Amtrak Train 188 Tragic Accident – What is the Complete Story?

[LocoEngineer2000]

The Amtrak Train 188 derailment on May 12, 2015 at Frankford Junction Curve in Northeast Philadelphia was a terrible tragedy. Eight passengers died and scores were injured, many seriously. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted their usual detailed investigation and determined the accident’s probable cause. Train 188, operating northbound from Washington to New York City, entered the 50 mph curve at 106 mph, a very unsafe speed, because of what is called “situational awareness.” The train’s engineer Brandon Bostian apparently lost track of where he was on the route, and believed that he was beyond this unusually sharp curve when he was not.

The investigation established that Engineer Bostian had a clean disciplinary record, was not impaired by drugs or alcohol, and he was not using a cell phone or any other personal electronic device. Shortly before the accident, a SEPTA train on an adjacent track stopped because of a thrown rock shattering that train’s windshield. There was much radio chatter about the SEPTA incident as Train 188 approached the fateful curve, and this may have distracted Bostian. All the available evidence points to the conclusion that the locomotive engineer failed to properly control his train’s speed simply because of losing track of where he was in the nighttime darkness – human failure at the worst possible time. The NTSB’s assessment and commentary are “spot on” based on the known facts.

The NTSB reported that Positive Train Control (PTC), mandated by Congress in 2008, had not yet been implemented at the time of the accident on that portion of the Northeast Corridor. The NTSB also found that “the accident could have been avoided if positive train control or another control system had been in place to enforce the permanent speed restriction of 50 mph at the Franklin (sic) Junction Curve.”

As detailed as the NTSB’s accident report is, its findings are somewhat incomplete and even misleading. That is because a fully capable train control system was in place at the time of the accident. The necessary equipment has been on the Northeast Corridor passenger locomotives, including Train 188, for at least 50 years, and this train control system has also been part of the Northeast Corridor wayside signaling between New York City and Washington, including at Frankford Junction, for even longer than that.

As mentioned in the NTSB report, this long existing train control system is called Automatic Train Control (ATC), and consists of cab signaling with speed enforcement and limiting. Cab signaling on a locomotive inductively receives signal system information transmitted by the wayside signaling through the running rails, and provides a display in the locomotive cab of the safe speed (sometimes a signal aspect denoting speed requirements) based on the real time conditions ahead of the train. The ATC speed enforcement feature stops the train if the engineer does not comply with the cab signal speed. At Frankford Junction, this longstanding ATC equipment has provided protection that forces trains to slowdown when approaching preceding trains and stop signals. This existing safety system also forces trains to slowdown for lower speed turnouts when switching from track to track.

Prior to the accident and as reported by the NTSB, this existing ATC equipment even forced slowdowns for some Northeast Corridor curves, including this very Frankford Junction Curve in the southbound direction. However, Train 188 was operating northbound, and the ATC system was not used to display or enforce a reduced speed for the Frankford Junction Curve in the northbound direction. Yes, the necessary equipment had been in place on the locomotives and in the wayside signaling for over 50 years, something the NTSB did not fully explain. As Train 188 approached and entered the 50 mph curve, the cab signal displayed and permitted the locomotive’s maximum speed of 125 mph, even though lower cab signal speeds were available. To its credit, the NTSB did conclude that ATC cab signaling protection for the Frankford Junction Curve “would have prevented the accident.” But why wasn’t this existing ATC equipment used to force northbound trains down to a safe speed before reaching the curve?      

Although no mention was found in the NTSB report about speed signs approaching the accident curve, Dennis Pierce, president of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, said to a congressional committee that “the simple use of speed signs in the approach to the curve, as a reminder, may have prevented this accident.” The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Emergency Order 31 issued after the accident directed Amtrak to “enhance speed restriction signage.” It is hard to fathom why a railroad line with speeds up to 150 mph wouldn’t have signs approaching low speed curves, and why the NTSB’s report didn’t address this issue.

Excessive speeds on railway curves have caused many tragic accidents over the years. One of the early and more serious accidents of this type occurred November 1, 1918 on the Brooklyn Rapid Transit’s Brighton Beach Line in New York City. Known as the Malbone Street Wreck, somewhere between 93 and 103 people died and many others were seriously injured.

Two notable train wrecks occurred in the United States during the 1950s because of excessive speed on curves – one on what is now the Northeast Corridor at Jenkins Curve in Bridgeport Connecticut, and the other at Redondo Junction in Southern California. For these two excessive speed accidents, a total of 31 died and 175 were injured. Such excessive speed accidents are not peculiar only to the United States, but have occurred around the world with some frequency. For one 50 mph curve in Morpeth, England, there have been three serious excessive speed derailments in modern times – in 1969, 1984 and 1994. For the three accidents at this one curve there were a total of 6 fatalities and 57 injured.

These types of excessive speed accidents virtually always involve human failure and associated factors such as loss of situational awareness, distraction, forgetfulness, drowsiness, falling asleep, and on occasion impairment.   

The first accident that is particularly germane to the Frankford Junction accident occurred 8:23 AM December 12, 1990 on Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor at Back Bay in Boston. Amtrak Train 66 operating from Washington to Boston approached the 30 mph speed restriction and curve entering Back Bay Station at excessive speed. The resulting derailment and crash into a commuter train on an adjacent track injured 453 people, not counting 175 additional claims of injury that were made after the fact. One of many interesting factors about the Back Bay accident was that the engineer’s 4:30 AM report time in New Haven, Connecticut for the assignment made it likely that he had to arise somewhere around 3:00 AM or earlier – a difficult wakeup time for most human beings.

The NTSB reported that the Back Bay accident’s probable cause was human failure with several significant contributing factors, one of which was “Amtrak’s failure to have advanced warning devices for a speed reduction for the curve entering Back Bay Station.” This wording didn’t make clear that both the Back Bay locomotive and wayside signaling were already equipped with the ATC cab signaling and speed enforcement system, and that this preexisting safety system was not used to force trains to slowdown for the curve.           

The Back Bay accident on the Northeast Corridor was a loud wakeup call. America’s most prestigious and highest speed rail line had modern ATC cab signaling with speed enforcement and limiting capability, but this safety system was rarely used to force trains to slowdown to safe speeds for curves. In the aftermath of the Back Bay accident, Amtrak after conferring with the FRA reconfigured the existing ATC system and equipment to force speed reductions approaching the Back Bay Curve. Amtrak also rearranged the existing ATC cab signal equipment at some other locations to limit train speeds approaching curves, including the Frankford Junction Curve in the southbound direction, but not in the northbound direction.

Several foreign curve excessive speed accidents occurred in recent years and were widely reported in the American news media. Two of the more pertinent accidents occurred in Japan and Spain. The Amagasaki rail crash in April 2005 took 107 lives and injured 562, and Spain’s Santiago de Compostela derailment and rollover in July 2013 was caught on dramatic video and resulted in 79 dead and 140 injured. These and other similar excessive speed accidents were caused by human failure and the lack of safety systems. As these accidents illustrate, the number of deaths and injuries resulting from excessive speed accidents can reach catastrophic levels.

Then on December 1, 2013, a southbound Metro North Railroad commuter train derailed after entering Spuyten Duyvil Curve in New York City at excessive speed. This accident resulted in 4 deaths and 61 injured. The engineer was believed to have fallen asleep while at the controls of the fast moving train, and he was later diagnosed to have severe obstructive sleep apnea. The NTSB found that a contributory factor to the accident “was the absence of a positive train control system.” However, the Metro North trains and wayside signaling have had ATC cab signaling with speed enforcement and limiting for several decades, which system was and is fully capable of preventing curve excessive speed accidents. It wasn’t absent; it just wasn’t used for that purpose.

In response to the Spuyten Duyvil accident, the FRA issued Emergency Order 29 requiring the Metro North Railroad to use its existing ATC train control system to provide for safety wherever the authorized speed dropped by more than 20 mph. For example, if the track approaching a 50 mph curve is authorized for 80 mph, the speed reduction at the curve would be 30 mph, and the existing ATC system had to be used to ensure safe speeds were enforced. Metro North modified the signaling approaching the Spuyten Duyvil Curve and approaching all other speed restrictions on its entire rail network that were covered by the FRA emergency directive. Thanks to the ATC system, the Spuyten Duyvil accident should never happen again on the Metro North Railroad.

The wreck of Amtrak Train 188 in Northeast Philadelphia occurred less than two years after the Metro North accident and the FRA’s issuance of Emergency Order 29. The permitted speed approaching Frankford Junction Curve for Train 188 was 80 mph and the curve was timetabled for 50 mph – a 30 mph speed drop. Two questions were never raised or answered by the NTSB. Why didn’t the FRA make Emergency Order 29 applicable to Amtrak and all rail lines already equipped with an ATC train control system? Was it because the FRA believed the Amtrak locomotive engineers are less fallible than those of Metro North, and those in Spain and Japan?

There was much commentary reported in the news media about Bostian’s 106 mph speed being reckless. Of course, that speed was wrong and unsafe at that location. However, 106 mph is not an unusual speed for Amtrak trains when operating on the Northeast Corridor. For Bostian’s Train 188 run from Washington to New York, major stretches had authorized speeds of 110 to 125 mph. In fact, as the NTSB reported, the authorized speed immediately beyond the Frankford Junction area was 110 mph. The speed of 106 mph was quite a normal speed for Train 188, but it was a wrong and dangerous speed before being past the Frankford Junction Curve. Sadly, as the NTSB has made clear, situational awareness has been a significant factor in many transportation fatal accidents. That is one important reason why there are safety systems to protect against human error.     

The NTSB railroad accident reports have not looked at the bigger picture and possible systemic problems and failures, especially with respect to those responsible for railroad signal systems here in North America. For instance, neither the NTSB nor the FRA ever mentioned how passenger railroad safety systems in the United States compare with those on our own domestic rail transit systems, especially with respect to limiting train speeds when necessary for safety – such as approaching curves.

It just happens that many of our modern heavy rail transit systems in the United States have had their signal systems enforce all speed restrictions, including all curves, beginning more than 40 years ago. This level of safety has been provided on the PATCO Speedline between Philadelphia and New Jersey since 1969, on San Francisco Bay Area’s BART rail network since 1972, on WMATA in our nation’s capital since 1976, and on Atlanta’s MARTA since 1979. The maximum speeds on these transit systems are relatively low and range from 65 to 80 mph. Since Amtrak trains on the Northeast Corridor operate up to 125, 135 and 150 mph depending on location and train type, it seems very incongruous that the Northeast Corridor curve speeds weren’t all speed limited long ago.  

While the NTSB report is correct in its technical detail and findings, it does not provide a top down and broad assessment about how such an unnecessary and tragic accident could occur on Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor in this 21^st Century. The safety technology not only existed, but was in place at Frankford Junction for more than 50 years. No new equipment was required. The public deserves to know why, after the Metro North accident and many other speed related accidents here in the United States and around the world, FRA Emergency Order 29 was not made applicable to Amtrak. And the public should be told why the FRA allowed the Spuyten Duyvil curve to not be protected by the existing signal system equipment until after that unnecessary fatal accident.

Focusing on Engineer Brandon Bostian and his performance was a necessary part of the accident investigation. However, his human failing is dwarfed by the failure of the FRA and the railroads to enforce safe speeds before these accidents occurred, by using long existing equipment for very little cost. The complete story of the Amtrak Train 188 accident deserves to be told.

[BaltACD]

Not to sound overly cynical - what are your trying to sell?

[Euclid]

LocoEngineer2000

To its credit, the NTSB did conclude that ATC cab signaling protection for the Frankford Junction Curve “would have prevented the accident.” But why wasn’t this existing ATC equipment used to force northbound trains down to a safe speed before reaching the curve?

Here is the explanation that I read during the news coverage of this wreck:  Because the speed limit during the advanced approach to the curve northbound was lower than the actual 50 mph curve speed limit, managers felt that there was no need to warn trains to slow down for the curve.  In other words, northbound trains would be running slower than the curve speed limit as they approached, so there would be no need to warn them to slow down.  Of course, this completely overlooks the possibility that a northbound engineer might forget where he was and speed up to the upcoming 106 mph limit while forgetting about the intervening 50 mph curve restriction.

Conversely, managers reasoned that southbound trains would be approaching the curve at the 106 mph limit, so if they forgot about the curve, they would run right into it and its 50 mph limit at 106 mph. 

If this explanation for the lack of northbound speed control is true, I strikes me as being extremely poor and narrow minded reasoning.  Southbound, the risk was a failure to slow down.  Northbound, the risk was a failure to limit acceleration to beyond the curve limit.  Either one would have equal potential to derail a train. 

[LocoEngineer2000]

Not trying to sell anything. Posted to get the truth out. They are trying to jail the engineer for life and the full story has not been told. Many important people have made wrong statements about the accident and the engineer, and the public tends to believe what imoportant people say because they should know. Bostian lost track of where he was in the darkness, something that could happen to any of us. The safety equipment was there for 50 years. Just wasn't used. If you are wondering, I have never met or talked with Bostian.

Loco 

[LocoEngineer2000]

Thanks Euclid for your reply.

As the NTSB said and I wrote, the northbound approach speed was 80 mph. Bostian exceeded that because as the NTSB said he lost situational awareness, something that can happen to any of us. Powerful electric trains let him get to 106 mph very quickly. The speed limit north of the curve is 110 mph.

Southbound, the approach speed is 110, then a 60 mph curve, and then the 50 mph curve where the accident happened. As you wrote, they have been using the existing ATC train control equipment to force southbound trains to slow since the Back Bay accident.

Thanks for writing a comment.

The accident should never have happened.

Loco  

[PJS1]

"However, his human failing is dwarfed by the failure of the FRA and the railroads to enforce safe speeds before these accidents occurred, by using long existing equipment for very little cost. The complete story of the Amtrak Train 188 accident deserves to be told."

Agreed!

 

I have experienced disorientation while flying as a pilot in command.  One night, while flying to Teterboro, I momentarily lost track of where I was.  Fortunately, in an airplane, one can get it together quickly by focusing on the instruments.  

 

Failure to install the warning systems on the northbound leg of the route is a management issue.  If any of the higher ups at Amtrak and/or the regulatory agencies accept responsibility for their negligence, I will be surprised.  Their usual refrain goes something like this:  No one told us!  We didn’t know it could happen. 

[LocoEngineer2000]

 

Thanks PJS1. On occasion, we all lose track of where we are. A few times while driving a car I missed a turn or made a wrong turn. And then when I see where I am, I am shocked to realize that I screwed up without even knowing it.

 

On rare occasions, this also happens to railroad engineers, and the risk is greatest during the nighttime hours when there are few landmarks. When it happens, we usually figure out quickly that something is wrong and we then operate defensively while we sort it out. But to operate defensively, you have to know that you are disoriented. At night on a railroad, that doesn’t always happen quickly.

 

Based on the NTSB report, Bostian did not realize his situational screw up until he was just about to enter the curve at a very unsafe speed. It was too late.

 

Anyone interested in this accident should carefully read the NTSB report and the attached board member statements. The report makes very clear that the best and well intentioned human beings can make tragic and fatal mistakes. And the report also makes clear that the accident would have been prevented had the existing safety equipment been used.

 

Thanks again PJS1.

Loco

[243129]

The fault lies with the company. Their training regimen is inadequate and flawed, supervision is  largely inexperienced and consequently inept. The vetting procedure for operations candidates is carried out by HR employees with no operations knowledge or experience.

[BaltACD]

243129

The fault lies with the company. Their training regimen is inadequate and flawed, supervision is  largely inexperienced and consequently inept. The vetting procedure for operations candidates is carried out by HR employees with no operations knowledge or experience.

I'd venture you are the only individual in the world that would pass your version of vetting.

[zugmann]

LocoEngineer2000

Focusing on Engineer Brandon Bostian and his performance was a necessary part of the accident investigation. However, his human failing is dwarfed by the failure of the FRA and the railroads to enforce safe speeds before these accidents occurred, by using long existing equipment for very little cost. The complete story of the Amtrak Train 188 accident deserves to be told.

You can tell it all you want - most people aren't going to listen.  They got their antagonist in Bostian, and that's all they want/need.  Since most people have very little understanding of railroad ops, and are not interested in learning, the matter is settled in their eyes.   Engineer = reckless and speeding bad guy.

 

Anyone that has time in the cab knows there are many systematic failures in inicidents like these.  But trying to show those issues to the general public is pretty much a fool's errand. They simply don't care.

[243129]

BaltACD

 

 

243129

The fault lies with the company. Their training regimen is inadequate and flawed, supervision is  largely inexperienced and consequently inept. The vetting procedure for operations candidates is carried out by HR employees with no operations knowledge or experience.

 

 

I'd venture you are the only individual in the world that would pass your version of vetting.

 

I probably shouldn't but I will reply to your smart-ass remark.

So what is my version of vetting?

[zugmann]

BaltACD

I'd venture you are the only individual in the world that would pass your version of vetting.

Who knows if even he would pass.

 

TOSZ

[BaltACD]

243129

 

BaltACD

 

243129

The fault lies with the company. Their training regimen is inadequate and flawed, supervision is  largely inexperienced and consequently inept. The vetting procedure for operations candidates is carried out by HR employees with no operations knowledge or experience. 

I'd venture you are the only individual in the world that would pass your version of vetting. 

I probably shouldn't but I will reply to your smart-ass remark.

So what is my version of vetting?

60 years at the throttle before ever sitting in the seat as a Engineer.

[243129]

BaltACD

 

 

243129

 

BaltACD

 

243129

The fault lies with the company. Their training regimen is inadequate and flawed, supervision is  largely inexperienced and consequently inept. The vetting procedure for operations candidates is carried out by HR employees with no operations knowledge or experience. 

I'd venture you are the only individual in the world that would pass your version of vetting. 

I probably shouldn't but I will reply to your smart-ass remark.

So what is my version of vetting?

 

 

60 years at the throttle before ever sitting in the seat as a Engineer.

 

It seems to be the modus operandi around around here if you can't come up with an intelligent response you come up with a juvenile one instead.

[LocoEngineer2000]

 

Thanks 243129 for your comments. It is not appropriate for me to comment on Amtrak’s training and supervision. However, you are quite correct that training and supervision are critically important on a railroad, because they can affect and reduce the potential for major rule violations and accidents.

 

However, even with the best training and supervision, human beings can and do make fatal mistakes. My point is that the accident should have never occurred because the existing ATC train control system could have and should have forced safe speeds many years before the accident occurred.

Loco

[zugmann]

243129

It seems to be the modus operandi around around here if you can't come up with an intelligent response you come up with a juvenile one instead.

The two are not mutually exclusive.

 

TOSZ

[LocoEngineer2000]

 

Thanks zugmann for your comment, with which I sadly agree. The public, politicians and even railroad executives have little understanding of the railroad environment and train operations. I am just trying to do my part in getting truth out to the public.

Loco

 

 

[BaltACD]

243129

 

BaltACD

 

243129 

BaltACD 

243129

The fault lies with the company. Their training regimen is inadequate and flawed, supervision is  largely inexperienced and consequently inept. The vetting procedure for operations candidates is carried out by HR employees with no operations knowledge or experience. 

I'd venture you are the only individual in the world that would pass your version of vetting. 

I probably shouldn't but I will reply to your smart-ass remark.

So what is my version of vetting? 

60 years at the throttle before ever sitting in the seat as a Engineer. 

It seems to be the modus operandi around around here if you can't come up with an intelligent response you come up with a juvenile one instead.

So - what are your standards?

[CMStPnP]

In this specific case, I believe the Engineer is equally confused at what happened based on what he said and his behavior previous to the incident.   It is possible to lose consciousness and then wake up in mental state of confusion at what just happened without realizing you lost consciousness to begin with.    It's happened to me just with sleep deprivation.    Perhaps the guy had sleep apnea, perhaps he suffered a stroke........not enough self-monitoring in a locomotive cab to ever know for sure.

[charlie hebdo]

Loss of situational awareness. Could be a host of causes. Sleep apnea, sleep deprivation from of shifts, ADHD, some other neurological  condition, fatigue, "highway hypnosis: and even Joe's mantra triad.

[Backshop]

What someone is charged with and what (if anything) they are convicted of, are two entirely different things.  We'd have to know the engineer's prior work history and any disciplinary actions to know why he was charged as he was.  There are true "accidents" and there are "not enough attention" incidents.  His life may be ruined but think about all his victims.

[243129]

BaltACD

 

 

243129

 

BaltACD

 

243129 

BaltACD 

243129

The fault lies with the company. Their training regimen is inadequate and flawed, supervision is  largely inexperienced and consequently inept. The vetting procedure for operations candidates is carried out by HR employees with no operations knowledge or experience. 

I'd venture you are the only individual in the world that would pass your version of vetting. 

I probably shouldn't but I will reply to your smart-ass remark.

So what is my version of vetting? 

60 years at the throttle before ever sitting in the seat as a Engineer. 

It seems to be the modus operandi around around here if you can't come up with an intelligent response you come up with a juvenile one instead.

 

 

So - what are your standards?

 

I would not hire someone with an imperious attitude such as yours.

[LocoEngineer2000]

CMStPnP

In this specific case, I believe the Engineer is equally confused at what happened based on what he said and his behavior previous to the incident.   It is possible to lose consciousness and then wake up in mental state of confusion at what just happened without realizing you lost consciousness to begin with.    It's happened to me just with sleep deprivation.    Perhaps the guy had sleep apnea, perhaps he suffered a stroke........not enough self-monitoring in a locomotive cab to ever know for sure.

 

Thanks CMStPnP. I tend to agree. The truth is that Bostian has not given an explicit explanation about what happened. Maybe it is not clear to him or maybe he is being careful because of legal and liabulity reasons. We may never know.

 

One thing is for sure, the ATC train control existed at the curve and on the locomotives for fifty years and was not used to slowdown northbound trains until after the wreck. The accident should not have happened.

 

Loco 

[LocoEngineer2000]

charlie hebdo

Loss of situational awareness. Could be a host of causes. Sleep apnea, sleep deprivation from of shifts, ADHD, some other neurological  condition, fatigue, "highway hypnosis: and even Joe's mantra triad.

 

I agree Charlie.

 

My point is the human being should have been out of the equation.

 

The ATC train control has been existing for fifty years and should have been used to force trains to slowdown before the accident happened. It took the accident to get the wires moved around.

 

Loco    

[BaltACD]

243129

 

BaltACD

 

243129 

BaltACD 

243129 

BaltACD 

243129

The fault lies with the company. Their training regimen is inadequate and flawed, supervision is  largely inexperienced and consequently inept. The vetting procedure for operations candidates is carried out by HR employees with no operations knowledge or experience. 

I'd venture you are the only individual in the world that would pass your version of vetting. 

I probably shouldn't but I will reply to your smart-ass remark.

So what is my version of vetting? 

60 years at the throttle before ever sitting in the seat as a Engineer. 

It seems to be the modus operandi around around here if you can't come up with an intelligent response you come up with a juvenile one instead.

So - what are your standards? 

I would not hire someone with an imperious attitude such as yours.

Nor would I you!  So we are even. We are both unemployable! 

So a attitude that detects BS is not employable to you.  Bring on Trip Optimizer and Leader automatons that they are - totally blind scripted operators.

[BaltACD]

Your bladder will explode!

[CMStPnP]

charlie hebdo

Joe's mantra triad.

Have to admit I have no clue what that is.

[CMStPnP]

Backshop

We'd have to know the engineer's prior work history and any disciplinary actions to know why he was charged as he was.

"The investigation established that Engineer Bostian had a clean disciplinary record, was not impaired by drugs or alcohol, and he was not using a cell phone or any other personal electronic device. Shortly before the accident"

In fact if my memory serves me correct someone went on to state he was a model employee and very pro-Amtrak.   They charged him with failure to control the train only because they lacked evidence of any other causes but at the same time I am not sure they did a full battery of tests on him after the accident or if every existing medical condition would show up if they did.    So time might exhonerate him yet.

[blue streak 1]

After the Boston back bay, MNRR overturns Amtrak did not take the lesson to heart.  Absolutely the ATC signal system should have  had the northbound 80 MPH signal aspect for the track north of PNE station where applicable,  Then the Frankford permanent speed restriction on the ATC signal system as well.  Then as well the ACSES should have been done as well.  This is all management fault.

Management was of course forced by FRA to install these signal aspects before service restarted.  That took what 5 days ?

The obvious question is of course are all NEC restrictions now so signaled ?

It would never happen but discovery could reveal who made the decision(s) to not install the northbound restrictions.  Then the real persons who did not have situation awareness of possible overspeeds can be identified.

[Euclid]

LocoEngineer2000

Thanks Euclid for your reply.

As the NTSB said and I wrote, the northbound approach speed was 80 mph. Bostian exceeded that because as the NTSB said he lost situational awareness, something that can happen to any of us. Powerful electric trains let him get to 106 mph very quickly. The speed limit north of the curve is 110 mph.

Southbound, the approach speed is 110, then a 60 mph curve, and then the 50 mph curve where the accident happened. As you wrote, they have been using the existing ATC train control equipment to force southbound trains to slow since the Back Bay accident.

Thanks for writing a comment.

The accident should never have happened.

Loco  

 

Loco,

The question of why there was no speed control for northbound trains at the curve is interesting because it could have been provided just as it was provided for the southbound trains at the curve.  I had forgotten some of the explanation details that I provided above.  I was trying to recall the information from an article posted just after the wreck happened, and mistakenly recalled the speed limit approaching the curve northbound. 

As I now see in the NTSB report, the reason for only controlling the southbound speed was that southbound trains were coming out of a 106 mph speed while northbounds were coming out of an 80 mph zone.  And while 80 mph is faster than the 50 mph curve speed limit, 80 was still below the tip-over speed of the curve.

I am amazed at that rationale that no speed control is needed for trains approaching from the south because the speed limit to the south is less than the tip-over speed of the curve.  That is stunningly illogical.  It seems to overlook the possibility that overspeed in the curve might be a continuation of overspeed prior to the curve, northbound.   It only assumes a southbound curve overspeed due to the possibility of entering the curve too fast southbound after abiding by the speed limit while approaching the curve speed reduction zone southbound. 

Note: I am referring to the directions northbound and southbound, while apparently they are technically eastbound and westbound respectively.  

Here is the detailed coverage of this matter from the NTSB report:  

“There was cab signal protection for westbound trains at the accident location because the maximum approach speed for westbound trains was 110 mph, higher than the overturn speed of 98 mph.25 Westbound train engineers approaching the curve at the accident site would have received a cab signal warning to reduce the train speed. If an engineer failed to do so, the system would have automatically slowed the train. However, that protection was not added to the accident curve in the eastbound direction because Amtrak assumed that those trains would not be traveling faster than the maximum approach speed of 80 mph. Because the overturn speed was 98 mph, even if an engineer failed to slow from that maximum approach speed, the train would still be below the overturn speed.

The NTSB concludes that cab signal protection to enforce the 50 mph speed restriction in the eastbound direction at Frankford Junction or a fully implemented PTC system would have prevented the accident. Following the accident, Amtrak modified the signal system so that eastbound trains traveling toward Frankford Junction received a cab signal change to ensure speed restriction enforcement until December 2015 when PTC was implemented on that section of track. (PTC enforces speed restrictions, so the signal change was no longer necessary.)”

 

When you say the complete story of the accident needs to be told, what do you have in mind as the means to tell it?