CMStPnP So time might exhonerate him yet.
LocoEngineer2000 Thanks Euclid for your reply. As the NTSB said and I wrote, the northbound approach speed was 80 mph. Bostian exceeded that because as the NTSB said he lost situational awareness, something that can happen to any of us. Powerful electric trains let him get to 106 mph very quickly. The speed limit north of the curve is 110 mph. Southbound, the approach speed is 110, then a 60 mph curve, and then the 50 mph curve where the accident happened. As you wrote, they have been using the existing ATC train control equipment to force southbound trains to slow since the Back Bay accident. Thanks for writing a comment. The accident should never have happened. Loco
Thanks Euclid for your reply.
As the NTSB said and I wrote, the northbound approach speed was 80 mph. Bostian exceeded that because as the NTSB said he lost situational awareness, something that can happen to any of us. Powerful electric trains let him get to 106 mph very quickly. The speed limit north of the curve is 110 mph.
Southbound, the approach speed is 110, then a 60 mph curve, and then the 50 mph curve where the accident happened. As you wrote, they have been using the existing ATC train control equipment to force southbound trains to slow since the Back Bay accident.
Thanks for writing a comment.
The accident should never have happened.
Loco
Loco,
The question of why there was no speed control for northbound trains at the curve is interesting because it could have been provided just as it was provided for the southbound trains at the curve. I had forgotten some of the explanation details that I provided above. I was trying to recall the information from an article posted just after the wreck happened, and mistakenly recalled the speed limit approaching the curve northbound.
As I now see in the NTSB report, the reason for only controlling the southbound speed was that southbound trains were coming out of a 106 mph speed while northbounds were coming out of an 80 mph zone. And while 80 mph is faster than the 50 mph curve speed limit, 80 was still below the tip-over speed of the curve.
I am amazed at that rationale that no speed control is needed for trains approaching from the south because the speed limit to the south is less than the tip-over speed of the curve. That is stunningly illogical. It seems to overlook the possibility that overspeed in the curve might be a continuation of overspeed prior to the curve, northbound. It only assumes a southbound curve overspeed due to the possibility of entering the curve too fast southbound after abiding by the speed limit while approaching the curve speed reduction zone southbound.
Note: I am referring to the directions northbound and southbound, while apparently they are technically eastbound and westbound respectively.
Here is the detailed coverage of this matter from the NTSB report:
“There was cab signal protection for westbound trains at the accident location because the maximum approach speed for westbound trains was 110 mph, higher than the overturn speed of 98 mph.25 Westbound train engineers approaching the curve at the accident site would have received a cab signal warning to reduce the train speed. If an engineer failed to do so, the system would have automatically slowed the train. However, that protection was not added to the accident curve in the eastbound direction because Amtrak assumed that those trains would not be traveling faster than the maximum approach speed of 80 mph. Because the overturn speed was 98 mph, even if an engineer failed to slow from that maximum approach speed, the train would still be below the overturn speed.
The NTSB concludes that cab signal protection to enforce the 50 mph speed restriction in the eastbound direction at Frankford Junction or a fully implemented PTC system would have prevented the accident. Following the accident, Amtrak modified the signal system so that eastbound trains traveling toward Frankford Junction received a cab signal change to ensure speed restriction enforcement until December 2015 when PTC was implemented on that section of track. (PTC enforces speed restrictions, so the signal change was no longer necessary.)”
When you say the complete story of the accident needs to be told, what do you have in mind as the means to tell it?
After the Boston back bay, MNRR overturns Amtrak did not take the lesson to heart. Absolutely the ATC signal system should have had the northbound 80 MPH signal aspect for the track north of PNE station where applicable, Then the Frankford permanent speed restriction on the ATC signal system as well. Then as well the ACSES should have been done as well. This is all management fault.
Management was of course forced by FRA to install these signal aspects before service restarted. That took what 5 days ?
The obvious question is of course are all NEC restrictions now so signaled ?
It would never happen but discovery could reveal who made the decision(s) to not install the northbound restrictions. Then the real persons who did not have situation awareness of possible overspeeds can be identified.
BackshopWe'd have to know the engineer's prior work history and any disciplinary actions to know why he was charged as he was.
"The investigation established that Engineer Bostian had a clean disciplinary record, was not impaired by drugs or alcohol, and he was not using a cell phone or any other personal electronic device. Shortly before the accident"
In fact if my memory serves me correct someone went on to state he was a model employee and very pro-Amtrak. They charged him with failure to control the train only because they lacked evidence of any other causes but at the same time I am not sure they did a full battery of tests on him after the accident or if every existing medical condition would show up if they did. So time might exhonerate him yet.
charlie hebdoJoe's mantra triad.
Have to admit I have no clue what that is.
Your bladder will explode!
Never too old to have a happy childhood!
243129 BaltACD 243129 BaltACD 243129 BaltACD 243129 The fault lies with the company. Their training regimen is inadequate and flawed, supervision is largely inexperienced and consequently inept. The vetting procedure for operations candidates is carried out by HR employees with no operations knowledge or experience. I'd venture you are the only individual in the world that would pass your version of vetting. I probably shouldn't but I will reply to your smart-ass remark. So what is my version of vetting? 60 years at the throttle before ever sitting in the seat as a Engineer. It seems to be the modus operandi around around here if you can't come up with an intelligent response you come up with a juvenile one instead. So - what are your standards? I would not hire someone with an imperious attitude such as yours.
BaltACD 243129 BaltACD 243129 BaltACD 243129 The fault lies with the company. Their training regimen is inadequate and flawed, supervision is largely inexperienced and consequently inept. The vetting procedure for operations candidates is carried out by HR employees with no operations knowledge or experience. I'd venture you are the only individual in the world that would pass your version of vetting. I probably shouldn't but I will reply to your smart-ass remark. So what is my version of vetting? 60 years at the throttle before ever sitting in the seat as a Engineer. It seems to be the modus operandi around around here if you can't come up with an intelligent response you come up with a juvenile one instead. So - what are your standards?
243129 BaltACD 243129 BaltACD 243129 The fault lies with the company. Their training regimen is inadequate and flawed, supervision is largely inexperienced and consequently inept. The vetting procedure for operations candidates is carried out by HR employees with no operations knowledge or experience. I'd venture you are the only individual in the world that would pass your version of vetting. I probably shouldn't but I will reply to your smart-ass remark. So what is my version of vetting? 60 years at the throttle before ever sitting in the seat as a Engineer. It seems to be the modus operandi around around here if you can't come up with an intelligent response you come up with a juvenile one instead.
BaltACD 243129 BaltACD 243129 The fault lies with the company. Their training regimen is inadequate and flawed, supervision is largely inexperienced and consequently inept. The vetting procedure for operations candidates is carried out by HR employees with no operations knowledge or experience. I'd venture you are the only individual in the world that would pass your version of vetting. I probably shouldn't but I will reply to your smart-ass remark. So what is my version of vetting? 60 years at the throttle before ever sitting in the seat as a Engineer.
243129 BaltACD 243129 The fault lies with the company. Their training regimen is inadequate and flawed, supervision is largely inexperienced and consequently inept. The vetting procedure for operations candidates is carried out by HR employees with no operations knowledge or experience. I'd venture you are the only individual in the world that would pass your version of vetting. I probably shouldn't but I will reply to your smart-ass remark. So what is my version of vetting?
BaltACD 243129 The fault lies with the company. Their training regimen is inadequate and flawed, supervision is largely inexperienced and consequently inept. The vetting procedure for operations candidates is carried out by HR employees with no operations knowledge or experience. I'd venture you are the only individual in the world that would pass your version of vetting.
243129 The fault lies with the company. Their training regimen is inadequate and flawed, supervision is largely inexperienced and consequently inept. The vetting procedure for operations candidates is carried out by HR employees with no operations knowledge or experience.
I'd venture you are the only individual in the world that would pass your version of vetting.
I probably shouldn't but I will reply to your smart-ass remark.
So what is my version of vetting?
60 years at the throttle before ever sitting in the seat as a Engineer.
It seems to be the modus operandi around around here if you can't come up with an intelligent response you come up with a juvenile one instead.
So - what are your standards?
I would not hire someone with an imperious attitude such as yours.
Nor would I you! So we are even. We are both unemployable!
So a attitude that detects BS is not employable to you. Bring on Trip Optimizer and Leader automatons that they are - totally blind scripted operators.
charlie hebdo Loss of situational awareness. Could be a host of causes. Sleep apnea, sleep deprivation from of shifts, ADHD, some other neurological condition, fatigue, "highway hypnosis: and even Joe's mantra triad.
Loss of situational awareness. Could be a host of causes. Sleep apnea, sleep deprivation from of shifts, ADHD, some other neurological condition, fatigue, "highway hypnosis: and even Joe's mantra triad.
CMStPnP In this specific case, I believe the Engineer is equally confused at what happened based on what he said and his behavior previous to the incident. It is possible to lose consciousness and then wake up in mental state of confusion at what just happened without realizing you lost consciousness to begin with. It's happened to me just with sleep deprivation. Perhaps the guy had sleep apnea, perhaps he suffered a stroke........not enough self-monitoring in a locomotive cab to ever know for sure.
In this specific case, I believe the Engineer is equally confused at what happened based on what he said and his behavior previous to the incident. It is possible to lose consciousness and then wake up in mental state of confusion at what just happened without realizing you lost consciousness to begin with. It's happened to me just with sleep deprivation. Perhaps the guy had sleep apnea, perhaps he suffered a stroke........not enough self-monitoring in a locomotive cab to ever know for sure.
What someone is charged with and what (if anything) they are convicted of, are two entirely different things. We'd have to know the engineer's prior work history and any disciplinary actions to know why he was charged as he was. There are true "accidents" and there are "not enough attention" incidents. His life may be ruined but think about all his victims.
Thanks zugmann for your comment, with which I sadly agree. The public, politicians and even railroad executives have little understanding of the railroad environment and train operations. I am just trying to do my part in getting truth out to the public.
243129 It seems to be the modus operandi around around here if you can't come up with an intelligent response you come up with a juvenile one instead.
The two are not mutually exclusive.
TOSZ
It's been fun. But it isn't much fun anymore. Signing off for now.
The opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer, any other railroad, company, or person.t fun any
Thanks 243129 for your comments. It is not appropriate for me to comment on Amtrak’s training and supervision. However, you are quite correct that training and supervision are critically important on a railroad, because they can affect and reduce the potential for major rule violations and accidents.
However, even with the best training and supervision, human beings can and do make fatal mistakes. My point is that the accident should have never occurred because the existing ATC train control system could have and should have forced safe speeds many years before the accident occurred.
BaltACDI'd venture you are the only individual in the world that would pass your version of vetting.
Who knows if even he would pass.
LocoEngineer2000Focusing on Engineer Brandon Bostian and his performance was a necessary part of the accident investigation. However, his human failing is dwarfed by the failure of the FRA and the railroads to enforce safe speeds before these accidents occurred, by using long existing equipment for very little cost. The complete story of the Amtrak Train 188 accident deserves to be told.
You can tell it all you want - most people aren't going to listen. They got their antagonist in Bostian, and that's all they want/need. Since most people have very little understanding of railroad ops, and are not interested in learning, the matter is settled in their eyes. Engineer = reckless and speeding bad guy.
Anyone that has time in the cab knows there are many systematic failures in inicidents like these. But trying to show those issues to the general public is pretty much a fool's errand. They simply don't care.
243129The fault lies with the company. Their training regimen is inadequate and flawed, supervision is largely inexperienced and consequently inept. The vetting procedure for operations candidates is carried out by HR employees with no operations knowledge or experience.
The fault lies with the company. Their training regimen is inadequate and flawed, supervision is largely inexperienced and consequently inept. The vetting procedure for operations candidates is carried out by HR employees with no operations knowledge or experience.
Thanks PJS1. On occasion, we all lose track of where we are. A few times while driving a car I missed a turn or made a wrong turn. And then when I see where I am, I am shocked to realize that I screwed up without even knowing it.
On rare occasions, this also happens to railroad engineers, and the risk is greatest during the nighttime hours when there are few landmarks. When it happens, we usually figure out quickly that something is wrong and we then operate defensively while we sort it out. But to operate defensively, you have to know that you are disoriented. At night on a railroad, that doesn’t always happen quickly.
Based on the NTSB report, Bostian did not realize his situational screw up until he was just about to enter the curve at a very unsafe speed. It was too late.
Anyone interested in this accident should carefully read the NTSB report and the attached board member statements. The report makes very clear that the best and well intentioned human beings can make tragic and fatal mistakes. And the report also makes clear that the accident would have been prevented had the existing safety equipment been used.
Thanks again PJS1.
"However, his human failing is dwarfed by the failure of the FRA and the railroads to enforce safe speeds before these accidents occurred, by using long existing equipment for very little cost. The complete story of the Amtrak Train 188 accident deserves to be told."
Rio Grande Valley, CFI,CFII
Not trying to sell anything. Posted to get the truth out. They are trying to jail the engineer for life and the full story has not been told. Many important people have made wrong statements about the accident and the engineer, and the public tends to believe what imoportant people say because they should know. Bostian lost track of where he was in the darkness, something that could happen to any of us. The safety equipment was there for 50 years. Just wasn't used. If you are wondering, I have never met or talked with Bostian.
LocoEngineer2000To its credit, the NTSB did conclude that ATC cab signaling protection for the Frankford Junction Curve “would have prevented the accident.” But why wasn’t this existing ATC equipment used to force northbound trains down to a safe speed before reaching the curve?
Here is the explanation that I read during the news coverage of this wreck: Because the speed limit during the advanced approach to the curve northbound was lower than the actual 50 mph curve speed limit, managers felt that there was no need to warn trains to slow down for the curve. In other words, northbound trains would be running slower than the curve speed limit as they approached, so there would be no need to warn them to slow down. Of course, this completely overlooks the possibility that a northbound engineer might forget where he was and speed up to the upcoming 106 mph limit while forgetting about the intervening 50 mph curve restriction.
Conversely, managers reasoned that southbound trains would be approaching the curve at the 106 mph limit, so if they forgot about the curve, they would run right into it and its 50 mph limit at 106 mph.
If this explanation for the lack of northbound speed control is true, I strikes me as being extremely poor and narrow minded reasoning. Southbound, the risk was a failure to slow down. Northbound, the risk was a failure to limit acceleration to beyond the curve limit. Either one would have equal potential to derail a train.
Not to sound overly cynical - what are your trying to sell?
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