired property and engineered a new ROW to eliminate the curve at Frankfort Jct. Then at the last minute decided against it and superelevated the tracks instead. Three years ago it came back to bite us.
Editor Emeritus, This Week at Amtrak
charlie hebdoI wonder what the poster's real agenda is? Union lawyer?
I wonder what the agenda is behind the engineer being charged with 200 counts of reckless endangerment, 8 counts of involuntary manslaughter, and 1 count of causing a catastrophe. Could it be that the agenda is to get the blame off of Amtrak by putting it on Bostian?
EuclidCould it be that the agenda is to get the blame off of Amtrak by putting it on Bostian?
I think it's someone grandstanding for future political office. Always an election coming up.
LocoEngineer2000 charlie hebdo I wonder what the poster's real agenda is? Union lawyer? Hello Charlie: I understand your curiousity. But who I am shouldn't matter since I am only posting truths. Loco
RED Flag! Truther!
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
Some correct if this incorrect. Did PRR overturn a GG-1 nothbound train at Frankford during WW-2 ? Probably it was a much heavier PRR heavyweight train behind the GG-1 instead of the more powerful ACS-64 of 188 a shorter train ?
zugmann Euclid Could it be that the agenda is to get the blame off of Amtrak by putting it on Bostian? I think it's someone grandstanding for future political office. Always an election coming up.
Euclid Could it be that the agenda is to get the blame off of Amtrak by putting it on Bostian?
BaltACD LocoEngineer2000 charlie hebdo I wonder what the poster's real agenda is? Union lawyer? Hello Charlie: I understand your curiousity. But who I am shouldn't matter since I am only posting truths. Loco RED Flag! Truther!
Hello Everyone:
I wish that I could disclose my identity, but I can't.
I ask that you all focus on the facts and issues, and not the personalities. This subject matter is too important to become involved with side issues.
daveklepper Loco: When did you start running trains on the NEC? My all-PRR head-end observations were WWII-1966. Possibly the enforcement of permanent speed restrictions feature was removed when top speeds were raised from 100 to 125 mph? However, the speed restriction feature may have been independent of the signal display itself.
David:
My NEC involvement began long ago. And I have discussed these issues in the past with several experts, one of which hired on the PRR in the 1940s. I assume that you knew Belknap who is now deceased.
Since you mentioned 1966, send me a email at rrengr1776@aol.com and I will send you a PRR signal plan correct as of January 1, 1967. It shows for the northbound home signls and the 834 distant signals that they all displayed Clear, and the only code change was when the Shore home signal was at stop.
blue streak 1 Some correct if this incorrect. Did PRR overturn a GG-1 nothbound at Frankford during WW-2 ? Probably a much heavier PRR heavyweight train behind a GG-1 instead of the more powerful ACS-64 of 188 ?
Some correct if this incorrect. Did PRR overturn a GG-1 nothbound at Frankford during WW-2 ? Probably a much heavier PRR heavyweight train behind a GG-1 instead of the more powerful ACS-64 of 188 ?
September 6, 1943
Said it was a hotbox.
Possibly excessive speed on the curve.
Do you really think there would be much political mileage from granstanding by charging Bostian with criminal negligence for simply losing situational awareness for a couple minutes. I don't see it.
Euclid zugmann Euclid Could it be that the agenda is to get the blame off of Amtrak by putting it on Bostian? I think it's someone grandstanding for future political office. Always an election coming up. Do you really think there would be much political mileage from granstanding by charging Bostian with criminal negligence for simply losing situational awareness for a couple minutes. I don't see it.
zugmann Euclid Could it be that the agenda is to get the blame off of Amtrak by putting it on Bostian? I think it's someone grandstanding for future political office. Always an election coming up. Do you really think there would be much political mileage from granstanding by charging Bostian with criminal negligence for simply losing situational awareness for a couple minutes. I don't see it.
If the prosecuting authority is elected - there is much political capital to be mined from grandstanding. Isn't that what politics is at its bottom line - GRANDSTANDING to attract the vote.
BaltACD Euclid zugmann Euclid Could it be that the agenda is to get the blame off of Amtrak by putting it on Bostian? I think it's someone grandstanding for future political office. Always an election coming up. Do you really think there would be much political mileage from granstanding by charging Bostian with criminal negligence for simply losing situational awareness for a couple minutes. I don't see it. If the prosecuting authority is elected - there is much political capital to be mined from grandstanding. Isn't that what politics is at its bottom line - GRANDSTANDING to attract the vote.
Sure, if the cause you are grandstanding over is a cause that will attract votes. I think life in prision for Bostian for simply making an honest mistake would be a cause that would repell votes instead of attracting them.
Blue Streak. The GG1 Washington Terminal event resulted from something, possibly ballast kicked-up, that moved a lever blocking air-passage on the train air line between the GG1 and the baggage car immediately following. The engineer had applied the brakes, but the only brakes functioning on the entire train were those on the loomotive, since full release brake pressure still existed on the rest of the airbrake train line. This made whatever the ATC system communicated to the train ineffective.
Another thooght is that if the speed control for curves etc was reflected in the signal display, the control for speed restrictions might have been removed so that singal aspects would be in complete conformance with the genereal many-railroad common Northeastern signal practice.
daveklepper Blue Streak. The GG1 Washington Terminal event Another thooght is that if the speed control for curves etc was reflected in the signal display, the control for speed restrictions might have been removed so that singal aspects would be in complete conformance with the genereal many-railroad common Northeastern signal practice.
Blue Streak. The GG1 Washington Terminal event
Airline pilots are liable all of the time for their errors, but they're usually dead, so it doesn't matter. The Colgan crash in Buffalo and Air France 447 are two recent examples. Sometimes, when people die, "oops, I wasn't paying attention" just doesn't cut it.
daveklepper Blue Streak. The GG1 Washington Terminal event resulted from something, possibly ballast kicked-up, that moved a lever blocking air-passage on the train air line between the GG1 and the baggage car immediately following. The engineer had applied the brakes, but the only brakes functioning on the entire train were those on the loomotive, since full release brake pressure still existed on the rest of the airbrake train line. This made whatever the ATC system communicated to the train ineffective. Another thooght is that if the speed control for curves etc was reflected in the signal display, the control for speed restrictions might have been removed so that singal aspects would be in complete conformance with the genereal many-railroad common Northeastern signal practice.
The Washington Federal Express accident of January 15, 1953 occurred because of braking issues as you described.
This was one location on the PRR where the signal system was used to remind of a lower speed. The last southbound PRR signal 1339 showed Approach Medium when the next and first terminal signal at New York Avenue showed Clear. Not only that, the cab signal would drop to Approach Medium at 1339 and the engineer had to acknowledge. I do not remember whether the ATC speed limiting was in place at that time or whether it was added to the locomotives later.
This was one place where the signaling was used to force slowdowns when there were no trains ahead.
The engineer only learned about the braking problems when he applied the brake at signal 1339, and the rest is history.
BaltACD 243129 BaltACD 243129 So this is your take on the reasons for the #188 disaster? So what are you detailed takes on the #188 incident - you have to have many more insights than I since it was the failure of your craft. I don' want your continual canary turds, lets have some factual insights - wow me with your experience and knowledge of operating locomotives and trains on the NEC. It is your time to shine. Yes I do have many more insights than you and they are all here in this thread. You have read this entire thread have you not? Scattered chicken scratchings. Wow us with ALL your insights NOW in a single post.
243129 BaltACD 243129 So this is your take on the reasons for the #188 disaster? So what are you detailed takes on the #188 incident - you have to have many more insights than I since it was the failure of your craft. I don' want your continual canary turds, lets have some factual insights - wow me with your experience and knowledge of operating locomotives and trains on the NEC. It is your time to shine. Yes I do have many more insights than you and they are all here in this thread. You have read this entire thread have you not?
BaltACD 243129 So this is your take on the reasons for the #188 disaster? So what are you detailed takes on the #188 incident - you have to have many more insights than I since it was the failure of your craft. I don' want your continual canary turds, lets have some factual insights - wow me with your experience and knowledge of operating locomotives and trains on the NEC. It is your time to shine.
243129 So this is your take on the reasons for the #188 disaster?
So what are you detailed takes on the #188 incident - you have to have many more insights than I since it was the failure of your craft. I don' want your continual canary turds, lets have some factual insights - wow me with your experience and knowledge of operating locomotives and trains on the NEC. It is your time to shine.
Yes I do have many more insights than you and they are all here in this thread. You have read this entire thread have you not?
Scattered chicken scratchings. Wow us with ALL your insights NOW in a single post.
My thoughts, insights and reasons for Amtrak's debacles are contained in this forum and you want me to assemble them into a single post for you? Given your obvious lack of knowledge of railroad operations 'in the field' that would prove to be a waste of my time.
To borrow a charlie hebdo tactic , do your own research I am not going to do it for you.
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