A Critique of the SOUTHWEST CHIEF bus-bridge plan

[Railvt]

As forum readers probably know Amtrak has proposed to replace the SOUTHWEST CHIEF from Dodge City, KS (or in a slightly less horrific variant from La Junta, CO) to Albuquerque, NM with a "bus-bridge" for 550 miles effective January 1, 2019. This is being blamed on the fact that the BNSF/former Santa Fe mainline over Raton and Glorietta Passes lacks Positive Train Control (PTC). But except for 80 miles in the Rail Runner commuter district west of Lamy to Isleta, NM the line is legally exempt from the PTC requirement. In the Rail Runner segment an extension to 2020 is expected to b e ok'd well before December 31, 2018. But even if this were denied the "bus bridge" would need to be barely 80 miles from Lamy, NM through Albuquerque to either Belen or Isleta, NM.

The article below reflects my critique of this plan in much greater detail. This will appear in the "Callboy" magazine of the Mass Bay RRE next month and is also posted on multiple rail-focused Facebook groups and to the sites of newspapers along the SW CHIEF route.

*********

This article is a response to an Amtrak Power Point slide show, presented by Amtrak to the Kansas, Colorado and New Mexico Congressional delegations. It showed Amtrak's plan to replace through Chicago-Albuquerque-Los Angeles SOUTHWEST CHIEF train service with a stub train from Chicago to either Dodge City, KS or La Junta, CO; then a bus for up to 550 miles from Dodge City to Albuquerque; finally connecting to another stub train from Albuquerque to Los Angeles. As noted below the bus ride will probably mean sitting up overnight!

In my personal view we have been misled by Amtrak, which only last month promised the Rail Passengers Association (NARP) that it had no plans to cut any national network services. I am an RPA Vice Chair, although these views are my own. We have been misdirected by Amtrak management. But more importantly they’ve done the same to all their supporters in Kansas, Colorado and New Mexico, indeed throughout the West. The Amtrak claim that a 550 mile "bus bridge" preserves rail service is a transparent falsehood.

This is the test case for Amtrak in trying to create a kind of "Balkan Track"--a train here and train there--but services isolated and of only local use. Since the Amtrak law requires full state support of all routes under 750 milers, it's easy to understand that such a disconnected network will never survive. Even the Northeast Corridor would wither if Amtrak served only the east coast, a few local lines in the Midwest and California, Oregon and Washington. Such a "network" would serve less than half the states and would never win a funding vote in Congress.

Amtrak’s assurances for the continuation of trains like the EMPIRE BUILDER and the CALIFORNIA ZEPHYR can no longer be taken as true either. If the SOUTHWEST CHIEF must go because of largely PTC (Positive Train Control) exempt track, the others will follow, as they all have this problem on at least a few route segments. Already reliable sources confirm that Amtrak has asked the Union Pacific for costs to reroute the CZ thru Wyoming west of Denver. This would eliminate the stunning crossing of the Colorado Rockies by day, which is the great draw of the route. Yet this reroute bypasses tracks that are legally PTC exempt, which means Amtrak is not prohibited from running there. This is the situation on the great majority of the SW CHIEF line as well.

The former Santa Fe RR mainline used by the SW CHIEF in the Rail Runner district is already equipped with a superb "heritage" safety system, automatic train stop. Already this pre-World War II system will stop any train that passes a block signal in violation of a green light or exceeds the speed limit. For over 200 miles west from Trinidad, CO to Lamy, NM the SW CHIEF is the sole train on this line. The Raton Pass route is legally PTC exempt due to low volumes of both freight and passenger traffic except in the Rail Runner district, yet Amtrak is falsely blaming the absence of PTC for removing 550 miles of service from Dodge City to Albuquerque. The Rail Runner is moving to complete PTC and should get an extension to 2020, yet Amtrak disingenuously uses this as an excuse to end service!

Amtrak's own refusal to honor its promise to provide a $3,000,000 match to the otherwise successful Tiger Nine Grant, to release $19,000,000 in Federal, state and local funding and $3,000,000 from BNSF ($25,000,000 total!), is the core issue here. Amtrak claims it needs a ten-year commitment to maintain the line, yet it knows very well BNSF has promised to cover costs for 79mph operation for 20 years when all jointed rail is replaced by welded rail. This of course is the central project to be addressed in the frozen grant. Amtrak knows full well that the Federal government never makes ten-year funding guarantees, but BNSF has publicly restated its promise within the last week. 

The incredibly long SW CHIEF bus bridge will obviously not work, and Amtrak knows that very well. Can they possibly believe that a bus crossing two Rocky Mountain passes (particularly in the winter) is safer than a riding the single train each day on a CTC equipped mainline? If they run the stub trains on a daylight schedule, as they suggest in the slides shown to the Congressional delegation, then the bus bridge would be an overnight trip! And this is very likely, as they could then eliminate diner and sleeper service on the line, if the trains ran only by day/evening.

The likely cost for a single 46 passenger bus in each direction will be $1200-1500 per day, each way, or no less than $876,000 per year, plus the cost of driver rooms. The trip is likely to exceed the Hours in Service Law for drivers in a 24-hour period, so an extra driver will be needed each way. But as the train averages 150-200 passengers on-board daily, Amtrak will need 3-5 buses each way per day. All these expenses will be added to the basic bus charter cost.

They think they may save $3,000,000 in maintenance costs annually by not continuing the train over the Raton Pass line, but the substitute buses could cost even more. Of course, ridership will be quickly devastated by the inconvenience and discomfort of the bus bridge. Amtrak knows this too and is clearly counting on it to justify a complete end to service west of Kansas City. Few passengers will accept the inconvenience and discomfort of an 11-12 hour/550-mile bus ride in the middle of their train trip!

The rump day trains would effectively connect to nothing. To get from Los Angeles to Albuquerque by day means leaving Los Angeles at six to seven AM at the latest, before any connections could arrive. Westbound arrivals would be after ten at night. The same would happen to a purported day train from Chicago to either Dodge City or La Junta. Indeed, to La Junta all by day/evening from Chicago is impossible.

And why these points, rather than Lamy, if PTC is the issue? The line is exempt as noted from the PTC requirement except in the roughly 80 miles served by the Rail Runner commuter line. At most the bus bridge would only be needed from Lamy thru Albuquerque to Belen, NM (or better, Isleta, NM, if a platform was rebuilt there--80 miles total) if the Rail Runner's extension request is denied. This would be a 90-120-minute bus ride--not 11-12 hours (or even the 8 hours for the shorter Albuquerque--La Junta option).

We need to go beyond mere opposition to calling out the dishonesty underlying Amtrak’s failure to honor its promises on the Tiger Grant, and the impossibility of the so-called bus-substitute plan of working as purported.

A real truth is in the last slide in the Amtrak Congressional presentation. This is really an attempt to cost shift. Amtrak claims to favor new trains in Colorado, Kansas, and Oklahoma in lieu of the SW CHIEF. But it knows perfectly well these trains will never run. Services like the suggested "Front Range Corridor" from Cheyenne, WY to Pueblo, CO would require 100% state support, as would a new Chicago to KC mini Corridor. More improbably, these new services would require multi-state compacts. This simply will not happen. Just last month the long planned New Orleans-Mobile service restoration collapsed when Mississippi and Alabama refused to contribute to the costs. Amtrak knows this. But its real plan is to transfer as much as possible of its costs to the states.

If the SW CHIEF dies it will not be replaced, rather neglect of maintenance between La Junta to Albuquerque will guarantee it won’t return, even after the Rail Runner gets its PTC going. I applaud the opposition to this plan by the Kansas, Colorado and New Mexico Congressional members on both sides of the aisle.

 

If Amtrak pulls this off it will itself ultimately die, and not only trains 3 and 4, as it will never win a national appropriation without a national network. This cannot be allowed to happen. The SW CHIEF is the 5th most heavily used long-distance train in the United States. It served over 363,000 passengers in FY 2017. This travesty of a plan will devastate ridership, as Amtrak very well knows.

 

We need legislative language specifically requiring Amtrak to continue service on this and any other national network routes and we need a directive to Amtrak to honor its promise to provide its match to release the Tiger Nine grant. It is precisely that funding which addresses Amtrak’s purported concern for the long-term operation of the SW CHIEF line. This is an existential crisis for supporters of Amtrak as a national carrier.

Carl Fowler

Mr. Fowler is the retired President of Rail Travel Center. He organized and led tours on the Amtrak national network trains for 35 years, including many programs on the SW CHIEF route. The views expressed are his own.

 

 

[Convicted One]

Railvt

But as the train averages 150-200 passengers on-board daily, Amtrak will need 3-5 buses each way per day.

I would expect the ridership to dwindle down significantly after the "bus bridge" plan is implemented. Amtak likely is depending upon that, as well.

[Alan Follett]

There is absolutely nothing in this proposal that should lead to anything less than the expulsion of Anderson in disgrace.

[CMStPnP]

Also, the whole busses and stub ended trains thing is one of the dumbest proposals I have seen.    So many other much cheaper options where the passengers stay on the train and the train safely operates over track once a day. 

In the most draconian scenario, just discontinue the train West of Kansas City and use the extra equipment elsewhere.  

[BaltACD]

Anderson is on a train killing path - nothing more and nothing less - using any available excuse, real or imagined.

[CMStPnP]

BaltACD

Anderson is on a train killing path - nothing more and nothing less - using any available excuse, real or imagined.

I think he is still trying to preserve the National LD Network.   Understand his concern over this route as one train derailment on this little used track section due to washout or some other cause......will cost Amtrak probably several times what it's annual operating subsidy is for the train.     

If that is his real concern then just yank the plug on the train West of KC or reroute via Newton and OKC to DFW and yank the Texas Eagle / Heartland Flyer both.

[BaltACD]

CMStPnP

 

BaltACD

Anderson is on a train killing path - nothing more and nothing less - using any available excuse, real or imagined. 

I think he is still trying to preserve the National LD Network.   Understand his concern over this route as one train derailment on this little used track section due to washout or some other cause......will cost Amtrak probably several times what it's annual operating subsidy is for the train.     

If that is his real concern then just yank the plug on the train West of KC or reroute via Newton and OKC to DFW and yank the Texas Eagle / Heartland Flyer both.

If he is that risk averse - time for him to shut Amtrak down in it's entirety.  Every wheel that rolls is a potential catastrophe.

[PNWRMNM]

CMStPnP

Understand his concern over this route as one train derailment on this little used track section due to washout or some other cause......will cost Amtrak probably several times what it's annual operating subsidy is for the train.

I do not understand your point about "little used track section". The track either meets standards or it doesn't. The probability of washout has nothing to do with traffic density, but agree that if passenger trains are the only traffic on the line, then a passenger train is more likely to find it.

You are right about liability, but that attaches when you run the train and is largely independent of trafic density on a line segment. In fact, I would argue that likelyhood of an Ax and consequences increase as traffic density increases.

As Balt points out in his adjacent post, every train start is a potential disaster, just like starting your automobile is. Chicken little is in charge at ATK!

Mac

[Railvt]

The view that Amtrak's attempt to shut down Raton Pass over (in)valid fears of running on PTC exempt track is somehow some sort of attempt to save the National Network is a red-herring. PTC is not a panacea. It can not protect against broken rails, heat kinks, auto intrusions, tie failure, axel breakage, nor a host of other hazards. More importantly the FRA has exlicitely ruled that it is NOT needed here.

An exhaustive review process led to the official FRA exemptions for trackage deemed not to need PTC. The key metrics are low volumes of freight and/or passenger traffic and the existence of good quality trackage, maintained to at minimum Class Three (59mph for passenger service w/out signals).

The Raton/Glorietta Pass ex-Santa Fe/BNSF line is Class Four, 79mph, CTC-signalled territory. Most of the route from Newton, KS to la Junta does/will have PTC due to freight volumes. West of there it was not required because it was not needed.

And this is hardly the only place where this matters. Here's a brief list of just a few other already exempted trackage--all at deep threat if Amtrak sticks to this SW CHIEF policy.

VERMONTER: Entire route north of Springfield, MA to St. Albans, VT.

ETHAN ALLEN EXPRESS: Whitehall, NY to Rutland, VT and if/when service actually starts (all trackwork is done) Rutland, VT to Burlington, VT.

DOWNEASTER: all track north of Haverhill, MA to Portland/Brunswick, ME.

CARDINAL: Entire line on the Buckingham Branch RR Orange, VA to Clifton Forge, VA.

EMPIRE BUILDER: The Minneapolis to St. Paul terminal trackage on the Minnesota Transfer RR.

CALIFORNIA ZEPHYR: The former Rio Grande RR/now UP mainline from at least Grand Jct. CO to Helper, UT and possibly more. (Amtrak has already sought costing/permission from UP to consider a Denver-Salt Lake City reroute across Wyoming on the Overland Route). This reroute would remove the Colorado Rockies from the route and two of the train's most used stops--Glenwood Springs, CO and Grand Jct. CO. Ridership would be devastated.

COAST STARLIGHT: Several track segments in the San Jose-Oakland area (this also could impact corridor/commuter services). Some sections of the Coast Line north of San Luis Obispo may also be impacted.

TEXAS EAGLE: Ex-MP trackage in the Poplar Bluff-St. Louis area.

There are many other examples. A further problem is the possibility that several commuter operators, over whose track Amtrak operates, may not be ready sufficiently to qualify for an exemption to 2020 to install their PTC.

NEW MEXICO RAIL RUNNER/RIO METRO: This is the one district of the SW CHIEF where a short bus bridge might for a short time be needed--although the Rio Metro folks think they will get an extension to 2020 before the December 31, 2018 deadline.

SUN RAIL: The Central Florida commuter carrier may not be ready. Their line hosts both the SILVER METEOR and the SILVER STAR and if outlawed would block the AUTO TRAIN from reaching its Sanford, FL southern terminal. Access for Amtrak to Orlando, and Disney World would be blocked.

TRI RAIL: The Miami-West Palm Beach commuter carrier also may not be ready. If a blockaide occured here the SILVER METEOR/SILVER STAR could not reach the Hialeah Yards, which actually, on a cyclical basis, does heavy maintenance on all eastern long-haul Viewliner overnight trains.

The current Amtrak mangement claims its Safety Management System (SMS) review process will identify needed mitigations for exempt territories (apparently not including the SW CHIEF), but they made that promise as early as April and we still await their reports.

With respect to the VERMONTER/ETHAN ALLEN EXPRESS routes our legislature is now in recess until January--but any needed mitigation projects need to go forward this summer. We wait for a date unknown to get our marching orders.

In the case of the SW CHIEF Amtrak is refusing funds intended to directly address its purported concerns. This is not a good situation and I'm sorry, but I can not buy the argument that Amtrak is trying to save its national network by destroying the SW CHIEF. Rather trains 3 & 4 are their test case for weaponizing the PTC process as a wedge to kill all longer-distance connected National Network trains.

Carl Fowler

[BaltACD]

Anderson was brought in to kill Amtrak, not save it.

[CMStPnP]

PNWRMNM

I do not understand your point about "little used track section". The track either meets standards or it doesn't. The probability of washout has nothing to do with traffic density, but agree that if passenger trains are the only traffic on the line, then a passenger train is more likely to find it. You are right about liability, but that attaches when you run the train and is largely independent of trafic density on a line segment. In fact, I would argue that likelyhood of an Ax and consequences increase as traffic density increases. As Balt points out in his adjacent post, every train start is a potential disaster, just like starting your automobile is. Chicken little is in charge at ATK!

Except in this case there is precedent.    Amtrak tried it this way with the Phoenix line and it led to sabotage and a derailment.     So it does not surprise me if when the same case occurs again elsewhere on the map they are more cautious.

[CMStPnP]

BaltACD

Anderson was brought in to kill Amtrak, not save it.

The Cardinal and Sunset Limited are still running and neither really should be based on any comparisons to other LD routes sanity check.   No attempt to kill either of those two trains yet.     So I don't see any evidence of this.

Further, Amtrak has not yet publicly backed away from any proposal by states to pay for expansion yet.

[CMStPnP]

Railvt

The view that Amtrak's attempt to shut down Raton Pass over (in)valid fears of running on PTC exempt track is a red-herring. PTC is not a panacea. It can not protect against broken rails, heat kinks, auto intrusions, tie failure, axel breakage, nor a host of other hazards. More importantly the FRA has exlicitely ruled that it is NOT needed here.

An exhaustive review process led to the official FRA exemptions for trackage deemed not to need PTC. The key metrics are low volumes of freight and/or passenger traffic and the existence of good quality trackage, maintained to at minimum Class Three (59mph for passenger service w/out signals).

The Raton/Glorietta Pass ex-Santa Fe/BNSF line is Class Four, 79mph, CTC-signalled territory. Most of the route from Newton, KS to la Junta does/will have PTC due to freight volumes. West of there it was not required because it was not needed.

And this is hardly the only place where this matters. Here's a brief list of just a few other already exempted trackage--all at deep threat if Amtrak sticks to this SW CHIEF policy.

VERMONTER: Entire route north of Springfield, MA to St. Albans, VT.

ETHAN ALLEN EXPRESS: Whitehall, NY to Rutland, VT and if/when service actually starts (all trackwork is done) Rutland, VT to Burlington, VT.

DOWNEASTER: all track north of Haverhill, MA to Portland/Brunswick, ME.

CARDINAL: Entire line on the Buckingham Branch RR Orange, VA to Clifton Forge, VA.

EMPIRE BUILDER: The Minneapolis to St. Paul terminal trackage on the Minnesota Transfer RR.

CALIFORNIA ZEPHYR: The former Rio Grande RR/now UP mainline from at least Grand Jct. CO to Helper, UT and possibly more. (Amtrak has already sought costing/permission from UP to consider a Denver-Salt Lake City reroute across Wyoming on the Overland Route). This reroute would remove the Colorado Rockies from the route and two of the train's most used stops--Glenwood Springs, CO and Grand Jct. CO. Ridership would be devastated.

COAST STARLIGHT: Several track segments in the San Jose-Oakland area (this also could impact corridor/commuter services). Some sections of the Coast Line north of San Luis Obispo may also be impacted.

TEXAS EAGLE: Ex-MP trackage in the Poplar Bluff-St. Louis area.

There are many other examples. A further problem is the possibility that several commuter operators, over whose track Amtrak operates, may not be ready sufficiently to qualify for an exemption to 2020 to install their PTC.

NEW MEXICO RAIL RUNNER/RIO METRO: This is the one district of the SW CHIEF where a short bus bridge might for a short time be needed--although the Rio Metro folks think they will get an extension to 2020 before the December 31, 2018 deadline.

SUN RAIL: The Central Florida commuter carrier may not be ready. Their line hosts both the SILVER METEOR and the SILVER STAR and if outlawed would block the AUTO TRAIN from reaching its Sanford, FL southern terminal. Access for Amtrak to Orlando, and Disney World would be blocked.

TRI RAIL: The Miami-West Palm Beach commuter carrier also may not be ready. If a blockaide occured here the SILVER METEOR/SILVER STAR could not reach the Hialeah Yards, which actually, on a cyclical basis, does heavy maintenance on all eastern long-haul Viewliner overnight trains.

The current Amtrak mangement claims its Safety Management System (SMS) review process will identify needed mitigations for exempt territories (apparently not including the SW CHIEF), but they made that promise as early as April and we still await their reports.

With respect to the VERMONTER/ETHAN ALLEN EXPRESS routes our legislature is now in recess until January--but any needed mitigation projects need to go forward this summer. We wait for a date unknown to get our marching orders.

In the case of the SW CHIEF Amtrak is refusing funds intended to directly address its purported concerns. This is not a good situation and I'm sorry, but I can not buy the argument that Amtrak is trying to save its national network by destroying the SW CHIEF. Rather trains 3 & 4 are their test case for weaponizing the PTC process as a wedge to kill all longer-distance connected National Network trains.

Carl Fowler

Amtrak management stated they would pay their share of the money once the states involved showed the route could be financially sustained.    They did not mention PTC.    So to me that statement reflects that Amtrak ran a few scenarios including "what if" scenarios of what might happen along the route with Amtrak being the sole operator on the track segment.    So they turned back to the states and asked them to make a business case to continue the train in light of all the money that has to be spent to continue the train along it's current route. 

I think it is a fair question.    What does it benefit Amtrak to continue the train with declining ridership and massively increased sustainment costs for the route?  In other words what is the longer term future plan other than just keeping this one train going on it's current trajectory.

Additionally, this could also be a call for more money for the route and a stronger plan for the train.    Colorado wants a Front Range passenger train from Denver to Pueblo,  Kansas wants a train that connects Newton and potentially KC with the Heartland Flyer.    Both states paid for studies on this.    Potentially if they could demonstrate how this improves the trains finances and they both were serious about the two potentially new trains........maybe Amtrak management would relent?

BTW, Imagine keeping Chicago Union Station open just for four trains a day.    That is what is happening in Kansas City with KC Union Station.      Happily the ownership and function of the station has changed so it is no longer purely a train station and it is sustainable without Amtrak.  

[Railvt]

Ridership on the SW CHIEF is not declining. Over the past 5 years it grew 14%. 363,000 passengers used the train in FY 2017. Occupancy levels are better than on the ACELA EXPRESS. There was a very slight (2000 riders) decline in the last year only, caused by Amtrak's failure to restore the third coach during peak holiday seasons, despite near daily sell-outs over segments like Kansas City to Chicago.

The "dramatic cost increases" that Amtrak claims are false as well. They admit that their share of the threatened section is only about $3,000,000 per year, but further ignore BNSF's repeated promise to pay for 20 years of Class Four 79mph maintenance once welded rail is fully in place over the line. A large part of that is in the Tiger Nine grant's $25,000,000 which Amtrak has effectively torpedoed by refusing to pay its $3,000,000 match that was specifically promised as part of the grant application.

[Railvt]

This superb analysis from Abe Zumwalt at the Rail Passengers Association goes into the full spectrum of reasons for supporting the SW CHIEF and debunks myths posited by Amtrak's management. Feel free to repost and use this at will!

Carl Fowler, RPA Vice Chair

Fact Checking the Amtrak Proposal to Replace the Southwest Chief with Bus Service in Kansas, Colorado, and New Mexico.

The Southwest Chief would effectively cease to exist if the proposed bus bridge from Dodge City, KS or La Junta, CO to Albuquerque is implemented. While presented as a decision based in concern for passenger safety and cost reductions, the plan would make passengers less safe, dissipate the service’s economic impact across the corridor, and—given the resulting collapse of ridership and revenue—effectively save no tax dollars on operational expenses.

The plan to truncate the Southwest Chief with a bus bridge would also shift costs to states that have the most to lose from its truncation. In its presentation on the proposed bus bridge, Amtrak points to plans for service expansions in Colorado, Kansas, and Oklahoma as evidence of its commitment to the region.

However, the cost of these services would be borne by the states under PRIIA Sec. 209. While the continued presence of the Chief would in fact facilitate the development of these services with valuable passenger connections, the development of these urban corridor services shouldn’t come at the expense of rural communities that currently depend on Amtrak National Network service.

The bus bridge will worsen the performance metrics Amtrak is using to justify this truncation without lowering taxpayer costs.

The Chief’s ridership trends are steady: Amtrak’s earlier statement that the number of passengers using the Chief is “steadily declining” is false. Ridership volume in FY 2017 was down only 1% from its peak in FY 2015; it was up 14% from eight years ago in FY 2009.

Amtrak’s presentation highlights the fact that 96% of Amtrak trips are under 750 miles. But for the Chief’s 2,265 miles, conspicuously absent is the fact that trips on the Chief overlap along the entirety of the corridor. Having analyzed the Chief’s passenger load throughout its route, Rail Passengers estimates significant ridership and 70% of the trains’ current revenue is at risk under this proposal. The proposed bus bridge would be of a significant enough duration – 6-12 hours—to decimate high revenue sleeping car ridership. This is made more disappointing because; The Chief’s seat occupancy rate compares well even to the NEC: Amtrak’s earlier claim that the Chief operates “40% empty” fails to fully capture how busy the train is.

The reality is that passengers filled 61.5% of the Chief’s available seat miles during FY 2017. This number puts the Chief within the top 20% of all Amtrak’s routes (8th out of 48), higher than even the Acela Express service. (In assessing “occupancy,”

it’s important to recognize that trains do not operate the same as airplanes; trains do not make a single trip between a pair of end points, they make numerous stops along a single corridor. As a result, there is a constant turnover of seats.

That’s the strength of a long-distance corridor train like the Chief; by connecting 36 stations, it provides a convenient, single seat ride for passengers traveling short, medium and long distances, serving 528 unique city pairs. This allows a single corridor to generate the volumes and revenues needed to serve people in urban and rural communities. In matter of fact, on the more heavily traveled segments of the Chief’s route, the number of passengers can be 90% or more of the available seats, causing “sold out” conditions for prospective passengers.)

By using a Fully Allocated Cost methodology, Amtrak fails to fully capture the incremental cost of running the Chief. Had the railroad also employed Avoidable Cost methodology—as stipulated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 (Public Law 108-447)—the cost would have been significantly lower. Rail Passengers’ estimate, developed using concepts developed by the Volpe Transportation Center for Amtrak in 2009, suggests that as much as 80% of the costs that Amtrak allocates to the Chief may represent fixed costs for shared facilities and overhead. These costs would not go away with the Chief’s elimination and would instead be allocated to other routes.

Amtrak is asking its stakeholders for more, after reneging on a partnership it has repeatedly and publicly committed to over the course of multiple grant applications. States have already invested local funds in partnership with Amtrak: Colorado, Kansas, and New Mexico have all invested over $9 million in state funds ($6 million in previous TIGER grant applications with another $3 million in the current round of TIGER grants), based upon an explicit agreement between Amtrak, Amtrak-served communities, and BNSF Railroad. For Amtrak to suddenly withdraw its support for the Chief in the middle of the preservation effort, without any opportunity for stakeholder input, constitutes a serious breach of trust.

This sudden decision by Amtrak has stalled applications for additional infrastructure grants, including plans to apply for a share of the $1.5 billion in grant funding offered through the Better Utilizing Investments to Leverage Development (BUILD) Transportation Discretionary Grants program. Given the BUILD program’s emphasis on supporting rural transportation systems, it’s safe to assume the Southwest Chief would have scored well.

The bus bridge will be less safe for passengers, less accessible to the public. Amtrak’s justification of forcing passengers onto busses for lack of Positive Train Control will make them less safe; Busses have 3.04 accidents per million passenger miles, while intercity passenger trains only have 1.7, over 40% fewer accidents mile for mile.

Amtrak has enjoyed considerable gains in ridership from the Accessibility Community, because Busses and trains are not equal options for these passengers. Bus Bathrooms are in no way ADA compliant, while accomodations can be made on Amtrak, a real factor for a 6-12 hour journey. Ingress and Egress issues are a significant area of risk addressed in the ADA, and multiple transfers increase the probability of injuries.

Amtrak states that the $50 million, ten year-investment in infrastructure investment “does not include positive train control (PTC) installation and implementation costs.” 

The focus on safety is admirable and correct. However, the Federal Railroad Administration does not require PTC over lines with fewer than four passenger trains per day, and less than 15 Million tons of freight per year. (49 CFR 236.1019 - Main line track exceptions). Risks are limited because competing traffic is light in some places, non-existent in others. The absence of heavy axle load freight traffic should also make derailment prevention easier, given the reduced risk of rail breaks and freight braking-induced kinks. This segment should have lower overall risk, even without PTC, than most of the network.

The Raton Route in question is considered safely exempt by the FRA, save for the Rail Runner district in Albuquerque; the Rio Metro Regional Transit District is currently working with the FRA to ensure that it meets all PTC requirements in a timely fashion.

The Rail Passengers Association represents the passengers and communities that depend on this corridor, and so we feel compelled to provide a broader and more complete context to help members of Congress evaluate the proper next steps to preserve this important transportation service for residents in the 36 communities across 8 states that depend on the Southwest Chief. We are available for any further elaboration.

 

[CMStPnP]

Railvt

Ridership on the SW CHIEF is not declining. Over the past 5 years it grew 14%. 363,000 passengers used the train in FY 2017. Occupancy levels are better than on the ACELA EXPRESS. There was a very slight (2000 riders) decline in the last year only, caused by Amtrak's failure to restore the third coach during peak holiday seasons, despite near daily sell-outs over segments like Kansas City to Chicago. The "dramatic cost increases" that Amtrak claims are false as well. They admit that their share of the threatened section is only about $3,000,000 per year, but further ignore BNSF's repeated promise to pay for 20 years of Class Four 79mph maintenance once welded rail is fully in place over the line. A large part of that is in the Tiger Nine grant's $25,000,000 which Amtrak has effectively torpedoed by refusing to pay its $3,000,000 match that was specifically promised as part of the grant application.

Is that just to maintain the track or does it include.....

snow removal costs, dispatching costs, inspecting of the line prior to each Amtrak passenger train run, free overtime when Amtrak is not running on schedule, etc, etc.    Also, say an Amtrak locomotive fails and they cannot make it up the grades, where is the nearest staffed crew change point with a spare locomotive and crew?     Are all those costs covered by the BNSF agreement?    What about inflation, does BNSF swallow inflation beyond what they estimated or do they pass the hat again?    I have not seen the verbatium agreement itself to see exactly what BNSF agreed to pay for.     However, I think your expecting a LOT if you think that agreement is all inclusive of all costs with protecting Amtraks schedule.

Most of that is irrelevant though.  Amtrak is just asking for a business case for financial sustainability of the train over the next 20 years.

[V.Payne]

Back when the SWC hauled Mail & Express it was close to covering its "above-the-rail" costs. The problem then and now is that is not the goal set by the in their own eyes reform types for the National Network.

They still believe that passenger trains have to finance their infrastructure, equipment, and operations from ticket revenue. Highways come no where close to self-financing their infrastructure from the fuel taxes collected only between exits let alone covering government borne accident costs. Instead the use of locally financed streets is also taxed, thus leveraging funds toward highways. It was what was needed to get modern highways at low fuel tax rates, but it is a leveraged investment that can skew markets.

What is needed is an agreement on a equivalent level (to highways) of public investment in the below-the-rail infrastructure, large-loss insurance, and terminal costs of passenger rail atop which a business case is made to run a service on ticket revenue.

This same situation is why of course we both have no rail service to Phoenix, AZ and why we cannot agree to reinvest in National Network equipment to cash in on the large potential for more revenue above the fixed costs of running a route.

Additionally, why could two through cutoff cars not be operated accross the Kansas City transfer or the Williams Jct non-stop? The transfer times are either fairly early or late. All the infrastructure is there, with two through running station tracks at KCT and a crew base nearby in both cases. The Missouri River Rail Runners have to run with a minimum axle count of 30 axles, so they haul around old baggages. Grand Canyon Railways runs to the canyon just a bit away from the junction.

I would suggest this chase to try to get the National Network trains to recover their infrastructure costs clouds the view of such easy net revenue generators as there is no case to buy new equipment or expend minimal additonal funds when a large brick is tied around their neck that no other ground transportation has to bear.   

[Railvt]

Every Amtrak track access contract includes reasonable payment from Amtrak for maintenance above the standards needed for freight only. BNSF have been candid that they want to keep Raton as (if nothing else) a safety valve. They have not proposed outright closure. Before the Tiger Grants began the deepest threat was  to go to Class Three dark territory. Of course their view could change, but they have been an enthusiastic supporter of the Tiger process.

Even after current New Mexico Governor Martinez reneged on the promise under previous governor Bill Richardson to buy the line to the Colorado state line, they kept things up very well  Indeed with no Federal funds yet for New Mexico they’ve been replacing the semaphore signals still in service near Las Vegas, NM. 

By the bye on snow removal, engine pilot wedge plows have sufficed in recent years. The climate could of course revert and even if it doesn’t there will I’m sure be a deep snow year eventually, but this is not an issue anything like it was decades ago. Even the Moffat Line hasn’t seen a rotary in decades. 

[V.Payne]

I am exploring if the net cost to all levels of government (state and federal) would increase if the SWC was split as proposed with the 70% loss of revenue. So little variable cost is taken away and of course additional costs would be added in to start trains in the middle of the old route. This might go agains the text of the current CFR language as the intent was to reduce cost to governments.

[Gramp]

Makes me wonder if the better course to follow in the west would be to run a UP-like City of Everywhere train out of Chicago twice a day; to Omaha, Denver, SLC.  Then split to Vegas-LA, Reno-Sacramento-Oakland, and Boise-Portland-Seattle.  Run the Sunset daily as hookup to Texas Eagle at San Antonio.  Either keep the Eagle via Little Rock-St Louis, or run Dallas-OkC-Wichita-KC.

In the midwest, focus on the Midwest Initiative routes.

[Railvt]

The V Payne;

Such an analysis would be very helpful. The bus bridge alone, per bus, per day can be expected to run $1200-1500 per day times at minimum two buses. That is the minimum for one bus each way daily.

That’s no less than $876,000 per year, plus costs for driver rooms and for the extra driver each way due to exceeding the hours in service law. And until ridership collapses Amtrak will actually need 3-5 buses each way to handle the 150/200 riders typically on the train. Real bus costs will be into seven figures  

Then there will be terminal and servicing costs for the stub trains at both Dodge City and Albuquerque. Plus for each forced train/bus/train change Amtrak will lose at least 30-30% of current ridership, balanced only by no longer providing a proper diner or sleepers on the supposedly daylight stub trains. Revenue will collapse and expenses with the bus charters will very likely climb.

If Amtrak has actually done this analysis they know full well what is coming and are counting on it to justify totally closing the route.  

Carl Fowler

[Miningman]

Of course. Thats the plan. Opposition and voices of reason mean nothing.

[PNWRMNM]

Railvt

Every Amtrak track access contract includes reasonable payment from Amtrak for maintenance above the standards needed for freight only.

This is a flat lie. See Malcolm's contract excert blog.

In fact, ATK far far underpays for the value of train slots it uses. That is a big part of what is driving this whole SWC shreech fest. ATK will have to pay its full costs over that section. Horrors!

Mac

[Railvt]

 

The word nonsense is a fascinating choice as a response to your shall we say use of the term lie. I try to be thoughtful and do not recall the last time I consciously posted a lie. 

I’ve read Malcolm’s column and find no basis for that view. I’ve also seen other Amtrak access agreements over my career. They were far from extortion rackets.

From 1971 the requirement has been for Amtrak to pay a differential price for use of freight lines, and at an adjusted basis because the freighters were relieved of their statutory obligation to run passenger trains.

All roads would like to hit Amtrak for more and Amtrak tries to get top dollar for access to the NEC. But in the end the carriers benefit from the superior facilities they provide as a passenger host and the good ones like the BNSF have the graciousness not to howl too loudly about their sad fate as what they always knew they were, common carriers.

Carl Fowler

[BaltACD]

CMStPnP

 

BaltACD

Anderson was brought in to kill Amtrak, not save it. 

The Cardinal and Sunset Limited are still running and neither really should be based on any comparisons to other LD routes sanity check.   No attempt to kill either of those two trains yet.     So I don't see any evidence of this.

Further, Amtrak has not yet publicly backed away from any proposal by states to pay for expansion yet.

This is just Anderson's initial play, a trial baloon as it were - there will be more and the Sunset and Cardinal will be among them

[PJS1]

Railvt

Ridership on the SW CHIEF is not declining. Over the past 5 years it grew 14%. 363,000 passengers used the train in FY 2017. Occupancy levels are better than on the ACELA EXPRESS. 

From FY13 through FY17 ridership on Southwest Chief increased from 355,815 to approximately 363,000 or by 2.1 percent.  Five-year periods are the most common used by many if not most financial analysts for comparative purposes.  Of course, one can cherry pick the outcomes by finding a low period, such as 2009, which was the depth of the Great Recession, and show a more dramatic increase in ridership.  Doing so, however, is a bit disingenuous. 

 

The population of the large cities served by the SWC, i.e. Chicago, Kansas City, Albuquerque, etc., over the same time period, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, increased an average of 2.9 percent or .8 more than the ridership increases on the SWC.

 

But the average change in the population for the cities that would lose service if the SWC were re-routed via Amarillo or discontinued was -2.3 percent. 

 

The total population of these communities as of July 2017, again as shown by the U.S. Census Bureau, was approximately 188,000 or approximately 15 percent of the combined populations of Kansas City and Albuquerque.  Moreover, with the exception of Santa Fe, none of the in-between communities served by the SWC have a population of more than 28,000. 

 

Given the populations for the areas served by the SWC, as well as its negative financials, it is difficult to justify the projected expenditures to keep the train on its current route.  No prudent business person would authorize such an expenditure.

[CMStPnP]

V.Payne

Back when the SWC hauled Mail & Express it was close to covering its "above-the-rail" costs. The problem then and now is that is not the goal set by the in their own eyes reform types for the National Network.

They still believe that passenger trains have to finance their infrastructure, equipment, and operations from ticket revenue. Highways come no where close to self-financing their infrastructure from the fuel taxes collected only between exits let alone covering government borne accident costs. Instead the use of locally financed streets is also taxed, thus leveraging funds toward highways. It was what was needed to get modern highways at low fuel tax rates, but it is a leveraged investment that can skew markets.

What is needed is an agreement on a equivalent level (to highways) of public investment in the below-the-rail infrastructure, large-loss insurance, and terminal costs of passenger rail atop which a business case is made to run a service on ticket revenue.

This same situation is why of course we both have no rail service to Phoenix, AZ and why we cannot agree to reinvest in National Network equipment to cash in on the large potential for more revenue above the fixed costs of running a route.

Additionally, why could two through cutoff cars not be operated accross the Kansas City transfer or the Williams Jct non-stop? The transfer times are either fairly early or late. All the infrastructure is there, with two through running station tracks at KCT and a crew base nearby in both cases. The Missouri River Rail Runners have to run with a minimum axle count of 30 axles, so they haul around old baggages. Grand Canyon Railways runs to the canyon just a bit away from the junction.

I would suggest this chase to try to get the National Network trains to recover their infrastructure costs clouds the view of such easy net revenue generators as there is no case to buy new equipment or expend minimal additonal funds when a large brick is tied around their neck that no other ground transportation has to bear.   

They only have two through tracks at KC Union Station now but they can easily add 3-5 more stub tracks by using the underulitized parking lot where they park business cars now.    KC could easily become a  mini-hub of the plains states all that is missing is public support and money.

[PJS1]

Highway financing, which is subject to varying interpretations, has nothing to do with how much the U.S. should invest in passenger rail.

Those who think the federal government has a pot of money to invest in passenger trains, irrespective of when, where, and in what flavor, might want to keep the following in mind.  

The combined federal, state, and local government debt is $24.1 trillion.  The federal public debt is approximately $15.3 trillion.  Total government debt is approximatey 124 percent of GDP; public federal debt is approximately 80 percent of  GDP.    

 

The average government debt burden per household is approximately $204,000.  Add in personal debt and the total burden averages $346,000 per household.  Even Paulson, Bernanke, and Geithner, the three most important persons who engineered the government’s response to the Great Recession, just last week again expressed their alarm at the burgeoning U.S. debt. 

 

To suggest that the federal or most state governments have the monies to invest in passenger rail, with the possible exception of some high-density corridors, is unrealistic. 

[PJS1]

Railvt

The V Payne;

Such an analysis would be very helpful. The bus bridge alone, per bus, per day can be expected to run $1200-1500 per day times at minimum two buses. That is the minimum for one bus each way daily.

That’s no less than $876,000 per year, plus costs for driver rooms and for the extra driver each way due to exceeding the hours in service law. And until ridership collapses Amtrak will actually need 3-5 buses each way to handle the 150/200 riders typically on the train. Real bus costs will be into seven figures  

Then there will be terminal and servicing costs for the stub trains at both Dodge City and Albuquerque. Plus for each forced train/bus/train change Amtrak will lose at least 30-30% of current ridership, balanced only by no longer providing a proper diner or sleepers on the supposedly daylight stub trains. Revenue will collapse and expenses with the bus charters will very likely climb.

If Amtrak has actually done this analysis they know full well what is coming and are counting on it to justify totally closing the route.  

Carl Fowler 

Anyone doing a serious analysis of Amtrak's operations has to have access to its books.  Otherwise, they are just speculating.

[Railvt]

You’re right, the 14% growth was over 8 years.